

# HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN MACHINE GUN CORPS, C.E.F.

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## Background Notes by the Transcribers

The following background notes to the transcription of this material is offered to the reader to understand the process, organization and weaknesses in this manuscript:-

This transcribed document is believed to be based on all the available materials of the 1919 post-Armistice work of Major Harry T. Logan and Captain Mark Robert Levey, "*History of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, C.E.F.*" This material is an unpublished 1919 manuscript from the Directorate of History and Heritage, Ottawa. The originals in Ottawa were not available for transcription at this time. Prior to the Great War, Harry T. Logan was an instructor in the Department of Classics at the University of British Columbia and Captain Levey was land surveyor by training.

The following people were directly involved in the discovery, assembly and subsequent transcription of the three parts of this manuscript: the Late Ron Edwards (1926-2015) from Powell River, BC, Les Fowler from Port Coquitlam BC, Brett Payne from Tauranga, New Zealand and Dwight Mercer from Regina, Saskatchewan. The manuscript copies for Part 1 and Part 2 were obtained from the University of British Columbia Fonds by Les Fowler. Ron Edwards provided the material on Independent Force in Part 3. Msrs. Mercer and Payne assisted in the transcriptions.

The original 900+ page manuscript was on legal sized paper and typed in a font similar to Courier 12 pt. This current document has been reformatted to 8.5 inch by 11 inch and the font size reduced to News Times Roman and in a 10 pt font in an attempt to retain a similar formatting of the text and reduce the number of pages. Capitalized sections and key sections were established as new pages. In addition, a general attempt was made to keep organized material onto one page to be able to review each section in its entirety. Key-word searches are possible in this document.

It should also be noted this manuscript was unfinished in 1919 and many references and cross-references were not completed. Nevertheless, the transcription; wherever possible, has retained the original text, spellings and the sometimes incomplete references. Some maps and charts are referenced but were not available to the transcription team.

This document is the result of many hundreds of hours of transcription work from a poor quality copy of what appears to be a photocopy of mimeograph material. A bleeding of the ink also complicated any optical character reader scanning. It is believed about 20-30 pages of material may still be missing from this transcribed manuscript.

Expanded research has already begun based on this document and will be published on the CEF Study Group Discussion Forum.

Any errors and omissions in this transcribed document will be corrected with amendments made as necessary. Details are provided at the end of this document.



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PART I.  
ORGANISATION.



## PREFACE

**T**he History of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps as told in the following pages requires no apology. As with other Formations, so with this Branch of the Canadian Overseas Services, to tell the full story of it, to deal adequately with the heroic deeds of Officers and Men, to trace in detail the intricate course of development of Organisation, Tactics, and Machine Gun Science, to describe Operations with clearness, fullness, and accuracy, would necessitate far more time and study than it has been possible to give in the preparation of this History.

An effort has been made, however, to make the Narrative complete and accurate so far as time and available information would allow. Each Unit of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps was asked to prepare an account of its own war achievements; many Officers of the Corps with special knowledge or experience in the Field contributed their quota of information; Machine Gun War Diaries, official Reports, correspondence, etc., were studied, and, in addition to these sources, War Diaries of the Canadian Corps, Canadian Divisions and Brigades were searched in an endeavour to maintain a proper perspective for the Machine Gun Corps in relation to other Branches of the Service.

Perhaps some explanation should be made of the method of arrangement adopted. The story of how the Canadian M.G. Corps struggled into being and eventually became one of the most vital and thoroughly efficient fighting Formations in the Service is of intense interest, taken by itself, quite apart from the story of the fighting. It is realised that the steps in the formation of the Corps and its subsequent growth, the instructional work done within the Corps, the supply and disposal of Reinforcements, and such kindred subjects, have all had an intimate connection with the progress of the fighting and the needs of the Campaign. Yet, as in biography a distinction is justly made between private and public life, so here it was considered legitimate, and for purposes of instructional interest, advisable, to deal with the Organisation of the Machine Gun Corps, its physical appearance and intellectual interests, so to say, in a separate part, and to narrate its more public and popular achievements by themselves consecutively from the beginning.

The only apparent exception to this method occurs in the treatment of "*Brutinel's Brigade*" whose Organisation is described along with Operations carried out by that Force. But in this case we are dealing with a Force somewhat artificially organised, hastily composed, and as hastily disbanded when its work was done; in the case of the Units of the Machine Gun Corps proper, the form which their Organisation ultimately took was the result of long and varied experience in the Field and had many lessons in its story for the Machine Gunner of the Future.

The first part of the History is therefore devoted to the birth and growth of the Corps with its various Units as they existed at the time of the Armistice. Part II deals with Operations, and, quite generally, with the life and activities of Machine Gun Units in the Field.



## I.

## INTRODUCTORY.

**Development of M.G. Service.**

There have been many amazing developments in Military Science during the period of the War; not the least remarkable of these is the development in the use of the Machine Gun and quick-firing rifle. In August, 1914, a British Infantry Battalion was equipped with 2 Machine Guns; in November, 1918, each Battalion had on its Establishment 36 Lewis Automatic Rifles, commonly known as Lewis Guns. In August, 1914, a British Infantry Division had no Machine Guns except those on the Establishment of its own Battalions; in November, 1918, each British Division had in addition to the Infantry-Battalion Lewis Guns, a Machine Gun Battalion with 64 Vickers Guns. At the outbreak of War Machine Guns were controlled in action entirely by Infantry Commanders, and training in Machine Gunnery was regarded and carried out as a sort of advanced Musketry. The progress of the War witnessed the formation of the British Machine Gun Corps on October 22nd, 1915, and the gradual building up of a special Machine Gun Branch of the Service, akin to the Infantry, Artillery and other Arms, and with highly-developed Tactics of its own.

**Canadian M.G. Corps.**

In all this Machine Gun development the Canadian Corps not merely kept pace with the advance, but also, in certain important directions, led the way. The conclusion of the Armistice found the Canadian Machine Gun Service organised into an independent Formation, the Canadian Machine Gun Corps: this Organisation consisted of: (a) a Corps Headquarters; (b) 4 Vickers Gun Battalions – ONE for each Division – each Battalion with 96 Vickers Guns; (c) 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades of 40 Guns each, and Motor Transport Company; (d) a School of Machine Gun Instruction; and (e) a Reinforcement depot in France with a permanent Staff of its own. In addition a Canadian Machine Gun Squadron and a large Reinforcement Depot, in England, were technically Units of the Corps, but not administered by it. The former, forming part of the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, operated with a British Cavalry Division and so was usually detached from the Canadian Corps. The latter was administered by the O.M.F.C. in England.

**Personnel.**

The important role to be played by Machine Guns was early realised and an effort put forward in the selection and training of Personnel to make the Canadian Machine Gun Corps a “*Corps d'élite*”: the high state of discipline and technical efficiency shown by our Machine Gunners, under the varying conditions of the Western Campaign, is adequate testimony to the success of that effort.

**M.G. Battalion.**

Boldness and initiative have characterised the Machine Gun Corps, not less in organisation than in the Field; and the result of a determined attempt to have the Establishments of the tactical Units keep pace with the needs of the campaign was the formation of a Machine Gun Battalion, with an Organisation quite different from a British Machine Gun Battalion and peculiar to the Canadian Corps.

**Motor M.G. Organisation.**

Another feature peculiar to our own Machine Gun Service is the form of our Motor Machine Gun Organisation. On November 12th, 1914, the British Motor Machine Gun Service was formed, in accordance with which 1 Motor Battery of 6 Machine Guns was to be added to each Infantry Division. These batteries were withdrawn from the British Divisions in the Summer of 1916, and were finally grouped together, in 1918, into a Motor Machine Gun Brigade consisting of 5 Eight-Gun Batteries. When the First Canadian Division came to England there came with it 2 Motor Batteries of 10 Machine Guns each. On November 11th, 1918, the Canadian Corps possessed 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades, each of 5 Batteries. These were Corps Troops, forming a Mobile Reserve at the disposal of the Corps Commander.

In the following pages is told the story of the genesis and growth of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, and of the evolution of the Units administered by it in the Field, *viz.* A Machine Gun Battalion, a Motor Machine Gun Brigade, a Machine Gun School, a Machine Gun Reinforcement Depot.



## II.

**EARLY PERIOD:  
FORMATION OF FIRST CANADIAN DIVISION TO ORGANISATION OF  
MACHINE GUN COMPANIES, AUGUST 4TH, 1914, TO JANUARY 1ST, 1916.**

**INFANTRY BATTALION MACHINE GUN SECTIONS.****Original Establishment.**

The outbreak of War found the British Army vastly inferior to that of the enemy in the numbers of Machine Guns in possession. It is calculated that, in August 1914, Germany was already provided with 1600 Machine Guns<sup>1</sup>. The Personnel to serve these Guns was organised into Companies, one to each Infantry Regiment, and into specially-trained "*Detachments*" which were used where most needed. The Machine Gun Strength of the British Army was based upon the Machine Gun Establishment of Infantry and Cavalry Units. In August, 1914, each Infantry Battalion had 2 Machine Guns, with Establishment in Personnel and Transport as follows:

Personnel					Transport		
Detail	Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Rank and File	TOTAL	Detail	Vehicles	Light Draught Horses
Lieutenant	1			1	Limbered G.S. Wagons for 2 Machine Guns, Tripods and Ammunition  Cart, S.A.A.		
Sergeant		1		1			
Corporal			1	1			
Privates			12	12		1	2
Drivers (1st Line Transport)			2	2		1	2
Batman (Fully Armed and Trained)			1	1			
<b>TOTAL M.G. SECTION</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>18</b>		<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>

It was upon this Establishment that the Machine Gun Section of the First Canadian Division Battalions were organised when raised in Canada. With the exception of the P.P.C.L.I., which had Vickers Guns, all the Battalions were initially equipped with Colt Machine Guns, procured by the Canadian Government in the United States. The two Guns issued by the Government to each unit were, in very many cases, supplemented by the addition of two or more Guns presented by individuals, or Corporations of the districts or towns where the Battalions were recruited.

<sup>1</sup> Subsequent increases in the Machine Gun Strength of the German Forces are shown by the following figures:-

Date	No. M.G.s in Possession
December, 1915	8,000
July, 1916	11,000
January, 1917	16,000
January, 1918	32,000 Heavy, 37,000 Light



**Increase in Establishment.**

In December, 1914, while the First Division was on SALISBURY PLAIN, the first increase in Machine Gun Establishment of the British Army took place. The number of Guns of a Machine Gun Section was increased to 4 and the Personnel from 18 to 35. The new Establishment was as follows:-

Personnel					Transport		
Detail	Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Rank and File	TOTAL	Detail	Vehicles	Light Draught Horses
Lieutenant	1			1	Limbered G.S. Wagons for 4 Machine Guns, Tripods and Ammunition  Cart, S.A.A.		
Sergeant		2		2			
Corporal			1	1			
Privates			24	24		2	8
Drivers (1st Line Transport)			6	6		2	4
Batman (Fully Armed and Trained)			1	1			
TOTAL	1	2	32	35		4	12

As a result of this increase in Establishment some First Division Battalions crossed to France in February, 1915 with as many as eight Colt Guns, fully manned with trained or partially trained crews.



## **BRIGADE MACHINE GUN OFFICER.**

### **Authorisation.**

The co-ordination of Machine Guns on a frontage greater than that of a Battalion in offensive and defensive Operations was a feature in Machine Gun Tactics which became prominent very early in the War. With the increase in Machine Gun Establishment the problems of siting Machine Guns for the Defence of a Brigade Frontage, of arranging for their employment in Attack, of effecting their Relief and other tactical matters, placed an additional burden upon Brigade Staffs. It soon became the practice for the Senior Machine Gun Officer of the Battalions of a brigade to assist the G.O.C. in tactical matters affecting the Machine Guns, and in the Winter of 1914-15 a definite appointment was created by the War Office of a Brigade Machine Gun Officer for each Brigade.

### **Appointments.**

When the First Division went to France, the Brigade Machine Gun Officers were already functioning, and the following Officers were appointed to this position:-

1st Brigade	Captain W.J.A. LALOR
2nd Brigade	Lieut. G.C.St.P. de DOMBASLE
3rd Brigade	Major P.F. VILLIERS

Captain LALOR held this appointment until the formation of Brigade Machine Gun Companies. Lieut. de DOMBASLE (now Lieut-Col. de Dombasle, Director of Canadian Air Service) was succeeded by Captain T.H. RADDALL in October, 1915. Major VILLIERS gave place to Captain E. BRISTOL in July, 1915, and the latter when wounded in December, was succeeded by Captain E.H. HOUGHTON, who remained B.M.G.O. of the 3rd Brigade until the 3rd Machine Gun Company was formed.

In the Second Division the position was held by the following Officers:-

4th Brigade	Lieut. J. EDWARDS
5th Brigade	Lieut. S.W. WATSON
6th Brigade	Lieut. H.A. WEBB

Of these Officers Lieut. EDWARDS and Lieut. WATSON commanded 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Brigade Machine Gun Companies respectively, on their formation.

Brigade Machine Gun Officers functioned for a short time also in the Third Division: those holding the appointment were:-

7th Brigade	Captain H.T. COOK, who later commanded the 7th M.G. Company.
8th Brigade	Captain W.M. BALFOUR, the first C.O. of the 8th M.G. Company.
9th Brigade	Captain W.H. BOTHWELL, who commanded the 9 <sup>th</sup> Brigade Machine Gun Company on its formation

### **Duties of B.M.G.O.**

The duties of the Brigade Machine Gun Officer were, quite generally, to assist and advise the G.O.C. Brigade in all matters pertaining to Machine Guns: but he did not have the authority over Machine Guns in Action, except such Guns as were held in Brigade Reserve or explicitly placed under his command by the Brigadier. The Machine Guns remained with their Battalions for Command as well as administration, each Battalion Machine Gun Section being immediately under the Battalion Machine Gun Officer.

The B.M.G.O. was virtually a Liaison Officer between the Brigade Staff and the 4 Battalion Machine Gun Officers in the Brigade. During normal periods of holding the line he advised the G.O.C. as to dispositions of Machine Guns, and often issued orders for the G.O.C. indicating changes of disposition and moves of Guns to more advantageous positions. He superintended the placing of Guns in Front and Support Lines. He made arrangements with his opposite B.M.G.O. for the Relief of the Battalion Machine Gun Sections.

During an Artillery Demonstration of the 3rd Brigade Front on October 14th, 1915, the Infantry Garrison, except a few Sentries and certain Machine Guns, was withdrawn from the Front Line. The B.M.G.O. detailed the Machine Guns to be withdrawn from this Operation and those to be left in the Front Trenches.

For special Operations where fire co-operation was required within the Brigade, the B.M.G.O. made such arrangements as were necessary. Thus in the Operation Order dealing with an Artillery Demonstration and



wire-cutting Operation on the 6th Brigade Front, dated November 24th, 1915, the B.M.G.O. was instructed to “*arrange for burst of long range enfilading fire on the enemy's communication trenches and support lines in the vicinity of the bombardment, commencing at Noon*”. During period of rest and training this Officer co-related Machine Gun instructional work for the Brigade, and made arrangements for any special Schools of Instruction, formed within his own Brigade. If outside Gun Sections were attached for Instruction, he supervised such work as they carried out. From the 16th to the 19th October, 1915, Machine Guns of the 42nd Battalion were attached for periods of 24 hours to the Machine Guns of the 3rd Brigade in the trenches. It was the duty of the B.M.G.O., 3rd Brigade, to “arrange to instruct the detachments in Machine Gun Tactics.”<sup>2</sup> In the exercise of all his duties the Brigade Machine Gun Officer acted in close co-operation with the Battalion Machine Gun Officers.

This was the Organisation and system of control under which the Infantry Machine Guns of the Canadian Corps fought in the 1915 engagements, – 2nd Battle of YPRES, FESTUBERT and GIVENCHY – and under which they continued to function until Brigade Machine Gun Companies were formed in the Winter of 1915-16.

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<sup>2</sup> Program of Training, 3rd Brigade, October 16th-24th, 1915.



### III.

## FIRST CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE AND ATTACHED BATTERIES.

### INTRODUCTORY.

While the Infantry Battalion Machine Gun Sections were in this transition stage of Brigade Machine Gun Officer supervision, there already existed, in the Canadian Overseas Forces, Machine Gun Units which, in form, foreshadowed the Machine Gun Company Organisation. The First Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade, and the 3 Motor Machine Gun Batteries eventually attached to the Brigade – the Borden, Eaton and Yukon Batteries – were, from the time of formation, independent Machine Gun Units, complete with tactical and administrative Staffs and provided with their own Transport. Theoretically these units formed a Divisional Mobile Reserve of Machine Guns, making the Canadian Organisation conform with the British Divisional Establishments, which included a Motor Machine Gun Battery with each Infantry Division. For some months the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Batteries did operate with Divisions in this way – the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade with the First Division, the Borden Battery with the Second, the Eaton with the Third, while the Fourth Division had the Yukon Battery. But by August 19th, 1916, all 3 Motor Machine Gun Batteries were attached for tactical Operations to the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade, and, from this time on, all were employed as a Corps Mobile Reserve of Machine Guns.

The 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade and the Borden and Eaton Batteries used the Colt Gun until August 9th, 1916, when they were issued with Vickers Guns. The Yukon Battery was equipped with the Vickers before leaving England.



## FIRST CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE.

### Authorisation; Initial Establishment.

The First Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade was the earliest Motor Machine Gun Unit in the Corps. At the time of its formation it was officially known as "*The Automobile Machine Gun Brigade No. 1.*" On September 2nd, 1914, the Brigade was authorised as a Unit in the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force. The authority for its formation is contained, under Mobilisation Orders, in a report of the Privy Council Committee, of that date, in part as follows: "*The Committee of the Privy Council have had before them a report dated 20th August, 1914, from the Minister of Militia and Defence, representing that it is advisable immediately to organise a Machine Gun Corps as a part of the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force, and that several public spirited citizens of Canada have volunteered that at their own sole costs, charges and expenses they will provided and deliver immediately to the Canadian Government:*

*16 Machine Guns  
8 Armoured Motor Cars  
6 Trucks  
4 Automobile Cars for the use of Officers*

*The said Guns, Cars and Trucks to be of such style, pattern, construction and quality as the Minister and Defence may approve and accept.*

*"The Minister recommends that this offer be accepted and that he be authorised to receive and take over the said Guns, Cars and Trucks, after they have been duly accepted and approved by him.*

*"The Minister further recommends that, contingent on his approval and acceptance of the said Guns, Cars and Trucks, authority be granted for the organisation of a Unit of the Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force under the style and title of "The Automobile Machine Gun Brigade No. 1" and that the Establishment of its Personnel be:-*

*1 Major  
3 Captains  
5 Subalterns  
4 Sergeants  
2 Sergeant Artificiers  
4 Corporals  
4 Corporal Artificiers  
101 Privates."*

The Order-in-Council also provided for the issue of Clothing, Small Arms and Equipment, for Training, Transportation and for other matters incident to the raising and administration of the new Unit.

### Mobilisation.

But much had already been done before the Establishment was officially set forth. When the above mentioned "public spirited citizens", whose names are still withheld, presented their generous and patriotic offer to the Dominion Government it was at once accepted and permission granted by an Order-in-Council to recruit men for this purpose. Major R. BRUTINEL (now Brigadier-General R. Brutinel, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.) was named to command the Unit and to proceed with recruiting. The task proved an easy one and by September, 9th, 1914, the Brigade was complete in Personnel. It was more difficult, however, to obtain Guns and Motor Equipment and it was not until the 21st that the "*material*" as per Establishment was completed, by which time Major BRUTINEL had succeeded in procuring Guns and Cars (in the United States). Twenty Colt Guns were obtained instead of 16 and 8 Trucks instead of 6 as laid down by the Order-in-Council Establishment: this was the strength in machine Guns set forth in the new Establishment, published on May 16th, 1915, constituting a Brigade of 2 Ten-Gun Batteries.



**Personnel.**

The Unit assembled in OTTAWA. Of the Personnel 20% were ex-soldiers; and 5% had had experience in the Canadian Militia. The remaining 75% had had no military training and was composed of Chauffeurs and Motor Mechanics (50%), University Graduates (10%), and men of various trades (20%). The Officers were seconded from the Militia, many of them giving up their rank for a lower one in the Overseas Unit.

Those on the Strength on September 9th, were:

Major R. BRUTINEL	Commanding Officer
Lieut. C.A. BRADBROOKE	Adjutant
Captain J.E. BROWN	O.C. "A" Battery
Captain C.F. HAWKINS	O.C. "B" Battery
Captain H.G. DONNELLY	Q.M., & O.C. Train
Lieut. W.E.C. McCARTHY	
Lieut. M.A. SCOTT	
Lieut. F.A. WILKIN	

The total Strength, All Ranks, was 124.

**Composition: Equipment.**

The Brigade was composed of a Headquarters, 2 Batteries of 10 Guns each, and Train. 16 of the Machine Guns were mounted, 2 on each Armoured Car; the remaining 4 were carried, 1 on each Ammunition Lorry. The 8 Trucks were all 30-cwt. Lorries with 2-cylinder Autocar engines. These vehicles were employed during the period of training in England as follows:

Ammunition	4 Lorries
Repair Materials	1 Lorry
Supplies	1 Lorry
Gasoline	1 Lorry
Ambulance	1 Lorry

A number of Bicycles were also taken on the Strength for the use of Cyclists to maintain Communication on the Line of March. These were afterwards found unserviceable for this purpose and were replaced in England by 8 Solo Motor-Cycles.

The Brigade was fully organised by September 23rd, when H.R.H. the DUKE OF CONNAUGHT inspected it, and on September 29th, the Unit embarked at MONTREAL for England.



### Alterations in Equipment.

During the 8 months spent in England rigorous Training was carried out under varying conditions, and by Field Days, Alarm Operations, and the conduct of ordinary Routine, the Organisation and Equipment underwent a thorough test. As a result of experience gained in this interval, certain alterations were made in Motor Equipment. The 4 Officer's Cars were converted into Transport Cars for Other Ranks. The Bicycles were exchanged for Solos, and a number of Motor-Cycles with Side-Cars (Clyno) were procured to be used to transport the Officers and Repair Sections. The changes increased the flexibility of the Brigade.

### Increase in Personnel.

Certain important alterations and additions took place also in the Personnel during the same period. Some wastage in Personnel occurred in the winter of 1914-15. This wastage was made up by drafts from the Reserve Infantry Units of the Canadian Overseas Force in England. On May 16th, 1915, the Establishment was increased from 124 to 168 All Ranks as per Establishment<sup>3</sup> herewith.

#### FIRST CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE.

(2 Batteries, each of 10 Colt Automatic Guns).

WAR ESTABLISHMENTS 61 & 64.

(May 16th, 1915 & May 29th, 1915)

Detail	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	TOTAL	Motor Cars	Bicycles	Motor Cycles
Headquarters	2	1			8	11	1		4
2 Batteries	6		10		122	138	16		12
Trains	1		1	9	8	19	3		1
TOTAL BRIGADE	9	1	11	9	138	168	20	16	17

<sup>3</sup> This Establishment was republished on May 29th.



FIRST CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE.  
WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)  
COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

(i) Personnel.

Detail	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	TOTAL	Motor Cars	Bicycles	Motor Cycles
<u>HEADQUARTERS</u> <sup>4</sup>									
Lieut.-Colonel	1					1			
Adjutant	1					1			
Sergeant-Major		1				1			
Orderly Room Clerk					1	1			
Privates					4	4			
Batmen					2	2			
Drivers					1	1			
TOTAL HEADQUARTERS	2	1			8	11	1		4
<u>BATTERY</u> (2 Batteries)									
Major or Captain	1					1			
Subalterns	2					2			
Sergeants			5			5			
Corporals					5	5			
Privates					45	45			
Batmen					3	3			
Drivers					8	8			
TOTAL BATTERY	3		5		61	69	8		6
<u>TRAIN</u>									
Captain	1					1			
Quartermaster Sgt.			1			1			
Armourer Sgt.				1		1			
Fitters				8 <sup>5</sup>		8			
Privates					4	4			
Batmen					1	1			
Drivers					3	3			
TOTAL TRAIN	1		1	9	8	19	3		1
BASE DETACHMENT (Not included in the above totals)									
Subalterns	1					1			
Storemen					1	1			
First Reinforcement					40	40			
TOTAL	1				41	42			

<sup>4</sup> 1 Medical Officer accompanied the Brigade to France.

<sup>5</sup> 4 Corporals



FIRST CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE.  
WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)  
COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

(i) Transport.

Detail	Head-quarters		A Battery		B Battery		Train		TOTAL	
	Vehicles	Drivers	Vehicles	Drivers	Vehicles	Drivers	Vehicles	Drivers	Vehicles	Drivers
<u>1st LINE</u>										
Armoured Cars			4	4	4	4			8	8
Motor Cars for personnel	1	1	2	2	2	2			5	5
Motor Cars for ammunition			2	2	2	2			4	4
Motor Cars with side-cars	1		4		4				9	
Motor Cars for inter-communication	3		2		2				7	
<u>TRAIN</u>										
Motor Cars for fuel							1	1	1	1
Motor Cars for repairs							1	1	1	1
Motor Cars for baggage and supplies							1	1	1	1
Motor Cycles for inter-communication							1		1	
Bicycles									14	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>20</b>

- Notes: 1. Each armoured car carries 2 guns.  
2. Each ammunition car carries 1 gun.  
3. 5 cars are equipped with water tanks.

**Changes Effected.**

The men required to complete this new Establishment were drawn from the Fort Garry Horse, Canadian Cavalry Depot, CANTERBURY. These men were partially-trained Machine Gunners and were readily absorbed in the Brigade. The Vehicles provided for in the Establishment had already been obtained pending authorisation.

No Medical Officer was authorised, but the Brigade had an M.O. attached before proceeding to France.

The Base Detail of 1 Officer and 42 Other Ranks were not included in the new Brigade Total of 168 All Ranks. They were to be available in England as Reinforcements.

A short time before the Brigade left England, its original name was changed to the "*First Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade*".

**Officers.**

The Officer Personnel on leaving for France on June 16th, 1915, was composed as follows:

Lt.-Colonel R. BRUTINEL	Officer Commanding
Lieutenant E.D. WALLACE	Adjutant
Captain J.E. BROWNE	O.C. "A" Battery
Lieutenant W.E.C. McCARTHY	
Lieutenant F.A. WILKIN	
Captain C.F. HAWKINS	O.C. "B" Battery
Lieutenant F.M. GARRISON	
Lieutenant M.A. SCOTT	
Captain H.H. DONNELLY	Q.M. and O.C. Train
Captain D. MacCLENNAN	M.O.



### **Arrival in France.**

On its arrival in France the Brigade was attached to the First Division, on June 21st, at VENDIN-LEZ-BETHUNE.

### **Subsequent Alterations.**

From the time of its arrival in France until the radical changes which took place in 1918, when the 2nd Motor Machine Gun Brigade was formed, the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade remained almost unaltered in Establishment. At the period when the Brigade Machine Gun Companies were struggling into existence, the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade had already attained its majority.

The only alterations made between June 1st, 1915, and June 1st, 1918, were published on January 30th, 1917, in a new War Establishment<sup>6</sup> for the Brigade. These alterations consisted in the addition to Headquarters of 1 Motor Car and Driver and the attachment to Headquarters of a Medical Officer and 2 Water Details. The Total Personnel was increased in this way from 168 to 172 ALL Ranks. Of the 4 Motor Cycles on Headquarters 1 was specified as provided with a Side-Car, while of the 12 with Batteries, 8 were likewise stated to be equipped with Side-Cars.

This was in reality a belated Establishment as the new elements provided in it had for a long time actually been with the Brigade.

### **Early Activities.**

In the long months of Trench Warfare which followed its arrival in France, such a highly Mobile Force could not of course exercise its full powers, it operated very much as a Brigade Machine Gun Company, Batteries doing Tours in the Line with Brigades. The Brigade actually did duty as a Machine Gun Company for the 3rd Brigade during the months of March, April and May, 1916, until the newly formed 3rd Machine Gun Company was equipped with Guns.

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<sup>6</sup> W.E. 461.



**BORDEN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BATTERY.****Mobilisation; Initial Establishment.**

When the First Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade had been serving in France for 3 months, the Borden Motor Machine Gun Battery arrived with the 2nd Canadian Division on September 15th, 1915.

This Unit, originally known as "*Borden's Armoured Battery*", was raised through the private enterprise of certain public-spirited citizens and recruited in OTTAWA and in the PORCUPINE and COBALT Districts of Northern Ontario. On December 4th, 1914, the Personnel, 50% of whom were Chauffeurs and Motor Mechanics, assembled in the Peel Street Barracks in MONTREAL, and on January 15th, 1915, moved to new quarters in the Armoury of the 1st Grenadier Guards of Canada. On December 10th, the Department of Militia at OTTAWA authorised the mobilisation of the Unit, and Major E.J. HOLLAND, V.C., who had seen service in the South African Campaign and had done most of the recruiting, was made its first Commanding Officer.

The initial Establishment consisted of:

	6 Officers
	1 Warrant Officer
	8 Sergeants
	9 Corporals
	<u>45</u> Privates
TOTAL	<u>69</u>

**Original Officers.**

In the Spring of 1915, 3 or 4 Colt Guns were secured, but no Motor Equipment was received in Canada. Training in Drill, Musketry and Machine Gunnery was, however, carried out until May 15th, when the Battery proceeded to QUEBEC, and left for England the next day. At this time the following Officers were serving with the Unit:

Major E.J. HOLLAND, V.C.	Officer Commanding
Captain P.A.G. MacCARTHY	2nd in Command
Lieut. W.F. BATTERSBY	
Lieut. C.B. GRIER	
Lieut. E.H. HOLLAND	
Lieut. J.H. RATTRAY	
Lieut. J.R. RYAN	

**Re-organisation.**

From the time of their arrival in England until September 3rd Training was carried on and consisted of General Machine Gun Training, Map Work and Range Practices at HYTHE Ranges, which were situated close to CAESAR'S CAMP in the SHORNCLIFFE Area. In this period the Battery was organised on the basis of a 6-Gun British Motor Machine Gun Battery, and was re-named the "*Borden Motor Machine Gun Battery*". Motor Equipment was issued on September 4th, consisting of:

Scott Tri-Cars (Second Hand)	18
Triumph Motor Cycles	9
Motor Cars (with Box Bodies) Studebaker, 15 cwt.	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	<u>32</u>

The following week was spent in intensive Training in Drill and Tactics with the Motor Equipment. The Scott Tri-Cars were found to be in poor condition and unreliable. These Motor Cycles and Side-Cars proved particularly troublesome on September 12th and 13th, when the Battery was moving by road from the SHORNCLIFFE Area to SOUTHAMPTON, prior to Embarkation for France.



The Establishment of the Battery was as follows:

**MOTOR MACHINE GUN BATTERY.**  
(6 Machine Guns).  
WAR ESTABLISHMENT 92 A., August 1st, 1915.  
Composition in Detail.  
(i)

Detail	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	Total	Motor Cycles
Major or Captain	1					1	1
Subalterns	3					3	3
Battery Sergt.-Major		1				1	1
Sergeants			3			3	
Corporals					3	3	
Privates <sup>7</sup>					36	36	
Scouts <sup>8</sup>					4	4	4
ATTACHED A.S.C. Motor Car Drivers Fitters				3	5 3	5 3	
Total Battery	4	1	3	3	48	59	9

Notes:- 1. This Unit is divided into 3 Sections, each consisting of 2 guns, 6 Motor Cycles with Side-Cars and one Motor Car (with box body) are provided for the service of each Section carrying gun detachments and ammunition as follows:-

Each No. 1. Motor Cycle with Side-Car carried guns, 2 men and 1,350 rounds S.A.A.

Each No. 2. Motor Cycle with Side-Car carried guns, 2 men and 1,350 rounds S.A.A.

Each No. 3. Motor Cycle with Side-Car carried 1 Sgt. (or Cpl.), 1 man and 2,700 rounds S.A.A.

Each Motor Car carries Driver, Mechanic, Spare Man and 10,500 rounds S.A.A.

2. 2 Armament Artificers for repair of Guns are stationed at the Advanced Mechanical Transport Base.

<sup>7</sup> Includes Officers' Batmen and men for handling Ammunition and to replace Casualties.

<sup>8</sup> Includes 1 Lance Corporal



**MOTOR MACHINE GUN BATTERY.  
WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued).  
COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.**

(ii) Transport

Detail	Vehicles	Drivers
1st Line		
Motor Cycles for Commanders and Subalterns	4	
Motor Cycles for Battery Sergeant-Major	1	
Motor Cycles for Scouts	4	
Motor Cycles with Side-Cars:-		
For Guns	6	
For Men and Ammunition	12	
Motor Cars (with Box Bodies) for spare Men and Ammunition	3	3
SUPPLY COLUMN.		
Motor Cars (with Box Bodies) for Baggage and Supplies <sup>9</sup>	2	2

**Arrival in France.**

The Borden M.M.G. Battery arrived at LE HAVRE on September 15th, 1915. On this date the following Officers were serving with it:

Major E.J. HOLLAND, V.C.	Officer Commanding
Captain P.A.G. MacCARTHY	
Lieut. W.F. BATTERSBY	
Lieut. E.H. HOLLAND	
Lieut. J.H. RATTRAY	

**Replacement of Motor Equipment.**

After spending 10 days in Camp at SANVIC, a suburb of LE HAVRE, the Battery proceeded to ROUEN. Here, the Scott Tri-Cars, which had proved so unreliable, were turned in to the Ordnance Depot and were replaced on October 18th by Clyno Motor Cycles and Side-Cars. On October 4th, the Personnel, partly by train and partly by road with what remained of their Transport, proceeded via ABBEVILLE and BAILLEUL to WESTOUTRE, where they arrived on the 5th.

**Early Activities.**

During the Winter of 1915-16, and the Spring of 1916, the Borden Battery operated under orders of the 2nd Canadian Division, as Divisional Troops, organising and manning defensive positions and carrying on night firing in the VIERSTRAAT Sector and the YPRES SALIENT. On July 12th, the Battery was attached to the First Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade, as "C" Battery, and came under the O.C. of that Unit for all Tactical Operations.

<sup>9</sup> Provided from Divisional Supply Column.



**EATON MOTOR MACHINE GUN BATTERY.**

The Eaton Motor Machine Gun Battery crossed to France from England on the night February 24th/25th, 1916, and operated as Divisional Troops under the Third Canadian Division.

**Initial Organisation.**

This Unit, originally known as the Eaton Machine Gun Brigade, was recruited in Toronto. In December, 1914, Mr. J.C. Eaton, (now Sir JOHN EATON) offered to the Canadian Government to raise and equip at his own expense a Battery of Machine Guns mounted on 15 Armoured Cars. The Dominion Government accepted his munificent offer and on January 8th, 1915, the following Establishment, prepared by Capt. W.J. Morrison, was approved:-

Personnel	Motor Vehicles
10 Officers	17
1 Warrant Officer	
9 Staff Sgts. And Sgts.	
64 Artificers	
17 Drivers	
101 Total	

On February 8th, 1915, the following increase in the Establishment of the New Unit was authorised:-

Personnel	Motor Vehicles
14 Officers	32
17 Staff Sgts. And Sgts.	
117 Artificers	
32 Drivers	
180 Total	

The addition of an Adjutant to the Establishment was approved on May 13th, 1915.

All the officers, N.C.O.s and Men had to be qualified Mechanics, Chauffeurs and Machine Gunners. By the end of February 1915, the Unit was almost up to Strength, and Personnel was being trained in Infantry and Rifle Drill, and also in the Driving and Repairs of Cars. The Mechanism of the Colt Automatic Machine Gun commenced in April, 1915, when 4 Guns were allotted to the Unit for Instructional Purposes.

In May, 1915, the Eaton Machine Gun Brigade proceeded from Toronto to Niagara Camp, Ontario. It remained there until June 3rd, 1915. The following day, June 4th, the Unit consisting of 24 Officers and 254 Other Ranks embarked at Montreal on the S.S. "*Metagama*".<sup>10</sup> The names of the Officers who proceeded from Canada to England are shown below:-

Commanding Officer	Major W.J. Morrison
	Captain K.L. Knight
Adjutant	Lieut. W.A. Holloway
Quartermaster	Lieut. A.S. Jarvis
Paymaster	Lieut. F.O.G. Wood
Lieut. H.R. Aird	Lieut. G.A. McLean
Lieut. C.L. Bath	Lieut. P.M. Murdoch
Lieut. C.E. Burden	Lieut. J.N. Ormsby
Lieut. J. Fish	Lieut. E. Osborne
Lieut. E.W. Farrow	Lieut. G.A. Poterfield
Lieut. F.A. Hale	Lieut. L.B. Scardifield
Lieut. C.H. James	Lieut. H.W. Scardifield
Lieut. H.C. Lefroy	Lieut. G.A. Scroggie
Lieut. J. Mess	Lieut. G.O. Usborne
Lieut. T.R. Young	

After their arrival in England a large proportion of the Personnel of the Eaton Machine Gun Brigade was sent as Machine Gun Drafts to Units in France.

<sup>10</sup> The Motor Vehicles and Machine Guns of the Eaton Motor Machine Gun Battery were not sent to England.



**Reorganisation.**

In February 1916, a Machine Gun Battery similar in Establishment to the Borden Battery was Organised at Shorncliffe Camp, England. The Personnel of this Battery, which was named the Eaton Motor Machine Gun Battery, was drawn from the Eaton M.G. Brigade. On the night February 24th/25th, the Battery embarked at Southampton and disembarked the following morning at Le HAVRE. After 2 days' stay at Rest Camp, the Personnel of the Battery proceeded by Train and Transport by Road to GODEWAERSVELDE, a village 7 miles N.-W. of BAILLEUL. On March 25th, under Orders of the Third Cdn. Division, they had their first experience in the Line, relieving the 72nd Brigade M.G. Company in the ZILLEBEKE Sector. The Battery continued to serve as divisional Troops to the Third Cdn. Division until joining the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade at POPERINGHE on July 12th, 1916, when they became "D" Battery of the Composite Brigade.

The following Officers were serving with the Battery on its arrival in France:-

Lieut. W.A. Holloway  
Major E.L. Knight  
Lieut. P. McMurdoch  
Lieut. E. Osborne



## YUKON MOTOR MACHINE GUN BATTERY.

### Origin of Unit.

In the Winter of 1914-15, Mr. (now Lieut.-Colonel) J.W. BOYLE, of DAWSON CITY, Yukon Territory, raised at his own expense a body of 50 men known as the "*Boyle Mounted Machine Gun Detachment*". These men he brought to OTTAWA, and from there they were sent to England, where they were attached to the Eaton Motor Machine Gun Brigade then in Camp in the SHORNCLIFFE Area. There was no Establishment for the Detachment as this time. They remained here through the Winter of 1915-16, receiving some Training at the Canadian Machine Gun School, Napier Barracks. Some of the Personnel joined Units in the Field during this period.

### Re-organisation and Training.

On June 14th, 1916, what remained of the Detachment, numbering 33, were mobilised as the "*Yukon Motor Machine Gun Battery*" at the Canadian Cavalry Depot, SHORNCLIFFE. Captain H.F.V. MEURLING, from the Instructional Staff of the Canadian Machine Gun School, was placed in Command. Other Ranks required to complete Establishment were drawn from Infantry Reserve Battalions and the Canadian Cavalry Depot. Motor Car Drivers and Fitters were received from the C.A.S.C. By June 23rd, the Establishment of Other Ranks was complete. As no guns or Motor Equipment had been issued, Training consisted of Infantry Drill, Route Marching and preliminary Machine Gun Work.

### Motor Equipment.

On July 23rd, the Battery proceeded by train to BRAMSHOTT to join the Fourth Division as Divisional Troops. Here Training along similar lines was continued. On the 18th, part of the Motor Equipment was drawn, consisting of:

Motor Cycle and Side-Cars, Clyno, 2 Cyldr., 5 H.P.	
Side-Car for O.C. Battery	1
Type "A" (with Gun Carriage)	6
Type "B" (with Ammunition Carriage)	6
Motor Cars (with Box Bodies):	
Napier, 4 Cyldr., 20 H.P.	5
TOTAL	<u>18</u>

Further installments of vehicles were issued before leaving England; the last of the Motor Side-Car Cycles were received at the Docks at SOUTHAMPTON prior to sailing. Vickers Guns were drawn in the first week of August, 1916.

### Arrival in France.

On August 12th, the Battery crossed to France with the Fourth Division, and proceeded to ABEELE on the boundary between France and Belgium, about 5 miles S.W. of POPERINGHE, on the main ST. OMER Road. Here they joined the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade as "E" Battery. 12 days were spent in Training in the Vickers Gun under Instructors loaned by the 1<sup>st</sup> C.M.M.G. Brigade, and some Instructional Work was done in the Line at the same time. The Battery began its first Tour on September 1st, when it took up positions on the Left of the Fourth Division, just across the YPRES-COMINES CANAL, in support of the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade.

The Officers who proceeded to France with the Yukon Battery were:

Captain H.F.V. MEURLING,	Officer Commanding
Lieut. R.D. HARKNESS	
Lieut. W.C. NICHOLSON	
Lieut. H.H. STRONG.	



## **GROUPING OF MOTOR MACHINE GUN UNITS.**

On July 12th, 1916, the Borden Motor Machine Gun Battery and the Eaton Motor Machine Gun Battery were attached to the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade for Tactics.

On August 19th, the Yukon Motor Machine Gun Battery was attached to the Brigade for Tactics, and from this date the Motor Machine Gun Units of the Canadian Corps, though administratively self-contained, were normally kept together under the single Tactical Command of the Officer Commanding the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade. At this date, therefore, Canadian Infantry Divisions ceased to have a Motor Machine Gun Battery on their Strength. The entire Motor Machine Gun Strength of the Corps became the Corps Troops and were allotted special tasks with the various Divisions at the discretion of the Corps Commander.

Under this loosely compacted Organisation the First Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade and the Borden, Eaton and Yukon Batteries fought in the battles of the SOMME, in 1916, VIMY RIDGE, ARLEUX, FRESNOY, HILL 70 and PASSCHENDAELE in 1917, and with this Organisation they too so large a part in stemming the German Advance on AMIENS in March and early April, 1918.



#### IV.

### BRIGADE MACHINE GUN COMPANIES. DECEMBER, 1915, TO AUGUST, 1917.

#### INTRODUCTORY.

When the Yukon Motor Machine Gun Battery arrived in France with the Fourth Division in August, 1916, the entire Machine Gun organisation of the Army had been changed. The Motor Machine Gun Batteries were now no longer the only self-contained Machine Gun units, but each Infantry brigade included a Machine Gun Company of 16 Guns complete with tactical and administrative Staffs.

#### Evolution of Company Organisation.

The idea of centralised control of Brigade Machine Guns grew up with the increase and gradual definition of duties of the Brigade Machine Gun Officer. His assumption of tactical functions and his supervision of Training of Brigade Machine Guns made the transition to Brigade Machine Gun Companies a comparatively simple one. It involved simply the addition of administrative to training and tactical duties, the grouping together of Guns in a cohesive and self-contained Unit, and the provision of necessary increases in Personnel for the smooth working of the new Organisation.

The first Establishment for a Brigade Machine Gun Company was authorised in November, 1915<sup>11</sup>. This Establishment provided for 9 Officers and 141 Other Ranks, or 150 All Ranks. It is seen that this is virtually the same as the total of 4 Battalion Machine Gun Sections, with the addition of specialist Personnel. Four Battalion Sections would number 141, including the B.M.G.O. The Company was provided with 16 Guns and its own Transport.

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<sup>11</sup> A.O. 414/1915 Appendix.



**MACHINE GUN COMPANY**  
 (Headquarters and 4 Sections each of 4 Guns).  
**WAR ESTABLISHMENT A.O. 414, November, 1915.**

	Personnel						Horses				Bicycles
	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeant & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	TOTAL	Riding	Draught	Heavy Draught	TOTAL	
Headquarters (excluding Attached)	1	1	2	2	26	32	1	3		4	
Attached					2	2					
Four Sections	8		8		100	116	8	40		48	
<b>TOTAL COMPANY</b> (excluding Attached)	9	1	10	2	126	148	9	43		52	
<b>TOTAL COMPANY</b> (including Attached)	9	1	10	2	128	150	9	43		52	



**MACHINE GUN COMPANY**  
**WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)**  
**COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.**  
 (i) Personnel & Horses.

	Personnel						Horses				Bicycles
	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	TOTAL	Riding	Draught	Heavy Draught	TOTAL	
<b>HEADQUARTERS</b>											
Major or Captain	1					1	1			1	
Company Sergeant		1				1					
Major			1			1					
Company Q.M.			1			1					
Sergeant				1		1					
Transport Sergeant				1		1					
Artificer					4 <sup>13</sup>	4					
Shoeing-Smith					16 <sup>14</sup>	16					
Signallers					2	2		3		3	
Privates					1	1					
Drivers					2	2					
Storemen					1	1					
Cooks											
Batmen <sup>12</sup>											
<b>TOTAL HEADQUARTERS</b> (excluding Attached)	1	1	2	2	26	32	1	3		4	4
<b>ATTACHED</b>											
R.A.M.C.					2	2					
Drivers A.S.C. <sup>15</sup> (Train Transport)					1	1			2	2	
<b>TOTAL HEADQUARTERS</b> (including Attached)	1	1	2	2	28	34	1	3		4	4
<b>MACHINE GUN SECTION</b>											
Subalterns	2					2	2			2	
Sergeants			2			2					
Corporals					2	2					
Privates					16	16					
Drivers (1st Line Transport)					5	5		10		10	
Batmen <sup>16</sup>					2	2					
<b>TOTAL MACHINE GUN SECTION</b>	2		2		25	29	2	10		12	

<sup>12</sup> Fully armed and trained.<sup>13</sup> Includes 1 Corporal.<sup>14</sup> 8 Range Takers and 8 Scouts.<sup>15</sup> Not included in total.<sup>16</sup> Fully armed and trained.



MACHINE GUN COMPANY  
WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)  
COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.  
(ii) Transport.

Detail	Vehicles	Drivers	Horses	
			Draught	Heavy Draught
1st Line				
HEADQUARTERS				
Bicycles	4			
Carts – Cooks	1	1	1	
Carts – Water	1	1	2	
EACH SECTION			8	
Wagons Limbered G.S.			2	
– for 4 Machine Guns, Tripods, Ammunition & 4 Ammunition				
Pack Saddles <sup>17,18</sup>	2	4		
– for Ammunition <sup>19</sup>	1	1		
TRAIN				
Wagon, G.S., for Baggage and Supplies	1	1		2
TOTAL	19	22	43	2

#### Increase in Establishment.

This Establishment underwent certain minor changes as a result of early experience of its working. It was soon found that a Second-in-Command was required to look after Administration, and that the number of Artificers was insufficient; the latter were increased by 2. These additions brought the Strength of the Company up to 153, 10 Officers and 143 Other Ranks.

#### Final Establishment.

A further testing of the new Company Organisation led to an increase of 34 Other Ranks, of whom 32 were Gunners, giving a final total Company Establishment of 187, composed of 10 Officers and 177 Other Ranks. This Company Establishment, which was published on April 3rd, 1917, persisted down to the reorganisation of the Canadian Machine Gun Service in February, 1918.

<sup>17</sup> For lead horses.

<sup>18</sup> 7,000 rounds in each limbered wagon.

<sup>19</sup> 18,000 rounds.



**MACHINE GUN COMPANY**  
 (Headquarters and 4 Sections each of 4 Guns).  
 WAR ESTABLISHMENT W.E. 501/87, April 3rd, 1917.

	Personnel						Horses				
	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	TOTAL	Riding	Draught	Heavy Draught	TOTAL	Bicycles
Headquarters (excluding Attached)	2	1	2	3	29	37	3	7		10	4
Attached					2	2					
Four Sections	8		8		132	148	4	40		44	
<b>TOTAL COMPANY</b> (excluding Attached)	10	1	10	3	161	185	7	47		54	4
<b>TOTAL COMPANY</b> (including Attached)	10	1	10	3	163	187	7	47		54	4



**MACHINE GUN COMPANY**  
**WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)**  
**COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.**  
**(i) Personnel & Horses.**

	Personnel						Horses				Bicycles
	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	TOTAL	Riding	Draught	Heavy Draught	TOTAL	
<b>HEADQUARTERS</b>											
Major or Captain	1					1	1			1	
Captain or Lieut.	1					1	1			1	
Coy. Sergt.-Major		1				1					
Coy. Q.M. Sergeant			1			1	1			1	
Transport Sergeant			1			1					
Artificer				1		1					
Shoeing-Smith				1							
Saddler				1							
Signallers <sup>20</sup>					4	4					4
Privates <sup>21</sup>					16	16					
Drivers <sup>22</sup>					4	4		7 <sup>24</sup>		7 <sup>24</sup>	
Storemen					1	1					
Cooks					2	2					
Batmen <sup>23</sup>					2	2					
<b>TOTAL HEADQUARTERS (excluding Attached)</b>	2	1	2	3	29	37	3	7		10	4
<b>ATTACHED</b>											
R.A.M.C.					2	2					
Drivers A.S.C. (Train Transport)					(1)	(1)			(2)		
<b>TOTAL HEADQUARTERS (including Attached)</b>	2	1	2	3	31	39	3	7		10	4
Note:- Above Establishment includes 1 L/Sergt. And 5 L/Corporals.											
<b>MACHINE GUN SECTION</b>											
Subalterns	2					2	1			1	
Sergeants			2			2					
Corporals					2	2					
Privates					24	24					
Drivers (First Line Transport)					5	5		10		10	
Batmen					2	2					
<b>TOTAL MACHINE GUN SECTION</b>	2		2		33	37	1	10		11	

<sup>20</sup> Includes 1 Corporal.<sup>21</sup> 8 Scouts and 8 range Takers.<sup>22</sup> 1 Driver for spare animals.<sup>23</sup> Fully armed and trained.<sup>24</sup> Includes 2 spare animals.



MACHINE GUN COMPANY  
WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)  
COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.  
(ii) Transport.

Detail	Vehicles	Drivers	Horses- Mules	
			Draught	Heavy Draught
HEADQUARTERS				
Bicycles for Signallers	4			
Wagons, limbered, G.S.	1	1	2	
Carts – Cooks	1	1	1	
Carts – Water	1	1	2	
Drivers for Spare Draught Horses		1	2	
EACH SECTION				
Wagons Limbered G.S.				
– for 4 Machine Guns, Tripods, Ammunition & Ammunition				
Pack Saddles <sup>25,26</sup>	2	4	8	
– for Ammunition <sup>27</sup>	1	1	2	
TRAIN				
Wagon, G.S., for Baggage and Supplies <sup>28</sup>	1	1 <sup>29</sup>		2
TOTAL	11	24	47	

Total of All Animals is 54, and 2 Attached.

<sup>25</sup> For led animals.

<sup>26</sup> 7,000 rounds in each limbered wagon.

<sup>27</sup> 18,000 rounds

<sup>28</sup> Excl. in total. Detached from Divisional Train: not properly on the Strength of M.G. Company.

<sup>29</sup> Provided from Divisional Train.



## FORMATION OF CANADIAN MACHINE GUN COMPANIES.

### Authorisation; Nomenclature.

The Authority for the Mobilisation of these new Machine Gun Units was contained in the Adjutant-General's letter C.B. 18/1, dated October 29th, 1915, but it was not until December, 1915, that the first Machine Gun Companies of the Canadian Corps was mobilised. Companies took their names from the Brigades to which they belonged when formed, and were officially known at first as the "*1st Canadian Infantry Brigade Machine Gun Company*," "*2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade Machine Gun Company*," etc.: but in July, 1916, this cumbersome name was shortened to read "*1st Canadian Machine Gun Company*," "*2nd Canadian Machine Gun Company*," etc., the number of the Brigade being retained.

In August, 1916, after the Fourth Division arrived in France, there were 12 Machine Gun Companies in the Canadian Corps, numbered from 1 to 12. In January, 1917, the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Machine Gun Companies were formed and became the Divisional Machine Gun Companies of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions, respectively. The 3 Machine Gun Companies of the Fifth Division were formed in England in 1917, and went to France in March, 1918. These last 3 Companies, which were numbered the 17th, 18th and 19th, lost their identity in June, 1918, when they were merged in the 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades.

The Mobilisation of the First and Second Division Brigade Companies began in December, 1915, and by the end of June, 1916, each of the four Divisions had its 3 Machine Gun Companies complete in Personnel, Guns and Equipment.

### Guns.

To begin with all Companies were issued with Colt Guns, which were taken over from Infantry Battalions or supplied from Ordnance. The First, Second and Third Division Companies employed these Guns in the Line until issued with the Vickers in July, 1916. The Companies of the Fourth Division had their Colt Guns withdrawn and received Vickers Guns 3 weeks before leaving England for France.

### Personnel.

In all four Divisions the nucleus at least of the Personnel for the new Units came from the Machine Gun Sections of Battalions – usually the Battalion Machine Gun Officer along with a cadre of trained Machine Gunners: in the case of the Third and Fourth Divisions, the entire Battalion Machine Gun Sections were supplied to form the new Companies. Officers and men required to complete Establishments were supplied from the Machine Gun Depot, then at SHORNCLIFFE. Great difficulty was experienced in the matter of Specialists. Units generally had to train their own Signallers and Short Rein drivers, and rely for Artificers upon enlisted men of the different trades without special experience of Army requirements. Up to this time the needs of the Field in fighting men had been so excessive that Training Depots were quite unable to provide a full supply of trained Personnel for Specialist as well as fighting departments.

At this time and until the formation of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, all Machine Gun Personnel serving with Machine Gun Companies were shown as seconded from their own units.



## FIRST DIVISION COMPANIES.

### Mobilisation.

When the First Division Companies were mobilised in January, 1916, the Division was holding the Line from PLOEGSTEERT WOOD to a point about 1500 yards North of WULVERGHEM. A nucleus of trained Personnel was withdrawn from each Battalion for these Companies. This nucleus consisted in the first place of 1 Officer and 10 Other Ranks from the Battalion Machine Gun Sections, and was increased very shortly afterwards by a further draft of 10 Other Ranks from each Battalion. 16 Colt Guns per Brigade were provided from Infantry Battalions.

### Officers.

On January 1st, the First, Second and Third Canadian Infantry Brigade Machine Gun Companies were mobilised, the First near MONT DES CATS, the Second in the vicinity of PLOEGSTEERT and the Third near METEREN. The Units were virtually up to Strength in Personnel by March 1st. The following Officers were serving with the First Division Machine Gun Companies on that date:

<u>1st C.M.G. Coy.</u>	<u>2nd C.M.G. Coy.</u>	<u>3rd C.M.G. Coy.</u>
Capt. W.J.A. LALOR (O.C.)	Capt. T.H. RADDALL (O.C.)	Capt. E.H. HOUGHTON
Lieut. J.I. BUNDY	Lieut. F. EDGAR	Capt. W.M. PEARCE
Lieut. A.W. COULTER	Lieut. J.E. HETHERINGTON	Lieut. F.M. BRESSEY
Lieut. H.E. DETCHON	Lieut. N.E. KITSON	Lieut. L. BUCHANAN
Lieut. A.P. DOWLING	Lieut. J.E. MATTHEWS	Lieut. E.W. BROOKFIELD
Lieut. S.A. GRIFFIN	Lieut. C.G. McLEAN	Lieut. H. DONALD
Lieut. F. HOTRUM	Lieut. J.A. PTOLEMY	Lieut. A. DENHOLM
Lieut. H.W. SCRUTON	Lieut. J.L. SCLATER	Lieut. J. KAY
Lieut. G.T. SCOT-BROWN	Lieut. R.McB. STEWART	Lieut. H.A. KENNEDY
	Lieut. B.S. WALTON	Lieut. J.M. McEACHERN
		Lieut. G.K. MACBETH
		Lieut. H.G. PEPALL
		Lieut. J.S. THORPE
		Lieut. H.M. WILSON

### Organisation; Training.

The First Division Companies were equipped and made ready for the Line in the order of their Brigades. The 1st Brigade Company spent the month of January in training feverishly to acquire a knowledge of the Colt Gun, and on the 29th, moved from MONT DES CATS to Billets at ARTILLERY FARM, near KEMMEL, and at once took over Machine Gun Emplacements on the Left Sector of the Division. The 2nd Company had the whole of January and February for Organisation and Training and went into Line for its first Tour toward the end of March in the Right Sector, in the neighbourhood of LA HUTTE. Captain HOUGHTON's Company was less fortunate than the other two, as it was unable to obtain Guns for several months: the intervening time was spent doing working parties, and on Machine Gun Training in and out of the Line. At the end of March the First Division moved North, taking over the Line with its left Flank on HOOGE. The 3rd Company continued its routine in this Sector, was equipped with Transport at POPERINGHE on April 8th, and eventually on June 1st and 2nd received 16 Guns, 4 each from the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Infantry Battalions. On the night of 2nd/3rd June, the Company went into the Line for its first Tour, in trenches immediately South of ZILLEBEKE LAKE.



## SECOND DIVISION COMPANIES.

### Organisation.

The Machine Gun Units of the Second Division were formed in the same way as those of the First Division, and at the same time.

### Officers.

The following Officers were serving with the 4th, 5th and 6th Companies on March 1st, 1916:

4th Company	5th Company	6th Company
Lieut. J. EDWARDS (O.C.)	Lieut. S.W. WATSON	Lieut. T.A.H. TAYLOR
Lieut. J. DUNCANSON	Lieut. L.H. BERTRAM	Lieut. J. BASEVI
Lieut. W.J. FORBES	Lieut. A.C. BOWLES	Lieut. C.L. BECK
Lieut. MITCHELL	Lieut. F.H. DUCK	Lieut. A. EASTHAM
Lieut. A.D. GRAY	Lieut. C.V. GRANTHAM	Lieut. A.G.W. McLELAN
Lieut. C.H.J. JAMES	Lieut. W.H.F. KETCHESON	Lieut. G.G. WHITE
Lieut. J. MESS	Lieut. J.E. McCORKELL	
Lieut. H.J. PRICE	Lieut. C.E.H. THOMAS	
Lieut. J.G. WEIR		
Lieut. J.F. WHITE		
Lieut. R.W. WHITE		

When the Companies were formed the Second Division was in the Line on the KEMMEL-VIERSTRAAT Sector.

### 4th C.M.G. Company.

On December 24th, 1915, a nucleus of 4 Officers and 69 Other Ranks assembled at SCHOOL FARM, near the village of LA CLYTTE, in Belgium, to form the 4th Brigade Machine Gun Company. 8 Colt Guns were drawn from the Ordnance Depot, and a few days later, part of the Transport arrived. Most of this initial Personnel came from the M.G. Section of the Infantry Units in the Brigade:-

1 Officer (B.M.G.O.)	4th Brigade Headquarters
1 Officer and 27 Other Ranks	18th Battalion
9 Other Ranks	19th Battalion
1 Officer and 22 Other Ranks	20th Battalion
1 Officer and 10 Other Ranks	21st Battalion

Lieut. J. EDWARDS, who was appointed Commanding Officer, assisted by the other officers, immediately set himself to organise, train and build up the equipment of his Command. This work was greatly interfered with, as the Company had to begin, on the same day that it assembled, to do Tours in the Line – manning a number of Gun Positions, building new Emplacements and Night Firing. In January, 6 new Officers arrived, and by the end of the month the new Unit was fairly well organised and running smoothly. In March, another 8 Colt Guns were received from the 4th Brigade Infantry Battalions and 82 Men reported from the Machine Gun Sections of the Reserve Infantry Battalions in England. March 24th, 1916, found the 4th Company up to Establishment in Personnel, Guns and Transport and fully organised.



**5th C.M.G. Company.**

Before the end of December, the 5th Company under Lieut. WATSON had already assembled a nucleus of its Personnel, Transport and Guns. The Personnel was supplied from the Battalions in the 5th Brigade, as follows:-

22nd Battalion	12 Other Ranks
24th Battalion	13 Other Ranks
25th Battalion	12 Other Ranks
26th Battalion	<u>12</u> Other Ranks
	<u>49</u> Other Ranks.

The nucleus Transport and 8 Colt Guns were drawn from the Horse Transport Depot and Ordnance, respectively. The Strength in Officers and Other Ranks was made up by drafts from England, and on March 15th, the remaining 8 Guns required to complete were received from Infantry Battalions. The Company was finally organised into Sections on March 20th.

On March 24th, the Company began its maiden Tour in the Line as a Company. As early as January 2nd the Unit had made itself responsible for manning 4 Gun Positions in rear of KEMMEL TRENCH during Brigade Tours, but the larger proportion of the Personnel during the months of January, February and early March were engaged in building Machine Gun Emplacements, and doing Pioneer work in the vicinity of the Line. 7 new Officers, who arrived from England on January 30th, were sent to Infantry Battalions for Trench experience.

**6th C.M.G. Company.**

The 6th M.G. Company was formed at KEMMEL, in December, 1915. The original Personnel and 4 Colt Guns were drawn from the 27th, 28th, 29th and 31st Infantry Battalions. Lieut. T.A.H. Taylor, of the 29th Battalion, who was given Command of the Company, was the only officer on its Nominal Roll until the end of January, 1916, when Reinforcements from England began to arrive. A new Camp was constructed on the KEMMEL-HYDE PARK Corner Road near KEMMEL Corner, and here Lieut. TAYLOR trained, equipped and organised his new Command. In March, another batch of Reinforcements arrived and on April 1st, the Company had on its Strength 10 Officers and 147 Other Ranks. 12 Colt Guns were received on April 3rd from the Infantry Battalions of the 6th Brigade and the 2nd Pioneer Battalion, this bringing up the total to 16. The early days of the 6th Company were spent in building and holding Strong Points East of the VIERSTRAAT-NEUVE EGLISE Road in support to the 6th Brigade.



### THIRD DIVISION COMPANIES.

#### Organisation.

As was the case with the First and Second Divisions, the Machine Gun Companies of the Third Division were organised while the Division was holding the Line. This fact made the Mobilisation of the Companies a more difficult matter than if the Brigades had been at rest. The Companies were formed in each case of Personnel, Guns and Transport withdrawn from Battalions in their own Brigades. Where necessary the Personnel was supplemented by Officers and Other ranks from the Depot in England. The Units were organised in March and April, 1916, as the 7th, 8th and 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade Machine Gun Companies. The following Officers were serving with the respective Companies on their formation:

#### 7th Company.

Capt. H.F. Cook (O.C.)  
Lieut. H.T. BEECROFT  
Lieut. C.O.C. FENTON  
Lieut. F.A. HALE  
Lieut. G.T. SCROGGIE  
Lieut. W.F. TOBEY  
Lieut. W.G. WILLIAMS  
Lieut. E.H. ZIEGLER

#### 8th Company.

Capt. W.M. BALFOUR  
Capt. S.J. REDPATH  
Lieut. P.W. BEATTY  
Lieut. C.N. BENNETT  
Lieut. J.R. COULL  
Lieut. W.C. INCE  
Lieut. C.W. LAUBACH  
Lieut. W.N. MOORHOUSE  
Lieut. H.J.G. MORGAN  
Lieut. F.A. NEY  
Lieut. A.W. SIME  
Lieut. H.C. YOUNG

#### 9th Company.

Capt. W.H. BOTHWELL  
Lieut. H.D. BROWNE  
Lieut. G.W. BERESFORD  
Lieut. R.C. CORDINGLEY  
Lieut. K. EAGER  
Lieut. I. MacKINNON  
Lieut. E.I.H. INGS  
Lieut. L.S. PAGE  
Lieut. G. RUTHERFORD  
Lieut. R.A. WHITAKER

All three Commanding Officers had served in the capacity of Brigade Machine Gun Officer in their respective Brigades prior to the formation of the Companies. On April 28th, Captain BOTHWELL, evacuated sick, was succeeded by Lieut. IAN MacKINNON in the Command of the 9th Company.

#### **7th C.M.G. Company.**

Orders for the Mobilisation of the 7th Company were published on March 3rd, but it was not until late in April that the men assembled. The Brigade was in the Line and the Personnel selected for Transfer to the Machine Gun Company remained with the Battalions until the Tour was completed, 7 Officers who arrived from England on April 3rd, were attached to various Infantry Battalions pending the Mobilisation of the Company. On April 24th, 4 Colt Guns with Transport were received from the 49th Battalion, and the attached Officers returned from Battalions. On the 28th, the remaining 12 Guns were handed over, viz., 4 Colt Guns from R.C.R., 4 from the 42nd and 4 Vickers Guns from the P.P.C.L.I. Meantime the Personnel had assembled in huts at the Machine Gun Camp "B," S.W. of BRANDHOEK, and about 1 mile due East of POPERINGHE. On the day the last of their Guns were received, they relieved the 8th Brigade Company in the Right Sector of the Divisional Front, ZILLEBEKE-MAPLE COPSE-SANCTUARY WOOD.

#### **8th C.M.G. Company.**

Captain BALFOUR's Company was authorised on April 1st. The 8th Brigade had been relieved by the 7th brigade and the Machine Gunners for the new Unit were got together at once into a Camp of their own. The Machine Gun Sections of the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th C.M.R. Battalions formed the initial Strength of the Company. After a fortnight's Training the 8th Company relieved Machine Guns of the 7th Brigade in the ZILLEBEKE-MAPLE COPSE-SANCTUARY WOOD Sector for their first Line experience as a Company.

#### **9th C.M.G. Company.**

The 9th Company were more fortunate in the circumstances of their Organisation. The Brigade had just arrived from ENGLAND when the Machine Gun Companies were authorised so that it was found possible to collect the Personnel for the new Unit at once. The men selected for transfer from the 43rd, 52nd, 58th and 60th Battalions were assembled in a Camp near WISQUES. Captain BOTHWELL assumed Command when the Unit was formed on April 15th, and after a short period of Training the Company took up positions in the Left or HOOGE Sector of the Line about April 22nd.



## FOURTH DIVISION COMPANIES.

### Organisation.

The Fourth Division was gradually built up during the Summer of 1916 at BRAMSHOTT CAMP, Hampshire, from Battalions some of which had been in England for a considerable time, others of which joined the Division direct from Canada. In the first week of June the Brigade Machine Gun Companies, numbered 10th, 11th and 12th, were mobilised, the Personnel being composed of Battalion Machine Gun Sections with additional Officers and a very small number of Other Ranks from the SHORNCLIFFE Depot. The following Battalions supplied their Machine Gun Sections and Colt Guns to form the Machine Gun Units of their respective Brigades:

<u>10th M.G. Company.</u>	<u>11th M.G. Company.</u>	<u>12th M.G. Company.</u>
44th Battalion	53rd Battalion	51st Battalion
46th Battalion	54th Battalion	72nd Battalion
46th Battalion	74th Battalion	73rd Battalion
50th Battalion	75th Battalion	87th Battalion

The above Infantry Units were grouped under the Fourth Division when the Machine Gun Companies were mobilised.

### Officers.

The under mentioned Officers were taken on Strength and went to France with these Companies.

<u>10th M.G. Company.</u>	<u>11th M.G. Company.</u>	<u>12th M.G. Company.</u>
Capt. J. MESS (O.C.)	Capt. B.M. CLERK (O.C.)	Capt. H.E. HODGE (O.C.)
Lieut. C.T. BOWRING (2nd i/c)	Lieut. H. WARD (2nd i/c)	Lieut. L.F. PEARCE (2nd i/c)
Lieut. H.A. FOWLER	Lieut. F.E. BOULTBEE	Lieut. F.R. ALFORD
Lieut. C.U. HEBDEN	Lieut. F. BULLOCK-WEBSTER	Lieut. C.C. DREW
Lieut. A.E. LADLER	Lieut. H.J. BURDEN	Lieut. I.C. HALL
Lieut. G. SAGE	Lieut. K.W. JUNOR	Lieut. H.E. HENDERSON
Lieut. C.W. SMITH	Lieut. T.F. MURRAY	Lieut. H.T. LOGAN
Lieut. C.F. THOMPSON	Lieut. E.W. SANSOM	Lieut. H.A. PEVERLEY
Lieut. K. WEAVER	Lieut. A.G. SCOTT	Lieut. J.A. RIDDELL
Lieut. H.S. WHITESIDE	Lieut. C.W. STROUD	Lieut. W.G. WILLIAMS

### Training.

The Personnel was got together under canvas in each Brigade area of the Camp, and Organisation was proceeded with, an easy matter compared with the task of the Companies of the other 3 Divisions mobilised in the Field. The month of June and most of July was spent in Organisation and Training, and in gaining some knowledge of the Colt Gun. Toward the end of July this weapon was withdrawn and an issue made of Vickers Guns. The next 3 weeks were spent in intensive Instruction in the new Gun and in range practices, the latter carried out at LONGMOOR Ranges, where a camp was occupied for the purpose. The arrangements for Training and Range Firing were made by Captain BASIL FOSTER, who with a small Staff of Sergeant Instructors, was sent from the ALDERSHOT Machine Gun School to instruct the Fourth Division Machine Gun Units in the Vickers Gun.

This Training went on right up to the time of leaving for France.

### Arrival in France.

The 10th Company crossed to LE HAVRE on August 10th, 1916, the 11th on August 11th, and the 12th on the 12th. The Fourth Division relieved the Second Division on the 24th/25th August; the 10th and the 11th Machine Gun Companies relieved their opposite numbers, the 4th and 5th Companies, for the first Line experience. The 12th Company carried on with Machine Gun Training for a fortnight, when it relieved the 56th and 58th Machine Gun Companies of the Nineteenth Division East of KEMMEL.



### **Advantage of Company Organisation.**

The formation of Machine Gun Companies was a great gain for Machine Gunnery. It had been realised for many years and particularly since the commencement of the War that, although the Machine Gun was an Infantry weapon and possessed the fine effect of the Infantry Rifle, it had a power peculiar to itself and not very unlike that of the Artillery. This power was due to its special characteristics; its Fixed Platform with the derivative advantages of Overhead Fire, Indirect Fire and Surprise Effect; its ability to deliver and apply from a Narrow Front and Shallow Depth a Volume of Rapid and Accurate Fire; its All-Round Traverse; its Invulnerability; etc. Unless a special study of these characteristics were made, the principles underlying the employment of the Weapon in the Field could not be understood, and such study was impossible as long as the weapon remained in the hands of Infantry Units. The early experience of this War clearly indicated to close students of the subject, that the Machine Gun was a separate Arm of the Service, with tactics of its own, intermediate between those of the Infantry and the Artillery. The organisation of all the Machine Guns of an Infantry Brigade into one complete tactical and administrative Unit was a step up the road of progress and made possible the development of the Machine Gun along its own special lines.

This aspect of the new Organisation is, of course, secondary and derivative. The primary and actuating motive no doubt in the formation of Machine Gun Companies was the gradually acquired certainty of the power of the Machine Gun as an offensive and defensive weapon, in close co-operation with Infantry; and so, the number of guns was multiplied. The form which the new Company Organisation took, as has been pointed out, was the result, in large measure, of experience in methods of controlling the Battalion Machine Guns of a Brigade through a Brigade Machine Gun Officer.

### **Control and Training.**

The advantages or gains from the new Company Organisation were mainly two, *viz*: a centralised Control and uniformity of Training. Hitherto the Machine Guns, though supervised by the B.M.G.O. were trained with and administered by their own Battalions. The B.M.G.O. was deputed by the Brigadier to issue Orders for the Machine Guns of the Battalions; but the difficulties of Communication and Command when dealing with 4 widely scattered Units, and that too, without real authority over them, were very apparent. It was a great gain, therefore, when Machine Guns were brought together under a Company Commander, and provided with their own Transport and means of Communication. The wishes of the Brigadier regarding the disposition and action of Machine Guns could now be more readily carried out. The problem of Command was not settled definitely at this time but a step was taken in the direction of its settlement.

The gain in uniformity of Training throughout a Brigade was very marked and definite. When the Brigade Machine Guns were withdrawn from the Line a uniform Syllabus of Training could be carried out by the whole Company, under the direct supervision of the Company Commander; the latter had his own Officers and N.C.O.'s under his own undivided Command; whereas hitherto, in periods out of the Line, Training was carried out by Battalions billeted often far apart and under conditions which made any central supervision very difficult.

### **Esprit de Corps.**

The grouping of the Machine Gun Personnel into Companies had also with it a subtler intangible advantage. The creation in each Brigade of a Machine Gun Unit with its own separate life, building up its own traditions, solving its own problems, could not but give an impetus to the development of this new arm of the Service.

Under this Company Organisation the fighting of 1916 and most of 1917 was done, including ST. ELOI, the June, 1916, battles, the SOMME, VIMY RIDGE, ARLEUX and FRESNOY, and HILL 70.



## V.

## APPOINTMENT OF CORPS AND DIVISIONAL MACHINE GUN OFFICERS.

## CANADIAN CORPS MACHINE GUN OFFICER – APPOINTED, OCTOBER 28TH, 1916.

**Appointment.**

The next step in chronological order in the Machine Gun Organisation was the appointment of a Corps Machine Gun Officer (C.M.G.O.). The Adjutant General's letter No. A/16505, dated October 30th, 1916, authorised the appointment of a Machine Gun Officer at each Corps Headquarters of the British Army and on November 2nd, Lieut.-Colonel R. BRUTINEL, D.S.O., Commanding the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade was chosen for this office in the Canadian Corps, his appointment dating from October 28th, 1916.

In the Canadian Corps the functioning of a C.M.G.O. was not entirely new. For some months prior to his appointment as C.M.G.O., Lieut.-Colonel BRUTINEL had been in command on successive occasions of large concentrations of Machine Guns; during our operations on the SOMME, from mid-September, 1916, he had co-ordinated, for Barrage purposes, groups of Guns from the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade, and from the First, Second, Third and Fourth Divisions for their successive Operations on that Battle Field. But the office was new and the appointment of Lieut.-Colonel BRUTINEL ensured that it would at once possess life and vigour.

**Duties of C.M.G.O.**

The duties of the C.M.G.O. were outlined in Canadian Corps letter making the appointment, and were stated as follows:-

- A. To assist Divisional and Brigade Commanders when required in matters connected with Machine Guns and their employment in offensive and defensive Operations.
- B. To assist in the tactical training of Machine Gun Companies out of the line; to inspect Machine Gun Companies in the Line.
- C. To ensure that a sound doctrine regarding the principles of handling Machine Guns is spread throughout the Infantry by means of lectures for Officers of Machine Gun Companies at Corps or Divisional Schools of instruction.
- D. To watch on behalf of the Corps Commander the special interests of the Machine Gun Corps Personnel as regards promotion and appointment. (Auth. O.B./407 dated September 26, 1916).
- E. In the event of operations the C.M.G.O. will exercise executive command over such Machine Gun Units of the Corps as may be placed under his orders by the Corps Commander for this purpose.

**Canadian Corps M.G.O.'s Task.**

From the outset Colonel BRUTINEL laboured unceasingly under the Corps Commander, to complete the Machine Gun Organisation of the Canadian Corps and to pilot Machine Gunnery into its proper Channel. The object aimed at on the side of Organisation was, starting with the disconnected Infantry and Motor Machine Gun Units then existing, to create, within the Canadian Corps, a Machine Gun Corps of intelligent, highly trained, and disciplined men. On the administrative and tactical side Colonel BRUTINEL set himself to gain, for Machine Guns, complete independence of action and so make it possible for them to find their true "metier." Both these aspirations were achieved within eighteen months of his assumption of office.

The Canadian Machine Gun Corps was authorised on April 16th, 1917, and on April 30th, 1918, was published Canadian Corps letter G.126/3-6, stating that "*there is no similarity between Infantry Battalions and Machine Gun Battalions, either as regards administration or tactics,*" and that "*the Machine Gun Service must be regarded as a distinctive Arm with Tactics of its own.*"



### **Progress in Barrage Fire.**

It was from the time of Colonel BRUTINEL's appointment that the Machine Gun Service of the Corps began to show that independence of effort and initiative which became one of its most striking characteristics. Indirect Barrage Fire for Machine Guns was employed on a large scale for the first time in History under Colonel BRUTINEL's direction during the SOMME fighting. Immediately after this Battle the Canadian Corps was requested to send copies of its Machine Gun Instructions and Operation Orders to all the other Corps in France. From the time of the VIMY RIDGE Operation the Canadian Machine Gun Corps was regarded throughout the British Army as the leader in this Branch of Machine Gun Science, and a number of British C.M.G.O.'s were sent to Canadian Corps Headquarters to study Indirect Fire Methods.

### **Development of Organisation.**

From this period, too, in the matter of Organisation, the evolution of forms and Establishments in the Canadian Machine Gun Corps always seemed to be a stage in advance of parallel developments in the British Machine Gun Corps. The most notable example of this is the Machine Gun battalion Establishment first authorised for the Canadian Corps in February, 1918: at the time of the Armistice the general form of this Organisation was under consideration for adoption by the British Machine Gun Corps.

The complete success of the later Organisation of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps was, to a very large extent, due to the forethought, energy and determination of General BRUTINEL.



**DIVISIONAL MACHINE GUN OFFICERS – APPOINTED, DECEMBER 1ST, 1916.****Need of D.M.G.O.**

The institution of the C.M.G.O.'s office left a very wide gap between the Machine Gun Officer at Corps and the Machine Gun Company Commander whose work it was the C.M.G.O.'s duty to supervise, and with whom he had to co-operate in tactical and administrative matters. It was obviously an impossibility for an Officer whose duties kept him at Corps Headquarters to maintain a close relationship with Officers so widely separated from him and from one another as the Commanders of Machine Gun Companies. Moreover, within Divisions themselves, the feeling was growing that some means should be devised of securing among the three Brigade Machine Gun Companies a measure of uniformity in Training, Efficiency and Discipline.

**Provisional Office.**

This need of an Officer mid-way between the C.M.G.O. and the Officers Commanding Companies led to the provisional appointment in the 4 Divisions of Divisional Machine Gun Officers, (D.M.G.O.) to serve as a link between the Machine Gun Units in Divisions and the C.M.G.O., and to assist Divisional and Brigade Commanders in correlating Machine Gun work within each Division. These appointments were made on December 1st, 1916.

**Duties.**

The duties of this office were set forth as follows in the Canadian Corps letter which established it<sup>30</sup>:-

- A. To assist Divisional and Brigade Commanders in co-coordinating the organisation, training and tactical employment of all Machine Guns in the Division.
- B. To assist the Corps Machine Gun Officer in all matter concerning Machine Gun training and Organisation in the Division.
- C. To inspect Machine Gun Detachments in the Line, and to report to the Divisional Commander as regards, discipline, alertness, knowledge of duties and all matters affecting efficiency of the Machine Guns in the Line.
- D. To assist in the training of the Machine Gun Companies out of the Line with a view to ensuring uniformity of principles and training throughout the Machine Gun Units in the Division.
- E. To assist the Machine Gun Company Commanders in all matters appertaining to the Machine Gun Service.

**Appointment.**

The undermentioned Officers were appointed D.M.G.O's at this time:-

1st Division	Major W.J.A. LALOR, M.C.
2nd Division	Major W.D.B. GOODFELLOW, M.C.
3rd Division	Major W.M. BALFOUR, D.S.O.
4th Division	Capt. H.F.V. MEURLING, M.C.

These provisional appointments were made pending the official sanction from the War Office, which appeared in 1917. Before the Authority came, several Corps beside the Canadian Corps, had found it impossible to obtain the best results from the Machine Gun without the help of a Divisional Officer, and had accordingly made provisional D.M.G.O's.

**D.M.G.O.'s Function.**

The D.M.G.O. had no authority of command. In relation to the General Officers Commanding the Division and its Brigades, he was in a position very similar to that of the B.M.G.O. in relation to the G.O.C. Brigade and the Officers Commanding its Battalions. He advised and supervised: he had no Command.

<sup>30</sup> C.C. G.874, d/28-11-16.



**Appointment Justified.**

The appointments in the different Divisions came at a time of more than ordinary strain, when preparations were being made for the capture of VIMY RIDGE, and during this strenuous period as well as in the subsequent Operations the office more than justified itself. The functions of the D.M.G.O. became of more and more importance on account of the rapid development in Machine Gun Fire Tactics, and as a result of the increase in Machine Gun Strength by the addition of a 4th Company in each Division. The appointment was continued therefore until the formation of "*Divisional Machine Gun 'Battalions'*" on August 3rd, 1917, when the D.M.G.O.'s place was taken by the Divisional Machine Gun Commander (D.M.G.C.).



## VI.

## REINFORCEMENTS AND INSTRUCTION: 1914-1916.

**SUPPLY OF REINFORCEMENTS.****Early Reinforcements.**

Prior to the formation of a Canadian Machine Gun Reinforcement Depot in England the demands for Machine Gunners for France were made up from the Infantry reserve Battalions. The Personnel of Officers and Other Ranks so drawn were trained (a) in Captain Johnston's School, at Ross Barracks, for Officers and N.C.Os., (b) in the Reserve Battalions themselves, (c) in the "*Canadian Machine Gun School*," under Major T.C. BAMFIELD, at Napier Barracks, and (d) in the "*Brigade Machine Gun Bases*." These reinforcing arrangements continued for some months after the formation of Brigade Machine Gun Companies in the Field.

**Formation of Canadian M.G. Depot.**

In May, 1916, the 86th Canadian (Machine Gun) Battalion arrived in England. This Battalion, raised in Ontario, with Headquarters at Hamilton, had been recruited and trained as a Machine Gun Unit. At the time of its arrival in England the needs for Machine Gun Personnel for France had outstripped the available supplies in England. It was decided by the Canadian Authorities, in view of this situation, to use the 86th Battalion to supply wastage in the Field, and accordingly a Machine Gun reinforcement and Training Depot was formed, composed of the 86th Battalion and the Canadian Machine Gun School, amalgamated with it. Lieut.-Colonel W.W. STEWART, Officer Commanding the 86th Battalion, assumed Command of the Depot, which was accommodated in Risborough Barracks, and part of Napier Barracks. In the Autumn of 1916, the Depot was moved from the SHORNCLIFFE Area to CROWBOROUGH and eventually, in the Spring of 1917, from CROWBOROUGH to SEAFORD, where it remained till the end of the War.

**Establishment.**

An Establishment for the Depot was drawn up in December, 1916, and approved as from January 4th, 1917.<sup>31</sup> But so far no definite number of Reinforcements to be maintained was fixed upon, in relation to the requirement in the Field.

**Reorganisation.**

In February, 1917, the Machine Gun Depot was reorganised. Lieut.-Colonel W.M. BALFOUR, D.S.O., D.M.G.O., 3rd Canadian Division, became Commandant at this time and supervised the reorganisation.

**Scale of Reinforcements.**

Provision was made for the Supply and Training of Reinforcements on the basis of the following monthly requirements:-

	Officers	Other Ranks
Infantry Branch	25	281
Motor Branch	3	40
Cavalry Branch	<u>2</u>	<u>20</u>
	<u>30</u>	<u>341</u>

These were the numbers of Reinforcements considered necessary at the time. They were calculated on the same basis as the requirements of the British Machine Gun Corps, viz., 15% of Officers and 10% of Other Ranks on the Strengths of Units in the Field to be reinforced.

<sup>31</sup> A.G. Canadians 43-3-15 and No. 150 H.Q. Cdns. Dated January 4th, 1917.



**Training.**

Arrangements were made at this time for a certain number of the Officer and Other Ranks Personnel of the Depot to receive Machine Gun Training at the British Machine Gun Centre, GRANTHAM, this Training to supplement that carried on at the Depot in the ordinary course.

**Administration.**

When the Canadian Machine Gun Corps was formed in April, 1917, the Machine Gun Depot was mentioned in its constitution as one of the Establishments to be maintained in the Machine Gun Corps: in practice the Depot at SEAFORD was administered by the Canadian Military Authorities in England.



**MACHINE GUN INSTRUCTION.**

It is convenient at this point to consider, shortly, the Machine Gun Instructional Work done in the Canadian Overseas Forces up to this time.

The 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade have the distinction of conducting the first M.G. Course in England for Members of the Canadian Expeditionary Force after proceeding Overseas. The First Canadian Division Daily Orders, issued by Lieut.-General ALDERSON, for December 9th, 1914, contain the following paragraph, giving instructions for the Assembly of this Course:-

*"Machine Gun Course 474"*

*"A Course of Instruction in the Mechanism of the Colt Automatic Machine Gun under the Superintendence of the O.C. Auto Machine Gun Brigade has been arranged to commence on Monday, December, 14th. The Course will conclude at 12 Noon on December 19th.*

*"Officers Commanding Infantry Brigades will forward early the names of 1 Officer and 1 N.C.O. selected from each Battalion of their Brigades to attend this Course.*

*"Those selected should be those who will be responsible for the Training of M.G. Sections.*

*"Tents will be provided for Officers, N.C.O.'s and Officers' Servants at BUSTARD CAMP, where arrangements will be made for meeting.*

*"Officers and N.C.O.'s attending the Course should report to Major Brutinel, Commanding the Auto Machine Gun Brigade, at 7.000 A.M., December 14th, at his camp."*

A further Order regarding this First Course was published on December 13th, as follows:-

*"540"*

*"With reference to Divisional Order No. 474, dated 9th instant, Battalions will arrange to send their Machine Guns and Tools to the Camp of the Auto Machine Gun Brigade by 9.00 A.M. on Monday, December 14th.*

*"A Camp for those attending the Course is being pitched near that of the Auto M.G. Brigade to whom N.C.O.'s and Officers' Servants will be attached for rations. Major Brutinel has kindly arranged for the Officers of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades attending the Course to use the Mess of the Auto Machine Gun Brigade."*

**Subjects Taught.**

The Instruction given consisted of Elementary Training in the Parts and Mechanism of the Colt Gun, Stripping, and Assembling the Gun, and Firing on the Ranges. Major BRUTINEL gave a number of lectures on Fire Tactics.

**Colt Gun Handbook.**

This Course was untended to assist Battalions to train their own Machine Gun Sections. In order to make uniform the Instruction throughout the various Units of the "Contingent," a book was published under Major BRUTINEL's direction, called the *"Provisional Handbook of the Colt Automatic Gun, First Contingent, Canadian Expeditionary Forces,"* containing the detail for Elementary Machine Gun Instruction in the Colt Gun.

**Early M.G. Training in France.**

Machine Gun Instruction in the First Division was continued by the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade in France. In July and August, 1915, a 3-weeks Machine Gun Course was given under Lieut.-Colonel BRUTINEL's supervision for Machine Gunners of the First Division. The Course was given at LA BOURSE (near BAILLEUL), where the Rest Billets of the M.M.G. Brigade were situated; and was attended by 15 Officers, 15 N.C.Os. and 50 Men of the First Division. At the same place 3 seven-day Machine Gun Courses were given, under direction of the 1st M.M.G. Brigade for Officers, N.C.Os. and Men of the 3rd Infantry Brigade. These were the first machine Gun Courses given in France to the Personnel of the Canadian Forces.



### **Indirect and Harassing Fire.**

The Instruction given in these Schools consisted of Elementary Machine Gun Training and Range Practices. In the Autumn of 1915, a system of Indirect Fire was applied by Officers of the M.M.G. Brigade. Indirect Fire was first used in a definite Operation in the Canadian Forces on the night of 24th/25th September, 1915. On this and the following night our Artillery sought to create a diversion on the flank of a British Attack at LOOS, and 16 Guns of the 1st M.M.G. Brigade co-operated by firing on Enemy Communications Trenches, and other suitable targets. By this time the Officers and the N.C.Os. of the M.M.G. Brigade had acquired some knowledge of Indirect Fire Theory, and Indirect Harassing Fire now became a feature of the Canadian Machine Gunner's Trench Routine.

Meantime, while Machine Gunners had been solving Instructional problems in France, there were Instructional developments in England which had an important influence upon Machine Gun Operations in the Field.

### **M.G. Training in Reserve Infantry Battalions.**

After the departure of the First Division for France the Units left behind were moved from SALISBURY PLAIN to the SHORNCLIFFE Area. The Reserve Battalions were issued with one and, in some cases, two Colt Guns for Instructional use. The 11th Reserve Battalion, which supplied Reinforcements for the P.P.C.L.I., then Brigaded with a British Unit, was issued with one Vickers Gun. It was intended that the various Reserve Battalions should train sufficient Personnel to replace casualties incurred by Machine Gun Sections of the Battalions they were reinforcing in the Field, but great difficulty was experienced in accomplishing this Training owing to the lack of Instructors. At the time there was no School for the Training of Machine Gun Instructors.

### **Captain JOHNSTON's School.**

This need was provided for in April, 1915, when Captain D.J. JOHNSTON, 1st Battalion the Queen's Own (Royal West Kent Regiment), was loaned by the War Office to instruct Canadian Officers and N.C.Os. in Machine Gun Work. Captain JOHNSTON, with the assistance of the "*Provisional Handbook of the Colt Automatic Gun*," previously prepared by the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade, got together and had published a "*Handbook of the Colt Gun*."

Classes were held in Ross Barracks and consisted of from 12 to 15 Officers and the same number of N.C.Os. drawn from the various Training Battalions in the Area. The Courses lasted for 2 two weeks and included Instruction in Gun Drill, Mechanism, Stoppages, Night Firing, Indirect and Overhead Fire, and Machine Gun Tactics. The 1st Class assembled at Ross Barracks, SHORNCLIFFE, on April 12th, 1915.

These Course did much to improve the standard of Machine Gun Training in Reserve Units, and also provided a supply of Trained Machine Gun Officers and N.C.O. Reinforcements in the 1st Division Battalion in France.

### **Formation of Colt Machine Gun School.**

But this school was found to be inadequate for the requirements of Training. When the Instruction of Personnel was left to the Machine Gun Officers and N.C.Os. of Reserve Units there was an inevitable lack of uniformity in Training: this went to indicate that the supply and Training of Machine Gunners should be controlled, not by individual Reinforcing Battalions, but by the Headquarters of the Training Division.

On June 10th, 1915, therefore, a Central School for Other Ranks called the "*Colt Machine Gun School*" was opened at Napier Barracks, SHORNCLIFFE. The School was under the Command of Captain T.O. BAMFIELD, assisted by Lieut. F.B. McRAE, Lieut. E.W. SANSON and 10 N.C.O. Instructors drawn from the various Units of the Training Division. The Other Ranks attending were quartered in Risborough Barracks with the Canadian Military School.

### **Courses.**

The first Colt Machine Gun Course, which lasted 3 weeks, turned out about 50 Machine Gunners. The Classes increased in size as more Guns became available, and the Instructional Staff and attendance grew until 500 thoroughly trained Gunners were produced every week.



### **The Canadian M.G. School.**

In September, 1915, Captain JOHNSTON's School was absorbed into the Colt Machine Gun School, which now became a Wing of the Canadian Military School for Administration, Quarters and Discipline, and was re-named "*The Canadian Machine Gun School.*"

### **Subjects Taught.**

The Instruction given consisted up to this time entirely of Elementary Training and Range Practices. On completion of Range Work all candidates were classified as 1st, 2nd or 3rd Class Gunners.

### **Indirect Fire Instruction.**

In the Autumn of 1915, Captain BAMFIELD went to France for a fortnight, where he was attached to the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade. He found them already using Indirect Fire, and, having studied their methods, he brought back detailed information about them. This information created an intense interest among the Officers of the Machine Gun School and Lieut. H.F.V. MEURLING was detailed to take charge of the material and develop it along Instructional lines.

Lieut. MEURLING worked on these Indirect Fire methods and prepared a Course of Lectures. These Lectures were first given in January, 1916, to a class consisting of the Officers and N.C.Os. of the Eaton M.M.G. Battery and the N.C.Os. of the Boyle M.G. Detachment then attached to the Eaton M.M.G. Battery.

In this way the Employment of Indirect Fire, which began in the 1st Motor M.G. Brigade in France, came to be studied and taught to Officers and N.C.Os. in the Canadian Machine Gun School in England, and when the Brigade Machine Gun Companies were formed early in the Winter of 1915-16, Indirect Fire was regularly used as a part of normal Trench Routine.

### **Brigade M.G. Bases.**

The Formation of Brigade Machine Gun Companies created such additional demands for Trained Reinforcements that the Machine Gun School was unable to supply them. Accordingly, Machine Gun Schools, called "*Brigade Machine Gun Bases,*" were formed by each Training Brigade in the SHORNCLIFFE Area. Here a 2 or 3 weeks' Course in Elementary Training was given, and those who successfully passed the Elementary Tests were sent to the Machine Gun School at Napier and Risborough Barracks, where their Machine Gun Training was completed and Long Range Firing carried out.

### **Canadian M.G. Depot.**

In the Summer of 1916, the Canadian Machine Gun school was amalgamated with the 86th (Machine Gun) Battalion to form the Canadian Machine Gun Depot. Major BAMFIELD became Chief Instructor of the Depot and continued to supervise its Instructional Work, until he proceeded to France in the Summer of 1917, to take Command of the Machine Gun reinforcement Depot at DIVION. Prior to February, 1917, over 7,000 Officers and Men received Machine Gun Training in the Colt Machine Gun School, the Canadian Machine Gun School, and the Machine Gun Depot.

### **British M.G. School.**

During this period (1915-1916) selected Canadian Machine Gun Officers, N.C.Os. and Other Ranks attended Machine Gun Courses conducted by the British Authorities, in France at WISQUES (near ST. OMER), and later at the G.H.Q. Small Arms School, CAMIERS, and in England at the Machine Gun raining Centre, GRANTHAM. There was as yet no Canadian Corps Machine Gun School in the Field.



## VII.

INCREASE OF MACHINE GUN STRENGTH; SPECIAL INSTRUCTION.  
JANUARY to MARCH, 1917.**FORMATION OF DIVISIONAL MACHINE GUN COMPANIES.****Reasons.**

During 1916, the first year of their existence, Machine Gun Companies were put to a severe test by the long periods of Trench Warfare and the heavy fighting on the SOMME. As a result of experience gained it was decided to form in each Division a fourth or Divisional Company, to supplement the Machine Gun Strength which had been found insufficient. The Strength of Gun Crews, under the Company Establishment, did not admit of Reliefs being carried out within Companies themselves: and so the whole Machine Gun Strength of a Company was required to be in the Line during the entire Tour of a Brigade, a fact which proved a severe strain upon the physical powers of Machine Gunners and consequently tended to impair efficiency. The Divisional Companies were formed to relieve this situation as well as to provide a Divisional Reserve of Machine Guns.

The new Companies of the 4 Canadian Divisions assembled at FLORINGHEM, near PERNES-EN-ARTOIS, and began training on January 18th, 1917, under the supervision of Major W.M. BALFOUR, D.S.O. The Companies were numbered 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th, the 13th being the First Divisional Company, the 14th the Second Divisional Company, etc.

**Personnel.**

The Personnel of Officers and Other Ranks were drawn from three sources; (1) the existing Machine Gun Companies, (2) Infantry Battalions in the Field, and (3) the Canadian Machine Gun Depot newly established at SEAFORD. A certain number of Other Ranks ear-marked for Commissions in the new Units were transferred from Machine Gun Companies and Infantry Battalions, while those drawn from SEAFORD were chiefly Specialists and Officers required to complete Establishments.

**Training.**

Some Training had already been done in their Divisional Areas when the new Companies gathered at FLORINGHEM. Here training was carried out under special arrangements made by the C.M.G.O. A temporary Unit was formed, known as the Canadian Corps School, Machine Gun Branch, and the following Staff were appointed:-

Commandant	Major W.M. BALFOUR, D.S.O.
Chief Instructor	Captain W.N. MOORHOUSE
Adjutant	Lieut. H.T. LOGAN
Quartermaster	Lieut. J.C. HARTLEY.

Instructors in the School were composed of Officers and N.C.Os. transferred from Machine Gun Units, and of Other Ranks loaned for the purpose by the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade. The 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade also supplied Guns for instructional use until Machine Guns were available from Army Ordnance.

Training on the Gun and in Range Practices was continued for six weeks. Special classes were conducted for newly transferred Infantry Officers and Candidates for Commissions. The class for Officers was conducted by the late Lieut. C.J. FRENCH, M.C. The entire course was carried on under the C.M.G.O.'s supervision.



**Officers.**

While in FLORINGHEM the Companies completed their organisation and Establishment in Personnel, Equipment, and Transport, and proceeded to join their respective Divisions in the last week of February. The following Officers were serving in the Divisional Companies on March 1st, 1918:-

	13th C.M.G. Coy.	14th C.M.G. Coy.
Officer Commanding:	Lieut. J. KAY	Lieut. J. BASEVI
2nd in Command:	Lieut. A. DENHOLM	Lieut. G.N. DOUGLAS
	Lieut. G.W.N. DAY	Lieut. P.J. BULLOCK
	Lieut. G.H. DUNBAR	Lieut. T. DICK
	Lieut. J. MAITLAND	Lieut. T.F. O'FLAHERTY
	Lieut. D.A. McINTOSH	Lieut. W.C. THOMPSON
	Lieut. C.G. McLEAN	Lieut. J. TURNER
	Lieut. A. McKENZIE	Lieut. L.F. WHITE
	15th C.M.G. Coy.	16th C.M.G. Coy.
Officer Commanding:	Capt. W.N. MOORHOUSE	Lieut. E.W. SANSOM
	Lieut. J.C. HARTLEY	Lieut. H.T. LOGAN
	Lieut. F.McK. GARRISON	Lieut. L. GAVREAU
	Lieut. C.E. GARNEAU	Lieut. S. JOHNSTON
	Lieut. W.J. HUTCHENS	Lieut. B.C. MONTAGNON
	Lieut. J.R. McLEAN	Lieut. E.L. RAINBOTH
	Lieut. P.C. MULHOLLAND	Lieut. A. RITCHIE
		Lieut. W.H. WATSON

**Special Advantages of Increase.**

It was a fortunate coincidence that the new organisation came just at the time of the introduction of Machine Gun Barrage Fire into the Corps on a large scale: for in each Division there were now available for Barrage purposes a proportion of these 16 Guns. In addition to those available for special Operations from the existing Machine Gun Companies with Brigades. When the Divisional Companies completed their Training preparations were already well advanced for the VIMY RIDGE Operation and this Battle was actually the initial engagement in which the New Units took part.



**CANADIAN MACHINE GUN SCHOOL FOR OFFICERS.****Object of School.**

While the Divisional Machine Gun Companies were undergoing Training at FLORINGHEM, a Machine Gun School was in progress at the village of PERNES close by. The object of this School, which was formed temporarily for this purpose, was to give the Officers of the Canadian Machine Gun Companies Special Training in Indirect Fire and subsidiary subjects. The plans for the capture of VIMY RIDGE involved the intensive employment of Barrage Fire in the Attack itself and of Indirect Harassing Fire in Preparatory Stages, and it was the desire of the Corps Machine Gun Officer to make his Units as proficient as possible in this new form of Machine Gun Fire: at this period there was a lack of instruction in the Schools in this Branch of Machine Gun Work.

**Staff.**

The Staff was composed of Major M.A. SCOTT, and Lieut. M.R. LEVEY, both of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade. Special lectures were also delivered by Lieut.-Colonel R. BRUTINEL. Classes consisted of 1 Officer from each Machine Gun Unit in the Corps. Each Course lasted 8 days.

**Syllabus.**

The following is a specimen Syllabus:-

<u>First Day:</u>	9.30 – 10.00 A.M. 10.00 – 11.00 11.00 – 12.30 P.M. 2.00 – 3.30 3.30 – 4.30 4.30	Opening Address. Construction of Maps. Scales and Protractors. Bearings, Rays, Meridians. Map Setting. Reduction of Notes.
<u>Second Day:</u>	9.00 – 10.30 A.M. 10.30 – 12.30 P.M. 2.00 – 4.30 4.30	Verniers, Compass, Sextant. Field Sketching. Practical Field Sketching. Reduction of Notes.
<u>Third Day:</u>	9.00 – 10.30 A.M. 10.30 – 12.30 P.M. 2.00 – 4.30 4.30	Correction of Field Sketches. Abney Level, Contouring. Practical Contouring. Reduction of Notes.
<u>Fourth Day:</u>	9.00 – 10.00 A.M. 10.00 – 11.30 11.30 – 12.30 P.M. 2.00 – 4.30 P.M. 4.30	Contouring. Cross Sections; Visibility of Points. Musketry. Indirect and Overhead Fire. Reduction of Notes.
<u>Fifth Day:</u>	9.00 – 11.00 A.M. 11.00 – 11.30 11.30 – 12.30 P.M. 2.00 – 4.30 4.30	Reduction and Use of Sextant. Plane Table. Lecture: " <i>M.Gs. in Defence.</i> " Practical Resection. Reduction of Notes.
<u>Sixth Day:</u>	9.00 – 11.30 A.M. 11.30 – 12.30 P.M. 2.30 – 4.30 4.30	Indirect Fire. Lecture: " <i>M.Gs. in Attack.</i> " Practical Gun Laying. Reduction of Notes.
<u>Seventh Day:</u>	9.00 – 12.30 P.M. 2.00 – 4.30 4.30	Safety Angles and Reverse Slopes. Triangle of Reference, " <i>Tables.</i> " Reduction of Notes.
<u>Eighth Day:</u>	9.00 – 9.30 A.M. 9.30 – 10.30 10.30 – 12.00 12.00	Probability of Errors. Supplies of Guns in Action. Copying, Enlarging and Reducing Maps. Dismiss.



**Duration of Courses.**

Courses continued until the plans for the VIMY RIDGE Attack were well forward. In this way 80% of the Officer Personnel of the Machine Gun Service were given a most useful working knowledge of Indirect Fire Methods.



## VIII.

## RESUME OF MACHINE GUN STRENGTH.

March 31st, 1917.

It is of some interest at this point to survey the Machine Gun Strength of the Overseas Forces of Canada when the Divisional Companies had been formed. At this time the Fifth Division was in process of formation at BRAMSHOTT and in January, 1917, its three Brigade Machine Gun Units were mobilised as the 17th, 18th and 19th Machine Gun Companies. The total of Machine Gun Officers and Other Ranks in the Field at the end of March, 1917, was 3,604, while in England there were 2,561, making a grand total of 6,165 All Ranks in the Machine Gun Service, distributed as follows:-

A. In the Field.		Officers	Other Ranks	TOTAL All Ranks
16 M.G. Companies		160	2,832	2,992
1 M.M.G. Brigade (5 Batteries)		22	360	382
1 M.G. Squadron		<u>10</u>	<u>220</u>	<u>230</u>
TOTAL		<u>192</u>	<u>3,412</u>	<u>3,604</u>
B. In England	17th, 18th & 19th M.G. Companies	30	531	561
	M.G. Depot, SEAFORD		<u>2,000</u>	<u>2,000</u>
	TOTAL	<u>30</u>	<u>2,531</u>	<u>2,561</u>
TOTAL All Ranks				
In France		3,604		
In England		<u>2,561</u>		
GRAND TOTAL		<u>6,165</u>	All Ranks.	



Following are the names of Units, D.M.G.Os. and Officers on March 31st, 1917:-

**First Division**

D.M.G.O. Major T.H. RADDALL.

	1st C.M.G. Company.	2nd C.M.G. Company.
Officer Commanding	Captain W.M. PEARCE	Major R.McP. STEWART
	Lieut. D.S. BANKIER	Lieut. H. CARTER
	Lieut. A.S. BLEAKNEY	Lieut. W.D. DARLING
	Lieut. H.E. DETCHON	Lieut. J.A. DEWART
	Lieut. W.H. GILLARD	Lieut. T. DOMAILLE
	Lieut. B.S. HEATH	Lieut. G.C. FERRIE
	Lieut. P.K. HEYWOOD	Lieut. R.M.L. GLADNEY
	Lieut. G. HYMERS	Lieut. E. HOLTZMAN
	Lieut. A.H. KETCHESON	Lieut. D. JENKIN
	Lieut. C.M. MACREATH	Lieut. F. LAYTON
		Lieut. A.C. McFARLANE
		Lieut. T.B. SMITH (attached)
	3rd C.M.G. Company	13th C.M.G. Company
Officer Commanding	Major E.H. HOUGHTON	Lieut. J. KAY
	Lieut V.E. CHAMBERS	Lieut. G.W.N. DAY
	Lieut. H. DONALD	Lieut. A. DENHOLM
	Lieut. M.S. HAAS	Lieut. G.H. DUNBAR
	Lieut. J.A. HOUSE	Lieut. J. MAITLAND
	Lieut. R.H. MORRIS	Lieut. W.B. MILNER
	Lieut. H.V.de ST. REAL	Lieut. D.A. McINTOSH
	Lieut. W.J. SCOUGAL	Lieut. A. McKENZIE
	Lieut. T. STEELE	Lieut. C.G. McLEAN
	Lieut. R.H. MATTHEWS	Lieut. A.E. PARKER
	Lieut. R.D. TAYLOR (Attached)	



**Second Division.**

D.M.G.O. Major W.D.B. GOODFELLOW.

	4th C.M.G. Company.	5th C.M.G. Company.
Officer Commanding	Major W.J. FORBES-MITCHELL	Major S.W. WATSON
	Captain J.G. WEIR	Lieut. A.C. BOWLES
	Lieut. W.L. CAMPBELL	Lieut. H.A. CREIGHTON
	Lieut. G.F. CLINGAN	Lieut. O.B. ELLER
	Lieut. W.R. COX	Lieut. C.V. GRANTHAM
	Lieut. C.W. DUFF	Lieut. G. HOBSON
	Lieut. R. FLEMING	Lieut. W.H.F. KETCHESON
	Lieut. A.D. GRAY	Lieut. H.A. McBURNEY
	Lieut. J.A. McCAMUS	Lieut. H.B. SINCLAIR
	Lieut. W.D. NORTHGRAVE	Lieut. B.A. TAYLOR
	Lieut. J.H. RAMSAY	
	Lieut. W.J. SMALLACOMBE	
	Lieut. L.F. WHITE	
	6th C.M.G. Company.	14th C.M.G. Company.
Officer Commanding	A/Major A. EASTHAM	A/Major J. BASEVI
	Lieut. J.W.V. DICKIE	Lieut. P.J. BULLOCK
	Lieut. W.L. HARDIMAN	Lieut. G.N. DOUGLAS
	Lieut. E.R. ROBINSON	Lieut. T.F. O'FLAHERTY
	Lieut. J. STONEHEWER	Lieut. W.C. THOMPSON
	Lieut. W.F. TUCKER	Lieut. J. TURNER
	Lieut. J. WADDINGTON	Lieut. L.F. WHITE
	Lieut. C.V. WILLIAMS	Lieut. T. DICK ( <i>Attached</i> )



### Third Division

D.M.G.O. Major J.W.H.G.H. VAN den BERG.

	<b>7th C.M.G. Company.</b>	<b>8th C.M.G. Company.</b>
Office Commanding	Lieut. D.S. FORBES, M.C.	Lieut. J.R. COULL
	Lieut. F.W. BURNHAM	Lieut. V. BECKETT
	Lieut. H.E.B. COYNE	Lieut. J. DICKINSON
	Lieut. J.J. DIXON	Lieut. G.Q. DOWLING
	Lieut. F.A. HALE	Lieut. R.S. HICKS
	Lieut. B.J. MOTHERSILL	Lieut. H.J.G. MORGAN
	Lieut. E.R. MORRIS	Lieut. H.J.R. PARKES
	Lieut. J.C. McDOWELL	Lieut. J.K. PITCAIRN
	Lieut. H. McKENZIE	Lieut. D.W. ROWAT
	Lieut. F.M. WHEATLEY	Lieut. J. THOMSON (Attached)
	<b>9th C.M.G. Company.</b>	<b>15th C.M.G. Company.</b>
Officer Commanding	Lieut. A.M. McFAUL	Captain W.N. MOORHOUSE
	Lieut. J.H. CLARK	Lieut. C.E. GARNEAU
	Lieut. K.E. DRINKWATER	Lieut. F.McK. GARRISON
	Lieut. M.L. ELLIS	Lieut. J.C. HARTLEY
	Lieut. J.S. HENRY	Lieut. W.J. HUTCHENS
	Lieut. E.H.I. INGS	Lieut. P.C. MULHOLLAND
	Lieut. H.A. JOHNSON	Lieut. J.R. McLEAN
	Lieut. A.R. MADGETT	Lieut. G.W.H. MILLICAN (Attached)
	Lieut. L.S. PAGE	
	Lieut. W.G. CAIRNS (Attached)	



**Fourth Division.**

D.M.G.O. Captain H.F.V. MEURLING, M.C.

Officer Commanding	Lieut. J.C. BRITTON	Major B.M. CLERK
	Lieut. F.W.G. BARBER-STARKEY	Lieut. H.J. BURDEN
	Lieut. I. DICKENSON	Lieut. W.P. CLIFTON
	Lieut. H.A. FOWLER	Lieut. J.P. CONNOLLY
	Lieut. H.R. GOODDAY	Lieut. R.McG. FOSTER
	Lieut. A.E. LADLER	Lieut. A.G. GATES
	Lieut. G. SAGE	Lieut. T.F. MURRAY
	Lieut. C.F. THOMPSON	Lieut. A.G. SCOTT
	Lieut. K. WEAVER	Lieut. W.A. SHIELDS
		Lieut. W. STRONG
		Lieut. N.L. BURT (Attached)
		Lieut. A.B. ROBINSON (Attached)
		Lieut. H.L. STAVELEY (Attached)
		Lieut. V.C. QUAYLE (Attached)
		Lieut. J.M. WHITEHEAD (Attached)

**12th C.M.G. Company.**

Officer Commanding	Lieut. L.F. PEARCE
	Lieut. T.H.H. BEVAN
	Lieut. C.D. COTTON
	Lieut. I.C. HALL
	Lieut. H.E. HENDERSON
	Lieut. E.J.K. NORRIS
	Lieut. H.A. PEVERLEY
	Lieut. H. RAMSAY
	Lieut. A. RICHARDS
	Lieut. J.A. RIDDELL
	Lieut. W.G. WILLIAMS

**16th C.M.G. Company.**

Captain E.W. SANSOM
Lieut. A.W. ALLAN
Lieut. L. GAVREAU
Lieut. S. JOHNSTON
Lieut. H.T. LOGAN
Lieut. R.D. MATHESON
Lieut. B.C. MONTAGNON
Lieut. E.L. RAINBOTH
Lieut. A. RITCHIE
Lieut. W.H. WATSON
Major F.S. POVAH (Attached).



**1st C.M.M.G. Brigade**

Officer Commanding  
Adjutant

Lieut.-Colonel F.A. WILKIN  
Lieut. A.E. BAKER  
Major M.A. SCOTT  
Captain W.F. BATTERSBY  
Captain E.H. HOLLAND  
Lieut. T. BROTHERTON  
Lieut. R.C. CLARKE  
Lieut. L.G. FRANCIS  
Lieut. M.R. LEVEY  
Lieut. J.K. LAWSON  
Lieut. F.C. YOUNG

**Borden**

Motor Machine Gun Battery.

Officer Commanding    Captain P.A.G. MacCARTHY  
Lieut. A.E. KILL  
Lieut. F.W. THOMPSON

**Eaton**

Motor Machine Gun Battery.

Lieut. G.F. SCROGGIE  
Lieut. F.P. O'REILLY  
Lieut. E. OSBORNE (Detached)

**Yukon**

Motor Machine Gun Battery.

Officer Commanding    Lieut. W.C. NICHOLSON  
Lieut. W. BLACK  
Lieut. R.D. HARKNESS, M.C.  
Lieut. J.A. Mac KINNON.



## IX.

## FORMATION OF CANADIAN MACHINE GUN CORPS.

April 16th, 1917.

**Status of Personnel prior to Formation of C.M.G.C.**

The entire Machine Gun Personnel of 222 Officers and 5,943 Other Ranks, though belonging to independent Units and undergoing separate and different forms of Training from the Infantry, were still on the Strength of Infantry Units and shown as seconded to the various Machine Gun Units. Questions of seniority and promotion were settled by Infantry lists, a condition which, of course, worked a great hardship upon the Machine Gun Service, for there was no incentive for Officers and Other Ranks to join the Machine Gun Service, or to remain and take an interest in their work if they found themselves serving with a Machine Gun Unit. Many Officers returned to their Infantry Units because of this unsatisfactory condition of things. Machine Gun Companies had now been in existence over a year: they had enveloped fighting traditions, individuality and a degree of technical skill in the use of their weapons. The time was ripe for the bringing together of all the separate diverse Machine Gun Units under a single administrative Formation.

**Application for a C.M.G.C.**

On January 15th, 1917, application was made by Lieutenant-General Sir JULIAN BYNG, Commanding the Canadian Corps, for authority to form "*a Canadian Machine Gun Corps on similar lines to that of the British service.*" The serious condition of the Machine Gun Service at the time is clearly indicated in the Corps Commander's letter:-

*"The situation of the Machine Gun Companies serving with the Canadian Corps as regards supply of personnel, conditions of service, and promotion is highly unsatisfactory and has resulted in extravagance, inefficiency and discontent.*

*"To remedy this serious state of things the creation of a Canadian Machine Gun Corps should be undertaken forthwith, and I attach the greatest importance to this step being taken without delay.*

*"As things are at present the Machine Gun Companies of the Canadian Corps must inevitably break down during active operations."<sup>32</sup>*

**Authorisation: Constitution.**

This application was favourably considered and the formation of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps authorised as from April 16th, 1917,<sup>33</sup> just a week after the capture of VIMY RIDGE. The constitution was set forth as follows:-

*"Organisation.*

*"The Canadian Machine Gun Corps will be divided into three Branches and the Depot:-*

*(a) Cavalry*

*(b) Infantry*

*(c) Motor Machine Gun Service.*

*"Composition of Personnel.*

*"The personnel will be provided by the transfer to the Canadian Machine Gun Corps of all ranks now in the several branches of the Canadian Machine Gun Service in the Field and in England.*

*"Officers.*

*"Officers will be transferred, and, in special cases, seconded to the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, a seniority list will be established and future promotions will be made from the Seniority List of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, in their respective Branches, by selection with due regard to seniority. Officers who become casualties, on recovering will be employed on training duty in England, but are to be made available for service in the Field as soon as pronounced fit for General Service.*

*"Officer Instructors at the Machine Gun Depot are, as far as possible, to be selected from Units in the Field and are to be regarded as being on an equality for promotion with Officers in the Field.*

<sup>32</sup> (C.C. G.669/6 d/15-1-17).

<sup>33</sup> G.O. 101./1917.



*"The required supply of Officers to be secured from the following sources on organisation, and subsequently for maintenance of Officer personnel:-*

- (a) Reintegration by transfer to the Canadian Machine Gun Corps of Officers previously in the Machine Gun Service and now serving in Infantry Battalions.*
- (b) By transfer of casualty Machine Gun Officers now on the General List in England.*
- (c) By transfer to the Canadian Machine Gun Corps after a period of instruction and probation all Officers who may be available for service in the Canadian Machine Gun Corps.*
- (d) By promotion from the ranks after an adequate Course of Instruction, candidates qualified to become Officers in the Canadian Machine Gun Corps.*

*"Other Ranks.*

*"The Other Ranks of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps will be composed of W.O's, N.C.Os, and men transferred from their present Corps to the corresponding branch of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, and also of men of superior intelligence and physically suitable for the Machine Gun Corps transferred from training Battalions, etc: after acceptance at the Machine Gun Depot. Men whom it is found will not make good Machine Gunners are to be retransferred to their original Units.*

*"Promotions Other Ranks in the Field.*

*"Promotion up to and including the substantive Rank of Sergeant will be made by the O.C., the Brigade Machine Gun Squadron or Company on a roster comprising all personnel of Machine Gun Corps serving in the Brigade Machine Gun Squadron or Company.*

*"Promotion to Acting Colour Sergeant appointment as Acting Squadron or Company Sergeant-Major, or ACTING Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sergeant will be made personally by the O.C., the Machine Gun Squadron or Company.*

*"Promotion to Colour Sergeant appointment as Squadron or Company Sergeant-Major or Squadron or Company Quartermaster Sergeant will be made by the A.A.G., Canadian Section, 3rd Echelon, General Headquarters, for the personnel of Machine Gun Corps of each Cavalry or Infantry Division in the Field.*

*"Promotion in the Motor Machine Gun Service up to or including the substantive rank of Sergeant and temporary promotion to Acting Battery Sergeant-Major will be made by the O.C., the Motor Machine Gun Battery.*

*"Promotion to Battery Sergeant-Major will be made by the A.A.G., Canadian Section, 3rd Echelon, General Headquarters, from a roster kept by him of all Sergeants in the Motor Machine Gun Service in the Field, recommended for promotion by their Battery Commanders.*

*"Promotion Other Ranks in England. "Promotion up to and including the Acting Rank of Sergeant will be made by the O.C. Machine Gun Depot or Os.C. Brigade Machine Gun Squadrons, Batteries or Companies mobilising in England from the roster kept by the Os.C. the several units.*

*"Promotions to Acting ranks above that of Acting Sergeant will be made by the O.C. Canadian Machine Gun Depot, from a roster of all Acting Sergeants of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps in England recommended for promotion by their own Squadron, Battery or Company Commanders.*

*"Establishments:*

*(a) "The Units to be maintained are the several Machine Gun Companies, Machine Gun Squadron, and Motor Machine Gun Brigade, organised under W.E. Pat VII and W.E. Part XVI, 1916, at present serving with the British Expeditionary Force, and certain Machine Gun Companies mobilising for service Overseas under the same Establishments.*

*(b) "In addition to the Machine Gun Units serving or mobilising for service in the Field, a Machine Gun Depot is organised in England under the Establishment laid down in Routine Order No. 150, Headquarters Canadians, dated 4th January, 1917."*

*(Reference: A.G. Canadians, 43-3-15).*



**Command.**

It is to be observed that the question of command was not dealt with in the above contribution: its contents have to do solely with administration, with the provision of Machine Gun Personnel, and with looking after their interests when provided. But though the question of authority over Machine Guns was not directly advanced by the authorisation of the Corps, Machine Gun Service was very greatly benefitted by the formation of this central echelon.

**Promotion: Reinforcements.**

A career was guaranteed to Machine Gun Officers and Other Ranks within the limits of promotion on the Corps, and provision was made for a continuous supply of trained Reinforcements by the inclusion of an Establishment for a recognized Machine Gun Depot in England. The reorganisation of the Depot had already been carried out, pending the authorisation of its Establishment. The supply of trained Officer personnel was further increased by the provision for reintegration by transfer of Officers formerly in the Machine Gun Service who had returned to their Infantry Units.

**Conditions of Transfer.**

A firm foundation was laid for future successes in the Field by the high standard set up for admission of Personnel to the Machine Gun Corps. Officers of other Branches of the Service available for transfer were to be given instruction in Machine Gun work during a period of probation: Other Ranks, transferred to the Machine Gun Corps, who showed themselves unlikely to become efficient Machine Gunners were to be transferred to their original Units. It was also provided that only Other Ranks of "*superior intelligence and physically suitable*" were to be accepted for transfer from training Battalions.

**Canadian M.G. Squadron.**

The Cavalry Branch of the Corps consisted of the Canadian Machine Gun Squadron. This Unit, while technically on the strength of the Machine Gun Corps, in practice was detailed from the Canadian Corps and operated with a Cavalry Division of the British Forces. Its administrative needs were attended to by the Formation to which it was attached from time to time.

**Canadian M.G. Depot.**

As regards the Machine Gun Depot in England, its reorganisation was carried out under the direction of the Corps Machine Gun Officer, and the Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Col. W.M. BALFOUR was provided from the Field; but the Depot was administered from Canadian General headquarters in London.

**Headquarters Staff.**

A temporary Staff to assist the C.M.G.O. was appointed at this time as the constitution made no provision for a Headquarters Staff. This omission was, however, remedied on March 19th, 1918, when the Headquarters Staff was authorised and the following appointments were made:-

Major W.B. FORSTER, M.C.	27th Canadian Infantry Battalion
Staff Officer to C.M.G.C. Commander.	(Graded as Brigade Major).
Captain J.K. LAWSON	1st C.M.M.G. Brigade.
Lieut. W.T. TRENCH	C.M.G.C. Pool,
Staff Lieutenant for Reconnaissance Duties.	



**Changes in Staff.**

On April 24th, Lieut. P.M. HUMME replaced Lieut. W.T. TRENCH as Reconnaissance Officer when the latter received the Command of a Battery in 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade.

In the Summer of 1918, the addition of a Staff Learner to the Staff was authorised and Captain M.R. LEVEY was appointed to fill the position.

**C.M.G.C. a Separate Branch.**

By the granting of this constitution the Machine Gun Corps became an independent Branch of the Canadian Overseas Forces, on a par with the Infantry, Artillery, Engineers, Cavalry, etc. It may be said that the corporate life of the Corps had its beginning at this time, and all those subsequent changes in organisation served but to emphasise the individuality of its life and its active, original and progressive independence of character.



## X.

**PROVISIONAL FORMATION OF DIVISIONAL MACHINE GUN "BATTALION".**  
**August 23rd, 1917.**

**INTRODUCTORY.****Grouping of Companies Recommended.**

Two months after the provisional appointment of Divisional Machine Gun Officer Lieut.-Col. BRUTINEL recommended to the Corp Commander *"that the Machine Gun Companies of a Division should be grouped under a Group Commander, with a suitable Staff. The Commanders, Machine Gun Companies, would be responsible for the training and efficiency of the Machine Gun Companies and would co-ordinate the tactical employment of the Machine Gun Companies under the General staff of the Division."*<sup>34</sup>

**Chief Reason.**

The chief reason for the change put forward by the Corps Machine Gun Officer was that, under the prevailing organisation the Machine Gun Personnel could not acquire and maintain the increasing high standard of Training required of them. The modified employment of Machine Guns in Overhead and Barrage Fire demanded of Officers and Men greater technical knowledge and skill than was formerly necessary, whereas the distribution of Companies among Brigades was unfavourable to the maintenance or improvement of training standards *"by reason of their employment in the line or other reasons."* Some companies were well-trained, others were less well-trained, their *"comparative efficiency reflecting in the main the personality of the Company Commander."*

**Other Reasons.**

There were difficulties too in the way of the Provisional D.M.G.O.'s supervision of the work of the Machine Gun Units. By the terms of his office he *"assisted"* Divisional and Brigade Commanders in co-ordinating the Organisation, Training, and Technical Employment of all the Machine Guns in the Division, just as the Brigade Machine Gun Officer had assisted Brigade and Battalion Commanders in Machine Gun matters in the Brigade: but as was the case with the B.M.G.O., so to a much greater degree with the D.M.G.O., there were practical difficulties in the way of translating this assistance into results.

**D.M.G.O.'s lack of Authority.**

In the first place the D.M.G.O. had no real authority. In the Line and out of the Line Machine Gun Companies were with their Brigades, and in all matters of Tactics, Administration and Training, Company Commanders were responsible to the G.O.C. Brigade. The D.M.G.O. might inspect Machine Gun Units as to their state of Discipline and Training: he could not issue Orders, on his own authority, to improve or correct conditions which he found prevailing. A further difficulty was that, even had the D.M.G.O. possessed the requisite authority, his supervision of Organisation and Training could with great difficulty be made effective so long as the Units with which he had to do were billeted, when out of the Line, each in its own Brigade Area.

It was to remove these difficulties, which experience showed to impede the work of the D.M.G.O., that Lieut.-Col. BRUTINEL recommended the grouping of the 4 Companies in each Division under a Senior Machine Gun Officer and giving to this Officer the *"responsibility"* for their Training and efficiency.

**Derivative Advantages.**

At the same time it was urged that other advantages would be derived from this Organisation besides improvement in Training and efficiency. Among these advantages were the following:-

- (1) Uniformity of doctrine in the Division.
- (2) Facilities for interchange and promotion of Officers and N.C.O.'s in the group on a Broader basis than is the case in the Brigade Companies.
- (3) Facilities for reorganization during heavy fighting, permitting the prompt re-construction of efficient and organized fighting elements.

<sup>34</sup> C.C.M.G. A 1/103218, dated February 12th, 1917.



- (4) Better distribution of the Machine Gun Companies on the Divisional Front, according to the tactical requirements; and better co-ordination.
- (5) Improved liaison with the Infantry and other Arms: the liaison would begin in '*fact*' at the Divisional Headquarters.

It was maintained that these advantages were "*sufficient to outweigh the sentimental objections which might be raised regarding the separation of Companies from the Brigade with which they had served.*" These sentimental objections had already been reduced as a result of the radical changes in the methods of recruiting Machine Gun Personnel.



## ORGANISATION.

### Corps Commander's Recommendation.

The recommendations of Lieut.-Col. BRUTINEL were warmly approved by Lieut.-General BYNG who forwarded them to Army with a covering letter in which he wrote:-

*"I advocate very ardently the grouping of the four Machine Gun Companies in the Division."*

*"The standard of training at present is not level, nor is it likely to be under the present conditions."*

*"The tactics of Machine Gun Companies require a specialist and he can only be found when several Units are placed under one Command."<sup>35</sup>*

No authority for the new organisation was received during the Summer of 1917. In the Autumn pending the receipt of authority, the organisation was instituted provisionally, and the Four Machine Gun Companies in each Division were grouped into a Machine Gun Battalion. On August 23rd, instructions were issued by the Corps Commander for its provisional organisation. His letter which stated shortly the reasons for the change, and the nature of the new organisation, and defined with some detail the duties of the Divisional Machine Gun Commander (D.M.G.C.) is quoted in full:-

### MACHINE GUN ORGANISATION.

*"Recent fighting experience tends to show that the present organization of Machine Gun Companies is not the best that could be devised for tactical purposes. For several months past it has been the exception rather than the rule for Machine Gun Companies belonging to Brigades to be covering only their own Brigades in the Line or to be withdrawn from the Line when their own Brigades go out for rest and training."*

*"With the increasing development of Machine Gun Fire this tendency will be more and more accentuated. It follows from this that Infantry Brigadiers, while normally responsible for the training and tactical employment of their Machine Gun Companies, have, in practice, little opportunity for supervising their discipline and training, while the tactical employment of their Machine Gun Companies has more often than not to be organised on a Divisional or Corps basis in which all the resources of the Division, and even of the Corps have to be pooled."*

*"The Corps Commander has therefore decided that all four Machine Gun Companies in each Division shall be grouped in one Unit under Divisional control. This Unit which will be known provisionally as the 'the Divisional Machine Gun Battalion,' will be commanded by the Divisional Machine Gun Officer, who will be known as the D.M.G. Commander and will be provided with the necessary Headquarters as laid down in Appendix "A" attached.<sup>36</sup>"*

*"This personnel will be provided under Divisional arrangements pending the establishment being approved officially."*

*"While the general administration of the Machine Gun Battalion will be in the hands of the D.M.G. Commander, each Machine Gun Company will continue to be a self-contained administrative Unit as at present."*

*"The Divisional Machine Gun Commander's duties will be, generally, as follows:-*

- (1) "The D.M.G. Commander's position will be analogous to that of the C.R.A. He will wear the Divisional Brassard with the M.G. Badge."*
- (2) "He will be solely responsible to the Divisional Commander for the training and administration of all the Machine Gun Companies of the Division."*
- (3) "He will assist the Corps Machine Gun Officer in all matters concerning the personnel of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps and in the technical machine gun training and organization of his units."*

<sup>35</sup> C.C. G.547. 61/16 dated February 14th, 1917.

<sup>36</sup> No Appendix A is available from the records at this time.



- (4) *“He will be the technical adviser of the Divisional Commander in all matters regarding the tactical employment of Machine Guns in attack and defence and will assist the Divisional and Brigade Staffs in co-ordinating all details connected therewith, including the organization of the necessary communications in conjunction with the Divisional Signal Officer, and the arrangement of Machine Gun reliefs.”*
- (5) *“For the purpose of operations he will take executive command of any concentration of Machine Guns which the Divisional Commander may wish to make.”*
- (6) *“He will be responsible for keeping Infantry brigadiers and Battalion Commanders in the line and on either flank of the Division informed as to the disposition of the Machine Guns covering their respective sectors, and will ensure that close and constant liaison is maintained between Infantry and Machine Gun Units.”*

***“Battalion” Headquarters.***

*“Battalion” Headquarters as detailed in Appendix “A” of the above letter was composed as under:*

<i>Commander<sup>37</sup></i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Adjutant<sup>38</sup></i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Clerks<sup>39</sup></i>	<i>2</i>
<i>Batmen</i>	<i>2</i>

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<sup>37</sup> Should be given the rank of Lieut.-Colonel.

<sup>38</sup> Rank of Captain.

<sup>39</sup> One of the Clerks to be a draughtsman.



## ASSEMBLING OF “BATTALIONS”.

### 1st Divisional Battalion.

The change to the new Organisation, involving as it did the little alteration in Establishment, occurred with scarcely an outward sign that a change had taken place. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 13th Companies were in the Line LIEVIN-LOOS Sector when the Order for their formation into a “*Battalion*” was published by the First Division on September 8th. Rear Headquarters of the 2 Right Companies, the 1st and 2nd, were at SAINS-EN-GOHELLE; the 3rd and 13th Companies had their Rear Headquarters and Transport Lines at LES BREBIS. These Locations were not altered until the end of the Divisional Tour, when all 4 Companies, on Relief, moved to Billets in DIVION and there came together for the first time as a “*Battalion*,” on October 18th, 1917.

### 2nd Divisional Battalion.

The Second Division Companies were in the Line for the capture of HILL 70 when the Order for the formation of M.G. “Battalions” was issued. On completion of this Tour they were relieved by Third Division Companies and proceeded to CAMBLAIN L’ABBE where they were first organised as a “*Battalion*.”

### 3rd Divisional Battalion.

Companies of the Third Division which relieved Second Division M.G. Units after the HILL 70 Operation were in turn relieved by First Division Companies on the night of 5th/6th September. Their first Tour with the new Organisation began at once on the VIMY SECTOR, with Transport Lines at AUX RIETZ-LA TARGETTE.

### 4th Divisional Battalion.

The Transport Lines of the 10th, 11th, 12th and 16th Companies were brought together in a new Fourth Division Machine Gun Camp at CARENCY in the first week of September. The Companies were continuously in the Line when the Transition from Company to Battalion Organisation took place.

### D.M.G.C.’s.

The D.M.G.O.’s in each Division became D.M.G.C.s:-

First Divisional M.G. Battalion, Major S.W. WATSON, D.S.O.

Second Divisional M.G. Battalion, Major W.D.B. GOODFELLOW, M.C.

Third Divisional M.G. Battalion, Major W.N. MOORHOUSE

Fourth Divisional M.G. Battalion, Major E.H. HOUGHTON, M.C.

In the case of the Fourth Division Major HOUGHTON had been brought in as D.M.G.O. from the First Division in June 1917, to succeed Capt. H.F.V. MEURLING, M.C., evacuated sick in March, 1917. Major HOUGHTON relinquished the appointment of D.M.G.C. on Sept. 2nd on proceeding to join the United States Army, and was succeeded by Major M.A. SCOTT, D.S.O., of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade.



## OBSERVATION ON "BATTALION" ORGANISATION.

### Limited Powers of D.M.G.C.

Each one of these Divisional M.G. Units was a "*Battalion*" in name only. It was not a Battalion in the sense of the work as applied to an Infantry Battalion. Each Machine Gun Company remained unchanged as an administrative Unit, keeping its own Records, with its own Orderly Room Staff and Q.M. Stores. "Q" requirements, Pay and Medical Services were attended to separately for each Company. O.S.C. Companies possessed punishment powers of a Commanding Officer. The D.M.G.C. was not a Commanding Officer in the normal meaning of the term. His powers of Command were exercised only in matters of Training.

Moreover at this stage the tie between the Brigades and Machine Gun Companies was still very strong. Brigade Staff thought and long continued to think of the Machine Gun Companies as "*their own*," as a Unit in their Brigade Group.

### Tactical Defects.

This lack of real authority of the D.M.G.C. over Machine Gun Units in tactical matters was a very central weakness in the Organisation. It was soon recognised that the logical development of Machine Gun Organisation was the formation of a Battalion with a cohesive Battalion Organisation. A Commanding Officer cannot get the most out of his Command if he only has the supervision of Training. He cannot secure control of Officers and Men serving directly under him by meeting them on the parade ground alone. He must fight with his Unit; he must exercise control over his Men under Fire as well as in Billets if he is to obtain the fullest and best results of Training. This fact of Nature had eventually to be accepted, with necessary modifications, for the Machine Gun Corps as well as for other Branches of the Service. Again the dual control involved in this Organisation impaired the efficiency of the Machine Gun Service. When out of Line Machine Gun Units were under the D.M.G.C. When in Line, such of them as were not employed on Barrage work were under Orders of the Brigadier in whose area they were placed. In some cases Orders were given by the Brigade Staffs which entailed the employment of principles directly contrary to those received in Training. This was only natural; it reflected in no way upon the efficiency of the Staff Officers concerned: but was due rather to the fact that during the War, Machine Gunnery had become a special Branch of Military Science with Tactics of its own distinct from Infantry Tactics: to become an efficient Machine Gun Officer and to understand the correct employment of Machine Guns it was now necessary to "*know the gun*," its powers and possibilities, and to have experience in the actual handling of it in the Field: and few Infantry Officers had this knowledge and experience. It could only be expected, therefore, that Machine Gunners under Orders of Infantry Brigadiers and Battalion Commanders should be asked to do tasks which were impossible or which should properly be carried out by the Lewis Gun. If any hesitation was shown to carry out the Orders of Brigade Staffs there was often a disposition to regard Machine Gunners as unwilling to do their full share of the work of fighting, whereas the central problem governing the entire development of Machine Gun Organisation and Tactics was, "*given the Vickers Gun, with its own peculiar characteristics, how can it be best employed to support the Infantry under all conditions of warfare*." It became more and more clear that Machine Guns could not be employed to the best advantage so long as this system of dual control was continued.

### Formation of Administrative Battalions Advocated.

This Divisional Machine Gun Group known as "*Divisional Machine Gun Battalion*" was never officially authorised by G.H.Q. It was just a step in the development of the Machine Gun Battalion Organisation, and before its authorisation took place it was superseded by a Battalion organised in fact as well as in form. Experience gained in the fighting of 1917 proved conclusively that the development could not rest at this stage. The Machine Gun Strength of a Division had to be fluid, - immediately available at that part of the Line where it was most needed: and it ought to be controlled in large measure in the Field as well as in periods of Training by qualified Machine Gun Officers. This fact began to be realised by the Higher Command towards the end of 1917, as is shown by the following extracts from a letter written on November 2nd, by General Sir H.S. HORNE, Commanding the First Army. The letter was forwarded to G.H.Q. in reply to the points for consideration under G.H.Q., No.).B./407, dated October 21st, 1917, and the Notes which accompanied it.

*"I am strongly of the opinion, and am supported by a large proportion of the Divisional and Infantry Brigade Commanders, that the Machine Gun Companies should be organised as a Battalion, and form part of the Divisional Troops."*



After indicating recent developments in Machine Gun Tactics, the letter concludes:

*“The view of the correct tactical handling of Machine Guns advocated by me, and supported by the majority of opinion in this Army, is this:”*

*“They should be employed on similar principles to Artillery and be allotted to meet the tactical situation, and, as required, for training. To carry out this role, the Machine Guns must be organised in on formation and as Divisional Troops.”*

*“Theoretically, every Infantry Brigadier and Battalion Commander should understand the training and the tactical employment of Machine Guns, but this is not the case in fact, I fancy but few Brigadiers now-a-days are fit to train a Machine Gun Company. The whole training is now a matter of ‘cram,’ it takes a Brigadier all his time to command and train four Battalions. The less thoroughly educated the Officers of the Army are, the more the necessity for experts in the different Arms. The D.M.G.O. should be responsible for the training of the whole of the Machine Gun Companies in the Division in order that the training may be equal and uniform and the tactical use of the Machine Gun developed.”*

*“I do not think that need be any fear, during the continuance of the war, that the senior Machine Gun Officers will not have sufficient general tactical knowledge to permit of their being posted to Command of Battalions.”<sup>40</sup>*

### **Duration of New Organisation.**

This Divisional-Group, or so called Battalion Machine Gun Organisation was comparatively short-lived. The D.M.G.C. like his predecessor the D.M.G.O., had never more than a provisional existence in the Canadian Corps. This Organisation came into effect on September 1st, 1917: it persisted during the Operations of the Third Battle of YPRES (PASSCHENDAELE), and on through the Trench Warfare of the Winter of 1917-18. On February 22nd, 1918, it was superseded by a form of Battalion Organisation which proved to be the fore-runner of that final Organisation assumed by battalions of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps.

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<sup>40</sup> First Army No. 1587 (C).



## XI.

### IMPROVEMENT IN INSTRUCTIONAL AND REINFORCING ARRANGEMENTS.

#### FORMATION OF MACHINE GUN WING, CANADIAN CORPS SCHOOL. AUGUST 18TH, 1917.

##### **Instruction in the Summer of 1917.**

In the Summer of 1917, while efforts were being put forward to improve the existing Machine Gun Organisation, the interests of Machine Gun Instruction were also receiving the attention of the Corps Machine Gun Officer. The School for Officers at PERNES had been discontinued in March, prior to the VIMY RIDGE Operation. Since that time there had been no central School of Machine Gun Instruction in the Canadian Corps in the Field. Training of Canadian Machine Gun Personnel was carried on during this period in the Machine Gun Companies themselves, at the Depot in England or at the G.H.Q., Small Arms School, CAMIENS.

##### **Formation.**

On July 26th, the first step was taken toward the formation of a Corps Machine Gun School in the Field. On this date Lieut-Colonel BRUTINEL met the 4 D.M.G.O.'s to discuss the subject and it was decided to go on with Organisation. On August 8th, the C.M.G.O. submitted to the B.C., G.S. Canadian Corps a proposed Syllabus of Training for Officers and N.C.O.'s. On the 18th, Canadian Corps issued a letter<sup>41</sup> authorising the School and setting forth its Organisation. On the 23rd, Captain M.R. Levey, 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade was appointed Chief Instructor.

##### **Staff.**

The School assumed the form of a permanent Machine Gun Branch of the Canadian Corps School; the permanent Staff was to consist of 2 Officers and 3 N.C.O.'s from the authorised Establishment of the Canadian Corps School. These were to be supplemented as required by Officers and N.C.O.'s from the C.M.G.O.'s Machine Gun Pool, or Machine Gun Units of the Canadian Corps.

##### **Objects.**

The Objects of the School were:-

- (1) To improve the General and Technical Knowledge of the Officers and N.C.O.'s.
- (2) To develop their Instructional ability.
- (3) To qualify Men for promotion to N.C.O. Rank.

##### **Attendance.**

Attendance at each Course was arranged for and allotments were distributed as follows:

	Officers.	Other Ranks.	TOTAL.
1 Officer, 1 N.C.O. and 1 Gunner from each M.G. Company	16	32	48
2 Officers, 2 N.C.O.'s and 2 Gunners from 1st M.M.G. Brigade	2	4	6
TOTAL	18	36	54

<sup>41</sup> G.49-15-16 dated August 8th, 1917.



**Selection of Students.**

N.C.O.'s were to be selected from among the Senior Corporals suitable for Promotion to the Rank of Sergeant; Gunners were to be sent because of their suitability for Promotion to N.C.O. Rank.

**Entrance Examination.**

It was taken for granted that Officers and N.C.O.'s possessed a knowledge of Elementary Machine Gunnery and Instructional ability sufficient to teach it, so that Elementary Subjects were almost entirely omitted from the Courses. Candidates were obliged, however, to pass an Entrance Examination and those who failed to qualify were returned to their Units for further Training. The Examination was to bear in knowledge of the following subjects and ability to teach them:-

## MACHINE GUN WING – CANADIAN CORPS SCHOOL

## ENTRANCE EXAMINATION

- A. Stripping – (care and correctness).
- B. Care and Cleaning.
- C. Mechanism and Nomenclature.
- D. Immediate Action and Setting up of Stoppages.
- E. How to conduct Test of Elementary Training.
- F. Allocation of Duties – (Sec.16 Inf. M.G. Coy. Training, 1917).
- G. Elementary Drill – (Sec.17 Inf. M.G. Coy. Training, 1917).

**Syllabi.**

The following Syllabi of Training for Officers and N.C.O.'s were laid down and followed as closely as possible:-

## OFFICERS' COURSE.

“A” Discipline and Allied Subjects.

1. Discipline.
  - (a) General Behaviour and Conduct of Officers.
  - (b) Personal Appearance, Physical Fitness, Punctuality.
  - (c) Bearing of Officers toward superior Officers, and N.C.O.'s and Men.
  - (d) Cheerful acceptance of discipline must be taught to Men, by example and precept.
  - (e) Strict and immediate repression of Crime essential.
- 1a. Arrest.
  - (a) Rules for.
  - (b) Telling off and disposal of prisoners.
  - (c) Crimes and punishment on Active Service.
  - (d) Field General Court Martial.
  - (e) Suspension of sentences, Army Act 1915.
2. Morale.
  - (a) Meaning and importance of Morale.
  - (b) Responsibility of Officers for the fostering of Morale. Patriotism, Devotion to Duty, Abnegation and Unselfishness, Comradeship, Unity of Action resulting from intelligent acceptance of rigid Discipline. *Esprit de Corps*, its wider as well as Regimental meaning.
  - (c) Fostering of spirit of Self-Reliance, Grit, Determination and endurance, which must characterize the Machine Gunners.
3. Leadership.
  - (a) Its meaning.



- (b) How to acquire the gift of.
  - (c) Offensive spirit.
  - (d) Training of Men to look up to their Leaders.
  - 4. The Art of Command.
    - (a) Its meaning.
    - (b) How to acquire it.
    - (c) System to ensure continuity of purpose. (Devolution of Command).
    - (d) Issue of Orders, Written and Verbal.
    - (e) Orders – Operation, Standing, Routine.
  - 5. Drill.
    - (a) The Object and value of Drill.
    - (b) Its importance in ensuring the accurate execution of orders in Battle, and as a means of teaching Discipline.
    - (c) Close Order Drill. Section and Company Drill.
    - (d) Gun Drill.
    - (e) Communication or “*Shouting Drill.*” ) To develop the habit of Command.
    - (f) Acting as Instructors and checking faults. )
  - 6. Responsibility of Officers.
    - (a) In Billets and At Training.
    - (b) On the March.
    - (c) In the Trenches.
    - (d) In Battle.
- “B” Organisation Routine Economy Sanitation
- 7. Organisation.
    - (a) Canadian Expeditionary Forces.
    - (b) Canadian Corps.
    - (c) A Division.
    - (d) A Brigade.
    - (e) A Battalion.
    - (f) Canadian Machine Gun Corps.
    - (g) A Machine Gun Company.
  - 8. Interior Economy.
    - (a) Administration of a M.G. Company.
    - (b) Equipment of a M.G. Company.  
Equipment of a M.G. Section.  
Equipment of a Machine Gun.
    - (c) Scale of Clothing.
    - (d) Method of issue of Clothing and Equipment.
    - (e) Rations, scale of issue.
    - (f) Responsibility of Officers with regard to-
      - (i) Upkeep, Maintenance and Economy of Equipment and Clothing.
      - (ii) Proper Cooking and Distribution of Rations.
    - (g) Routine Duties of Officers and N.C.O.’s.
    - (h) Special Duties of Orderly Officers and N.C.O.’s.
  - 9. Sanitation and Medical.
    - (a) Object of, and Rules to follow.
    - (b) Responsibility of Officers with regard to maintenance of Health and Physical Efficiency.
      - (i) In Trenches.
      - (ii) In Billets.
      - (iii) In Bivouacs.
      - (iv) On the Line of March.
    - (c) Care of Feet, Standing Orders on the subject.
    - (d) First Aid and use of Field Dressing.
    - (e) General principles of Evacuation of Wounded.



“C” Communications Messages Reports.

10. Correspondence.

- (a) Official Letters.
- (b) Memoranda and Notes.
- (c) Minutes.

11. Messages.

- (a) Use of A.F. c2121.
- (b) Method of writing a Message, method of finding a PERSON IN THE Field and delivery of the Message.
- (c) Verbal Messages, limitation of.

12. Reports.

- (a) How to be written.
- (b) Trench Reports.
- (c) Reconnaissance, reports. Illustration by Sketches.

“D: Infantry Tactics.

NOTE: THE SUCCESSFUL HANDLING OF MACHINE GUN COMPANIES IN BATTLE IS BASED ON THE CORRECT UNDERSTANDING OF THE INFANTRY TACTICS IN GENERAL AND ON THE DEFINITE AND DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTION IN PROGRESS AS WELL AS THE INTENTION OF THE INFANTRY COMMANDER; THEREFORE THE STUDY OF TACTICAL HANDLING OF THE MACHINE GUNS CANNOT BE DISSOCIATED FROM THE STUDY OF THE INFANTRY TACTICS.

13. Attack in open Warfare of Tactical Points.

- (a) Organisation previous to.
- (b) Distribution of Troops.
- (c) Formation with regard to Ground.
- (d) Formation with regard to Fire.
- (e) Close Communication with Troops on the Flanks.
- (f) Moppers up.
- (g) Handling of Machine Guns.

14. Defence in open Warfare.

- (a) Principle Lines of Defence, holding of Tactical Points.
- (b) Taking up a Defensive Line.
- (c) Siting Trenches by day and by night.
- (d) Handling of Machine Guns.

15. Attack in Trench Warfare.

- (a) Organisation for an Attack from Trenches.
- (b) Supply of Ammunition, Rations and Water.
- (c) Assembly Places.
- (d) Control Post.
- (e) Objective.
- (f) Direction of Attack.
- (g) Flanks.
- (h) Action of various Waves.
- (i) Action of Moppers up.
- (j) Handling of Machine Guns.
  - (i) Mobile Guns.
  - (ii) Barrage Guns.

16. Defence in Trench Warfare.

- (a) Construction of Trenches and improvised System of Defence.
- (b) Siting of Trenches by day and night.
- (c) Methods of holding Trenches.



- (d) Sapping.
- (e) Wiring.
- (f) Handling of Machine Guns.
  - (i) Distribution in Depth
  - (ii) Arrangements for Flanking Fire.
  - (iii) Nest on Tactical Points.

17. Protection of Troops.

- (a) At the Halt.
  - (i) Billets.
  - (ii) Outposts
- (b) On the move.
  - (i) Advanced Guards.
  - (ii) Rear Guards.
  - (iii) Flank Guards.

18. Co-Operation with all Arms.

General Principles of co-operation between M.G., Infantry, Artillery, Trench Mortars, Lewis Guns.

“E” Maps and Allied Subjects.

19. (a) Construction of Maps, Square System.

- (b) Compass, Principle, Construction, Handling.
- (c) Scales and Protractors.
- (d) Contours.
- (e) Map Setting.
- (f) Resection, Plane Table, Compass, Sextant.
- (g) Cross Section.
- (h) Value of correct Map knowledge from tactical point of view, and for Technical Machine Gunnery.
- (i) Trench Map, Situation Map, keeping up to date.
- (j) Field Sketching (Newton method).
  - (i) Value of Field Sketching to illustrate Reports.
  - (ii) Convey information regarding lay of Ground.
  - (iii) Range of Grads.

“F” Technical Machine Gunnery.

- 20. (a) First Elements of Musketry.
  - (i) Theory of Rifle Fire, M.G. Fire, Influences.
  - (ii) Indication and Recognition of Targets.
  - (iii) Estimation of Distances.
  - (iv) Fire Orders, Fire Control.
- (b) Characteristics of M.G. Fire.
  - (i) Various Methods of Application.
  - (ii) Capital Value of Short Range Enfilade Fire.
- 21. (a) The Theory of Indirect M.G. Fire.
- (b) Calculations, Tables, Graphs.
- (c) Tactical value of Overhead M.G. Barrage and Supporting Fire.
- (d) Organisation of Barrage.
  - (i) Terminology.
  - (ii) Fire Organisation.
  - (iii) Fire Orders.
  - (iv) Fire Control.
- (e) Preparation of Barrage Maps.
  - (i) Selection and rapid Organisation of Battery Positions (Camouflage).
  - (ii) Reduction of Barrage Time to Watch Time.
  - (iii) Preparation of Gunners Fire Slips.
  - (iv) Battery Drill.
- (f) Ammunition, Water and various Supplies.
- (g) Intercommunications, Liaison, Control.

22. Organisation of Harrassing Fire.



- (a) Various Methods.
  - (i) Preparation for the Offensive.
  - (ii) In Active Sectors.
  - (iii) In Quiet Sectors.
- (b) Liaison with Intelligence, Artillery, Infantry.
- (c) Selection of Targets.
- (d) Preparation of Targets, Maps, Fire Organisation, Fire Orders.
- (e) Preparation of Position,
- (f) Emphasise value of "Concentration Fire".

23. Anti-Aircraft.

- (a) Mounts.
- (b) Special Sights
- (c) Method of applying Fire.

"G" Special Subjects.

24. (a) Aeroplane Photographs
- (i) Their Interpretation.
  - (ii) Tactical value of Information conveyed.
- (b) Intelligence.
- (i) Gathering and Diffusion of.
- (c) Organisation of a M.G. Position in Trench Warfare.
- (i) Trench Orders, Routine and Standing, Log Book.
  - (ii) Fire Orders, Battle Orders.
  - (iii) Range Cards, Targets, Maps, Fire Organisation.
  - (iv) Trench Stores, Supplies, Inventories.
  - (v) System of making Reliefs.
- (d) Physical Training.
- (i) Physical Fitness is the foundation of all Training. Physical Training is necessary to all Soldiers and vital to the Machine Gunners.
  - (ii) Direct Methods are the best.

Time will be devoted to the application on the ground of all subjects requiring it, and also to the teaching of the Methods of Instruction of these subjects.

N.C.O.'s COURSE.

"A" Discipline and Allied Subjects.

1. Discipline.
  - (a) General Behaviour and Conduct of N.C.O.s.
  - (b) Personal Appearance, Physical Fitness and Punctuality.
  - (c) Knowledge of K.R. & O. paras. 431 to 546.
  - (d) Cheerful acceptance of Discipline, value of Example.
  - (e) Strict and Immediate repression of Crime essential.
- 1a. Arrest.
  - (a) Rules for.
  - (b) Making out Charge Sheet.
  - (c) Making out Statement of Evidence.
  - (d) How to give Evidence.
  - (e) Responsibility for Warning Witnesses.
2. Morale.
  - (a) Meaning and importance of Morale, created chiefly by good discipline.
  - (b) Responsibility of N.C.O.s for the fostering of Morale, Patriotism, Devotion to Duty, Abnegation and spirit of Sacrifice, Comradeship, Unity of Action resulting from Esprit de Corps, its wider as well as its Regimental Meaning.
3. Leadership.



- (a) Its meaning.
  - (b) How to acquire the gift of.
  - (c) Offensive spirit.
  - (d) Training the Men to look up to their Leaders.
4. Command.
- (a) Its meaning.
  - (b) How to acquire it.
  - (c) System to Ensuring Continuity.
  - (d) Issue of Orders, Written and Verbal.
  - (e) Bearing of N.C.O.s towards Men.
5. Drill.
- (a) Object and value of.
  - (b) Its importance to obtain cohesion, and as a means of Discipline. As a means of obtaining accurate execution of Orders in Battle, and the correct execution of all Motions required to keep Gun in action under great stress.
  - (c) Communication Drill, Elementary Gun Drill.
  - (d) Squad Drill.
  - (e) Section Drill.
  - (f) Company Drill.
6. Responsibility of N.C.O.s
- (a) In Billets.
  - (b) On the March.
  - (c) In Trenches.
  - (d) In Billets.

“B” Organisation Routine Economy Sanitation

7. Organisation.
- (a) Of an Army Corps.
  - (b) Of a Division.
  - (c) Of a Brigade.
  - (d) Of a Machine Gun Company.
  - (e) Of a Canadian Machine Gun Corps.
8. Interior Economy.
- (a) Duties of N.C.O.s.
  - (b) Equipment of a Machine Gun Company.
  - (c) Equipment of a Machine Gun Section.
  - (d) Equipment of a Machine Gun.
  - (e) Scale of Clothing.
  - (f) Method of Indenting for Clothing and Rations.
  - (g) Method of Issue of Clothing and Rations.
  - (h) Responsibility of N.C.O.s with regard to upkeep and maintenance of Clothing and Equipment.
9. Sanitation.
- (a) Its object.
  - (b) Responsibility of N.C.O.s
  - (c) Rules to be followed:-
    - In Trenches.
    - In Billets.
    - On the March.
10. Guards and Pickets.
- (a) Duties of Commander.
  - (b) Duties of Sentries.
  - (c) Custody of Prisoners.
11. Essentials for Instructors.



- (a) Study of Text Books.
- (b) Qualities of Machine Gun Instructors.
- (c) Manner.
- (d) Methods of Instruction.
- (e) Instructional Kit.
- (f) Mutual Instruction.
- (g) Practice in Words of Command.

12. Those taking this course are expected to have a working knowledge of the Vickers Gun and of Elementary Drill. Further Instruction in the following is intended to develop Men as Instructors.

- (a) Mechanism and Stoppages.
- (b) Belt Loader.
- (c) Elementary Drill.
- (d) Night Practice in (a), (b) and (c).

“C” Communications Messages and Reports.

13. (a) Official Letters.
- (b) Memoranda and Notes.
  - (c) Minutes.
  - (d) Field Messages, Method of Writing.
  - (e) Method of Finding a Person in the Field.
  - (f) Verbal Messages.
  - (g) Reports, how to be written.
  - (h) Trench Reports.
  - (i) Use of Telegraph, Telephone, Flares, etc.
  - (j) Inventories, taking over Trench Stores.
  - (k) Reconnaissance Reports and illustration by Sketches.
  - (l) Necessity of quick Communication in Battle.

“D” Tactics.

14. Handling of Machine Guns.

- (a) In Open Warfare.
  - (i) Attack.
  - (ii) Defence.
  - (iii) Cover and the Use of Ground.
- (b) In Trench Warfare.
  - (i) Attack.
  - (ii) Defence.

15. Protection.

- (a) At the Halt:-
  - of Billets,
  - of Outposts
- (b) On the Move:-
  - Advanced Guards.
  - Rear Guards.
  - Flank Guards.

“E” Physical Training.

16. (a) The Foundation of all other Training, necessity of, to all Soldiers, especially to Machine Gunners.
- (b) Best Methods, Practical Instruction in.

“F” Maps and Allied Subjects.

17. (a) Construction and Square System, Conventional Signs.
- (b) Scales and Protractors.
  - (c) Compass – Construction of, Use and Handling.
  - (d) Contours, locating and plotting.
  - (e) Setting of Maps, various Methods.



- (f) Resection by Plane Table, Compass, etc.
  - (g) Cross Sections.
  - (h) Value of correct Map knowledge from a tactical point of view and for Technical Machine Gunnery.
  - (i) Trench and Situation Maps, how to keep up to date.
  - (j) All Methods of finding and keeping Direction.
18. Field Sketching.
- (a) To illustrate Reports and convey information re Ground.
  - (b) Applied to Range Cards.
19. (a) Elements of Musketry and Influences including:-
- Theory of Rifle Fire.
  - Indication and Recognition of Targets.
  - Visual Training, Range Finders.
  - Fire Orders.
  - Fire Control.
- (b) Characteristics of Machine Gun Fire, and various applications, including Short Range, Enfilade Fire.
  - (c) Theory of Indirect Fire.
  - (d) Calculations and Tables.
  - (e) Organisation of Barrages and supporting Fire. (Terminology).
  - (f) Fire Organisation.
  - (g) Fire Orders.
  - (h) Fire Control – various Methods (Whistles, Flappers).
  - (i) Preparation of Maps for Barrages.
  - (j) Selection and rapid Organisation of Positions.
  - (k) Reduction of Barrage Time to Watch Time.
  - (l) Written Orders for Gunners.
  - (m) Battery Drill.
  - (n) Ammunition and Water Supply.
  - (o) Liaison.
  - (p) Organisation of Harrassing Fire:-
    - (i) Preparation for the Offensive.
    - (ii) During Operations.
    - (iii) In quiet Sector.
  - (q) Liaison with Intelligence, Artillery and Infantry in the Line.
  - (r) Selection of Targets.
  - (s) Preparation of Positions.
  - (t) Preparation of Targets, Maps and Fire Organization.
  - (u) Value of Concentration Fire.
20. Anti-Aircraft Sights and Mounts and their use.

#### **Additional Lectures.**

Senior Machine Gun Officers from Units in the Corps lectured occasionally on experimental subjects and the Corps Machine Gun Officer gave frequent lectures on Machine Gun Organisation and Tactics. Lectures were also given on Staff Work, Infantry Tactics, Lewis Guns, Artillery, Engineers, Aircraft, Aeroplane Photographs, Tanks, Sanitation, etc., by Officers of the respective Branches of the Service. These lectures were not only of intrinsic value to members of the School as students of Military Science but also furthered the co-operation of Machine Gunners with other Arms of the Service by giving them a sympathetic understanding of the many different Branches that make up a modern Army.



### **Courses.**

Course lasted one month. The First Course commenced on October 1st, 1917, and was opened by Lieut.-Col. BRUTINEL. Courses continued regularly throughout the winter of 1917-18 and until the German Offensive in March, 1918, when the Sixth Course was broken up and the Guns at the School sent to reinforce Guns in the Field.

### **Influence of School.**

The Machine Gun Wing, Canadian Corps School, spread a sound knowledge of General Military Subjects and of Technical Machine Gunnery throughout the Machine Gun Service and did much to stimulate that "*esprit*" which has characterized the Machine Gun Corps. It served to give Machine Gun Units a solid basis of highly trained Officers and N.C.O.s, so that when the rapid expansion of Machine Gun Battalions took place in the Spring of 1918 each Unit was able to train efficiently, and with comparative ease, a large proportion of their newly transferred Infantry Personnel.



## **SCHOOL FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRING WITH MACHINE GUNS AND LEWIS GUNS, JANUARY 1ST, 1918.**

### **Anti-Aircraft Firing.**

The work at the Machine Gun Wing, Canadian Corps School, was supplemented, during February and March 1918, by the formation of a Special School for A.A. Firing. Machine Guns were employed early in the War against Hostile Aircraft. At first the Guns were fired over open sights from an impromptu Mounting. Later Sight devices and special A.A. Mounts were introduced and Machine Gun and Lewis Gun Personnel had to be trained in the use of their weapons for Anti-Aircraft Firing.

### **Origin of School.**

The effectiveness of enemy low flying Aeroplanes, as well as the ineffectiveness of our Machine Gun A.A. Defences were demonstrated during the PASSCHENDAELE Operations, and as soon as the Corps returned to the LENS Area plans were undertaken for the formation of a school of Instruction in the use of Machine and Lewis Guns against Aircraft.

### **Object.**

The object of the School, as stated in the Corps letter authorising it<sup>42</sup>, was "*to form a nucleus of Instructors in M.G.A.A. Firing in every Infantry Brigade and Machine Gun Battalion.*" The Attendance was not to exceed 32, the Personnel being drawn partly from Infantry and partly from Machine Gun Battalions. The Administration and Instructional Work of the School were placed under the supervision of the Corps Machine Gun Officer. Instruction included a study of models of our own and hostile planes, and by arrangement with the Royal Flying Corps demonstrations were given of our own Aeroplanes in flight.

### **Courses.**

The School assembled at BRUAY, Courses lasted 5 days. The First Course began February 1st, 1918, and Instruction was continued during the month of February and the first fortnight of March. Lieut. P.A. Green, M.C., M.M., 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade, was in charge of the School.

Following is a copy of the Syllabus followed:-

- 1st Day:     Opening Lecture.  
              Explanation of special terms employed during the Course.  
              Firing at hostile Aircraft.
- 2nd Day:     Revision of Special Terms.  
              Demonstration of A.A. Sights and Mounts.  
              Elements of M.G.A.A. Fire, Location of A.A. Positions.
- 3rd Day:     Description of Aeroplanes, including characteristics of hostile Planes (Models) (by  
              arrangement with Canadian A.A. Group).  
              Visit to Aerodrome.  
              Practice with A.A. Sights and Models.
- 4th Day:     Estimation of Distance and Height of flying Planes, Observation of Visibility at various  
              heights. (By arrangement with R.F.C. a Plane will fly for the purpose of Demonstration).  
              Practice with A.A. Sights, Models placed at various Positions.
- 5th Day:     Revision of Syllabus; Discussion of points raised during the Course; Methods of Instruction  
              in A.A. Machine Gun Fire.

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<sup>42</sup> Canadian Corps G. 50/14-18.



## **FORMATION OF CANADIAN MACHINE GUN CORPS REINFORCEMENT DEPOT, SEPTEMBER 15TH, 1917.**

Negotiations were in progress throughout the Spring and Summer of 1917 for an improvement in M.G. reinforcing arrangements. These negotiations culminated in September in the formation of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps Reinforcement Depot (C.M.G.C.R.D.)

### **Early Arrangements.**

Up to February, 1917, no Machine Gun reinforcements had been maintained in France. They were dispatched from England to Units in the Field as required. In Active Operations the delay caused in this way might prove serious, and it was decided to establish a Reinforcement Centre in France.

### **CAMIERS Depot.**

An Independent Canadian Depot was not formed in the first instance. The British Machine Gun Depot was situated at CAMIERS, and application was made and granted by G.H.Q.<sup>43</sup> for the maintenance here of Reinforcements for Canadian Machine Gun Units in the Field as follows:-

	Officers	Other Ranks
Infantry Branch	13	195
Motor Branch	3	30
Cavalry Branch	2	55
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>280</b>

This Personnel was despatched from the Canadian Machine Gun Depot in England in February, 1917, and was maintained from SEAFORD. There was no Establishment: a Canadian Officer was placed in charge of it and the entire Personnel was included in one of the existing Depot Companies.

### **C.M.G.O.'s Pool.**

In April, 1917, a Pool of Machine Gun Officers was formed known as the "*C.M.G.O.'s Pool*." 16 Officers of the Infantry Branch were attached to Companies in the Field. Under this arrangement Officers newly-transferred to the Machine Gun Service were able to gain Machine Gun training and some experience of Machine Gun Work under Active Service conditions.

### **Motor Machine Gun Pool.**

A Motor Machine Gun "*Pool*" along similar lines was authorised at the same time. 5 Officers and 50 Other Ranks were attached to the 1st Motor Machine Gun Brigade for Training. The original intention was that successive batches were to be attached from the Base Depot for periods of 6 weeks, but the first Detachment were permanently attached as supernumerary to Establishment and were held by the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade as First Reinforcements, not to be taken into Action until required to replace Casualties.

### **C.M.G.C.R.D. Authorised.**

These irregular Units, the Canadian Detachment at CAMIERS, and the Machine Gun Pools, continued to form the only link between the Depot at SEAFORD and Machine Gun Units in the Field until September, 1917. On the 15th of this month the Canadian Machine Gun Corps Reinforcement Depot (C.M.G.C.R.D.) was authorised without Establishment.<sup>44</sup>

### **Original Personnel.**

The Depot was to be composed of all Officers and Other Ranks attached to Machine Gun Companies and the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade and surplus to War Establishments on September 15th. In effect, the C.M.G.C.R.D. was a bringing under one name of the Personnel composing the Machine Gun Pools. The CAMIERS Base was maintained.

<sup>43</sup> G.H.Q. A.6864 dated February 2nd, 1917.

<sup>44</sup> Canadian Corps A.24-0-51 dated September 9th, 1917.



**Branches of Depot.**

The Depot was divided into 2 parts<sup>45</sup>, the Infantry Branch and the Motor Branch. The former was established at DIVION, where the Personnel surplus to War Establishment from the Machine Gun Companies assembled: the Motor Branch remained with the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade. It was organised by the Officer Commanding the Brigade, and continued under his supervision until May 27th, 1918, when it joined the Infantry Branch at AUBIN-ST-VAAST.

**Temporary Establishment.**

For the Infantry Branch at DIVION a semi-permanent cadre was temporarily formed, composed as follows:-

Commandant  
 Adjutant  
 2 Officers – (Wing Commanders)  
 A “suitable number” of N.C.O.s or Acting N.C.O.s.

**Organisation of Infantry Branch.**

The Reinforcements were divided into 2 Wings, the Right Wing to reinforce the 1st and 2nd Divisions M.G. Companies, the Left Wing to reinforce the Companies of the 3rd and 4th Divisions. All Ranks received Machine Gun Training while at the Depot.

**Staff.**

Major T.C. Bamfield was appointed Commandant and remained in charge until the Infantry and Motor Branches were amalgamated, when he assumed command of the combined Depot, June 10th, 1918. He continued in command until the Armistice. The following Officers assisted the Commandant in the Administration and Training of the Depot:-

Lt. W.D. DARLING, M.C.	Adjutant and Quartermaster
Lt. R.H. MORRIS	Wing Commander
Lt. J.C. McDOWELL, M.M.	Wing Commander

**Increase in Scale of Reinforcements.**

At this time also the number of Reinforcements to be maintained in the Field was increased to 10% of the Strength of Active Units. The Distribution of Reinforcements on this new basis was laid down as follows<sup>46</sup>:-

	Officers	Other Ranks
At the C.M.G.C.R.D.		
Infantry Branch	20	200
Motor Branch	4	40
At CAMIERS		
Infantry Branch	4	100
Motor Branch	1	10
Cavalry Branch	1	24
With Unit (Surplus to Estab.)		
Cavalry Branch	2	42
TOTAL	32	416

<sup>45</sup> Canadian Corps M.G. 6/- dated September 22nd, 1917.

<sup>46</sup> A.G. A/19214 dated September 2nd, 1917, and G.H.Q. A.G./80(0) dated January 13th, 1918.



### **Advanced Reinforcements Depots.**

In order to facilitate the immediate supply of Personnel required to replace Casualties during the Active Operations Advanced Reinforcement Depots were formed near the Line, of Officers and Other Ranks supplied from the C.M.G.C.R.D., under arrangements made by the Commandant. Thus for the Canadian Corps Offensive Operations in the 3rd Battle of YPRES an Advanced Reinforcement Depot was formed at YORK CAMP, on the main YPRES Road, about 1 mile E. of POPERINGHE.<sup>47</sup>

### **Further Increase of Reinforcements Required.**

The Strength and Distribution of Reinforcements indicated above were in force during the PASSCHENDAELE Operations. Owing to the severe Casualties suffered by the Canadian Corps, and by the Machine Gun Units in particular a request was made immediately after these Operations for an increase in the number of Machine Gun Reinforcements to be maintained in the Field. It was urged that, while the basis of the existing arrangements was the requirements of the British Machine Gun Corps, the proportion of Reinforcements required in the Field by the Canadian Machine Gun Corps was really greater, as the whole Corps was engaged at once, and not a part of it as was the case with the British Machine Gun Corps. In addition to this underlying defect in the existing arrangements, the development of Aerial Bombing and the employment by the enemy of Area Shooting had greatly increased the Casualties to Machine Gun Personnel.

The Canadian Authorities, however, were unable to comply with this request, and the numbers of Reinforcements in France remained unchanged in the meantime.

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<sup>47</sup> Canadian Corps A.80-1-1 dated November 5th, 1917.



## XII.

## FORMATION OF 2-COMPANY MACHINE GUN BATTALIONS.

FEBRUARY 22nd, 1918.

**AUTHORISATION OF NEW ESTABLISHMENT.****Divergence from British Organization.**

At this stage the Canadian Machine Gun Corps entered upon a path of development in organisation which entirely diverged from that followed by the British Machine Gun Corps. Hitherto Canadian and British Machine Gun Organisation had been very similar. The Machine Gun "*Battalion*" adopted by the Canadian Corps in August, 1917, corresponded very closely with the British 4-Company Battalion whose Establishment was published by the War Office on April 2nd, 1918<sup>48</sup>. Five weeks before this organisation was published, however, the Canadian Machine Gun Corps had been authorised to mobilise Machine Gun Battalions with a totally different and novel Establishment.

**Establishment Drawn up.**

This Establishment was drawn up by Lieut.-Col. BRUTINEL on December 25th, 1917, after the Canadian Corps had returned from the YPRES Salient, after the PASSCHENDAELE fighting, and when it was doing ordinary Trench Routine on the LENS-MERICOURT-GAVRELLE Front.

**Increase in Personnel.**

Provision was made for the formation of a 2-Company Battalion, with 64 Guns, the same number as then existed in a Division, but with a Personnel of 43 Officers and 996 Other Ranks, totalling 1,039 All Ranks, and increase of 2 Officers and 288 Other Ranks over the prevailing "*Battalion*" Strength. The differences in Strength of Personnel may be seen at a glance from the following table:

	Lieut.-Col.	Majors	Captains	Lieutenants	W.O. Class I	W.O. Class II	S/Sergeants	Artificers	Corporals	Privates	TOTAL
New Organisation (2-Company Battalion)	1	3	12	27	1	11	80	17	74	813	1039
Old Organisation (4-Company " <i>Battalion</i> ")		4	5	32		4	40	12	652		749
Increase	1		7		1	7	40	5	235		296
Decrease		1		5							6

Aggregate Increase All Ranks 290.

**Command.**

The Battalion was to be commanded by a Lieut. Col. with a Major as Second in Command and a suitable Headquarters Staff. Each of the two Companies, with a Major in Command, was divided into 4 Eight-Gun Platoons, Commanded by Captains; each platoon was divided into 2 Four-Gun Sections, each Commanded by a Lieutenant, while a third Lieutenant was supernumerary in each Platoon. Each Gun Crew included both a Sergeant and a Corporal, thus doubling the Existing Strength in Gun N.C.O.'s.

<sup>48</sup> W.E. 1918: No. 1133.



**Gun Crews Self-Contained.**

The total of 8 Other ranks on each Gun Crew, together with the 24 Carriers (3 per Gun), on each Platoon Strength was calculated to make the Machine Gun Units independent of Infantry assistance, and so to do away with the practice hitherto found necessary of attaching Infantry-men as Ammunition Carriers for all important Operations.

**Tactical Unit Platoon or Battery.**

Perhaps the most striking innovation in this Establishment was the introduction of a new Tactical Unit – the Platoon, subsequently called a Battery. Under the previous organisation it had been customary to regard the Section (4 Guns) as the Unit for tactical purposes: e.g., for special Operations, a Section of a Machine Gun Company would be detailed to operate with an Infantry Battalion. Under the new Establishment the Platoon or Battery took the place of a Section, and in Moving Warfare, it became the practice for a Battery of 8 Guns to work in conjunction with a Battalion. Each Platoon was independent as regards Specialists and Transport. The normal group of Guns for Barrage purposes had already been fixed at 8, so that the new organisation was particularly well-suited to Machine Gun barrage requirements.

One of the most serious defects of the existing organisation was that a great deal of the Senior Officers time was taken up with administrative work. Each Machine Gun Company being a self-contained, administrative Unit, had virtually the same amount of Orderly Room and “Q” work to do as an Infantry Battalion without a Headquarters Staff to do it, with the result that the Commanding Officer of a Machine Gun Company had very often to spend time and effort on administration, which should have gone to Tactical Work.

**Battalion Administration.**

Under the new Establishment a Battalion Headquarters Staff was provided to perform the administrative duties formerly done by Companies. The Headquarters Staff was to include a Second in Command, Adjutant, Quartermaster, Signalling Officer, Medical Officer and Paymaster.

**Corps Commander’s Recommendation.**

In forwarding this Establishment the Corps Commander maintained this to be the main recommendation for it. He wrote,

*“The chief benefit from the organization will be derived from the fact that all Echelons below the Battalion Headquarters will be able to devote all their time to training and fighting.”*

**Signallers.**

In order to improve communications the Signalling Personnel was nearly trebled. Under the 4-Company organisation there was a total of 16 Signallers in the Battalion, 4 of whom were Corporals: the new Establishment provided for 40 Signallers, 8 of whom were to be Lance Corporals, under the direction of a Signalling Officer.



## 2-COMPANY MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

WAR ESTABLISHMENT 121/Overseas/53-a-2-(S.D.2),  
dated 22nd February, 1918.

Detail	Personnel								Horses				Bicycles
	Officers	Warrant Officers Class I	Warrant Officers Class II	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Corporals	Privates	TOTAL	Riding	Heavy Draught	Light Draught	TOTAL	
Headquarters	5	1	1	3	1		19	30	6	4	3	13	16
Headquarters	2			1				3	2			2	
Attached	36		10	76	16	76	794	100	20	4	206	230	
2 Companies								6					
<b>TOTAL BATTALION</b> (excluding Attached)	41	1	11	79	17	76	813	103	26	8	209	243	16
<b>TOTAL BATTALION</b> (including Attached)	43	1	11	80	17	76	813	103	28	8	209	245	16
								9					



## 2-COMPANY MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

## WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL

## (i) Personnel &amp; Horses.

Detail	Personnel								Horses			
	Officers	Warrant Officers Class I	Warrant Officers Class II	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Corporals	Privates	TOTAL	Riding	Heavy Draught	Light Draught	TOTAL
HEADQUARTERS												
Lieut.-Colonel (Bn. Commdr.)	1							1	1			1
Major (2nd in Command)	1							1	1			1
Adjutant (Captain)	1							1	1			1
Quartermaster (Captain)	1							1	1			1
Signalling Officer (Lieut.)		1						1				
Battalion Sergeant-Major			1					1				
Battalion Q.M. Sergeant					1			1				
Armourer Staff-Sergeant				1				1				
Orderly Room Sergeant				1				1	1			1
Transport Sergeant							3	3				
Clerks (incl. 1 Draughtsman)							1	1				
Storeman							1	1			2	2
Short Rein Driver							3	3		4	1	5
Long rein Drivers							2	2				
Cooks							7	7				
Batmen							1	1				
Water Details				1				1				
Shoemaker												
Pay Clerk												
TOTAL HEADQUARTERS (excluding Attached)	5	1	1	3	1		19	30	6	4	3	13
ATTACHED	1							1	1			1
C.A.M.C.	1							1				
C.A.P.C.				1				1	1			1
Veterinary Sergeant												
TOTAL HEADQUARTERS (including Attached)	7	1	1	4	1		19	33	8	4	3	15



Detail	Personnel								Horses				Bicycles
	Officers	Warrant Officers Class I	Warrant Officers Class II	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Corporals	Rank and File	TOTAL	Riding	Heavy Draught	Light Draught	TOTAL	
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS	1							1	1			1	
Major (Company Commander)	1		1					1	1			1	
Transport Officer (Lieut.)				1				1					
Company Sergeant-Major				1				1					
Company Q.M. Sergeant						1		1					
Signal Sergeant							20	20					8
Signal Corporal													
Signallers (4 to be L/Cpls)							4	4					
Storemen (1 to be attached to each Platoon)							2	2					
Cooks							2	2					
Batmen							3	3			6	6	
Short Rein Drivers							2	2	2	1		3	
Long Rein Drivers							2	2					
Saddlers							2	2					
Water Details													
TOTAL COMPANY HEADQUARTERS	2		1	2		1	37	43	2	2	7	11	8



Detail	Personnel								Horses				Bicycles
	Officers	Warrant Officers Class I	Warrant Officers Class II	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Corporals	Rank and File	TOTAL	Riding	Heavy Draught	Light Draught	TOTAL	
4 PLATOONS (Each)													
Captain (Platoon Commander)	1							1	1			1	
Section Commanders (Lieuts.)	2							2					
Lieutenant	1		1					1					
Platoon Sergeant-Major				1				1	1			1	
Transport Sergeant				8				8					
Gun Sergeants						1	8	1					
Transport Corporal					1			1					
Gun Corporals							48	48					
Armourer Corporal					1			1					
Gunners							24	24					
Shoeing Smith							2	2					
Carriers (Trained as Gunners)							4	4					
Cooks							12	12			24	24	
Batmen													
Short Rein Drivers													
TOTAL PLATOON	4		1	9	2	9	90	115	2		24	26	
TOTAL COMPANY	18		5	38	8	37	397	503	10		103	115	8



## 2-COMPANY MACHINE GUN BATTALION.

## WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL

## (ii) Transport.

	Vehicles	Drivers	Heavy Draught Horses	Light Draught Horses
<b>BATTALION HEADQUARTERS</b>				
G.S. Wagons	2	2	4	
Cooks' Carts	1	1		1
Water Cart	1	1		2
<b>EACH COMPANY HEADQUARTERS</b>				
G.S. Wagons	1	1	2	
Field Kitchens	2	2		4
Water Carts	1	1		2
Cooks' Carts	1	1		1
<b>EACH BATTERY</b>				
G.S. Limbered Wagons	7	11		22
Drivers for Spare Draught Horses		1		2
Battery G.S. Limbers distributed thus:-				
For Supplies ... 1				
For 8 Guns, Tripods, Ammunition, etc. ... 4				
For Ammunition ... 2				
<b>TOTAL TRANSPORT</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>209</b>

**Establishment Submitted.**

The Establishment was forwarded on January 10th, 1918, by the Corps Commander, Sir Arthur CURRIE, with a covering letter in which he unreservedly recommended it.

*"It is my considered opinion," he wrote, "that the employment of the Infantry and resulting wastage through casualties and sickness will be directly influenced this year, more than ever before, by the efficiency or otherwise of the Machine Gun Service."*

*It is urgent that the proposed Establishment be put in force as early as possible, so that the organization may be completed early this winter."*<sup>49</sup>

**Establishment Authorised.**

This Establishment was authorised by the War Office as from February 22nd, 1918<sup>50</sup>:-

<sup>49</sup> C.C. A.29-1-34, dated Jan. 1st, 1918.

<sup>50</sup> 121/Overseas /53 a 2 (S.D.2)



**ORGANISATION AND PROVISION OF PERSONNEL.**

As soon as authorisation was received from the War Office, arrangements were at once proceeded with to set the new Organisation going in each Division.

**Provision of Personnel.**

There was increase in Guns; those already in each Battalion were sufficient. The 4 Companies in each Division were re-organised to compose the greater part of the new Battalions, but a total of 1,152 Other Ranks were still required for the 4 Divisional Units, 288 for each Battalion. As the Strength of the Machine Gun Depot was based upon the ordinary requirements of Units in the Field, caused by sickness and casualties, it was not possible to draw upon the Depot for this personnel. On the other hand a large number of Specialists were required to complete the new Establishment so that the Strength could not be made up entirely from the surplus Infantry in the Field, where there were no more trained Specialists than were sufficient for Infantry requirements. Under these circumstances the Corps Machine Gun Officer was authorised to select 200 Other Ranks from each Divisional Wing of the Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp (C.C.R.C.); the remainder, chiefly Specialists and N.C.O.'s, were supplied from the Fifth Division Units then being broken up in England. The C.M.G.O. undertook to carry out in France the Machine Gun Training of Sergeants and Corporals so transferred, and the adapting of Specialists to the work required of them in the Machine Gun Service.

**Training.**

The Personnel from England arrived on April 13th, 1918, and was absorbed in the Machine Gun Battalions already reorganised. The 8,000 Other Ranks from the C.C.R.C. were trained as Machine Gunners under special arrangements made by each Divisional Machine Gun Commander, and when they had gained some knowledge of the Vickers Gun, were divided among trained and seasoned Gun Crews: so that the efficiency of Machine Gun Detachments was not impaired.

**Period of Reorganisation.**

This reorganisation into 2-Company Battalions was carried out just at the time of the German March Offensive, 1918, and completed by the end of the second week of April. The Canadian Corps was still holding the Line on the LENS Front.



**DETAILS OF EACH UNIT'S REORGANISATION.****First Bn., C.M.G.C.**

The 4 First Cdn. Division Machine Gun Companies were reconstituted as the first Battalion, C.M.G.C., on March 27th 1918, at MARQUEFFLES FARM, a Reserve Camp on the VIMY Front, between BOUVIGNY Village and AIX NOULETTE. The 2nd and 3rd C.M.G. Companies were united to form No. 1 Company under the command of Capt. E.R. MORRIS. The 1st and 13th C.M.G. Companies were united in No. 2 Company, commanded by Major J. KAY, M.C. 2 days later, Major Kay was evacuated sick and Capt. A. DENHOLM, D.C.M., assumed command of No. 2 Company. Battalion H.Q. Officers were appointed as follows:-

Officer Commanding	Lieut.-Col. S.W. WATSON, D.S.O.
Second in Command	Major C.V. GRANTHAM, M.C.
Adjutant	Capt. L.G. FRANCIS, M.C.

On the day of its Organisation, viz. March 27th, the First Battalion, C.M.G.C., moved by way of CAMBLAIN L'ABBE to the Front S. of ARRAS, with the Battalion H.Q. at GOUVES. The first tour of the newly-formed Batteries in the Line began on the night March 29th/30th.

**Second Bn., C.M.G.C.**

The 4 Companies, of the Second Divisional Machine Gun Battalion, viz. The 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th C.M.G. Companies, were officially embodied in the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., on March 23rd. It was arranged that the 5th and 14th C.M.G. Companies should form No. 1 Company, under the new Organisation and that the 4th and 6th C.M.G. Companies should form No. 2 Company. Owing to the Tactical Situation at the time and to the threatened imminence of Active Operations, the G.O.C., Second Cdn. Division decided not actually to re-form existing Machine Gun Companies into 4-Battery Companies in the meantime. Accordingly, the 4 Machine Gun Companies of the Second Cdn. Division continued to operate as Units for tactical purposes until April 7th.

On this date, the Second Cdn. Division was holding the Line, under Orders of the VI Corps, from S. of the COJEUL RIVER, E. of BOISIEUX-St. MARC, to the Southern Slope of TELEGRAPH HILL. The D.M.G.C., Lieut.-Col. J.G. WEIR, M.C., had his H.Q. at BASSEUX. The re-organisation was carried out and the new Batteries and Companies were formed in the Line. According to the provision already made for the new Establishment No. 1 Company (5th and 14th C.M.G. Companies) was placed under Major J. BASEVI. No. 2 Company (4th and 6th C.M.G. Companies) was commanded by Major W.M. PEARCE. Battalion H.Q. Officers were appointed as follows:-

Officer Commanding	Lieut.-Col. J.G. WEIR, M.C.
Second in Command	Major J.E. McCORKELL
Adjutant	Capt. G.N. DOUGLAS, M.C.

**Third Bn., C.M.G.C.**

The Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., was organised on March 23rd and 24th. At this time, the Third Cdn. Division was in the Line, holding the MERICOURT-AVION Section, and was daily expecting the German Attack which was eventually launched on March 28th, on the immediate Left from GAVRELLE to PUISIEUX. Machine Gun Companies were disposed in the Line and in Reserve with their respective Infantry Brigades. Lieut.-Col. MOORHOUSE, D.M.G.C., had his H.Q. at CHATEAU d'ACQ. It was under these conditions that Reorganisation was carried out. On March 23rd. the 9th and 15th C.M.G. Companies were formed into 4 Batteries to compose No. 2 Company under Capt. J.C. HARTLEY, M.C., M.M. The 7th and 8th C.M.G. Companies were embodied in No. 1 Company Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., on the following day, March 24th. The Battalion was commanded by Lieut.-Col. W.N. MOORHOUSE, with Major A.M. McFAUL as Second-in-Command and Lieut. G.M. DOWNTON as Adjutant.

**Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.**

The 10th, 11th, 12th and 16th C.M.G. Companies composing the Fourth Canadian Division Machine Gun "Battalion" were reorganised on March 29th at SPRINGVALE CAMP, near ECURIE. Companies had been relieved in LENS, ST. EMILE and HILL 70 Sections night March 28th/29th and had proceeded by Motor Lorries, during the night, to SPRINGVALE CAMP. The D.M.G.C., Lieut.-Col. M.A. SCOTT, D.S.O., had his H.Q. at ECURIE. On March 29th, the 10th and 16th C.M.G. Companies were brought together to form No. 1 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., under Major J.C. BRITTON. No. 2



Company was composed of the 11th and 12th C.M.G. Companies and commanded by Major L.F. PEARCE, M.C. Lieut.-Col. M.A. SCOTT, D.S.O., was placed in command of the Battalion, Major E.W. SANSOM was appointed Second-in-Command, Capt. H. WARD, M.C., Adjutant. On the day following Reorganisation, the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., took over M.G. defences in the GAVRELLE and ARLEUX Sections, immediately N. of ARRAS.

### **Names of Officers.**

The names of Officers of the 4 newly-created Machine Gun Battalions are given below:-

Nominal Roll of Officers in the 4 M.G. Battalions – February 22nd, 1918.

### **First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

#### **Battalion Headquarters.**

Officer Commanding	Lieut.-Col. S.W. Watson
2nd in Command	Major C.V. Grantham, M.C.
Adjutant	Captain L.G. Francis
Quartermaster	Lieut. J.Wylie
Signalling Officer	Lieut. A.W. Beaumont
Medical Officer	Captain D.A. Morrison (C.A.M.C.)
Paymaster	Captain H.B. Woods (C.A.P.C.)

#### **Company Officers.**

Major J. Kay	Lieut. K.B. Hamilton	Lieut. J.A. McPherson
Captain G.C. Ferris	Lieut. E. Hancock	Lieut. W.B. Milner
Captain E.R. Morris	Lieut. W.B. Henry	Lieut. J.R.B. More
Lieut. D.S. Bankier	Lieut. G.B. Herridge	Lieut. R.H. Morris
Lieut. C.A. Battershill	Lieut. P.M. Humme	Lieut. A.F. Morris
Lieut. A.C. Bowles	Lieut. R.S. Jackson	Lieut. A.E. Parker
Lieut. E.V. Chambers	Lieut. S.R. Jefferess	Lieut. J.E. Ritchie
Lieut. V.R. Davies	Lieut. D.A. Macintosh	Lieut. J.E. Robinson
Lieut. J.A. Dewar	Lieut. J. Maitland	Lieut. C.D. Schwab
Lieut. M.M. Dillon	Lieut. H.W. Martin	Lieut. H. Shaughnessy
Lieut. C.C. Drew	Lieut. L. McEwan	Lieut. E.H. Strickland
Lieut. O.W. Fawcett	Lieut. A.C. MacFarlane	Lieut. C.G. Warner
Lieut. S.J. Freeman		



**Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

## Battalion Headquarters.

Officer Commanding	Lieut.-Col. J.G. Weir
2nd in Command	
Adjutant	Captain G.N. Douglas
Quartermaster	Lieut. J. Stonehewer
Signalling Officer	
Medical Officer	
Paymaster	Captain T.D. Patterson

## Company Officers.

Major J. Basevi	Lieut. D.S. Jackson	Lieut. I.F. Price
Major J.H. McCorkell	Lieut. F. Layton	Lieut. J.A. Ramsay
Major W.M. Pearce	Lieut. I.G. MacLaren	Lieut. N.G. Richardson
Captain J.B. McCamus	Lieut. A.F. Mahaffy	Lieut. S.E. Sacks
Captain G.W.H. Millican	Lieut. H.A. McBurney	Lieut. H.S. Salisbury
Lieut. G.W. Comstock	Lieut. J.A. McCullough	Lieut. H.M. Sibbald
Lieut. P. Cowan	Lieut. R.M. McKenzie	Lieut. W.P. Tozer
Lieut. R. Edmunds	Lieut. F.L. Much	Lieut. C.W. Travis
Lieut. R. Fleming	Lieut. T.H. O'Rourke	Lieut. A.B. White
Lieut. C.G. Frost	Lieut. W.H. Patterson	Lieut. L.F. White
Lieut. G.E. Harley	Lieut. H.J.D. Pearce	Lieut. A.P. Williams
Lieut. G. Hobson		

**Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

## Battalion Headquarters.

Officer Commanding	Major W.N. Moorhouse
2nd in Command	Major A.M. McFaul
Adjutant	Lieut. G.M. Downton
Quartermaster	Hon. Captain C.M. Hall <sup>51</sup>
Signalling Officer	
Medical Officer	
Paymaster	

## Company Officers.

Major A.J.R. Parkes	Lieut. G.F. Douglas, M.C.	Lieut. A.F. Neatby, MC, DCM
Captain F.W. Burnham	Lieut. A.G. Fisher	Lieut. P.W. Newman
Captain J.H. Clark	Lieut. J.B. Fraser	Lieut. F.A. Parkins
Captain K.E. Drinkwater	Lieut. S.C. Gee	Lieut. G.V. Rayner
Captain F.M. Carrison	Lieut. A.M. German	Lieut. R. Rothwell
Captain J.C. Hartley, MC, MM	Lieut. F.E. Hinds	Lieut. J.G. Searles, MC
Captain E.I.J. Ings	Lieut. R.M. Hopper	Lieut. G.R. Smith
Captain B.J. Mothersill	Lieut. C.K. Hulbert	Lieut. H.F. Smith
Captain D.W. Rowatt, MC	Lieut. W.J. Hutchens	Lieut. W.N. Smith <sup>52</sup>
Lieut. D.A. Blunden	Lieut. C.W. Kern	Lieut. E.G. Spalding
Lieut. B.L. Cook	Lieut. F.W. Landreth	Lieut. J. Thompson
Lieut. J.D. Clark	Lieut. A.R. Madgett	Lieut. C.W. Tubbs
Lieut. H.E.B. Coyne	Lieut. J.R. McLean	Lieut. A.H. Tudhope

<sup>51</sup> Attached Cdn. Corps Cyclist Bn.<sup>52</sup> Attached 50th C.I.Bn.



**Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

## Battalion Headquarters.

Officer Commanding	Lieut.-Col. M.A. Scott
2nd in Command	Major E.W. Sansom
Adjutant	Captain H. Ward, M.C.
Quartermaster	Captain K. Weaver
Signalling Officer	Lieut. H.S. Moss
Medical Officer	Captain J.W. Laurie
Paymaster	Captain T.W. Seagram

## Company Officers.

Major J.C. Britton	Lieut. F.I. Carpenter	Lieut. H.O. Leach, MC
Major L.F. Pearce, MC	Lieut. G.E.W. Cook	Lieut. H. Lewis
Captain B.M. Clark, MC	Lieut. W.H. Duncan	Lieut. W.W.R. Mitchell
Captain H.A. Fowler	Lieut. O.B. Eaton	Lieut. H.A. Peverley, MC
Captain I.C. Hall, MC	Lieut. C.J.T. French	Lieut. M.P. Pope
Captain S. Johnston	Lieut. W.J.H. Gill	Lieut. J.A. Riddell
Captain H.T. Logan	Lieut. C.S. Grafton	Lieut. W. Riddell
Captain E.L. Rainboth, MC	Lieut. S.E. Gudgeon	Lieut. G.T. Roach
Captain A.G. Scott, MC	Lieut. C.J. Hearn	Lieut. C.J.S. Ryley
Captain W.G. Williams	Lieut. F.W. Hopper	Lieut. J.D. Sharp
Lieut. H.E. Anderson	Lieut. C.R. Hopper, MC	Lieut. W.J.A. Stewart
Lieut. F.W.G. Barber-Starkey	Lieut. J.T. Hughes	Lieut. E.J.L. Stinson
Lieut. A.L. Bourque, MC	Lieut. W.C. Killip	Lieut. C.A. Young
Lieut. E.S. Campbell	Lieut. G.E. Ladler	



## XIII.

**FINAL ORGANISATION: 3-COMPANY MACHINE GUN BATTALION.  
MAY 6th, 1918.**

The 4 Machine Gun Battalions of the Corps had scarcely completed their re-organisation on a 2-Company basis when each received a 50% addition to its Strength in Men and Guns in the form of a 3rd Company, and the Canadian Machine Gun Battalion assumed its final form.

**Chief Reason for Additional Company.**

The chief reason actuating this change was the sudden and unexpected success of the German Offensive. In order to withstand the effect of long range intense Artillery Fire accompanied by a determined Infantry Attack the necessity for a Machine Gun Defence in great depth and the possession of Divisional Machine Gun Reserves was realised as never before. The inadequacy of our Machine Gun Defences was accentuated at this time by reason of the enormous Frontage held by the Canadian Corps. The regrouping of the Forces following the German Attacks brought it about that the Corps was made responsible for twice the Frontage, normally assigned to it.

**Another Reason.**

The addition of Machine Gun Strength was also recommended by the fact that, as a result of the larger Infantry Establishment of a Canadian Division, the proportion of Machine Guns to Rifles in a Canadian Division was considerably below that of other Divisions of the British Army. In a British Division with 9 Battalions (9,000 Rifles), and 64 Vickers Guns the proportion was 1 Vickers Gun to 141 Rifles. In a Canadian Division with 12 Battalions (13,200 Rifles) and 64 Vickers Guns the proportion was 1 Vickers Gun to 206 Rifles. With the addition of 32 Guns per Division this proportion would be brought up to 1 Vickers Gun per 138 Rifles – not perceptibly greater than that obtaining in other Divisions of the British Army.

**Immediate Action taken by Corps Commander.**

On account of the need for immediate action and because much invaluable time must necessarily be consumed if formal approval were awaited from the Overseas Ministry, the Corps Commander decided to go on at once with the required addition to Machine Gun Strength.

Strong representations were made to General Headquarters as a result of which 128 Machine Guns and 20 Three-Ton Lorries were obtained. At the same time, on April 10th, a letter was addressed by the Corps Commander to the General Officers Commanding Divisions as follows:-<sup>53</sup>

*"I propose to form immediately a third Machine Gun Company per Division. I shall not wait until such an organization is sanctioned by the Higher Authorities, but shall proceed immediately with the organization, if I can obtain the Guns, Official sanction can come later."*

*"To do this I require 2400 men, and I propose that each Battalion be asked to give fifty of their best men who, for the time being will remain on command to the Machine Gun Corps. It is proposed to withdraw from the present Machine Gun Companies certain personnel, who will form the nucleus of the new Machine Gun Teams. The places of the men so withdrawn will be filled by men withdrawn from the Battalions as stated above, and who, in a very short time, will become expert Machine Gunners."*

*"A short time ago the strength of each Battalion was increased by one hundred men, and in view of the increased Fire Power which the new Machine Gun Company in each Division will give, it is considered Battalions will be agreeable to allow these men to go. There are no trained Machine Gun reinforcements in England available at the present time, so that the organization suggested must be improvised from resources here."*

*"I would like you to take this matter up with your Battalion Commanders at once. While no doubt they will dislike losing their men From the Infantry, I believe they will realise it is for the general good and I would ask you to urge upon them to ear-mark fifty of their best and brainiest men for the purpose outline above."*

<sup>53</sup> Headquarters, Canadian Corps, April 10th, 1918.



### **Sources of Supply of Personnel.**

On April 12th detailed instructions were issued by Canadian Corps for the supply and Training of Personnel for the new Companies. Each Division supplied 12 Officers and 600 Other Ranks, withdrawn at the rate of 1 Officer and 50 Other Ranks per Battalion. The Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp supplied 25 Officers. Transport Officers, Signal Sergeants, Signal Corporals, Signallers, Armourer Corporals, Saddlers and other Specialists were not provided initially but were later drawn, partly from the C.C.R.C., partly from the C.M.G.C.R.D. All Personnel found unsuitable for Machine Gun work were returned to their respective Units and immediately replaced by men likely to become Machine Gunners.

### **Transferred Officers.**

Among the Officers transferred in each Division were included one Major or Captain and 2 Lieutenants all three recommended for promotion. The remainder were Lieutenants; in all cases the date of Seniority was unaffected by the eventual transfer of these Officers to the Machine Gun Corps. The entire Personnel were attached to the Machine Gun Battalions of their respective Divisions pending authority for the new Organisation.

### **Training.**

Training of this new Personnel was carried out as follows. The 12 Officers in each Division, together with 392 out of the 600 Other Ranks joined the Machine Gun Battalions at once, and were trained in Machine Gun work under arrangements made by the Battalion Commanders concerned.

For the remaining 208 Other Ranks per Division a total of 832, and for the 25 Officers supplied by the C.C.R.C., a Special Machine Gun Training Depot was formed under the administrative command of Lieut.-Col. C.H. HILL, D.C.O., at Tank Camp, BOIS D'OHLAN near VERRELEL; the Instructional Staff was in charge of Captain M.R. LEVEY, M.M., assisted by 2 Officers and 45 Other Rank Instructors from the C.M.G.C.R.D. Machine Guns for training purposes were supplied by First Army Ordnance. After carrying on for 10 days at Tank Camp, the Depot moved to FRASER CAMP, BOIS DES AILLEUX, near MONT. ST. ELOY. Training was completed at GUISY CAMP, AUBIN-ST-VAAST, whither the Special Depot moved along with the C.M.G.C.R.D. on May 4th, and the Personnel joined their Battalions in the last week in May.

### **Guns and Lorries Received.**

On April 12th, the very day on which the instructions for Supply and Training of Personnel were published by Canadian Corps, 64 Machine Guns were drawn from Army Ordnance for the new Companies, and distributed by the C.M.G.O., 32 to the 1st Battalion, and 32 to the 4th Battalion. On April 13th, remaining 64 Vickers Guns were received and despatched to the 2nd and 3rd M.G. Battalions. 20 Three-Ton Lorries arrived on the same date, and were sent 5 to each Battalion, as Transport for the new extemporized Companies.

### **Assimilation of Infantry Personnel.**

Organisation and intensive Training began at once within all the Machine Gun Battalions. Nucleus Crews of Trained Gunners were formed for the New Guns: these Crews were gradually built up as Personnel, Transferred from the Infantry, received sufficient Training to be made members of Gun Teams. These nucleus Crews with some attached Infantry Personnel, were sent into the Line, 2 Crews with each Half-Battery (4 Guns) and in this way the Corps Machine Gun Defences were immediately strengthened without lowering the efficiency of the Machine Gun Units. As the portion of the Line which the Corps was then holding was comparatively quite a good deal of Instructional Work could be carried out in the Line, under the supervision of Company Commanders.

### **Revised Establishment Submitted.**

By April 15th, these preliminary arrangements were completed and on the 16th, Lieut.-General CURRIE wrote to Canadian Headquarters in London<sup>54</sup>, stating what had been done and at the same time he submitted a revised Establishment for the approval of the Overseas Ministry.

<sup>54</sup> Canadian Corps letter dated April 16th, 1918.



**Additions to Establishment.**

This Establishment provided for the addition of a Third Company exactly similar to those already existing. The addition of this Company necessitated a slight increase in the Administrative Staff and the following were added to Battalion Headquarters Establishment.

- 1 Assistant Adjutant
- 1 Assistant Quartermaster
- 2 Orderly Room Clerks
- 1 Postal Clerk
- 1 Quartermaster Corporal

Five Lorries were installed in the Establishment, 2 at Battalion Headquarters, Water Cart Trailers were to be used in conjunction with these instead of Water Carts drawn by Horses, and one at each Company Headquarters. It was argued that Lorries were not only economical as regards cost of maintenance compared with the Horse Transport replaced by them, but were also tactically essential, for they would *“enable a Divisional Commander, in an emergency to move the Machine Gun Batteries in Divisional Reserve much more quickly than would be the case if Horses had to be used.”* A Ford Car was provided for the Battalion Commander in lieu of a Riding Horse to enable him *“efficiently to perform his duties”* in and out of the Line.

**CANADIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION****WAR ESTABLISHMENT**

FINAL ORGANISATION – May 1st, 1918.

Detail	Personnel						Horses				Bicycles
	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	TOTAL	Riding	Light Draught	Heavy Draught	TOTAL	
Headquarters	7	2	3	1	21	34	5	3		8	
Headquarters, Attached	2		2		8	12	2			2	
3 Companies	54	15	114	24	1,299	1,506	30	297	12	339	24
3 Companies, Attached					6	6					
<b>TOTAL BATTALION (excluding Attached)</b>	61	17	117	25	1,320	1,540	35	300	12	347	24
<b>TOTAL BATTALION (including Attached)</b>	63	17	119	25	1,334	1,558	37	300	12	349	24



## CANADIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION

## WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL (i) Personnel &amp; Horses.

Detail	Personnel						Horses			
	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	TOTAL	Riding	Light Draught	Heavy Draught	TOTAL
<b>HEADQUARTERS</b>										
Lieutenant-Colonel	1					1				
Major (2nd in Command)	1					1	1			1
Adjutant (Captain)	1					1	1			1
Assistant Adjutant (Lieut.)	1					1				
Quartermaster (Captain)	1					1	1			1
Asst. Quartermaster (Lieut.)	1					1	1			
Signalling Officer (Lieut.)	1					1	1			1
Battalion Sergeant-Major		1				1				
Battalion Q.M. Sergeant		1				1				
Armourer Staff-Sergeant				1		1				
Orderly Room Sergeant			1			1				
Pay Sergeant			1			1				
Mail Sergeant			1			1				
Orderly Room Corporal					1	1				
Quartermaster's Corporal					1	1				
Clerks					4 <sup>55</sup>	4				
Transport Corporal					1	1	1			1
Storeman					1	1				
Drivers					2	2		3		3
Cooks					2	2				
Batmen					7	7				
Water Details					1	1				
Shoemaker					1	1				
<b>TOTAL HEADQUARTERS</b> (excluding Attached)	7	2	3	1	21	34	5	3		8
<b>ATTACHED</b>										
C.A.M.C.	1		1		2 <sup>56</sup>	4	1			1
C.A.P.C.	1				1	2				
Veterinary			1			1	1			1
Drivers, C.A.S.C., M.T.					5	5				
Drivers, C.A.S.C (Train Transport)					6	6			12	12
<b>TOTAL HEADQUARTERS</b> (including Attached)	9	2	5	1	29	46	7	3		10

<sup>55</sup> Includes 1 Draughtsman.<sup>56</sup> Includes 1 Corporal.



## CANADIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION

## WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

Detail	Personnel					Horses				Bicycles
	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Rank and File	TOTAL	Riding	Light Draught	Heavy Draught	TOTAL	
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS										
Major	1				1	1			1	
Transport Officer (Lieut.)	1				1	1			1	
Company Sergeant-Major		1			1					
Company Q.M. Sergeant			1		1					
Signal Sergeant			1		1					
Signal Corporal				1	1					
Signallers				20 <sup>57</sup>	20					8
Storemen				4 <sup>58</sup>	4					
Cooks				2	2					
Batmen				2	2					
Drivers, Short Rein				3	3		2	4	6	
Drivers, Long Rein				1	1		1		1	
Saddlers				2	2					
Water Details				2	2					
TOTAL COMPANY HEADQUARTERS (excluding Attached)	2	1	2	37	42	2	3	4	9	8
ATTACHED – Drivers, C.A.S.C.				2	2					
TOTAL COMPANY HEADQUARTERS (including Attached)	2	1	2	39	44	2	3	4	9	8

<sup>57</sup> 4 to be Lance-Corporals.<sup>58</sup> 1 to be attached to each Battery.



## CANADIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION

## WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

Detail	Personnel						Horses				Bicycles
	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	TOTAL	Riding	Light Draught	Heavy Draught	TOTAL	
4 BATTERIES (Each)											
Captain	1					1	1			1	
Subaltern	3					3					
Battery Sergeant-Major		1				1				1	
Transport Sergeant			1			1	1				
Armourer Corporal				1		1					
Transport Corporal					1	1					
Shoeing-Smith				1		1					
Sergeants			8			8					
Corporals <sup>59</sup>					8	8					
Gunners					48	48					
Carriers <sup>60</sup>					24	24					
Cooks					2	2					
Batmen					4	4					
Drivers, Short Rein					12	12		24		24	
TOTAL BATTERY	4	1	9	2	99	115	2	24		26	
TOTAL COMPANY (excluding Attached)	18	5	38	8	433	502	10	99	4	113	8
TOTAL COMPANY (including Attached)	18	5	38	8	435	504	10	99	4	113	8

- Notes: 1. 1 Sergeant per Battery will be trained in Gas Services.  
2. 1 Gunner per Crew to be trained as a Scout.

<sup>59</sup> Trained as Range-takers.

<sup>60</sup> Trained as Gunners.



## CANADIAN MACHINE GUN BATTALION

## WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

## (ii) Transport.

	Vehicles	Drivers	Light Draught Horses	Heavy Draught Horses
<b>1st Line Transport</b>				
BATTALION HEADQUARTERS				
Motor Cars (Light)	1	1		
Lorries (3-Ton)	2	4 <sup>61</sup>		
Cart, Cooks'	1	1	1	
Cart, Water	1	1	2	
EACH COMPANY				
Field Kitchens	2	2		4
Cart, Cooks'	1	1	1	
Cart, Water	1	1	2	
Lorry (3-Ton)	1	2 <sup>61</sup>		
EACH BATTERY				
Wagon, G.S. Limbered, for Supplies	1	1	2	
Driver for Spare Draught Horses		1	2	
EACH SECTION				
Wagons, G.S. Limbered, for 4 Machine Guns, Tripods, Ammunition and 4 Ammunition Pack Saddles	2	4	8	
Wagon, G.S. Limbered, for Ammunition	1	1	2	
<b>Train Transport</b>				
G.S. Wagon, for Baggage and Supplies	6	6		12
	104	169	300	12

**3rd Company Authorised.**

On May 6th, word was received by the Corps Machine Gun Officer that these Amendments to Establishment had been approved with the exception of the Water Cart Trailers<sup>62</sup>, and re-organisation was at once proceeded with. By a fortunate co-incidence the Canadian Corps was relieved by the XVII and XVIII Corps on the same day and the 1st, 3rd and 4th Battalions were able to organise their 3rd Company in the quiet of Billets many kilometres from the Line. The Second Division was detached on duty with the VI Corps and remained in the Line until relieved by the 3rd Canadian Division on June 26th. In the 2nd Battalion therefore the Third Company had to be organised under Trench Warfare conditions.

<sup>61</sup> C.A.S.C. M.T.

<sup>62</sup> Canadian Corps A.104-220 dated May 6th, 1918. A.G. (Cdn.) 7-1-177 dated May 2nd, 1918.



**Officers.**

The following Officers were added to the various Battalions at this time, the majority on transfer from the Infantry:-

## 1st Canadian Machine Gun Battalion.

Major R. Murdie	Lieut. W.S. Carey
Captain L.N. Balfe	Lieut. E.E. Duley
Captain J.W. Maynard	Lieut. H.H. Essex
Captain A.D.C. McDermott	Lieut. W.R. Hamilton
Captain J. Skinner	Lieut. J. Hay
Lieut. V.C. Anderson	Lieut. W.A. Liddell
Lieut. L.R. Anrey	Lieut. H.M. Lovell
Lieut. A.C. Bowles	Lieut. W.B. McMullin
Lieut. R. Byrne	Lieut. J.R.B. More
Lieut. D.M. Campbell	Lieut. A.F. Wallace.

## 2nd Canadian Machine Gun Battalion.

Major A. Graham	Lieut. St.G. Fildes
Lieut. C.H. Biddell	Lieut. F.J.G. Garneau
Lieut. C.W. Blair	Lieut. H.E. Hopkins
Lieut. J.R. Burchell	Lieut. W.J.H. Kreitzer
Lieut. A.H. Cameron	Lieut. A.G. Mercer
Lieut. A.C. Cleghorn	Lieut. A.D. Roughton
Lieut. H.A. Davis	Lieut. W.V. Smart
Lieut. T.H. Dudley	Lieut. A.R. Switzer.

## 3rd Canadian Machine Gun Battalion.

Captain D.A. Galt, M.C.	Lieut. H.J. Godber
Lieut. A.A. Atkinson	Lieut. O.C. Hughes
Lieut. F.M. Bradbury	Lieut. K.R. Lindsay
Lieut. S.H. Brown	Lieut. P.C. Mulholland
Lieut. H.V. Copley	Lieut. L.A. Roe
Lieut. R.H. Foulds	Lieut. J.D. Shearer
Lieut. G.E. Garneau	Lieut. H.F. Smith
Lieut. H.E. Gee	Lieut. W.F. Tobey
	Lieut. R.H. Warne.

Attached – Honorary Captain E.F. Pinnington (Chaplain)

## 4th Canadian Machine Gun Battalion.

Captain C.E. Bailey, MC, DSO	Lieut. H.S. Moss
Lieut. W.J.A. Fair	Lieut. C.R. Parsons
Lieut. W.J. Johnston	Lieut. J.H. Patterson
Lieut. K. Lorimer	Lieut. H.R. Simpson
Lieut. F.M. MacDonald	Lieut. J.M. Snetsinger
Lieut. D. McGillivray	Lieut. W.A. Woodward
Lieut. C.F. Mandel, MC	



**THE NEW ESTABLISHMENT TESTED; MAY 6TH, 1918, TO NOVEMBER 11TH, 1918.**

The Establishment granted at this time persisted without change down to the cessation of hostilities. Its adaptability for Defensive Operations, though undoubtedly supreme, was never put to the test, as the Germans did not attack on that part of the Front held by the Canadian Corps.

**Test in Offensive Operations.**

But the new Organisation was tested in the severest possible way during the Allied Offensive beginning August 8th. The Machine Gun reorganisation coincided with Military requirements; the months of May, June and July were utilized for getting the Units into smooth running order. For two months of that period the Canadian Corp was at rest, in G.H.Q. Reserve and constant Training was done both in conjunction with the Infantry and in Technical Machine Gun work.

**Final Organisation Found Satisfactory.**

In the 1st week of August the Corps left the LENS-ARRAS area and proceeded to AMIENS. From the morning of August 8th, when the Allied Attack broke in fury upon the Germans, until hostilities ceased on November 11th, the Canadian Corps was continuously engaged. In the Battle of AMIENS, in the 2nd Battle of ARRAS, in the taking of the QUEANT-DROCOURT Line, in the crossing of the CANAL de NORD and subsequent CAMBRAI Fighting, in the capture of VALENCIENNES and last of all in the delivery of MONS Machine Gun Organisation along with all other Arms, was tested as never before. All the technical skill in the use of the Machine Guns, acquired in 4 years of fighting was called into action: every variety of Offensive Machine Gun Tactics was employed: even at this stage of the war a new use was found for Machine Guns, when they were sent forward in Tanks in front of our Infantry Attack to seize important points in rear of the Enemy. Every detail of Machine Gun Organisation was put to the supreme test of long-continued strenuous fighting: and whether in Tactics or Administration it is generally admitted that the Machine Gun Work of the Corps had never before been so satisfactorily carried out.

**Quality of Personnel.**

These Machine Gun successes were due to various causes. Not least of these was the quality of the Personnel composing the Corps: without men of intelligence and disciplined courage no Organisation could succeed.

Another factor which helped to make these achievements possible was the method of administration adopted by all fighting Units of the Corps. A Unit as large as a Machine Gun Battalion, with a total Strength of 1558 All ranks and several times as much Transport as an Infantry Battalion, required specially careful provision for administrative matters. A system of Orderly Room Administration and Interior Economy<sup>63</sup> was devised by Major W.B. FORSTER, M.C. Staff Officer to the Corps Machine Gun Officer. Major FORSTER visited each Machine Gun Battalion in turn, in the Summer of 1918, and superintended the introduction of this common system of Administration. In this was the handling of Orderly Room and "Q" Matters was made uniform and the smooth interior working of all Units was assured.

**Elasticity of Unit.**

But the form of Organisation is a conspicuous cause of success or failure in all military enterprises and the Canadian Machine Gun Battalion was found in practice to be a Machine capable of undergoing the utmost trials of endurance with the maximum of ease and under all circumstances it was able to do the things required of it. The Battery proved itself as a perfect a Tactical Unit as could be devised, ideal for co-operation with an Infantry Battalion, and of great mobility under conditions of Open Warfare. So efficiently did it serve its purpose that an 8-Gun Unit, modelled on the Canadian Machine Gun Battery is the basis of the Organisation recommended for the Post-War British Machine Gun Service.

<sup>63</sup> Published 1919 by Canadian Corps as "*Canadian Machine Gun Corps Organisation, Administration and Duties.*" (Page and Thomas Ltd. 131, Finsbury Pavement, E.C.)



## XIV.

**“NOTES FOR THE INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE OF ALL OFFICERS  
REGARDING THE ORGANISATION OF MACHINE GUN BATTALIONS AND  
THEIR EMPLOYMENT.”**

ISSUED APRIL 30th, 1918.

A circumstance which contributed very materially to the smooth working of Machine Gun Battalions in the Field was the publication by Canadian Corps of the document quoted in full here-under, setting forth the Principles of Employment of Machine Guns and the Duties of Machine Gun and Infantry Officers in relation to Machine Guns in Action. This Memorandum was prepared by General BRUTINEL and many of the questions with which it dealt had previously been wrapped in uncertainty and had been the cause of a great deal of misunderstanding between the Infantry and the Machine Gun Service. The questions of Command and Liaison with the Infantry are here set forth so clearly as to be place beyond dispute.

The Memorandum which was circulated to all officers of the Corps was as follows:-<sup>64</sup>

**I. Organisation.**

1. *"The organization of a Canadian Machine Gun Battalion is shown in the attached diagram. Appendix "A"<sup>65</sup> It is commanded by the D.M.G.C. (see Appendix "C") for duties of this officer. The Battalion is the Unit for purposes of administration and training. The Training has been thus centralised to obtain uniformity in tactics and greater efficiency in technical training.*
2. *The Company has no administrative function. It is a convenient echelon for the co-ordination of the Machine Gun Batteries, the supervision of their tactical handling, and the maintenance of good liaison with the Infantry.*
3. *The Battery is essentially the tactical Unit, and will be the smallest Unit detailed for detachment to Infantry Brigades or Battalions. It is self-contained as regards Command, Transport, and Personnel except Signallers, who are with the H.Q. of the Company. The Composition of a Machine Gun Battery is shown on the attached diagram, Appendix "B").*
4. *There is no similarity between Infantry Battalions and Machine Gun Battalions wither as regards administration or Tactics. A Machine Gun battalion can be more closely compared to a Divisional Artillery both in its organization and in its Tactical distribution.*

**II. Tactical Employment.**

1. *The Machine Gun Service must be regarded as a distinctive Arm with Tactics of its own. In all respects it is intermediate between the Infantry and the Artillery, its Tactics being radically different from the former, and approximating to, but not being identical with, the Tactics of the latter.*
2. *It must be thoroughly realized that the principle governing the employment of Machine Gun Units is their duty to support the Infantry in all phases of the fight, and to co-operate constantly with them. But they are not part of the Infantry, and must not be considered as such. (S.S.192, Sec4, and "Note on Recent Fighting No. 3, para. 3.)*
3. *The methods of employing Machine Guns have been fully explained in S.S.192, part 1. This Book must be taken as a guide regarding the principles of Machine Gun Tactics. Attention is called to the fact that the Germans have adopted principles similar to our own regarding the employment of their heavy Machine Guns, and that the methods used in their advance are identical with those prescribed in Chap. 6 of S.S.192 part I (See 1.a/47875 appended to "Notes on Recent Fighting" No.3. and No.5.)*

**III. Command.**

1. *Machine Gun Battalions are Divisional Troops and should be employed to support the Infantry in accordance with the plans of the G.O.C. Division.*

<sup>64</sup> Canadian Corps G.126/3-6 dated April 30th, 1918.

<sup>65</sup> Items noted in Appendix A, Appendix B and Notes No. 3 and 5 were not available in the current documents.



2. *In offensive operations it is often advisable for the dispositions and tasks of Machine Gun Units to be supervised by the C.M.G.C. in much the same manner as the Artillery is controlled by the G.O.C, R.A.*
3. *It is essential that, under all conditions, the Machine Gun Resources of a Division should be kept as fluid as possible, and that their distributions on the Divisional Front should be based solely on tactical considerations.*
4. *Special attention must be given to the engagement of Machine Gun reserves and to their withdrawal and reconstitution as soon as the necessity for their employment has passed, to the maintenance of a constant forward flow of Machine Gun Personnel and material in battle, and to the necessity for re-distributing the Machine Guns to meet the larger changes in the situation which will arise in the course of a Battle. These considerations make it imperative for the Division to retain form control of the Machine Guns, if the full value of these weapons is to be available when, and where, most required.*
5. *Control by the Division will always include arrangements regarding reliefs, and reinforcements of personnel and material, for which reason Officers Commanding Machine Gun Batteries must keep the D.M.G.C. constantly informed regarding orders received, movements of the Batteries, the condition of the Batteries, and the Tactical situation on their front. Such control by the Division, or Corps, will be exercised however without interfering with the tactical Command of Machine Gun Units which have been temporarily attached to Infantry Brigades or Battalions in accordance with the plan of operations of the G.O.C. Division. This immediate Tactical Command by Infantry Brigade or Battalion Commanders must be exercised through the O.C. Machine Gun Company or Batteries attached to them.*
6. *The D.M.G.C. will appoint an Officer to Command the Machine Guns attached to each Brigade. This Officer will usually be a Company Commander and will be responsible for co-ordinating the work of the Machine gun Batteries attached to that Brigade in accordance with the plans of the G.O.C. Division or Brigade.*
7. *A Machine Gun Commander should be given definite orders by the Infantry Commander, to whom he is Tactically attached, as to what is required of him, but he should be allowed as much freedom of action as possible in carrying out these orders, and should be kept informed of all changes and developments of the situation which may affect his action. Initiative, enterprise, and complete knowledge of the Technique of the weapons, are essential to the effective handling of Machine Guns (See Section 160. Para 13-Infantry Training, 1914).*

#### IV. Liaison.

1. *It is essential that good liaison be established and maintained between Machine Gun Commanders and Infantry Commanders, so that the most effective co-operation may be ensured at all times.*
2. *The Officer Commanding Machine Guns attached to a Brigade will establish his Headquarters at the H.Q. of the Infantry Brigade. If circumstances arise which make it necessary for him personally to leave the H.Q. of the Infantry Brigade he will detail an officer to act for him in his absence.*
3. *On relief of Machine Gun Batteries, or Infantry Brigades, the Machine Gun Commander will report fully to the Infantry Brigade Commander on the Machine Gun dispositions, including the state of the emplacements which are occupied, stores, ammunition, Section Headquarters, telephones and communications. He will also explain the progress of harassing fire in force and, if necessary, will ask for or suggest any modifications or alterations to it.*
4. *During the tour of duty in the Line, the Machine Gun Commander, working with the Brigade, and the Machine Gun Battery Commanders, will visit the Headquarters of Infantry Battalions immediately after reliefs and afterwards from time to time, to give Infantry Commanders full information regarding positions of Machine Guns, their tasks, etc. The further forward this liaison can be established the better, since many cases of misunderstanding, apparent lack of action at opportune moments, and other causes of friction can thus be eliminated.*
5. *When Machine Guns are organized for the purpose of applying local barrage fire for offensive or defensive purposes, the Officer Commanding Machine Guns should get in touch with the Infantry covered.*



6. *In a moving battle the importance of liaison is greatly increased. On it depends the regulation of the alternative advances of Infantry and Machine Gun Units, the opportune application of Machine Gun fire to support the Infantry, and, in extreme cases, the reinforcement of the firing line by Machine Guns to obtain definite superiority of fire over the enemy.*

*In a retirement the definite stopping power of Machine Guns should be utilized by Infantry Commander to the utmost. Infantry instinctively reform under cover of fire from the Machine Gun Batteries, which are the natural rallying points for them. But, under the conditions which make such action necessary, it is not likely that the Machine Gun personnel will be available to make the liaison: therefore all Infantry Commanders, whatever their rank, should be impressed with the necessity of initiating and maintaining liaison with the Machine Guns in such circumstances.*

7. *At all times Officers Commanding Machine Gun Units should be constantly on the alert to seize any opportunity of assisting the Infantry and of inflicting losses on the enemy. Machine Gun Officers must be thoroughly in touch with all matters affecting their front, and it is the duty of Infantry Commanders to keep them informed of all changes and developments of the situation which may affect their section.*
8. *It is the duty of the Commander of an Infantry force to arrange automatically for the protection, particularly of the flanks, of any Machine Gun Units which are co-operating with him, and, in consultation with the Machine Gun Commander, to make definite arrangements for any advance, counter attack, or other tactical manoeuvre.*

#### V. Communications.

1. *The number of signallers available in a Canadian machine Gun Battalion is sufficient to allow communication to be established and maintained, by telephone or visual, between the Machine Gun Batteries and the Headquarters Machine Gun Company or Group Commander, as the case may be, forward of the Headquarters of Infantry Brigades in the Line.*
2. *Communication between the Headquarters Machine Gun Company, or Group Commander, and the D.M.G.C. will be obtained through the Infantry Brigade exchange, or visual station.*
3. *Allotments of lines in buried cable routes will be obtained by the C.M.G. Battalion Signalling Officer through the O.C., Divisional Signal Company (A.D. Signals, S.1087/16-3 dated 14-4-18.)*
4. *In semi-open warfare many difficulties will be experienced but every effort must be made to re-establish communication between Headquarters Machine Gun Batteries, and Headquarters Machine Gun Company, as soon as possible after any interruption. Runners will be used very sparingly, and only on important occasions, when other means of communication fail.*

#### VI. Training.

1. *Technical training should be carried out all the time, whether in or out of the Line. It should be understood that the efficiency of Machine Gunners must be measured by their ability to prepare their guns for action, to rapidly select and occupy favourable positions, to open fire according to orders, and to maintain that fire as long as the situation demands.*
2. *The training of all ranks in indirect fire should be developed to, and maintained at the highest possible standard. It should be kept in mind that when we resume the offensive, our Machine Gun resources on the frontage which would probably be allotted to a Corps will permit the development of a dense and powerful overhead supporting fire, when required, and will also allow Machine Gun Batteries to be moved forward in alternate bounds. This overhead supporting fire may be, at times, the only support available for the Infantry, and it is essential that the training in indirect fire should be maintained at the highest degree of efficiency. The technically perfect execution of the daily programme of harassing fire is the best method of training now practicable.*
3. *Training in indication and recognition of targets, and in direct fire-control of Machine Gun Batteries, is of very great importance, and must be practised on the Machine Gun Long Ranges, disappearing targets being used for this purpose.*

*These practices should invariably include overhead direct fire with graticules, in which Infantry will be represented by panels, as well as overhead indirect fire applied on a local feature*



*representing a strong point. At least four N.C.O.'s in each Battery should be thoroughly trained in the use of the Range Finder.*

4. *The tactical principles and methods of employment of Machine Guns in defensive trench warfare, and in set piece offensive operations, are well known, and need not be repeated. (See Chapters 1, 2, & 3, S.S.192. Part I.)*
5. *D.M.G.C.'s must strongly impress on all their subordinates, and particularly on the Battery Commanders, the vital importance of initiative, good judgement, and ruthless energy and driving power.*

*It must be realized that highly organized trench warfare has checked rather than developed the qualities of initiative, leadership, and self-reliance on the part of subordinate commanders. Recent operations, which have been operations of movement rather than of position, have demonstrated the great importance of such qualities.*

*Tactical exercise on the ground, dealing with open fighting, are the best method of developing these qualities in all ranks, and should be carried out in conjunction with Infantry Battalions or Brigades whenever possible. The range practices, laid down above, must be made the means of further developing quick and accurate judgment and action.*

6. *During tactical exercises all ranks must be practised in assuming the duties of their superiors. This is of vital importance and it must be thoroughly impressed on all ranks that, no matter what the casualties among the senior commanders may be, the spirit and determination to carry out their allotted task must remain to the last survivor of the unit.*
7. *The organization of Transport, by Limber or Pack Animals, must be practised in the Companies and Battalions, under the personal supervision of the Battalion Commanders or Seconds in Command; it being understood by all ranks that the pressing forward of ammunition and supplies is essential if the Machine Gun batteries are to be kept in action.*

*In a moving battle the tactical handling of limbers or of pack animals is of great importance. Boldness, use of ground, and common sense will often enable Machine Gun Batteries to come into action quickly by using limbers or pack animals.*

8. *The Notes on Recent Fighting published up to date emphasize the value of certain principles which are applicable to a moving battle. The essential points to be studied and applied in all training are:-*
  - (a) *Machine Guns are employed apart from the Infantry.*
  - (b) *Under certain circumstances, and to a certain extent, Machine Guns replace Artillery.*
  - (c) *Machine Guns must be distributed in depth, must be able to intervene in the fight by opening fire rapidly to a flank, even when advancing, and must be the main protection against the enemy's counter-attacks.*
  - (d) *Machine Guns follow the waves of the attacking Infantry, advancing in alternate sections by large bounds, making every use of the ground, and taking up positions from which overhead or flanking fire can be brought to bear on the enemy.*
  - (e) *The aim of the Machine Gun Commanders at all times must be the production of the greatest possible fire power at those points where the hostile infantry is fighting most vigorously, so as to assist the progress of our infantry in the attack by bold and opportune action.*
  - (f) *In the moving battle the machine guns should be so disposed and so handled that the largest possible number will automatically intervene by fire at any point where our Infantry is held up being attracted, as it were, by the localities where our infantry meets the greatest resistance,*
  - (g) *The engagement of this Machine Guns in reserve, Brigade or Divisional, should be governed by the tactical situation and the urgency of breaking definitely the resistance of the enemy at certain points."*



**Duties of D.M.G.C.<sup>66</sup>**

Under normal conditions the D.M.G.C. will make his Headquarters with the Machine Gun Battalion. Too much of his time should not be absorbed by Staff work, and in this connection his subordinates should be used freely for minor reconnaissance, etc. At the same time he must keep in close touch with the tactical situation and should report frequently to the General Staff of the Division.

Arrangements should be made by the General Staff for the D.M.G.C. to have access to all tactical papers of instructional value, together with orders, instructions and correspondence which either directly or indirectly affect Machine Guns.

The services of the D.M.G.C. are available as required by the Administrative Staff in dealing with all matters affecting personnel, establishments, and equipment of Machine Gun Units.

During active operations the D.M.G.C., with a suitable proportion of his Headquarters Staff, must be located at the Headquarters of the Division.

The principle duties of the D.M.G.C. are:-

- (a) To administer and command the Machine Gun Battalion.
- (b) To direct the tactical action of the Machine Gun Battalion Batteries under his command, in accordance with the orders of the G.O.C. Division and in close co-operation with the other Arms.
- (c) To be responsible for arranging and carrying out reliefs of Machine Gun Batteries, and for the maintenance of Strength, both in personnel and material, of the Machine Gun Batteries in the line.
- (d) To advise the Divisional Commander regarding the distribution and employment of the Machine Gun resources of the Division in relation to the tactical situation,
- (e) To prepare for the approval of the G.O.C. the plan of operations for the Machine Guns of the Division, both in Offence and Defence and to co-ordinate these plans with those of the Divisions on either flank.
- (f) To be responsible for keeping Infantry Brigades in the line informed as to the disposition of the Machine Guns covering their respective sectors, and to ensure that close and constant liaison is maintained between Infantry and Machine Gun Units.
- (g) To supervise on behalf of the G.O.C. the carrying out of the instructions regarding Machine Gun Units both in offence and defence and to ensure continuity and method in the siting and construction of Machine Gun Emplacements in the Divisional Area.

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<sup>66</sup> Published as Appendix "C" to above Memorandum but not available in this document at this time.



XV.

REORGANISATION OF MOTOR MACHINE GUN UNITS:  
FORMATION OF 2 CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADES.

DECEMBER 25th, 1917, TO MAY 31st, 1918.

**INTRODUCTORY.**

**Reconstitution of Motor Branch.**

Although the organisation of the Machine Gun Corps, Motor Branch, remained unaltered during 16 months of strenuous activity, it was found by experience in the Field to be quite unsatisfactory. And while the reorganisation of the Infantry Branch and the formation of the Machine Gun Battalions was taking place an effort was also being made to reconstitute the Motor Machine Gun Units. The effort was not productive of its ultimate object until after the development of the Infantry Branch was completed: the final form of the Machine Gun Battalion was authorised on may 6th, 1918: the new Motor Machine Gun Organisation was not sanctioned until May 31st.

**Stages of Reorganisation.**

An account of the re-organisation of the Motor Branch falls naturally into three distinct parts. (a) In the first place application was made for the reconstitution of the existing Motor Machine Gun Units into a single Brigade. This followed (b) a request for the formation of a 2nd Motor Machine Gun Brigade from the 3 Machine Gun Companies of the 5th Division. Neither of these aims were achieved as originally intended. What eventually happened was (c) the formation of 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades by combining in each Brigade elements of the existing Motor Machine Gun Units with the untrained elements of the Fifth Division Companies absorbed in the Canadian Corps.



## **APPLICATION FOR FORMATION OF A 5-BATTERY MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE.**

### **New Establishment Suggested.**

On December 25th, 1917, the day on which the 2-Company Machine Gun Battalion Establishment was draughted the Corps Machine Gun Officer also forwarded to the Corps Commander a suggested new Motor Machine Gun Establishment.

### **Reasons for Proposed Change.**

The then existing condition of the Motor Branch and the reasons for this proposed change were enumerated in Lieut.-Colonel BRUTINEL's covering letter:

*"The Motor Branch, Canadian Machine Gun Corps, consisting at present of 4 administrative Units, namely:-*

*The 1st Motor Machine Gun Brigade  
The Borden Motor Machine Gun Battery  
The Eaton Motor Machine Gun Battery  
The Yukon Motor Machine Gun Battery"*

*"The 1st Motor Machine Gun Brigade consists of 1 Headquarters, 2 Batteries, 1 Train."*

*"The 2 Batteries consist each of 8 Machine Guns and 2 Machine Guns carried as Spares."*

*"The Borden, Eaton, and Yukon Motor Machine Gun Batteries are 6 Machine Gun Batteries, substantially with the same Establishment as the British Motor Machine Gun Batteries (Clyno Side-Cars, Cycles)."*

*"The Motor Machine Gun Brigade and the Motor Cycle Batteries, have been grouped together under the O.C., Motor Machine Gun Brigade, and are looked upon more or less as a Unit."*

*"Unfortunately the diversity of Motor Equipment and the unreliability of the Clyno Side-Car offer such drawbacks that this Unit is neither cohesive nor mobile."*

*"The upkeep is costly, the Establishment inadequate, and the supply of specially qualified Personnel is becoming rapidly difficult."*

*"The Personnel of the 3 Cycle Batteries must be recruited amongst qualified mechanics, since practically every man on the strength must be a trained Motor Cyclist, able to effect running repairs, as well as a Machine Gunner."*

*"It is a matter of general interest to reduce as far as possible the casualties in highly trained mechanics."*

*"As regards the Motor Machine Gun Brigade, the Armoured Lorries are obsolete, and are no longer suitable for 'Action mounted.' They are merely transport rendered cumbersome by the Armour."*

### **The Canadian M.M.G. Brigade.**

The amended Establishments submitted under the C.M.G.O.'s letter provided for the formation of a single administrative Unit to be known as "*The Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade*," to consist of 1 Headquarters, 2 Machine Gun Batteries, of 8 Guns each, and 1 Brigade Train, a total Personnel of 499, All Ranks. Under this Establishment the Batteries which were then of unequal Strength and Guns, and were diversely equipped, would be equalised and their Equipment standardised.



**Proposed Establishments.**

The amended Establishments, covering Personnel and Transport were as follows:-

**CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE  
WAR ESTABLISHMENT.**

Detail	Lieut.-Colonel	Major	Captains	Lieutenants	Warrant Officers Class I	Warrant Officers Class II	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Corporals	Privates	TOTAL	Motor Cars	Ford Motor Cars	Mobile <sup>67</sup> Workshop <sup>68</sup>	Men's Transport Auto-car Lorries	3-cwt. Lorries Amm'n. Transport	15-cwt. Box Cars Baggage Sundries	Motor Cycles	Water Cart Trailers
HEADQUARTERS	1	1	2		1		2	1	21	29	1				1	1	5	
5 BATTERIES (8 M.G.s each)			5	15		5	20	25	350	420		5		20	10	10	40	
TRAIN			1	1		2	3	5	38	50		1	1		4	5	5	2
	1	1	8	16	1	7	25	31	409	499	1	6	1	20	15	16	50	2

<sup>67</sup> Attached.

<sup>68</sup> Unit complete.



CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE  
WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

Detail	Personnel									Transport						
	Lieut.-Colonel	Major	Captains	Lieutenants	Warrant Officers Class I	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Corporals	Privates	TOTAL	Motor Cars	Ford Motor Cars	Mobile Workshop	Men's Transport Auto-Car Lorries	30-cwt. Lorries Amm'n. Transport	15-cwt. Box Cars Baggage Sundries	Motor Cycles
HEADQUARTERS	1	1	1 1		1	1 1	1	2 3 1 5 1 4 6	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1				1	1	5
O.C. Brigade																
2nd in Command																
Adjutant																
Medical Officer <sup>69</sup>																
Bde. Sergt.-Major																
Provost Sergeant																
Orderly Room Clerk																
Mail Clerk																
Privates																
Drivers																
Assistant Drivers																
Motor Cyclists <sup>70</sup>																
Cooks																
Batmen																
Water Details <sup>71</sup>																

<sup>69</sup> Attached.<sup>70</sup> To be trained Signallers.<sup>71</sup> 1 Detached to each Battery H.Q.



## CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE

## WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

Detail	Personnel										Transport						
	Lieut.-Colonel	Major	Captain	Lieutenants	Warrant Officers Class I	Warrant Officers Class II	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Corporals	Privates	TOTAL	Motor Cars	Ford Motor Cars	Mobile W' shop	Men's Transport Auto-Car Lorries <sup>72</sup>	30-cwt. Lorries Amm'n. Transport	15-cwt. Box Cars Baggage Sundries	Motor Cycles
BATTERY O.C. Battery Subaltern Battery Sergt.- Major N.C.O.s Gunners Drivers Motor Cyclists <sup>73</sup> Cook Batmen			1	3		1	4	5	48	131948		1		4	2	2	8
			1	3		1	4	5	70	84		1		4	2	2	8

<sup>72</sup> To transport 2 M.G. Detachments each.<sup>73</sup> To be trained as Signallers.



## CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE

## WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

Detail	Personnel									Transport								
	Lieut.-Colonel	Major	Captain	Lieutenant	Warrant Officer Class I	Warrant Officer Class II	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Corporals	Privates	TOTAL	Motor Cars	Ford Motor Cars	Mobile Workshop	Men's Transport Auto-Car Lorries	30-cwt. Lorries Amm'n. Transport	15-cwt. Box Cars Baggage Sundries	Motor Cycles	Ware Cart Trailers
TRAIN			1	1		1	1	5	5	1								
O.C. Train										1								
Q.M. & Paymaster						1				1								
Sergeant-Major						1				1								
Q.M. Sergeant							1			1								
Armourer							2	5		7								
Sergeant									5	5								
N.C.O.s									2	2								
Fitters									6	6								
Armourers									11	11		1	1 <sup>75</sup>		4	5		2
Privates									5	5								
Drivers									5	5							5	
Asst. Drivers									1	1								
Motor Cyclists <sup>74</sup>									1	1								
Cyclists <sup>74</sup>									2	2								
Cobbler																		
Cook																		
Batmen																		
			1	1		2	3	5	38	50		1	1		4	5	5	2

**Main Features.**

Some of the points specially recommending this Establishment were set forth by the Corps Machine Gun Officer.

*"This re-organisation will give 5 Machine Gun Batteries of equal size and great mobility, and the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade will be a well-balanced Unit with a greatly enhanced tactical value."*

*"The cost of upkeep will be greatly decreased by the elimination of the Clyno Motor-Cycles."*

*"As regards personnel, the Machine Gunners will not be required to be skilled mechanics."*

*"The Motor Drivers and the other skilled Mechanics will not be more exposed to become casualties than the Specialists of a Machine Gun Unit of the Infantry Branch."*

*The importance of the point is emphasized by the fact that A and B Batteries of the Motor Machine Gun Brigade have suffered about 140% casualties in the last 5 months without the unit*

<sup>74</sup> To be trained as Signallers.

<sup>75</sup> Attached.



*being crippled. Should the Casualties have occurred amongst the Motor Cycle Batteries great difficulty would have been experienced in obtaining sufficient specially-trained reinforcements."*

### **Designation of Batteries.**

In order to retain the identity of the donors or the original names of the Units, all of which had been offered fully equipped to the Canadian Government, the following designations were suggested:

- A – (M.M.C.B.) Battery.
- B – (M.M.C.B.) Battery.
- C – (Borden) Battery.
- D – (Eaton) Battery.
- E – (Yukon) Battery.

The Batteries grouped under the Officer Commanding the 1st Motor Machine Gun Brigade had actually been designated as above, A, B, C, D, and E, respectively, ever since the formation of the Group in 1916.

### **Differences between Existing and Proposed Establishment.**

The following tables indicate at a glance the numerical differences in Personnel and Transport between the existing and proposed Establishments.

	Lieut.-Colonel	Major	Captains	Medical Officer Att'd.	Lieutenants	W.O. Class I	W.O. Class II	Sergeants	Corporals	L/Corporals	Privates	Water Details	TOTAL
Proposed Establishment (The Canadian Motor M.G. Brigade)	1	1	7	1	16	1	7	25	31		403	6	499
Existing Establishment (1st C.M.M.G.Bde. and 3 Attd. Batteries)	1	1	6	1	13	1	3	21	23	3	277	2	352
Increase			1		3		4	4	8		126	4	150
Decrease										3			3



TRANSPORT	Motor Cars	Ford Cars	Auto-Cars	30 Cwt. Lorries	15 Cwt. Box Cars (Napiers)	Travelling Workshops	Clyno Side-Cars	Motor Cycles Solo	Push Cycles
Proposed Establishment (The Canadian Motor M.G. Brigade)	1	6	20	15	16	1		50	
Existing Establishment (1st C.M.M.G. Bde and 3 Attached Batteries)	1	6	20	3	12		66	32	12
Increase		6		12	4	1		18	
Decrease							66		12

#### Proposal for Reorganisation Forwarded.

The proposed new Organisation was forwarded by the Corps Commander, Lieut.-General Sir ARTHUR CURRIE, on January 10th, 1918, with a strong covering letter, in which he wrote:-

*“The value of Machine Gun Units operating under Corps Headquarters was demonstrated in the PASSCHENDAELE Operations, but the weak points of the present organization were also clearly shown.”*

*“The Motor Machine Gun Units as at present organised are not only not satisfactory from the tactical point of view, as pointed out by the C.M.G.O., but (a greater disadvantage) required to be reinforced by Specialist tradesmen trained as Machine Gunners. This means that reinforcement becomes increasingly difficult and alone makes reorganization desirable.”*

*“The adoption of the draft Establishments forwarded herewith is, I consider, essential in order:-*

- 1. To provide a homogeneous and mobile Unit.*
- 2. To make reinforcement possible.”*

#### Establishment Not Authorised.

This Establishment was never actually authorised as the Motor Machine Gun Branch of the Corps was increased and reorganised on the basis of another Establishment before this application of the Corps Commander had been dealt with.



## **APPLICATION FOR FORMATION OF 2ND CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE. FEBRUARY 19th, 1918.**

### **Corps Commander recommends Formation of 2nd Brigade.**

On February 19th, 1918, three days before the authorisation of the 2-company Machine Gun Battalion, the Corps Commander recommended to the Honourable the Minister, Overseas Military Forces of Canada at Argyll House, London,<sup>76</sup> *“that the 3 Machine Gun Companies of the 5th Canadian Division be reorganised under the name of the “2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade,” and provided with Motor Transport similarly, and on approximately the same scale as the pending Establishment of the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade now in the field.”*

### **Reason.**

The reason for this request as stated by the Corps Commander was *“to enable the Canadian Corps to retain approximately the former proportion of Machine Guns to Rifles”* – a proportion which had been temporarily reduced by the increase of strength of Infantry Battalions.

### **Proportion of Machine Guns to Rifles.**

The serious deficiencies of a Canadian Division in this respect at the time is shown by the following Memorandum showing the proportion of Machine Guns to Rifles in some of the various Forces in the Field. For the purpose of this Memorandum the approximate Strength only of Infantry Battalions is considered.

Formation	Approximate Strength	No. of Machine Guns Heavy Pattern.	Proportion of Machine Guns to Rifles
French Division	9 Battalions 9,000 Rifles	108	1 to 83
British Division	9 Battalions 9,000 Rifles	64	1 to 141
Canadian Division	12 Battalions 13,200 Rifles	64	1 to 206
German Division	9 Battalions 9,000 Rifles	144 <sup>77</sup>	1 to 62.5

Even after the addition of the 2nd Motor Machine Gun Brigade, as applied for, the Canadian Corps would still be 40 Guns short of the number required to make its proportion of Machine Guns to Rifles equal to that prevailing in the other Infantry Formations of the British Army.

### **Comparative Cost.**

The possible objection that this was an expensive form in which to mobilise the 48 machine Guns of the 5th Division for Service in France had been anticipated.

*“Careful comparisons were made between the organization of the Machine Gun companies of the 5th Canadian Division organized on Battalion basis, in accordance with the new Establishments, but with 48 Machine Guns only, and the same Companies organized as Motor Units.”*

*“This comparison shows that the organization of the Companies in Motor Units results in a saving of Personnel of 237 All ranks, equivalent to a saving in money exceeding 500 dollars a day for pay and upkeep of Personnel only.”*

*“The cost of running expenses and maintenance is also greatly in favour of Motor Units.”*

<sup>76</sup> C.C. G.645/1-23, M.G. 60/ dated 19-2-18.

<sup>77</sup> Including a Marksman Detachment.



**New Establishment Submitted.**

An Establishment was submitted by the Corps Commander, with the above recommendation, providing for the organisation of 1 Headquarters, 6 Eight-Gun Batteries, and Train, a total Personnel of 593 All Ranks, with Motor Transport, except that 2 additional 30 cwt Lorries for the transport of Spare Parts, Stores, etc., were recommended in place of a Mobile Workshop with the Trains, as it was considered that "*the Mobile Workshop recommended in the pending Establishment of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade*" would be "*sufficient for the maintenance of the aggregate Transport of the two Brigades.*" In order to bring the Strength of the 3 Machine Gun Companies up to that proposed Brigade Organisation only 29 All Ranks were required from outside sources.

**Immediate Formation Urged.**

AIR ARTHUR CURRIE urged "*in view of the lateness of the season, and the expected severity of the coming fighting, that the new Machine Gun Unit should be made available at the earliest possible date.*"

**G.H.Q.'s Sanction requested.**

The sanction of G.H.Q. for this change in organisation and accompanying increase of the Machine Gun strength of the Canadian Corps was applied for in the ordinary course<sup>78</sup>, at the same time as the above recommendations were submitted to the Overseas Minister.

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<sup>78</sup> C.C. G.616/1-23, M.G. 60/dated 18-2-18.



**FORMATION OF 2 MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADES – 5th DIVISION M.G. COMPANIES.****C.M.G.O's Conference with London Authorities.**

In the last week of February the Corps Machine Gun Officer was sent to England on duty "*with a view to dealing with all outstanding questions regarding the Canadian Machine Gun Corps.*" On March 4th, Lieutenant-General Sir RICHARD TURNER, V.C., stated to Lieut.-Col. BRUTINEL in the course of an interview that it had been decided to send the 5th Division Machine Gun Companies to France at once. Brigadier-General S.?. MCDONALD, also present, was requested by General TURNER to go into the question of Establishments for the new Motor Units, in conference with the C.M.G.O. All Establishment was drawn up at this time for 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades of 8 Eight-Gun Batteries, each. In view of the urgency of the situation, on the return of the C.M.G.O. to France application was made by Canadian Corps for authority to proceed with the organisation of the Brigades.<sup>79</sup>

**1st Motor Brigade is attached to Fifth Army.**

A week after this application was forwarded, on March 21st, the last great Offensive attempted by the Germans began. The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade received Orders on the 22nd to join the Fifth Army and left VIMY RIDGE Area for AMIENS in the early morning of the 23rd. Re-organisation had to be postponed indefinitely until the 1st Brigade should return to the Canadian Corps.

**5th Division Companies proceed to France.**

Meanwhile, the 17th, 18th and 19th Machine Gun Companies were hurriedly got together at WITLEY CAMP, SURREY and sent at once to France. They landed at LE HAVRE on the 25th and proceeded immediately by Lorry to the Camp at VERDREL.

Their Horse Transport made the journey by road in its own time. In view of the critical and urgent tactical situation and to facilitate tactical handling, the three Companies were temporarily brigaded, under Major B.M. Clerk, M.C., as "*Canadian Corps Machine Gun Companies.*" Each Company was formed into 2 Right-Gun Batteries; each Battery was placed under the Command of an Officer with experience in the Field.

**Officers with the 17th, 18th and 19th Companies.**

The undermentioned Officers came to France with the 5th Division Companies:-

**17th Canadian Machine Gun Company.**

Captain G. Black (O.C.)	Lieut. J.F. MacLennan
Captain G.G. Hulme	Lieut. W. Murray
Lieut. R.W. Chipman	Lieut. W.G. Radford
Lieut. E.M.C. Goodwin	Lieut. N.A. Watt
Lieut. W. Leary, M.C.	Lieut. P.S. Wilson

**18th Canadian Machine Gun Company.**

Captain G.W. de la P. Beresford (O.C.)	Lieut. W.J. Preston
Major A.W.L. Butler	Lieut. F.W. Thompson
Lieut. F. Adam	Lieut. J.E. Tudhope
Lieut. W.E. Frame	Lieut. M.B. Watts
Lieut. H. Norwick	Lieut. F.F. Worthington

**19th Canadian Machine Gun Company.**

Major J.H. Brownlee (O.C.)	Lieut. W. Macintyre
Captain J.McC. Cumming	Lieut. J.H. Morwick
Lieut. G.C. Anderson	Lieut. S.G. Rennie
Lieut. F.J. Buck	Lieut. M.M. Robinson
Lieut. L.W. Dinnie	Lieut. A.H. Wylie

<sup>79</sup> C.C. A.104-220 dated March 14th, 1918.



### **“Canadian Corps M.G. Companies” First Tour in the Line.**

This reserve of Machine Gun Strength was not allowed to remain in idleness at such a critical time. They received their first experience in Trench Fighting at once. All three Companies, on completion of their temporary reorganisation, were sent into the Line to relieve Machine Gun Units in need of rest. In order not to weaken the Machine Gun defences of the Corps, the new Units were diluted and not put into a special portion of the Front as entire Companies. Sub-sections (2 Guns each) of the “*Canadian Corps Machine Gun Companies*” relieved corresponding elements of experienced Machine Gun Units, along the whole Corps Front. In this way a useful Training, under fighting conditions, was given the newly-arrived Companies and, at the same time 48 Machine Guns were released to Divisional and Corps Reserve.

### **1st Brigade returned to Canadian Corps.**

On April 10th, the 1st Motor Machine Gun Brigade returned to VERDREL from AMIENS and proceeded to reorganise after the losses of a fortnight’s constant, rigorous fighting.

### **Formation of 2 Brigades.**

Following the decision arrived at in march in the conference of the C.M.G.O. with the London Authorities, arrangements were now got under way for the formation of 2 Brigades each of 8 Eight-Gun Batteries.

### **Change of Plan; Final Organisation.**

On May 4th, however, word was received that the new Establishment had been approved providing for 2 Brigades of 5 Eight-Gun Batteries each, and the reorganisation was proceeded with at once on this basis pending actual receipt of authority.

### **Personnel.**

During the month of May Other Ranks, Gunners and Specialists required to complete the new Establishments were transferred from the C.C.R.C. Divisional Wings, to the Canadian Machine Gun Corps Reinforcement Depot (C.M.G.C.R.D.) and their Training proceeded with. They were sent to the new Brigades as required.

### **Establishment.**

Authorisation of the Organisation was contained in G.H.Q. letter O.B./1964 dated May 31st, 1918, sanctioning the 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades and 1 M.T. Company, with the Establishments as follows:-



**CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE  
WAR ESTABLISHMENT**

No. 1449 – dated July 8th, 1918.

Detail	Personnel					Transport	
	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Rank and File	TOTAL	Motor Cycles	Water Cart Trailer
HEADQUARTERS	5	2	6	19	32	6	
HEADQUARTERS (Attached)	1		1		2		
5 BATTERIES	26	5	25	330 <sup>80</sup>	380	40	
TRAIN		1	3	14	18	5	2
TOTAL BRIGADE (excluding Attached)	25	8	34	363	430	51	2
TOTAL BRIGADE (including Attached)	26	8	35	363	432	51	2

<sup>80</sup> Includes 30 Corporals.



## CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE

## WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

## (i) Personnel &amp; Transport.

Detail	Personnel					Transport	
	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Rank and File	TOTAL	Motor Cycles	Water Cart Trailers
BRIGADE							
HEADQUARTERS	1				1		
Lieutenant-Colonel	1				1		
Major (2nd in Command)	1				1		
Adjutant (Captain)	1				1		
Quartermaster (Captain)	1				1	1	
Signalling Officer (Lieut.)		1			1		
Brigade Sergt.-Major		1			1		
(Class I)			1		1		
Brigade Q.M. Sergeant			1		1		
(Class II)			1		1		
Provost Sergeant			1		1		
Orderly Room Sergeant			2	3	5	5	
Pay Clerk				3 <sup>81</sup>	3		
Mail Clerk				1	1		
Motor Cyclist Signallers				6	6		
Privates				6 <sup>82</sup>	6		
Cook							
Batmen							
Water Details							
TOTAL HEADQUARTERS (excluding Attached)	5	2	6	19	32	6	
ATTACHED	1				1		
C.A.M.C. (Captain)			1		1		
C.A.M.C. (Sergeant)							
TOTAL HEADQUARTERS (including Attached)	6	2	7	19	34	6	

<sup>81</sup> Includes 1 Lance-Corporal, Storeman.<sup>82</sup> 1 attached to each Battery.



## CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE

## WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

Detail	Personnel					Transport	
	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Rank and File	TOTAL	Motor Cycles	Water Cart Trailers
5 BATTERIES (Each)							
Captain	1				1		
Subalterns	3				3		
Battery Sergt.-Major (Class II).		1			1		
Sergeants			5	5	5		
Corporals				48	48		
Gunners				8 <sup>83</sup>	8	8	
Motor Cyclist Signallers				1	1		
Cook				4	4		
Batmen							
TOTAL	4	1	5	66	76	8	

## CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN M.T. COMPANY, C.A.S.C.

For Two 5-Battery Brigades (H.Q. &amp; 2 Sections).

## WAR ESTABLISHMENT.

	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	TOTAL
HEADQUARTERS	3	2	3	39	32	79
TWO SECTIONS	2		2		188	192
TOTAL	5	2	5	39	220	271
Personnel for Attached Vehicles other than TRAIN	2		2		8 36	8 40
TRAIN PERSONNEL						
TOTAL	7	2	7	39	264	319

<sup>83</sup> Includes 1 Corporal.



## CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN M.T. COMPANY, C.A.S.C.

For Two 5-Battery Brigades (H.Q. &amp; 2 Sections).

WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

COMPOSITION IN DETAIL. (i) Personnel.

	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	TOTAL
HEADQUARTERS						
Major	1					1
Captains	2 <sup>85</sup>					2
Warrant Officer (Class I)		1				1
Company Sergeant-Major		1				1
Company Q.M. Sergeant			1			1
Sergeants			2			2
Corporals					1	1
Drivers – Motor Box Car					4 <sup>86</sup>	4
Lorries					12 <sup>87</sup>	12
Motor Cycles					1	1
Spare 15%					10 <sup>88</sup>	10
Batmen				3	4	4
Workshop <sup>84</sup> – Foremen				22		22
(S/Sgts)				6		6
Fitters & Turners				6		6
Blacksmiths				2		2
Wheelers						
Electricians						
TOTAL	3	2	3	39	32	79

<sup>84</sup> Includes 6 Sergeants and 6 Corporals.<sup>85</sup> 1 for Workshop.<sup>86</sup> Includes 1 Driver for M.C. for G.O.C. C.M.G.C.<sup>87</sup> Includes 1 Driver for each Workshop and Store Lorry.<sup>88</sup> Includes 15% Spares for all attached vehicles.



## CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN M.T. COMPANY, C.A.S.C.

For Two 5-Battery Brigades (H.Q. &amp; 2 Sections).

WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Artificers	Rank and File	TOTAL
ATTACHED to each M.M.G. BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS.					2	2
Drivers, Motor Box Cars					2	2
Drivers, for Lorries						
TOTAL					4	4
ATTACHED for each TRAIN M.M.G. BRIGADE	1		1 <sup>89</sup>			1
Subalterns						1
Clerk					7	7
Drivers, Motor & Box Cars					10 <sup>90</sup>	10
Drivers for Lorries					1	1
Batman						
TOTAL	1		1		18	20

<sup>89</sup> 1 Supply Sergeant.<sup>90</sup> Includes 2 Corporals.



CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN M.T. COMPANY, C.A.S.C.

For Two 5-Battery Brigades (H.Q. & 2 Sections).

WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

	Officers	Warrant Officers	S/Sergeants & Sergeants	Rank and File	TOTAL
DETAIL for SECTION					
Subaltern	1				1
Sergeant			1		1
Corporals				6	6
Drivers <sup>91</sup> – Lorries				60	60
Motor & Box Cars				15	15
Spares 15%				12	12
Batmen				1	1
	1		1	94	96

<sup>91</sup> Includes 5 Lance-Corporals.



## CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN M.T. COMPANY, C.A.S.C.

For Two 5-Battery Brigades (H.Q. &amp; 2 Sections).

WAR ESTABLISHMENT (continued)

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

(ii) Transport.

(a) M.T. COMPANY HEADQUARTERS.

Detail	Motor Cars	Box Cars	Motor Cycles	30-cwt. Lorries	3-Ton Lorries	Workshop Lorries	Store Lorries	Drivers
For Personnel	2 <sup>92</sup>		1					2
For General Transport		2			3 <sup>93</sup>	3	3	14
For Intercommunication			1					1
	2	2	2		3	3	3	17

(b) ATTACHED FOR EACH M.M.G. BRIGADE.

For Personnel	1							1
For General Transport		5		2	3			15
For Intercommunication			1					1
	1	5	1	2	3			17

(c) ATTACHED FOR EACH M.M.G. SECTION.

For Personnel			1					
For Transport & Personnel				20				40
For Ammunition					10			20
For General Transport		10						10
		10	1	20	10			70

<sup>92</sup> Includes 1 Motor Car for G.O.C. C.M.G.C.<sup>93</sup> Includes 2 First Aid Lorries.



**Composition of 2 Brigades.**

The 2 Motor Brigades were composed as under:-

**1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.**

1st C.M.M.G. Brigade – (A & B Batteries)  
 Borden M.M.G. Battery  
 18th C.M.G. Company

**2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.**

Eaton M.M.G. Battery  
 Yukon M.M.G. Battery  
 17th C.M.G. Company  
 19th C.M.G. Company

**Transport.**

The 1st Brigade was completed in Transport first, the 18th Company exchanging its Horse Transport for the Motor Transport of the Eaton and Yukon Batteries. Reorganisation of Personnel was completed on June 8th, 1918. And Transport for 2 Brigades and M.T. Company was completed on July 10th. The Horse Transport thus released was partly distributed among the newly enlarged Machine Gun Battalions, the remainder was returned to the H.T. Depot.

**Officers.**

The following Officers were serving with the Motor Machine Gun Brigades on Reorganisation:-

**1st Canadian M.M.G. Brigade.**

Commanding Officer	Lieut.-Col. W.K. Walker, D.S.O., M.C.
Second in Command	Major B.O. Hooper, M.C.
Adjutant	Captain W.W. Main
Quartermaster	Captain F.P. O'Reilly, M.C.
Medical Officer	Captain R.D. Orck
	Captain G.W.D. Beresford
	Captain A.W.L. Butler
	Captain R.C. Clark
	Captain R.F. Inch, M.C.
	Captain W.T. Trench
	Lieut. F.N. Adams
	Lieut. H.R.E. Dye
	Lieut. W.G. Frame
	Lieut. J.E. Hipwell
	Lieut. W.A. Montgomery
	Lieut. H. Morwick
	Lieut. J.M. Peebles
	Lieut. W.J. Preston
	Lieut. H. Smith, M.M.
	Lieut. T.A. Smith
	Lieut. W.H. Smith
	Lieut. R.M. Thompson
	Lieut. C. Thorburn
	Lieut. J.E. Tudhope
	Lieut. D.R. Vosburg
	Lieut. F.F. Worthington, M.M.

Attached (Supernumerary):

Lieut. S.V. Hargreaves, (C.M.G.C.R.D.)



**2nd Canadian M.M.G. Brigade.**

Commanding Officer	Major W.J.A. Lalor, M.C.
Second in Command	Major H.F.V. Meurling, M.C.
Adjutant	Captain J.McC. Cumming
Quartermaster	Captain G.G. Hulme
Medical Officer	Captain R.C. Weldon
	Captain G. Black
	Captain J.H. Brownlee
	Captain W.J. Campbell, M.C.
	Captain W. Leary, M.C.
	Captain F.W. Thompson, M.M.
	Lieut. G.C. Anderson
	Lieut. L.M. Black, M.C.
	Lieut. F.J. Buck
	Lieut. R.W. Chipman
	Lieut. M.H. Doig
	Lieut. E.M.C. Goodwin
	Lieut. F.A. Landrian
	Lieut. W. Macintyre
	Lieut. J.A. MacKinnon
	Lieut. J.F. MacLennan
	Lieut. J.H. Morwick
	Lieut. W.G. Radford
	Lieut. S.G. Rennie
	Lieut. W.H. Roberts
	Lieut. J.D. Seton
	Lieut.A.H. Wylie

Attached (Supernumerary):

Lieut. M.M. Robinson, (C.M.G.C.R.D.)  
Lieut. P.S. Wilson, (C.M.G.C.R.D.)



## XVI.

## FORMATION OF CANADIAN CORPS MACHINE GUN SCHOOL.

May 6th, 1918.

**Instruction April and May 1918.**

During the months of April and May, 1918, normal Machine Gun Instruction Work had been suspended. The Machine Gun Wing, Canadian Corps School had an existence on paper only during this period, as no Courses were conducted by it after the end of March. Special arrangements were made for the Instruction of Infantry men newly-transferred to the Machine Gun Service.

**New Policy.**

When the first menace of the German Offensive was past, the Corps Machine Gun Officer took steps to re-establish the Machine Gun School on a permanent basis. A vigorous Instructions Policy was more necessary than ever because of the large increase of Machine Gun Corps Personnel consequent upon the new Battalion Establishment.

**Establishment Secured.**

On April 28th, application was made for an increase of Staff and an authorised Establishment for the School. The members of the Instructional Staff of the Machine Gun Wing, Canadian Corps School, viz., 2 Officers and 2 N.C.O.'s had been taken out of the Bombing Branch of the School; there was no definite Machine Gun Establishment. The work of the Bombing and Trench Mortar School had been taken over recently by the Divisional Wings of the C.C.R.C., but the Establishment, consisting of 5 Officers and 22 Other ranks had not been withdrawn. General BRUTINEL applied for this Establishment and on May 6th, the Bombing and Trench Mortar School was placed under his control, to be known as the Canadian Corps Machine Gun School.

**Establishment.**

The Establishment was as follows:

DETAIL	Officers	Warrant Off. Class II	S/Sgts. & Sergts.	Rank & File	TOTAL
Chief Instructor (Captain)	1				1
Instructors	4				4
Acting Sergt.-Major		1			1
N.C.O. Instructors			8		8
Privates				8 <sup>94</sup>	8
Batmen				5	5
Total School	5	1	8	13	27

<sup>94</sup> 2 Storemen; 6 Tange Duties.



### **Administration.**

Administrative duties were allowed for in the Corps Infantry School Establishment.

### **School Organised.**

The Organisation of the Machine Gun School was undertaken at once. Captain M.H. LEVEY, M.M., appointed Chief Instructor, was already at AUBIN-ST-VAAST, to which place the Corps Infantry School had moved in April. When the Special Machine Gun Depot, of which Captain LEVEY had charge, was absorbed in the C.M.G.C.R.D. on May 28th, he was instructed to arrange for the commencement of work under the new M.G. School establishment.

### **Increased Attendance.**

The principles of Selection and Training of Candidates remained unaltered. The increase in Staff made it possible to increase the Students. The number attending each Course were raised from 18 Officers, 36 Other Ranks, to 24 Officers, 80 Other Ranks, a total of 104, All Ranks. Courses lasted for one Month. The first Course began on June 5th, 1918, and the work of the School was continued without interruption down to the Armistice.

In the month of August Capt. J.E. RITCHIE took over command of the School from Capt. LEVEY who was attached as Staff Learner to C.M.G.C. Headquarters.

### **Vickers Handbook.**

In order to make uniform Instruction in the Vickers Gun, a full detail, compiled by Captain Levey, containing the order and exact Method of Teaching at the School, was circulated to all Units of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps. This material was later published as "*The Vickers Light Automatic Machine Gun – Canadian Machine Gun Corps.*"

### **Influence of School.**

The Machine Gun School had very much to do with maintaining that high state of efficiency which marked the Machine Gun Corps. Those who attended it were fresh from Active Service in the Line with a full knowledge of conditions there, and the School served as a Clearing House for ideas gained in the Line experience of Different Units. It also taught a sound knowledge of Machine Gun Theory, as well as of General Military Subjects; and the Officers and N.C.O.s who attended Courses, on returning to their Units, communicated this knowledge to their own Men.

The thorough Course of Instructions, so brilliantly designed and so ably carried out at the Canadian Corps Machine Gun School by Captain LEVEY, under the C.M.G.O.'s direction, contributed very largely to the Esprit de Corps and Discipline of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, and was in no small measure responsible for its success in the Field.



## XVII.

## FORMATION OF MACHINE GUN WING, CANADIAN CORPS REINFORCEMENT CAMP.

JUNE 10th, 1918.

While the Battalions had been undergoing changes in Establishment to render them more adaptable to the needs of the service, the C.M.G.C.R.D. had also been altered to meet the new requirements. The final form of its Organisation was officially sanctioned on June 10th.

**M.G. Wing C.C.R.C.**

On May 27th, 1918, the Infantry and Motor Branches moved to GUISEY CAMP AUBIN-ST-VAAST, where both came under orders of the Commandant, C.M.G.C.R.D. A request was at once made by General BRUTINEL<sup>95</sup> to have the two Branches amalgamated. There was no longer a necessity for Special Training of Motor Machine Gun reinforcements. Under the Establishment just granted to the 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades a Canadian Motor Machine Gun, Motor Transport Company was authorised and this Unit would care for the Motor Specialist Personnel within its own Establishment. The amalgamation was approved and the 2 Branches became one Depot as from June 10th. The Depot was now known as the "*Machine Gun Wing, Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp*."<sup>96</sup>

**Increase of Reinforcements.**

Meantime the numbers of Reinforcements to be maintained had been increased. The new Canadian Machine Gun Battalion Establishment adopted in February, had increased the numbers of Machine Gunners in each Division by 290 All ranks. Following the introduction of this Establishment and to maintain the Proportion of Reinforcements to Strength of Units, the Scale of Personnel of Officers, Specialists and Gunners for Machine Gun Battalion Reinforcements at the Canadian Machine Gun Reinforcement Depot was increased on March 11th to:

Officers	Other Ranks
34	400

**Infantry Reinforcements, Specially Transferred to C.M.G.C.**

At the same time there was a falling off of Reinforcements available in England for the Machine Gun Service, and it was found that no Machine Gun Reinforcements could be expected from England for the months of April and May. In order to meet this situation, in view of the critical Military position, at the time, the Corps Commander, at the end of March, sanctioned the Transfer, to the Machine Gun Corps, or 500 Other Ranks from the Infantry Reinforcements at the Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp.

**Training of Transferred Reinforcements.**

As the Machine Gun School had just been dissolved owing to the German Offensive in the South, Captain M.R. Levey was free to take charge of the Machine Gun Training of these Men. The first batch of Reinforcements were drawn on March 30th and assembled at the Canadian Corps School, PERNES, where Captain Levey, assisted by 1 Officer and 14 Other Ranks, proceeded with Training. These were specially brilliant Men, and after a fortnight's Training were absorbed in the C.M.G.R.D. at DIVION.

<sup>95</sup> Canadian Corps M.G. 25-5/82 dated 6-6-18.

<sup>96</sup> Canadian Corps A. 104-280 dated 13-6-18.



**Final Increase in Reinforcements.**

The Strength of the Machine Gun Wing received its final authorised increase on June 26th. With the formation of 3-Company Machine Gun Battalions and the addition of the 2nd M.M.G. Brigade a further addition to Reinforcements maintained in the Field was found necessary. The Scale of Officers and Other Ranks was fixed at:

	Officers	Other Ranks.
Infantry Personnel	62	859
Motor Personnel	26	259
TOTAL	88	1118

No change was made in the Cavalry Branch.

**M.G. Depot, CAMIERS.**

During the Summer of 1918, very few Infantry and Motor Machine Gun Reinforcements were maintained at CAMIERS. It became the practice for these to proceed direct to the Machine Gun Wing, AUBIN-ST-VAAST.

**Establishment.**

On June 15th, an Establishment was submitted for the Machine Gun Wing, C.C.R.C., providing for 1 Headquarters, 2 Infantry Training Companies and 1 Motor Training Company, a Total Strength of 14 Officers and 98 Other Ranks. This Establishment authorised<sup>97</sup> on November 1st, was as follows:-

MACHINE GUN WING,  
CANADIAN CORPS REINFORCEMENT CAMP.

War Establishment.

(i) PERSONNEL.

Detail	Lt.-Col. or Major	Major or Captain	Captains	Captains or Lieutenants	Lieutenants	Warrant Officers	S/Sergts. & Sergts.	Rank and File	TOTAL
Headquarters	1	1	1	2		2	5	34	46
2 Inf. M.G. Trg. Coys.			2		4	2	8	32	48
1 Motor M.G. Trg. Coy.			1		2	1	2	12	18
TOTAL	1	1	4	2	6	5	15	78	112

<sup>97</sup> A.G.3>d. A.G. 7-1-182 dated 9-11-18.



## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL.

## HEADQUARTERS.

Detail	Lt.-Col. or Major	Major or Captain	Captains	Captains or Lieutenants	Lieutenants	Warrant Officers	S/Sergts. & Sergts.	Rank and File	TOTAL
Commandant	1								1
Chief Instructor		1							1
Adj. & Record Officer			1						1
Quartermaster				1					1
Range Officer				1					1
R.S.M. (W.O. Class II)						1			1
Qr. Mr. Sergt. (W.O. Class II)						1			1
Sgt. I/c Records							1 <sup>98</sup>		1
Orderly Room Sergt.							1		1
Pay Sergt.							1		1
Pioneer Sergt.							1		1
Armourer Sergt.								3	3
Clerks								2 <sup>99</sup>	2
Storemen								6	6
Signallers								2	2
Cooks								5	5
Pioneers								5	5
Batmen								11 <sup>100</sup>	11
Details									
TOTAL HEADQUARTERS	1	1	1	2		2	5	34	46

## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL (continued).

## INFANTRY MACHINE GUN TRAINING COMPANY.

	Lt.-Col. or Major	Major or Captain	Captains	Captains or Lieutenants	Lieutenants	Warrant Officers	S/Sergts. & Sergts.	Rank and File	TOTAL
Company Commander			1						1
Battery Commander					2				2
C.S.M.						1 <sup>101</sup>			1
Instructors							4 <sup>102</sup>	8 <sup>103</sup>	12
Storemen								1	1
Cooks								2	2
Tailor								1	1
Shoemaker								1	1
Batmen								3	3
Total Inf. M.G. Trg. Coy.			1		2	1	4	16	24

<sup>98</sup> Staff Sergeant.<sup>99</sup> Includes 1 L/Cpl.<sup>100</sup> Includes Buglers, Shoemaker, Tailor, Canteen and Range Duties.<sup>101</sup> W.O. II.<sup>102</sup> To be Staff Sgts.<sup>103</sup> To be Corporals.



## COMPOSITION IN DETAIL (continued).

## MOTOR MACHINE GUN TRAINING COMPANY.

	Lt.-Col. or Major	Major or Captain	Captains	Captains or Lieutenants	Lieutenants	Warrant Officers	S/Sergts. & Sergts.	Rank and File	TOTAL
Company Commander			1		2				1
Battery Commander						1 <sup>104</sup>			2
C.S.M.							2 <sup>105</sup>	4 <sup>106</sup>	1
Instructors								1	6
Storemen								1	1
Cooks								2	2
Tailor								1	1
Shoemaker								1	1
Batmen								3	3
Total M.M.G. Trg. Coy.			1		2	1	2	12	18

## TRANSPORT.

Detail	Vehicles	Drivers	Draught	Horses and Mules Heavy Draught Pack Mules
Wagons, G.S.	2	2		4
Carts, Water	2	2	4	
TOTAL	4	4	4	4

<sup>104</sup> W.O.II.<sup>105</sup> To be Staff Sergts.<sup>106</sup> To be Corporals.



**Casualties; Call on Reinforcements.**

The heavy fighting from August 8th onwards, with the Casualties involved, put a severe strain upon the Machine Gun reinforcing arrangements. Between August 8th and October 16th, Canadian Machine Gun Casualties amounted to:

Officers	Other Ranks
136	2734

On October 16th, the Reinforcements at the Machine Gun Wing were exhausted, and there were available in England only sufficient Personnel of Trained, Partially Trained and Untrained Machine Gunners to bring the Units in the Field up to Strength.

All this Personnel was sent to France for disposal.

**Arrangements in England and Canada.**

When the Armistice came arrangements were under way to fill the Depot in England to a Strength of 3000 Other ranks having 10 weeks Infantry Training. It was also arranged between the Canadian Authorities in England and Canada for a supply of Reinforcements already ear-marked in Canada for Machine Gun Service Overseas. But the Armistice put an end to further developments.



## XVIII.

## CONCLUSION.

**Growth of Canadian Machine Gun Corps.**

The amazing growth of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps may be illustrated by a comparison of Canadian Machine Gun establishments in the Field at various periods of the War. The following Table shows the Establishment Strength in Machine Gun Personnel of

- (1) The First Canadian Division on June 21st, 1915, i.e. prior to the Arrival in France of the Second Canadian Division and the Formation of the Canadian Corps.
- (2) The Canadian Corps on March 31st, 1917, immediately before the formation of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps; and
- (3) The Canadian Corps on November 11th, 1918, when the Canadian Machine Gun Corps had assumed its final form:-

	Officers	Other Ranks	TOTAL All Ranks
June 21st, 1915	24	567	591
March 31st, 1917	182	3,192	3,374
November 11th, 1918	422	8,349	8,771

The Total for June 21st, 1915, is Composed of the Personnel of Infantry Battalion Machine Gun Sections (with Brigade Machine Gun Officers) and of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade. The Total for March 31st, 1917, is composed of the Machine Gun Companies and the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade with attached Batteries. The Total for November 11th, 1918, includes the Establishment Strength of all Units making up the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, as shown on the accompanying Diagram<sup>107</sup>.

<sup>107</sup> No diagram is available for this document at this time.



**NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS.****Names of Officers.**

The names of Officers in the various Units comprising the Canadian Machine Gun Corps on November 11th, 1918, are given below:-

**C.M.G.C. HEADQUARTERS STAFF.**

Brigadier-General R. Brutinel, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.  
 Major W.B. Forster, M.C.  
 Captain J.K. Lawson  
 Captain M.R. Levey, M.M.  
 Lieut. P.M. Humme

**FIRST BATTALION, CANADIAN MACHINE GUN CORPS.**

Officer Commanding	Lieut.-Col. S.W. Watson, C.M.G., D.S.O.
Second in Command	Major R. Murdie, D.S.O.
Adjutant	Captain L.G. Francis, M.C.
Assistant Adjutant	Lieut. J.A.B. Reilly
Quartermaster	Captain J. Wylie
Assistant Q.M.	Lieut. H.V. Chown
Signalling Officer	Lieut. G.M. Smith
Medical Officer	Captain J.M. Livingston
Paymaster	Captain H.B. Wood

Major A. Denholm, D.C.M.	Lieut. C.C. Drew	Lieut. H.W. Martin, M.C.
Major C.V. Grantham, M.C.	Lieut. E.E. Duley, M.M.	Lieut. W. McClellan
Major E.H. Morris, D.S.O.	Lieut. O.A.W. Fawcett	Lieut. L. McEwan
Capt. E.V. Chambers, M.C.	Lieut. S.J. Freeman	Lieut. W.B. McMullan, M.C.
Capt. H. Donald, M.C.	Lieut. E.V. Frith	Lieut. A.M. Miller
Capt. H.K. Jordan	Lieut. E.P. Gillespie	Lieut. J.R.B. More
Capt. J. Maitland, M.C.	Lieut. C.M. Graham	Lieut. N. Neil
Capt. R.W. Mathews, M.C.	Lieut. M.S. Haas	Lieut. W. Nye, D.C.M.
Capt. J.W. Maynard	Lieut. W.R. Hamilton	Lieut. H.E. Palmer
Capt. W.B. Milner	Lieut. W.D.P. Hardisty	Lieut. H.C. Rawlings
Capt. A.E. Parker, M.C.	Lieut. H.J. Harris	Lieut. R.R. Rennison
Capt. J. Skinner	Lieut. S. Harrison, M.C.	Lieut. C.D. Schwab
Capt. C.G. Warner, M.C.	Lieut. T.B. Heney	Lieut. C. Simpson
Lieut. L.N. Balfe, M.C.	Lieut. W.B. Henry	Lieut. W.J. Spears
Lieut. W.G. Cairns	Lieut. G.B. Herridge	Lieut. A. Stalker
Lieut. R. Cullen	Lieut. S.H. Jefferess	Lieut. R. Stevenson
Lieut. V.R. Davies	Lieut. J.P. Knox	Lieut. J. Stewart
Lieut. M.M. Dillon, M.C.	Lieut. J.L. Lawler	Lieut. W.V.B. Webb
Lieut. B.A. Doiron, M.C.	Lieut. H.M. Lovell	Lieut. R.G. Whitelaw



## SECOND BATTALION, CANADIAN MACHINE GUN CORPS.

Officer Commanding	Major E.W. Sansom
Second in Command	Major A. Graham
Adjutant	Capt. G.N. Douglas, M.C.
Assistant Adjutant	Lieut. S.G. Fildes
Quartermaster	Lieut. E.B. Underwood, M.C., D.C.M.
Assistant Q.M.	Lieut. A.P. Williams
Signalling Officer	Lieut. S.E. Sacks, M.C.
Medical Officer	Capt. C.. Sutherland
Paymaster	Lieut. W.A. Fowler

Major J. Basevi, D.S.O.	Lieut. G.H.K. Bingham	Lieut. J. Ketchum
Major J.A. McCamus, M.C.	Lieut. C.W. Blair, M.C.	Lieut. F. Layton
Major J.E. McCorkell	Lieut. F.R. Bolton	Lieut. R.M. Mackenzie
Capt. H.A. Creighton	Lieut. W.G. Broadbridge	Lieut. I.G. MacLaren, M.C.
Capt. T.H. Dudley	Lieut. W.A. Brown	Lieut. A.F. Mahaffy
Capt. R.B. Duggan	Lieut. A.H. Cameron	Lieut. A.G. Mercer
Capt. C.G. Frost	Lieut. W. Carr	Lieut. W.E. Millsap
Capt. G.E. Harley	Lieut. L.A. Carrier	Lieut. W.H. Patterson
Capt. G. Hobson, M.C., M.M.	Lieut. C.H. Colwell	Lieut. G.F. Price
Capt. E.J.K. Norris	Lieut. G.W. Comstock, M.C.	Lieut. L. Richards
Capt. H.J.L. Pearce	Lieut. W.H. Cox	Lieut. D.H. Rose
Capt. J.A. Ramsay	Lieut. L.A. Cuff, D.C.M.	Lieut. A.C. Smith
Capt. H.S. Salisbury, M.C.	Lieut. J.H. Garlick	Lieut. K.S. Stover
Capt. H.M. Sibbald	Lieut. F.J.G. Garneau	Lieut. D. Urquhart
Capt. J. Stonehewer	Lieut. H.E. Hartwick	Lieut. G.A. Urquhart
Capt. L.F. White, M.C.	Lieut. L.G. Howard	Lieut. W.G. Welsford
Lieut. H.deB. Anderson, M.C.	Lieut. D.J. Hutchings	Lieut. A.B. White
Lieut. C.H. Appleby	Lieut. G. Jack, M.M.	Lieut. P.S. Wilson
Lieut. W. Beatty	Lieut. D.S. Jackson	Lieut. L. Withrow



## THIRD BATTALION, CANADIAN MACHINE GUN CORPS.

Officer Commanding	Lieut.-Col. W.M. Balfour, D.S.O.
Second in Command	Major J.C. Hartley, M.C., M.M.
Adjutant	Captain J.P. Le-Callais
Assistant Adjutant	
Quartermaster	Hon. Capt. C.M. Hall
Assistant Q.M.	Lieut. G.C. Rice
Signalling Officer	
Medical Officer	Captain L.T. Ainley
Paymaster	Captain E.B. Butler

Major G.S. Whitaker	Lieut. L.E. Bradford, M.M.	Lieut. R.P.G. Laurence
Capt. W.H. Bothwell	Lieut. O.R. Carson	Lieut. T.R. MacNutt
Capt. F.W. Burnham	Lieut. H.A. Chaddock	Lieut. B.P. McLaine
Capt. J.H. Clark	Lieut. C.L. Clayton, M.C.	Lieut. J.F. MacNeil
Capt. H.E.B. Coyne	Lieut. B.L. Cook	Lieut. P.C. Mulholland
Capt. G.M. Downton, M.C.	Lieut. H.V. Copley	Lieut. R.P. Qua
Capt. K.E. Drinkwater	Lieut. A.G. Fisher	Lieut. A.E. Raymond
Capt. F.M. Garrison	Lieut. H.E. Gee, M.C.	Lieut. L.A. Roe
Capt. A.M. German	Lieut. S.C. Gee, M.C.	Lieut. J.G. Searles, M.C.
Capt. F.E. Hinds, M.C.	Lieut. H.J. Godber	Lieut. J.D. Shearer, D.C.M.
Hon. Capt. &	Lieut. A.V. Hamilton	Lieut. H.F. Smith
Chapl. J.H.T. Holman, M.M.	Lieut. F.M. Hann	Lieut. W.N. Smith
Capt. E.I.H. Ings, M.C.	Lieut. P.M. Henry	Lieut. E.G. Spalding
Capt. K.R. Lindsay	Lieut. R.M. Hett	Lieut. H.H. Strong
Capt. H.L. Logan	Lieut. R.S. Hicks	Lieut. A.W. Taylor
Capt. A.R. Madgett	Lieut. R.M. Hopper	Lieut. J.E. Webber
Capt. J. Thompson	Lieut. F. Hudd	Lieut. F.H. Wheatley, M.M.
Capt. C.W. Tubbs	Lieut. A.G. Johnston	Lieut. F.L. White
Lieut. W.W. Anderson	Lieut. C.W. Kern	Lieut. W.H. Wilson
Lieut. K. Barr		



## FOURTH BATTALION, CANADIAN MACHINE GUN CORPS.

Officer Commanding	Lieut.-Col. M.A. Scott, D.S.O.
Second in Command	Major L.F. Pearce, D.S.O., M.C.
Adjutant	Lieut. A.R. Hill
Assistant Adjutant	Lieut. C.A. Good
Quartermaster	Lieut. F.C. Baird
Assistant Q.M.	Lieut. W.V. Smart
Signalling Officer	Lieut. H.S. Moss
Medical Officer	Captain J.S. Douglas
Paymaster	Captain T.W. Seagram

Major J.C. Britton, D.S.O.	Lieut. G.J. Colwell	Lieut. H.R. Pousette
Major H.A. Fowler, M.C.	Lieut. W.J.A. Fair	Lieut. W. Riddell, M.C.
Capt. H.E. Anderson	Lieut. W.P. Grieve	Lieut. C.J.S. Ryley, M.C.
Capt. T.H.H. Bevan	Lieut. W.R. Hadley	Lieut. C.W. Scott
Capt. S.E. Gudgeon	Lieut. J.T. Hughes	Lieut. J.D. Sharp
Capt. I.C. Hall, M.C.	Lieut. W.L. Isaacs, M.M.	Lieut. A.G. Sinclair
Capt. S. Johnston, M.C.	Lieut. C.W. Kerr	Lieut. A.L. Smith
Capt. W.J. Johnston	Lieut. H. Lewis	Lieut. J.M. Snetsinger
Capt. W.C. Killip	Lieut. C.F. Mandel, M.C.	Lieut. N.A. Sparks
Capt. H.T. Logan, M.C.	Lieut. M.W. McA'Nulty	Lieut. C.S. Spiers
Capt. G.H. Parsons, M.C.	Lieut. W.E. McIntyre	Lieut. P.E. Sweatman
Capt. K. Weaver, M.C.	Lieut. A.H. Middleton	Lieut. L.T. Tingley, M.M.
Capt. W.G. Williams, M.C.	Lieut. H.L. Montgomery, D.C.M.	Lieut. J.C. Veness
Lieut. A.W. Allan, M.C.	Lieut. J.J. Murray	Lieut. W.E. Wilson
Lieut. A.L. Bourque, M.C.	Lieut. T.F. Oliphant	Lieut. W.A. Woodward
Lieut. W.D. Cook	Lieut. C.T. Perkins	Lieut. F.B. Wright
Lieut. G.E.W. Cook	Lieut. G.M. Pomeroy	Lieut. C.A. Young
Lieut. L. Cox	Lieut. N.P. Pope	



1st CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE.

Officer Commanding	Lieut.-Col. W.K. Walker, D.S.O., M.C.
Second in Command	Major R.D. Harkness, D.S.O., M.C.
Adjutant	Captain W.W. Main
Quartermaster	Captain J.A. McKinnon
Medical Officer	
Paymaster	Captain E.J. Dickinson, M.C.

Captain G.W. de la P. Beresford	Lieut. J.E. Lodge
Captain J.McC. Cumming	Lieut. A.N. Moore
Captain F.F. Worthington, M.C., M.M.	Lieut. H. Norwick
Lieut. W.D. Brown	Lieut. J.M. Peebles
Lieut. W.G. Cuttle, M.M.	Lieut. W.J. Preston
Lieut. H.R.E. Dye	Lieut. H. Smith, M.C., M.M.
Lieut. J.R. Francis	Lieut. W.H. Smith
Lieut. S.V. Hargreaves	Lieut. R.McK. Thomson
Lieut. J.E. Hipwell	Lieut. C. Thorburn
Lieut. W. Little	Lieut. M.B. Watts

2nd CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE.

Officer Commanding	Lieut.-Col. H.F.V. Meurling, M.C., D.S.O.
Second in Command	Major W.T. Trench, M.C.
Adjutant	Captain A.W. Baker, M.C.
Quartermaster	Captain G.G. Hulme
Medical Officer	Captain R.C. Weldon, M.C.
Paymaster	

Captain W. Leary, M.C.	Lieut. W. Macintyre
Captain J. McIsaacs	Lieut. G.A. Marshall
Captain F.W. Thompson, M.M.	Lieut. W.G. Radford
Lieut. L.M. Black, M.C.	Lieut. M.M. Robinson
Lieut. F.J. Buck	Lieut. J.D. Seton, M.C.
Lieut. G.E. Couchman	Lieut. F.D. Trenwith
Lieut. F.E. Cowan	Lieut. A.W. Tuckwell
Lieut. L.W. Dinnie	Lieut. W.W. Turple
Lieut. M. Doig, M.C.	Lieut. D.R. Vosburg
Lieut. J.A.B. Hoyle	Lieut. A.H. Wylie
Lieut. J.F. MacLennan	



CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN,  
MECHANICAL TRANSPORT COMPANY.

Commanding Officer	Major F.G. Arnold Capt. G.M. Parker Capt. T.R.C. Young
Workshop Officer	Lieut. H.H. Himphries Lieut. E.A. Lovett Lieut. V.R. Stephenson Lieut. F. Wilde  Attached.  Lieut. W.R. Dyer Lieut. D.D. Morris

CANADIAN CORPS MACHINE GUN SCHOOL.

Chief Instructor	Capt. J.H. Ritchie Lieut. A.E. Millward Lieut. J.C. McDowell, M.M. Lieut. P.A. Green Lieut. W.J.A. Stewart
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MACHINE GUN WING.  
CANADIAN CORPS REINFORCEMENT CAMP.<sup>108</sup>

Commandant	Major T.C. Bamfield Lieut. W.D. Darling, M.C. Lieut. P.W. Norman Lieut. C.W. Torrens
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<sup>108</sup> Appointments to fill the Establishment authorised on November 1st, 1918, had not been made on November 11th, 1918.



## **INFLUENCE OF CANADIAN CORPS MACHINE GUN POLICY.**

It is difficult to estimate the widespread influence in the Allied Armies of Canadian Corps Machine Gun Policy in Organisation and Tactical Theory.

The great success achieved by the Canadian Corps Machine Gun Barrage in the Battle of VIMY RIDGE gave an impetus to the study and employment of Machine Gun Barrage Fire throughout the whole British Army.

The same event also led the French Army to the study and eventual adoption of this Method of Fire. Immediately before the VIMY RIDGE Operation, the Sub-Chief of the General Staff, French Army, G.H.Q., visited the Canadian Corps and saw the plans for the Attack including the Machine Gun Barrage. After the Attack detailed enquiries were made by the French Military Authorities as to Canadian Machine Gun Methods, and in the Summer of 1917 Overhead and Barrage Fire were adopted as a part of French Machine Gun Tactics. These were introduced as a direct result of the studies pursued by the French General Staff, into Canadian Machine Gun Methods. Lieut.-Col. BRUTINEL was asked to proceed to French G.H.Q. at CHALONS to give further exploration of our M.G. Fire Tactics.

Officers of the American and Italian Armies also were attached for Instructions on different occasions, to units of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, with a view to acquiring a knowledge of Canadian Machine Gun Fire Methods and Machine Gun Organisation.



**CANADIAN AND BRITISH MACHINE GUN POLICY.**

The Machine Gun Policy of the Canadian Corps, explicitly set forth in the Corps Commander's letter of April 30th<sup>109</sup>, was very far in advance of the published policy of General Headquarters. British Machine Gun Companies were formed into a Battalion of 4 Companies in each Division, in April, 1918. The G.H.Q. letter<sup>110</sup> authorising the adoption of this Organisation stated that *"the O.C. Machine Gun Battalion will be responsible under the orders of the Divisional Commander for the discipline, administration and training of the Battalion."* But no tactical control was given the Battalion Commander at this time.

During the succeeding months the British Machine Gun Corps and the various British Armies pressed continuously for a clear definition of Machine Gun Policy; this was finally given on November 2nd, 1918 in the following British G.H.Q. letter<sup>111</sup> addressed to the FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH and FIFTH ARMIES:-

1. *"With reference to M.G./2 of the 7th June 1918, dealing with certain matters in connection with the organization and command, etc. of machine gun units, it would appear that there is a tendency in some cases to look upon a machine gun battalion mainly as an administrative organization. The machine gun battalion is in fact, a tactical unit, and the machine gun battalion commander is a tactical commander. This is not altered by the fact that machine gun companies or sections must be frequently detailed to work in the closest co-operation with Infantry Brigades. Only under exceptional circumstances will it be necessary or expedient to attach machine gun units to Infantry Brigades, much less to Infantry Battalions."*
2. *"The duties of the Divisional Machine Gun Battalion Commander in respect to the machine guns may be looked upon as closely analogous to those of the C.R.A. of a Division in respect to the Artillery. The Machine Gun Battalion Commander is available to advise the Divisional Commander, through the General Staff of the Division, on all matters connected with the Divisional plans of machine gun action, whether in offence or defence; and the executive arrangements for the Divisional Commander's plan of machine action are also the responsibility of the Machine Gun Battalion Commander."*
3. *"In order that the fullest value may be obtained from the Divisional Machine Gun Battalion, any rigid plan of distribution and any permanent attachments must be avoided, and portions of the battalion must be distributed and re-distributed in accordance with the tactical requirements for the time being, taking into consideration the Divisional Front as a whole. This will necessarily involve central control of arrangements regarding reliefs and such matters. It must be realized by all Commanders that machine guns temporarily allotted for specific tactical purposes are likely to be withdrawn on completion of their tasks."*
4. *"Machine Gun Units detailed to co-operate with Infantry Brigades for offensive operations, or located in Brigade Sectors in the defence, will be under the tactical control of the Infantry Brigade Commander concerned. In view, however, of the necessity of considering the Divisional plan of Machine Gun action as a whole it may be necessary to place certain restrictions upon the Infantry Brigade Commander in respect of altering the dispositions of tasks of machine guns in his sector, either in attack or defence: such restrictions must be made clear to the Commander concerned. In the event of a new and unforeseen tactical situation arising to meet which no provision has been made in the original rules allotted in the Divisional plan to units of the Machine Gun battalion, it is the duty of the Infantry Commanders to inform superior authority immediately of any fresh orders which they may issue to the Machine Gun Units co-operating with them, or of any action which they may take in this connection."*
5. *"All Machine Guns retained under direct Divisional control will receive orders from the Machine Gun Battalion Commander."*

<sup>109</sup> Canadian Corps G.126/3-6 dated April 30th, 1918.

<sup>110</sup> O.B./407 dated February 19th, 1918.

<sup>111</sup> O.B./407 dated November 2nd, 1918.



This letter is in complete accord with what the originators of Modern Machine Gunnery in the British Army had long desired, and with what had become the practice in the Armies during the latter months of 1918. The Machine Gun Battalion was recognised as a Tactical Unit and the Machine Gun Battalion Commander as a Tactical Commander.

The principles underlying this letter are those principles of Command and Tactical Handling which had governed the activities of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps during 6 months of arduous fighting. No more striking illustration could be found of the soundness of Canadian Machine Gun organisation and Theory of Command than the adoption by General Headquarters of these essential principles which, initiated by the Canadian Corps, affected so deeply the development of Machine Gun Tactics and the whole future of Machine Gun Science.



## PART II



## HISTORY OF THE CANADIAN MACHINE GUN CORPS, C.E.F.

WRITTEN, February – August, 1919, in Bonn, London and Ottawa by Major H.T. Logan,  
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PART II.  
OPERATIONS.

INTRODUCTION.

The Narrative of Operations contained in Part II includes an account of the Activities of Canadian Machine Gun Units in the Chief Battles in which the Canadian Corps was engaged during the years 1917 and 1918. In addition to this are described the Operations of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade, in March and April 1918, under the FIFTH and FOURTH ARMIES, and a separate account is given of the Organisation and Achievement of the Canadian Independent Force and Brutinel's Brigade, of which a large and important section was composed of the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades.

The Operations show Canadian Machine Gun Units in Action at various Stages of their development. The Battle of VIMY RIDGE, in which the Machine Gun came into its own as a Barrage Fire Weapon, was fought just a week before the Canadian machine Gun Corps was authorised. Each Infantry Brigade at this time had its own Machine Gun Company, while the 4th Company in each Division was classified among Divisional Troops.

The Training of all 4 Companies was coordinated by the D.M.G.O. At PASSCHENDAELE, Machine Gun Units fought as Divisional Machine Gun "*Battalions*," still retaining their Company Organisation and identity virtually unchanged. Throughout this Period and in the AMIENS Fighting of March and April, 1918, the Borden, Eaton and Yukon M.M.G. Batteries fought under the Tactical Control of the O.C., 1st C.M.M.G.B. Then, in the Spring and Summer of 1918, occurred the radical change in Infantry and Motor Machine Gun Organisation, and, in the Battle of the Hundred Days, is described the Action of the 4 Machine Gun Battalions and the 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades, comprising the Active Units of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, in the final Stage of their development.

The Operations of the Canadian Independent Force and Brutinel's Brigade are treated separately from the Operations of Machine Gun Battalions for the sake of clearness and because of the widely different Tactical Methods employed. The Motor Machine Gun Brigades, as part of the Independent Force, operated as highly Mobile Forces, and their Activities could, with questionable propriety and doubtful advantage, be described along with the Operations of Machine Gun Battalions which invariably fought in the closest possible Liaison with Infantry Units.



## VIMY RIDGE.

APRIL 9TH to APRIL 14TH 1917.

### INTRODUCTORY.

#### Instructions; Operation Orders Issued.

Preparations for the Attack on VIMY RIDGE were begun on December 23rd, 1916. On this date the Corps Commander published an outline of the entire Operation and asked Divisions to prepare detailed Attack Schemes for their own Frontages. The Corps Machine Gun Officer was instructed to “*submit proposals for Machine Gun covering and barrage fire on the front of the Northern (Canadian) Corps.*”

A detailed Corps Scheme of Operations was published in detail as soon as plans of the various Services were submitted. The Corps Operation Order for the Attack was published on April 4th, 1917. Several modifications in the original Plans were made prior to Zero day. The final allotment of Frontages Objectives and Divisional and Brigade Boundaries was shown on Map<sup>112</sup>.

#### Intention.

The Task of the Canadian Corps was “*to form a strong defensive flank for the Operations of the Third Army by the capture of the VIMY RIDGE from the COMMANDANT’S HOUSE to GUNNER CRATER, both inclusive.*” COMMANDANT’S HOUSE is at the Fork formed by the WILLERVAL Road with the Road leading over the Ridge from NEUVILLE ST VAAST through THELUS to BAILLEUL. GUNNER CRATER was in the German Front Line about 1,000 yds. S.E. of SOUCHEZ. A line joining these two points ran obliquely to our Front Line, N.W. to S.E. and the ground to be taken formed a rough Triangle with the Apex to the North or Left Flank of the Corps Frontage. The total Front of Attack was something more than 6,000 yds.

#### Tactical Importance of VIMY RIDGE.

The Capture of this high ground and especially of THELUS and HILL 140 North of the Village was vital to the Third Army Operations to the South in order to deprive the enemy of observation into the Valleys running S.W. from VIMY RIDGE. Also, as long as they maintained a hold on this Ridge the Germans could withdraw South of ARRAS even to the HINDENBURG LINE without compromising the security of their Line to the North. His possession of the French Manufacturing Districts would be in no way threatened by Operations successfully carried out by us to the South on the Front of the Third and Fifth Armies. The enemy attached the utmost importance to the Ridge and had already considerably reinforced his Line in that Sector.

#### Objectives.

The principal Objectives of the Canadian Corps were:

- (1) THELUS and HILL 140 to the North of it.
- (2) HILL 145 and LA FOLIE FARM.
- (3) FARBUS and GOULOT WOOD with the German Guns in them.
- (4) THE PIMPLE, the Northernmost portion of the Ridge.

#### Troops Available.

The Infantry, Mounted Troops and Motor M.G. Units available were the First, Second, Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions, the Fifth Division (British), 3 Squadrons Canadian Light Horse, 3 Companies Canadian Cyclist Battalion and the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

Each Infantry Division had at this time 4 Machine Gun Companies making with the Fifth Division (British) Companies, a total of 20 M.G. Companies at the disposal of the Canadian Corps.

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<sup>112</sup> Reference to "Map" - map not included with available documents.



### **Order of Battle of Divisions.**

The Fifth Division (British) came under Orders of the Corps Commander on March 18th, 1917. All Divisions were in Position on their Battle Fronts by the middle of March in the following order from Right to Left of the Corps Frontage:- First Division (X), Second Division (Y), Third Division (A), Fourth Division (B). The Fifth Division (British), less 1 Infantry Brigade, was in Corps Reserve.

### **Machine Gun Dispositions.**

The 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade were on Anti-Aircraft Duty under Corps Orders, protecting the various Dumps in the Corps Area from hostile Aerial Attack. The Machine Gun Companies were disposed in the Line under their own Divisions.

The Headquarters of Canadian Divisions were situated as follows:-

First Division	ECOIVRES
Second Division	CHÂTEAU D'ACQ
Third Division	VILLERS-AU-BOIS
Fourth Division	CHATEAU DE LA HAIE



## **PREPARATORY PHASE.**

### **Raids October to April.**

The activities of the Canadian Corps from the time the First Division took over a portion of the Line on the VIMY RIDGE Front in October, 1916, until the capture of the Ridge on April 9th, 1917, though they were not as a whole a part of the Operation itself, had much to do with its astonishing success. Throughout the whole of this period the enemy opposite the Corps Front were given no rest. They were kept constantly on the alert and forced by our Minor Operations, to maintain a continual watch on every part of their Line. In this period no fewer than 55 Raids were made by Units of the Canadian Corps, the largest of these being that of March 1st, 1917, on the whole Frontage of the Fourth Division. Our Machine Guns co-operated with the Infantry in the majority of these Raids and contributed largely to their success.

### **Harassing Fire, March 1917.**

The Plans for the Attack on VIMY RIDGE included a Preparatory Phase during which attention was given by the Artillery to Wire Cutting, to the destruction of selected points in the enemy Defences, and to Counter Battery Work. But perhaps the most important feature of this Phase was the carrying out of a carefully co-ordinated Plan of Harassing Fire by the Artillery and Machine Guns.

### **Targets.**

Very great importance was attached by the Corps Commander to this Fire. "From minus 30 days onwards, every effort was made in the Divisions to increase the number of (Machine) Guns firing every night, and to arrange the selection of varied Targets in close co-operation with the Intelligence Branch of General Staff, the Artillery, and the Trench Mortar and Stokes Gun Officers. The following Targets were usually selected:-

1. *"The targets previously engaged by the Artillery more especially wire entanglements in order to prevent repairs and hinder new work.*
2. *"Communication Trenches which could be engaged in enfilade; routes and tracks used by ration parties and reliefs; tramways and dumps known to be used by the enemy, especially the track, trenches and railways leading to trench mortar emplacements.*
3. *"Hostile Field Gun Batteries on the reverse slope of the Ridge in the BOIS DE LA FOLIE."*

64 Guns by day and 64 Guns by night were eventually employed in Harassing Fire on the Corps Front.

### **Results of Harassing Fire.**

During the month of March this Fire is known to have interfered very greatly with enemy Movements restricting them very largely to the Trenches. This was ascertained from German Prisoners captured during the period who stated that Movement overland was difficult and dangerous on account of our Machine Gun Harassing Fire. Their Statements were corroborated by the evidence of Photographs taken from the air. Snow lay on the ground for a part of March, making Tracks especially clear, and on the Photographs of the German Defences, taken at this time, very few overland Paths are to be distinguished within Machine Gun Range. Traffic was also greatly interfered with on enemy Trench Railways by Machine Gun Fire.

The restriction of Movement to Trench Routes and interference with enemy Trench Railway Traffic probably caused a great deal of congestion, thereby hindering the bringing forward of supplies of Food and Ammunition. A direct practical and beneficial result of the Harassing Fire Programme was experienced in the very marked decrease of hostile Trench Mortar activity. The large number of enemy Trench Mortars captured in the subsequent Operations showed that this diminution of Trench Mortar activity was not due to the withdrawal of these weapons, but rather to the difficulty of bringing sufficient Ammunition forward to keep them in Action.

One of the chief objects sought in the carrying out of Harassing Fire was the lowering of enemy Morale. This result naturally followed from vigorous Programme of Fire, operating day and night over a period of several weeks, combine with constantly recurring Raids upon every part of the German Front. Casualties, but also, and perhaps, more especially by compelling individuals and parties to take constant precautions against avoiding Casualties.



**Harassing Fire Decrease.**

Difficulty was met with in maintaining this energetic Harassing Fire Programme. The life of a Machine Gun Barrel for purposes of accurate Indirect Overhead Fire is placed at 15,000 Rounds; so that Barrels used for Harassing Fire were "*worn out*" in a very few days. As Indirect Fire was comparatively a new thing at this time and the demands for War Materials of all kinds were so great, the supply of Machine Gun Barrels was quite insufficient for the requirements of a prolonged Harassing Fire Programme such as that being carried out under the Canadian Corps Machine Gun Officer.

Because of this shortage of Serviceable Barrels and also to a lesser extent on account of the increased demands on Machine Gun Companies for Working and Carrying Parties in preparation for "Z" Day, Machine Gun Fire decreased very substantially towards the end of March just at the time when it was most valuable. Germans captured on April 1st stated that the Reliefs and Ration Parties were then moving overland as far as the ZWISCHEN STELLUNG – 800 yds. to 1,000 yds. behind their own Front Line without suffering many Casualties from our Machine Guns.

**More Vigorous Programme.**

On April 2nd new Instructions were issued by the Canadian Corps for the overhauling of the Harassing Fire Scheme. The number of Guns firing at night on each Divisional Front was increased and the Programmes were carried out with fresh vigour from this date onwards.

**Training Advantages.**

Machine Gun Companies were enormously benefitted both by the cooperation on a large scale with these Raids, and by the execution of Harassing Fire. Elementary knowledge of the Gun and facility in using it were maintained at a high level by All Ranks, while Officers and N.C.O.'s by constant practice in Indirect Fire, acquired Training in more advanced Machine Gun Work which proved invaluable to them in the actual Attack upon VIMY RIDGE. In his Instructions for Harassing Fire the Corps Machine Gun Officer laid particular emphasis upon this aspect of the work. "*In the execution of this Programme every endeavour should be made to derive the greatest benefit possible in the training of the personnel of the Machine Gun Companies, especially the Officers.*" This Training was particularly necessary and useful for the newly formed Divisional Machine Gun Companies.



## PLAN OF ATTACK: USE OF MACHINE GUNS.

### General Plan: Infantry.

Simultaneously with the Attack of the Canadian Corps, the XVII Corps, on the Right, was to advance, keeping its Left in touch with the Right of the Canadian Corps. The I Corps, on the left of the Canadian Corps, was to remain in the Positions then held by it, in touch with the Canadian Corps Left Flank on which the whole movement of the Attack hinged.

### Successive Stages.

It was planned to carry out the Operation in four Stages, occupying successively the BLACK, RED, BLUE and BROWN Lines. Owing to the importance of gaining early possession of HILL 140, it was arranged that the Canadian Corps should push on to the BLUE LINE, 500 yds. East of THELUS, with as short intermediate pauses as possible. The following Table shows the Timing of the Advance.

Line	Infantry	Reach	Pause	Infantry	Advance From
BLACK	Zero	35'	40'	Zero	75'
RED	Zero	95'	150'	Zero	245'
BLUE	Zero	320'	96'	Zero	416'
BROWN (Final)	Zero	468'			

### Tasks of Divisions.

The First and Second Divisions were to attack right through to the BROWN LINE. The Third and Fourth Divisions had as their Final Objective the RED LINE. After the RED LINE had been reached the Third Division was made responsible for keeping touch with the Second Division in the BOIS de BONVAL and for protecting the Left of the Second Division from any Counter-attack coming from the direction of VIMY and the BOIS de GOULOT. The point of deepest penetration on the Right of the First Division, from our own Front Line to the BROWN LINE, East of COMMANDANT'S HOUSE, was in excess of 4,000 yds. equal to 2/3 of the entire Corps Frontage of Attack.

### Tasks of Brigades.

Each Division was to assault with 2 Brigades in Front and 1 Brigade in Reserve. The ultimate Task of leading the Brigades of each Division was the Capture and Consolidation of the RED LINE. The First and Second Divisions were to employ their Reserve Brigades for the Capture and Consolidation of the BLUE and BROWN LINES, 1 Brigade of the Fifth Division (British) was placed at the disposal of the Second Division to assist in the Capture of the BLUE LINE. The Reserve Brigades of the First and Second Divisions arranged to move forward from their Assembly Areas at such a time as would enable them to reach and form up behind the RED LINE ready to advance from it at Zero 245'. The pause of 2½ hours on the RED LINE gave ample time for this Movement and also for any alterations in the Plan which the Situation might demand.

### The PIMPLE.

The Attack on the PIMPLE was made a Subsidiary Operation. This Northernmost portion of the Ridge forms a spur rising between the Villages of SOUCHEZ and GIVENCHY-en-GOHELLE and commanding the Valley of the SOUCHEZ RIVER between VIMY RIDGE and the LORETTE RIDGE to the North. It was planned to capture this important Feature, in co-operation with the I Corps on a day subsequent to the Main Operation. The 10th Brigade in Reserve for the Main Attack was eventually given the Task of carrying out this Operation.

### Machine Gun Resources.

The total number of Machine Guns under the Canadian Corps for the Operation was 358, made up as follows:

16	Canadian Machine Gun Companies	256
4	Machine Gun Companies (Fifth Division, British)	64
	1st C.M.M.G. Brigade.	38
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>358</b>



### **Supporting and Barrage Fire.**

The Machine Gun Barrages used by the Canadian Corps during the SOMME Fighting had proved very successful. The Infantry had become familiar with and had gained confidence in Machine Gun Overhead Fire. In the employment of Machine Guns for Supporting and Barrage Fire there was never a question of depleting the number of Guns actually required by the Assaulting Troops: the narrow Frontage of the Formations attacking and the liberal supply of Lewis Guns with the Battalions left room for the useful employment of a comparatively small number of Machine Guns with the attacking Troops for early Consolidation. *“The Machine Guns used for Barrage purposes would otherwise have remained unemployed and this better utilisation of idle resources allowed additional protection to be given to the Infantry at a time when they needed it most.”*

The formation of a 4th or Divisional Company in each Division in the interval between the SOMME Fighting and the VIMY RIDGE Attack gave the Corps an additional Machine Gun Strength of 64 Guns. As a result of the experience gained in the use of these weapons on the SOMME and with the added number available the Corps Commander decided to employ them for Barrage and Supporting Fire in the VIMY RIDGE Operations on a scale unprecedented in Military History.

### **Tasks of Machine Gun.**

Quite generally the Tasks assigned to Machine Guns were two-fold. The Assaulting Brigades retained as many of the Guns of their own Machine Gun Companies as were thought sufficient for the purposes of Consolidation and Defence against Counter-Attack: the 7th and 8th Brigades retained 12 Guns each for this purpose, all the other Brigades, 8 Guns each. The surplus Guns of the Assaulting Brigades not required during the Attack and for the early period of Consolidation, the Guns of the Divisional Machine Gun Companies and 1st Motor M.G. Brigade, and part of the Machine Guns of the Brigades in Reserve were employed on Barrage and Supporting Fire. Details for the Operation of these Guns was arranged and Fire Organisation Tables co-ordinated by the Corps Machine Gun Officer.

### **Mobile Guns.**

There were 24 Mobile Guns in each Canadian Division, which, with the 8 Mobile Guns of the 13th Brigade (British) made a total of 104. Orders for the use of those Guns were issued by Divisions and Brigades. The Objects aimed at in their employment were:-

1. To get forward quickly.
2. To protect the Flanks of Brigades and Battalions.
3. To cover Gaps occurring during the progress of the Operation.
4. To take advantage of fleeting Targets of Opportunity.
5. To assist in Consolidation and establish, early, a progressive Organisation in Depth of the Defences.
6. To repel Counter-attacks.

Part of the Guns were placed under the Control of Battalion Commanders, in each Assaulting Brigade; the remainder were held in reserve under the Brigadiers. Each Machine Gun was allotted a definite locality which was to be reached at a definite Stage of the Operation.

Arrangements were made in conjunction with the Engineers, for the construction of Strong Points, during the period of Consolidation. These S.P.'s were to be manned by an Infantry Garrison with one or two Machine Guns from the Brigade Companies. In some instances, as e.g., in the case of the 1st Brigade, the O.C. of the Brigade Machine Gun Company (Captain W.M. PEARCE) was made responsible for siting and completing Strong Points on the Brigade Frontage.



**Detailed Instructions for Mobile Guns.**

The detailed Instructions for the Action of Mobile Guns are well illustrated by the "Preliminary Scheme of Consolidation by M.G. Companies of the Third Division," in part as follows:

4. "Disposition of Machine Guns Before and During the Advance.
  - a. *"The Machine Gun Companies of each assaulting Brigade will attach two Machine Guns, under a Machine Gun Officer, to each of the assaulting Battalions, with the exception of the Battalions attacking on the Flanks of the Division, who will have four Guns attached to them on account of the steep depressions in S.22.b. and S.30.c., from where counter-attacks will probably be promptly launched.*
  - b. *"These guns will come under the direct orders of the Battalion Commander who will be responsible that they are sent forward at the proper time and to the proper place. Their jumping off places will be, for the left Machine Gun Company, the vicinity of the mouth of GRANGE TUNNELL, and for the Right Machine Gun Company, the vicinity of the mouth of GOODMAN TUNNEL. All Machine Guns sent forward must be given explicit orders as to their positions and duties.*
  - c. *"The Machine Guns will be sent forward as soon as possible after the objectives have been reached, in order to be ready to repel counter-attacks. The Guns detailed to Battalions will make their initial move forward as soon as the Infantry have left the first objective. They will take up positions in the first objective in such a way that they can effectively participate in the defence of this Line.*
  - d. *"The balance of the guns of these Companies which have up till now been distributed in their forward positions and been employed:-*
    - (1) *With holding our own front line system.*
    - (2) *With indirect fire on the barrage targets of Brigades and Divisions on their flanks.**will now be led forward by their section guides, who will return for that purpose from the forward guns, to the positions occupied in the first objective by the guns of their corresponding sections.*
5. "Dispositions of Machine Guns in Depth for the Close Defence of the Consolidated Lines (Outpost and Main Line of Resistance).
  - a. *"Main Line of Resistance: When the final objective had been gained and is held by the Infantry, the guns in position in the intermediate objective will move forward to their pre-arranged positions, which will correspond, as closely as possible, to the locations of the strong points to be consolidated as the main resistance line. The Guns under Battalion control are deemed sufficient for this purpose. Care will be taken that the full length of the line of main resistance is enfiladed by Machine Gun fire; the guns will be posted in pairs, each pair in view of, and under fire from the pairs on its right and left, thus protecting each other. Barbed wire to be put up according to the Field of fire of the Machine Gun in such a manner that all the guns enfilade the front of the barbed wire. Care will also be taken that no promiscuous trench digging towards the front masks the fire from the Machine Guns.*
  - b. *"The Mobile Guns referred to in 4 (d) will, during the consolidation, be in position in the front objective vacated by the forward guns. The sub-section Officer or N.C.O. will get in touch as quickly as possible with the Officer Commanding the forward guns of this Section, who has sited the positions for the rear guns of his Section, who has sited his positions for the rear guns and will move them forward, if necessary, behind the forward line of guns in such a way that each gun in rear can see the positions of the guns in front, which they are supporting as well as the guns on the flanks, in order to form, in case of necessity, a second continuous belt of fire."It is not necessary that these rear line guns be posted in pairs."A tracing will be issued later showing the approximate position of all mobile guns and routes forward. These defensive guns will do no firing whatever, except in case of a well-defined counter-attack, and then only at close range."*
  - c. *"The Outpost Line will be defended by Lewis Guns."*



### **Barrage Guns.**

When the Mobile Guns had been allotted there still remained in the Corps 254 Machine Guns. Of this number 24 were held in Corps Reserve and did not actually take part in the Operation. The remaining 230 Guns were made available for Supporting and Barrage Fire. Owing to the great number of enemy Trenches to be captured, and on account of the Strength and Commanding Positions of most of them, it was decided that Machine Gun Supporting Fire should be given on the entire Corps Front at every step of the Attack. All arrangements for this Fire were made by the Corps Machine Gun Officer. A Creeping Machine Gun Barrage was prepared and Fire Organisation Tables drawn up, to correspond with the Artillery Barrage. In order to assist the Infantry in warding off possible enemy Counter-attacks a Protective Machine Gun Barrage was established at each definite Stage of the Operation. Arrangements were also made for a Final Protective Barrage to be fired during the early Consolidation of the Final Objective.

### **Organisation and Moves of Barrage Guns.**

The 230 Guns available for Barrage purposes were so distributed along the Corps Front and divided for the 4 Objectives, that 1 Machine Gun was allotted to every 50 yards of Frontage at each Stage. This distribution was calculated to give sufficient density to make the Barrage effective. To facilitate Control the Guns were organised into Batteries and Groups. 2 Machine Gun Sections (4 Guns each) were placed together to form a Battery with an Officer in charge. The Batteries in each Brigade Frontage constituted a Group, under a Group Commander. The Group Commander was in most cases the Officer Commanding the Machine Gun Company of the Brigade whose Frontage his Batteries were covering. Each Battery was designated by the letter or number of its own Barrage.

Owing to the depth of penetration of the German Lines on the First and Second Division Fronts it was necessary to fire the BLUE and BROWN LINE Barrages from successive Positions within the captured Area. This involved moving 8 BLACK LINE Batteries forward immediately after the Capture of the RED LINE, and 5 Batteries forward, later, after the Capture of the BLUE LINE. These BLACK LINE Batteries were to move forward under cover of the RED LINE Protective Barrage: the move of the BLUE LINE Batteries to their BROWN LINE Positions was arranged to take place in Echelon, 1 Battery at a time. As a precautionary measure the RED LINE Batteries, in the First and Second Division Areas, were instructed to remain in Position until the BROWN LINE was taken and permission to withdraw had been obtained from Corps Headquarters.

### **Control.**

Divisions retained Control of the Guns covering their own Sectors. Divisional Commanders had the power to allot special secondary Targets to any Group of Guns within their Area, providing that the Final Barrage was in no way interfered with. The Final Barrage was everywhere the primary consideration. Similarly on any Brigade Frontage, the fire of the Group of Guns covering the Sector could be applied or withheld at the request of the Brigade Commander.

### **Communication.**

The System of Communication adopted for all Barrage Guns is indicated on Plate X.<sup>113</sup> The Group Commanders were personally to be stationed at the Battle Headquarters of their affiliated Brigades, or at the Headquarters of a Battalion of the Brigade, as turned out to be most convenient in the course of the Operation. They were connected with their Batteries by Telephone (buried Cable in most cases) for the BLACK and RED LINE Stages; and in subsequent Stages by Runners. Communications with Divisions were maintained through Brigade Headquarters.

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<sup>113</sup> Details on "Plate X" are not known at this time.



**Composition of Batteries.**

The Composition of the Batteries for the various Stages of the Attack is shown in the following Table:-

Composition of Barrage M.G. Batteries for the Capture of VIMY RIDGE, April 9th, 1917.								
Division	LINE	Name of Battery	Unit	TOTAL GUNS				
				BLACK	RED	BLUE	BROWN	TOTAL
First Division	BLACK	0	'A' Bty.	8				
		1	1st	8				
		2	C.M.M.G.	8				
		3	Brigade	8				32
	RED	X	½ 13th		8			
		A	C.M.G.		8			
		B	Company		8			
		C	½ 13th		8			32
	BLUE	Y.1	C.M.G.			8		
		X.1	Company			8		
	BROWN	Y.2	'A' Bty.				8	16
		X.2	1st				8	16
			C.M.M.G.					
			Brigade					
			½ 2nd					
			C.M.G.					
			Company					
			½ 95th					
			C.M.G.					
			Company					
			(British)					
			½ 15th					
			C.M.G.					
			Company					
			(British)					
			½ 3rd					
			C.M.G.					
			Company					
			½ 13th					
			C.M.G.					
			Company					
			½ 13th					
			C.M.G.					
			Company					
			½ 1st					
			C.M.G.					
			Company					
			½ 13th					
			C.M.G.					
			Company					
Second Division	BLACK	4	½ 6th	8				
		5	C.M.G.	8				
		6	Company	8				
		7	½ 13th	8				
	RED	8	C.M.G.	6				38
		D	Company		8			
		E	½ 14th		8			
			C.M.G.					



	BLUE	F FS A1 B1 C1 D1 E1 F1	Company ½ 14th C.M.G. Company Eaton M.M.G. Battery ½ 4th C.M.G.	8 8		8 8 8 8 8 8	32
	BROWN	A2 B2 C2	Company Borden M.M.G. Battery Yukon M.M.G. Battery ½ 5th C.M.G. Company 'A' Bty. 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade 'B' Bty. 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade ½ 6th C.M.G. Company ½ 13th C.M.G. Company ½ 14th C.M.G. Company ½ 14th C.M.G. Company 'A' Bty. 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade 'B' Bty. 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade ½ 6th C.M.G. Company			8 8 8	48 24
Third Division	BLACK	H I J K	½ 15th C.M.G. Company 4 Guns 8th C.M.G.	8 8 8 8			
	RED	G H.I.	Company &		8		32



		J.K.	4 Guns 9th C.M.G. Company 4 Guns 7th C.M.G. Company & 4 Guns 9th C.M.G. Company ½ 9th C.M.G. Company ½ 15th C.M.G. Company as above as above		32			40
Fourth Division	BLACK	L M N O P Q	½ 16th C.M.G. Company ½ 16th C.M.G. Company ½ 11th C.M.G. Company ½ 12th C.M.G. Company ½ 10th C.M.G. Company ½ 205th C.M.G. Company as above as above as above	8 8 8 8 8 8 48				48  48
	RED	L.M N.O P.Q						
TOTAL				150	152	64	40	406

NOTE RED LINE Barrage Batteries fired from BLACK LINE Barrage Positions, with the exception of "G" Battery, which did not fire the BLACK LINE Barrage.



**Forecast of Ammunition Required.**

The supply of Ammunition available from Divisional Ammunition Column was calculated on the basis of 15,000 rounds per Gun per day for a period of 3 days. The following amounts were provided at the Gun Positions and at forward Dumps, ready to be taken forward to the BLUE and BROWN LINE Batteries:-

First Division Companies	1,408,000	Rounds
Second Division Companies	1,568,000	Rounds
Third Division Companies	1,000,000	Rounds
Fourth Division Companies	<u>1,000,000</u>	Rounds
TOTAL S.A.A. for Barrage Batteries -	<u>4,976,000</u>	Rounds

These amounts were for use during the first 24 hours of the Operation. Further Supplies were arranged to be made available at the Battery Positions for subsequent days.

**Distribution of Personnel.**

In order to expose as few Men as possible during the Attack and so reduce the Casualties in trained Personnel, the following distribution was adopted throughout the Machine Gun Companies of the Corps:-

For each Section of 4 Guns:-

	Officers	Sergeants	Corporals	Gunners	TOTAL
(a) With the Guns	1	1	1	16	19
(b) With the M.G. Coy. Commander				4 4	4 4
(c) At convenient place near Divisional H.Q.	1	1	1	6	9
(d) At Transport Lines					
TOTAL	2	2	2	30	36

Precise directions regarding the disposal of this Personnel were issued beforehand. Those with the M.G. Coy. Commanders were to be used to replace Casualties immediately; those at Divisional H.Q. should not be used without reference to the G.O.C. affiliated Brigades or Divisional Headquarters; and those as the Transport Lines were not to be used until Companies were withdrawn from the Line.

**Attached Infantry Carriers.**

In addition to the Machine Gun Personnel available in each Company, 2 Infantrymen per Gun Crew, 32 per Company, were attached as Ammunition Carriers. These Men joined the Companies 2 to 3 weeks prior to the Operation and received preliminary Training with the Gun Crews which they were to assist during the Attack. In this way they became familiar with the work expected of them and not less important, they got to know the Officers, N.C.O.'s and men of the Machine Gun Companies.

One trained Gunner and the 2 Infantry Carriers per Gun were equipped with either Tump Lines or Yukon Packs to use in carrying Ammunition.



### **Loads and Equipment.**

All Gun Detachments, whether Mobile or Barrage, carried Equipment and Ammunition as follows:-

- No. 1 Gunner, Tripod and 2 gallons of Water.
- No. 2 Gunner, Gun and Spare Parts.
- No. 3 Gunner, 3 Belt Boxes filled and Condenser Bag.
- No. 4 Gunner, 3 Belt Boxes filled.
- 2 Carriers (Infantrymen) – Each, 3 Belt Boxes filled.

Each Man carried, in addition to his load as detailed above:-

- 3 Sand Bags
- 1 Mills Bomb
- 50 Rounds Rifle Ammunition
- 48 Hours Rations
- 1 Full Water Bottle
- 1 Ground Sheet

and remaining articles of Battle Order Dress. Leather Garkins were carried or worn.

Each Section of 4 Gun Crews carried 8 Shovels.

### **Pack Transport.**

The problem of getting Ammunition forward for the Barrage Guns during the course of the Operation, and of establishing new forward Dumps in the captured area was a very difficult one, particularly on the First and Second Divisional Fronts. In order to prevent the overlapping of labour and to ensure a quick and uniform supply to all Batteries a Divisional pack train was formed in each Division, composed of all available Pack Animals with the 4 Machine Gun Companies. An Officer was placed in charge of each Pack train; this Officer received his Instructions from the D.M.G.O. of his Division. In addition to S.A.A. these animals were to take forward Water, Lubricating Oil and Rations.

### **Machine Gun Repairs.**

Under arrangements made by the Divisional M.G. Officers, an advanced Armourer's Shop was established well forward in each Division, to effect all possible immediate repairs to Machine Guns.



**Distribution of Machine Guns.**

The final distribution of the Machine Guns of all Units in the Corps, both for Mobile and Barrage Work, is shown in the following Table:-

Distribution of Machine Guns for the Capture of VIMY RIDGE, April 9th, 1917.				
Unit	Mobile Guns	BARRAGE GUNS		
		No. of Guns	Battery Position	Divisional Control
'A' Bty., 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade		8	O, A1, A2	First Second
'B' Bty., 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade		8	3 B1, B2	First Second
Borden M.M.G. Battery		8	E	Second
Eaton M.M.G. Battery		6	8	Second
Yukon M.M.G. Battery		8	F	Second
1st Canadian M.G. Company	8	8	Y2	First
2nd Canadian M.G. Company	8	8	X	First
3rd Canadian M.G. Company	8	8	C	First
13th Canadian M.G. Company		16	1, 2, X1 Y1, X2	First First
4th Canadian M.G. Company	8	8	D	Second
5th Canadian M.G. Company	8	8	FS	Second
6th Canadian M.G. Company	8	8	4, C1, C2	Second
14th Canadian M.G. Company		16	6,7, E1, F1	Second Second
7th Canadian M.G. Company	12	4	J	Third
8th Canadian M.G. Company	12	4	I	Third
			I (4 Guns)	Third
9th Canadian M.G. Company		16	J (4 Guns)	Third
			K (8 Guns)	Third
15th Canadian M.G. Company		16	G, H	Third
10th Canadian M.G. Company	8	8	P	Fourth
11th Canadian M.G. Company	8	8	N	Fourth
12th Canadian M.G. Company	8	8	O	Fourth
16th Canadian M.G. Company		16	L, M	Fourth
Attached Units of 5th Division (British)				
13th M.G. Company	8	8	5, D1	Second
15th M.G. Company		8	B	First
95th M.G. Company		8	A	First
205th M.G. Company		8	Q	Fourth
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>230</b>		

TOTAL Mobile and Barrage Guns 334. In Reserve 24. GRAND TOTAL 358.



## **SPECIAL TRAINING, CONSTRUCTION AND OCCUPATION OF BATTLE POSITIONS.**

### **Training of Mobile Gun Crews.**

By the middle of March all Companies were training hard for the Attack. All Gun Crews were assigned their jobs and no detail of Training was omitted to ensure that All Ranks should be ready to carry out their work during the Operation. Crews of Mobile Guns practised the Attack with the Infantry Battalions of their own Brigades. As for the SOMME Attacks, Training Areas were staked out to a scale on the known plan of the German Trench Systems and Defences to be captured. Forward Gun Crews went over the taped ground representing the Area of their own Attack with the Battalions and Infantry Companies to which they were to be attached for the Operation. The Positions to which the Guns were to go were generally taped.

Besides facilitating co-operation with the Infantry this practice had a very great advantage of giving All Ranks a thorough knowledge of every detail of the Operation. The entire Operation as planned was gone over in this way several times, and the specified Loads and Equipment were carried by Gun Crews. Considerable attention was paid also to Casualty Practice, which gave N.C.O.'s and Men opportunities for the exercise of initiative and leadership such as often occur in the emergencies of an Action.

This Training was supplemented by Map Reading, and a careful study was made by All Ranks of Trench Maps showing their Objectives and the ground over which they had to pass to reach them. In many cases as e.g., the 2nd Company (Major R.McP. STEWART), members of forward Gun Crews were given tracings of German Trenches showing their own Objectives and Routes. This was found in the Attack greatly to assist the early establishment of Machine Gun Defences.

### **Courses in German Guns.**

Most Machine Gun Companies found time to give an Elementary Course of Training to All Ranks in the German Machine Gun. The knowledge gained in this way proved of immense value, as many of the enemy Guns which fell into our hands were immediately turned on the Germans.

### **Assembly of Mobile Guns.**

Mobile Guns assembled with their own Brigades. Those operating closely with Infantry Battalions joined the Battalions in their jumping-off Trenches prior to Zero Hour. The Guns under direct Orders of Brigadiers and those operating with Brigades in Reserve proceeded to Assembly Areas allotted to them.

### **Training of Barrage Gun Crews.**

All the Brigade M.G. Companies, and the Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade had ad some considerable experience in Barrage Fire for Machine Guns, both in the SOMME Operations and in previous Fighting. Some Units e.g., the 1st M.M.G. Brigade, had done Overhead Fire since the Summer of 1915. But there was a lack of uniformity in Training and Method. The 1st Motor M.G. Brigade, under Lieut.-Col. BRUTINEL had evolved their own Method. All those Officers in the Field who had passed through the Canadian Machine Gun School at NAPIER BARRACKS, SHORNCLIFFE, or the Canadian Machine Gun Depot at CROWBOROUGH had received Training in Indirect fire along similar but not identical lines. Instruction was also given in the Field under Divisional and Brigade arrangements, but the detail of Instruction had not been co-ordinated throughout the Corps.

### **Special School for Officers.**

In view of the extensive use of Machine Guns for Barrage Fire in the VIMY RIDGE Operations and in order to ensure skill in the use of guns and uniformity of Practice a Special School for M.G. Officers was started in January. The Courses included Map Reading, quick Resection of Position on the ground and all Calculations necessary for Indirect Fire. 80% of the M.G. Officers of the Corps attended Courses here prior to the Attack.



### Training in Units.

In addition to the actual practice in all the details of Indirect Fire gained during the Winter in Raids and carrying out the Harassing Fire Programme, constant Training was carried out in the Units while out of the Line. As soon as the Fire Organisation Orders were issued all Barrage Batteries were practised in the execution of the actual lifts and Barrages to be fired in the Operation. Visibility Maps and Aeroplane Photographs of the Area of Attack were given to all Units to supplement the Study of Maps, and Field Glass Reconnaissances were carried out by those Officers who were to take Batteries forward to BLUE and BROWN LINE Barrage Positions.

### Preparation of Positions.

The Outline of the contemplated Machine Gun Scheme was issued on January 19th. On March 19th Instructions were published by the Corps giving the names of Machine Gun Batteries, allotment of Positions to the various Machine Gun Units and forecast of Ammunition required. Previous to this date BLACK and RED LINE Battery Sites had been selected and considerable Work done on the improvement of Positions and construction of Shelters and Dugouts. From this time on Companies were busily engaged in completing this work, storing the Battery Positions with Ammunition, and filling up Forwards S.A.A. Dumps. The greatest care had to be taken in digging Positions prior to the Operations as most of the ground was commanded by enemy Observation Posts.

All Preparations were complete and Barrage Guns in Position by April 7th, ready for the Attack which was arranged to take place on the morning of the 8th. On the 7th, the Operation was postponed 24 hours.

### Battle Order.

The following was the Battle Order of Infantry Brigades for the various Objectives from Right to Left of the Corps Front.

TASK	DIVISION	BRIGADE	BATTLE FRONTAGE	
A. BLACK and RED Objectives	First	2nd	3	Battalions
	First	3rd	3	Battalions
	Second	4th	3	Battalions
	Second	5th	3	Battalions
	Third	8th	3	Battalions
	Third	7th	3	Battalions
	Fourth	11th	3	Battalions
	Fourth	12th	3	Battalions
B. BLUE and BROWN Objectives (In reserve for A.)	First	1st	3	Battalions
	Second	6th	3	Battalions
	Fifth (British)	13th	3	Battalions
C. In Reserve	Third	9th		
	Fourth	10th		
	Fifth (British)	14th & 15th		



**THE OPERATION: APRIL 9th, 1917.****General.**

Our Barrage opened at 5.30 A.M., April 19th; at the same time several Mines were exploded, and our Troops advanced to the Attack. On the First, Second and Third Divisional Fronts the Operation proceeded as planned, and all Objectives were taken. The Advance was delayed by the stubborn Resistance of the Germans on the Front of the Fourth Division which reached a Line on the 9th corresponding roughly with the BLACK Objective. To meet this Situation the Third Division formed a Defensive Flank to the North and consolidated on the Line of its own Final Objective. The Fourth Division pushed on to the RED Objective on the following day.

**Action of Mobile Guns.**

Generally speaking the Mobile Guns moved forward at times varying from Zero to Zero plus 2 Hours. On the 11th Brigade Front where the Attack was held up before HILL 145, the Mobile Guns, - 8 of the 10th Company (Lieut. BRITTON) in CAVALIER TUNNEL, and 8 of the 11th Company (Capt. CLERK) in TOTTENHAM CAVES – remained where they were by Orders of the Brigadier, until dusk on the 9th.

**First Division Mobile Guns.**

All forward Guns of the First Division Companies reached their positions as planned in good time and without serious Casualties. The 2nd and 3rd Companies operated with their Brigades for the Capture of the RED and BLACK Objectives. The 1st Company went through to the Final Objective.

**2nd Company.**

The Guns of the 2nd Company (Maj. STEWART) advanced with the 8th C.I.Bn. (in Brigade reserve), leaving their Assembly Area at Zero plus 40 minutes. These Guns were on the extreme Right of the Corps Attack. All the Crews reached their previously selected Positions without Casualties. 4 Guns went forward to commanding Positions just in rear of the RED LINE: the other 4 were sited for Defence of the BLACK Objective, thus establishing Defence in Depth. Emplacements were built at once, and Consolidation effected along with the Infantry.

**3rd Company.**

Each of the Infantry Battalions of the 3rd C.I.B. had loaned 1 Colt Gun to the 3rd Machine Gun Company (Major HOUGHTON, M.C.). The 4 Guns thus supplied were named by Personnel of the 3rd Company who were trained, in the interval before the Operation, in the use of this weapon. For the actual Assault, therefore, the 3rd Company had 4 Colt and 8 Vickers Guns each; the Right Group, commanded by Lieut. HOUSE, operated with the 15th C.I.Bn., the Centre Group, commanded by Lieut. CHAMBERS, with the 14th C.I.Bn., the Left Group, commanded by Lieut. R.D. TAYLOR, with the 16th C.I.Bn. All the Mobile Guns were under the command of Major HOUGHTON, at Advanced Company H.Q., 300 yds. S. of les TILLEULS, on the LENS-ARRAS Road. Guns assembled with the attacking Battalions of the 3rd C.I.B. in the Jumping-off Trench, prior to Zero.

The 3rd C.I.B. attacked the BLACK and RED LINES on the LEFT of the 2nd C.I.B. Mobile Guns went forward with the Second Wave. During the pause in the BLACK LINE all Guns were placed in Defensive Positions. At Zero plus 75 the advance was continued, with the Second Wave of Infantry, to the RED LINE. The 4 Colt Guns remained on the BLACK LINE till 1.00 P.M., when they were withdrawn. The remaining Mobile Guns were sited for the Defence of the RED LINE and Positions consolidated. Communications were immediately established laterally, between Groups, and to the Rear with Company Advanced H.Q. On his Report on the Operation, the G.O.C., 3rd C.I.B. wrote: "*The Third C.M.G. Company carried out their work as a protection to the flanks and to the RED LINE expeditiously and without hitch, and were instrumental in securing 7 of the captured Machine Guns.*"

**1st Company.**

The 1st M.G. Company (Capt. W.M. PEARCE) had the farthest to go as their Brigade was responsible for capturing the BLUE and BROWN LINES on the First Division Front. Of the 8 Mobile Guns of this Company, 3 went forward with the 4th C.I.Bn. Headquarters, 2 with the 3rd C.I.Bn. When the BROWN Objective was taken and Outposts establish in FARBUS WOOD these Guns occupied Positions in front of the Main Resistance Line. The remaining 3 guns of the Company were placed in rear of this Line, 2 of them in Strong Points constructed under Captain PEARCE's directions.



### **Second Division Mobile Guns.**

In spite of the deep Advance on the Front of the Second, as well as the First Division, all Guns reached their Positions with few Casualties.

#### **4th Company.**

The forward Guns of the 4th Company (Major FORBES-MITCHELL) on the Right Sector of the Division were placed in prepared Strong Points for the Defence of the RED and BLACK LINES. 4 of these Guns under Lieut. SMALLCOMBE, moved forward at Zero plus 55 minutes; the remaining 4 commanded by Lieut. A.D. GRAY, went forward at Zero plus 6 hours. None of these Guns were attached to Infantry Battalions, but remained under Orders of the Brigadier.

#### **5th Company.**

4 Guns of the 5th Company (Major S.W. WATSON) advancing on the Left Divisional Sector to the BLACK and RED LINE Attack, were detailed to protect the Brigade's Left Flank and stop Enemy Counter-Attacks from VIMY Village through BONVAL RAVINE. The Crews of these Guns, under Lieut. B.A. TAYLOR, left their Dugouts close up to the Front Line at Zero plus 40 minutes. After a short rest on the BLACK Objective, they set out and reached the RED LINE on either side of the LENS-ARRAS Road. The Guns were sited so as to command the BONVAL RAVINE and protect the Left Flank of the Division: close co-operation was maintained with the 25th C.I.Bn., on the Right, and touch was at once established with 2 Third Division Guns on the Left under Lieut. MORGAN of the 8th Company. Major WATSON's 4 remaining Mobile Guns moved up at 4½ hours after Zero, as pre-arranged, to assist in the Defence of 2 Strong Points, on the Frontage of the 24th and 26th C.I. BNs.: these Units, along with the 25th C.I.Bn., on the Left, occupied the Main Line of Resistance for the 5th C.I.B.

#### **6th Company.**

The Task of the 6th Company (Major A. EASTHAM) was similar in the Second Division to that of the 1st Company in the 1st Division Attack. The Mobile Guns went forward past the BLACK and RED LINES to the Capture and Consolidation of the BLUE and BROWN Objectives. 4 Guns under Lieut. HARDIMAN were attached to the 29th C.I.Bn., and 4 Guns under Lieut. C.V. WILLIAMS operated with the 27th C.I.Bn. Lieut. HARDIMAN's Guns got into Position early and did exceptionally good work supporting the Advance of both Battalions to the BROWN LINE. These 2 Sections had numerous Targets of German Infantry and Gunners on the Reverse Slope of the Ridge during the day. 2 German Machine Guns were captured, along with a large Store of S.A.A., and were used with good effect throughout the remainder of the Operation.

### **Third Division Mobile Guns.**

The Mobile Guns of the Third Division, although not having so deep an Advance as the most Forward Guns of the 2 Right Divisions, had much difficult work to do. The Right Flank of the Division was particularly vulnerable as it included the BONVAL RAVINE. This feature consisted of a Re-entrant 200 to 300 yds. wide, leading up the Eastern Slope of the RIDGE from VIMY Village: its steep sides were fringed with Woods and gave excellent concealment for enemy Troops attempting a Counter-attack. Also the Third Division was responsible for protecting the Left of the Second Division from German Attacks through GOULOT WOOD to the Right of the BONVAL RAVINE. The Left Flank of the Third Division was also placed in an exposed position owing to the check of the Fourth before HILL 145. The exceptional opportunities afforded on both Flanks for effective Machine Gun Work were taken advantage of to the fullest extent by Machine Gun Officers in command of Forward Guns.

#### **8th Company.**

The Mobile Guns of the 8th Company (Lieut. COULLS) on the Right Divisional Sector, were distributed as follows from Right to Left:-

- 4 Guns under Lieut. MORGAN with the 1st C.M.R. Bn.
- 2 Guns under Lieut. ROWAT with the 2nd C.M.R. Bn.
- 2 Guns under Lieut. HICKS with the 4th C.M.R. Bn.
- 4 Guns under Lieut. PITCAIRN in Brigade Reserve



Lieut. MORGAN was given the Task of defending the BONVAL RAVINE and the Right Flank. Lieut. ROWAT's Guns were to advance in the Centre of the Brigade Front, and Lieut. HICKS was responsible for the Machine Gun co-operating on the Left Flank.

Lieut. MORGAN moved forward from the Jumping-off Trench at Zero hour. Leaving 8 of his Guns to follow under the command of Sergeant CUTTLE, he pushed on himself with the other 2 Guns under protection of our Barrage, reaching the previously selected Positions in advance of the Infantry, at 7.34 A.M. His Guns were at once placed to command the BONVAL RAVINE in Position 50 yds. E. of the LENS-ARRAS Road near the point where it bends Eastwards along the N. Side of the Ravine towards VIMY Village.

Soon after the Guns were in Position about 300 Germans were seen 100 yds. away in the lower ground in Front. These were immediately fired on and approximately 100 Casualties inflicted. The remainder of the enemy took shelter in the Dugouts along the Road beside the steep N. Side of the Ravine. L/Cpl. SAUVE and L/Cpl. CAIRNS were left in charge of the 2 Guns with Instructions to keep a careful watch upon the entrances to the Dugouts. Going forward with 7 Men, Lieut. MORGAN Bombed the Dugouts capturing 150 Germans, including 6 Regimental Officers and 1 Staff Officer. Some of the enemy who attempted to escape were caught in the Fire of the 2 Machine Guns posted to command the Dugout entrances. Later in the morning during Consolidation, the same Officer with 2 Other Ranks and a Lewis Gun, rushed an enemy Machine Gun Post concealed in the wooded high ground on the Left of the Ravine, capturing the Gun and 3 surviving members of the Crew. Sergeant CUTTLE, with the other 2 Guns of this Section took up Defensive Positions 250 yds. in rear of the RED Objective.

The Guns under Lieut. ROWAT and HICKS got forward to their Positions in excellent time and without serious Casualties, advancing with the Infantry in each case. Lieut. ROWAT had his Guns on the RED Objective at 7.15 A.M. Positions were consolidated and many Targets of enemy Infantry and Transport, on Roads in the vicinity of VIMY, were engaged during the day. In the afternoon, the Germans heavily shelled the Area and one of Lieut. ROWAT's Guns received a direct hit by a heavy Shell which destroyed the Gun and killed 4 members of the Crew. The 4 Guns in Brigade Reserve were moved up at 6.30 A.M. to Support Positions in Rear and to the Left of LA FOLIE FARM.

#### **7th Company.**

Previous to Zero Hour the Mobile Guns of the 7th Company (Lieut. HALE) were distributed as follows from Right to Left:-

- 2 Guns under Lieut. BURNHAM with the R.C.R.
- 2 Guns under Lieut. McDOWELL with the P.P.C.L.I.
- 4 Guns under Lieut. MORRIS with the 42nd Bn.
- 4 Guns under Lieut. MOTHERSGILL in Brigade Support

The 8 Guns with Infantry Battalions went forward shortly after Zero, keeping closely in touch with the Battalions to which they were attached. Their movements proceeded very much as planned. Lieut. BURNHAM on the Right and Lieut. McDOWELL in the Center, built 4 Emplacements for Lieut. MOTHERSGILL's Guns during the pause on the BLACK LINE. These Emplacements were occupied by the Support Guns as soon as the Forward guns had moved up to the Strong Points prepared along the Main Resistance Line.

By 8.30 A.M. all Guns were in Position and 2 Belts of Fire established across the Brigade Front, one in Front and one in support. Lieut. BURNHAM was in touch with the 8th Company Guns under Lieut. HICKS on the Right, near the ECOLE COMMUNE. One Gun Detachment of Lieut. BURNHAM's overran its Strong Point, and got over the Crest of the Ridge; this Crew effectively engaged Parties of Germans retreating to BLOATER TRENCH at the foot of the Ridge.

Lieut. MORRIS, on the Left Flank placed his Guns so as to cover completely this threatened part of the Line. A great deal of Machine Gun Fire was encountered by his Men throughout the day, coming from the direction of HILL 145, still in the hands of the Germans. One of his Guns was put out of action about Noon, and was replaced in the evening by a Gun from Support.

Under Orders of the Brigadier a Gun was sent up at the same time to Lieut. BURNHAM who reported the junction of the R.C.R. and the 4th C.M.R. in the right in need of Reinforcements. These 2 Guns were replaced in Support by 2 Guns of the 9th Company (Major McFAUL), detached from "K" Barrage Battery under orders of the G.O.C., 7th C.I.B., whose Frontage this Battery was covering.



#### **Fourth Division Mobile Guns.**

Mobile Machine Guns on the Fourth Division Front were in Action, during April 9th, on the 12th C.I.B. Sector only.

#### **10th and 11th Companies.**

As already stated the Guns of the 10th and 11th Companies operating with the 11th C.I.B., on the Right Divisional Sector, remained throughout the day in their Assembly Positions. In the evening they were ordered up to Defensive Positions in rear of the Black Objective.

#### **12th Company.**

The 12th C.I.B. had two distinct Tasks, viz., the capture of the BLACK and RED Objectives, and the securing of the Left Flank of the entire Corps Attack. As the Attack progresses, therefore, it was necessary to form a Defensive Flank to the Left as well as to maintain the Advance in the direction of the Attack. Our Troops were here exposed to enemy Fire from the Flank as well as from the Front and particularly heavy Casualties were sustained in this Sector on this account.

The 8 Consolidation Guns of the 12th Company (Major L.F. PEARCE) were attached as follows from Right to Left:-

4 Guns	2 under Lieut. PEVERLEY )	to 38th C.I.Bn.
	2 under Lieut. COTTON )	
2 Guns	under Lieut. HALL	to 72nd C.I.Bn.
2 Guns	under Lieut. BEVAN	to 73rd C.I.Bn.

The Guns under Lieut. PEVERLEY and Lieut. COTTON were to take up Positions in the vicinity of No. 4 and No. 6 Craters, respectively, as soon after Zero Hour as possible. These Craters were on high commanding ground about 200 yds. in rear of the BLACK Objective near the Centre of the Brigade Sector. Lieut. HALL and Lieut. BEVAN were responsible for the Machine Gun Defence of the new Left Flank. All Guns left the Jumping-off Trenches at Zero. At 6.00 A.M., 30 minutes after Zero, Lieut. PEVERLEY, having proceeded on a Compass Bearing, reached his Position ahead of the Infantry. After a hurried reconnaissance he found that No. 5 Crater afforded a better Field of Fire than No. 4, and his 2 Guns were immediately dug in on the forward lip of the Crater, and opened Fire on the retreating Germans. 2 German Machine Guns and 12 enemy Gunners were captured in this Crater. One of these Guns was at once put into Action and fired with good effect by L/Cpl. ANTHONY. Soon after carrying at No. 5 Crater, Lieut. PEVERLEY observed a Gap on the Right Flank of the Brigade and 1 Gun was placed to Cover it. On the evening of the 9th this Gap was closed by the 85th C.I.Bn. from Brigade Reserve. The Strong Point was consolidated by digging a Trench behind the forward lip of the Crater. A further Gun was sent up as a Reinforcement by Major PEARCE during the morning of the 9th from Lieut. COTTON's Sub-section.



Lieut. COTTON's 2 Crews, following the inclination of the Battalion, bore too far to the Left and down hill in the direction of GIVENCHY. Severe Casualties were suffered, including Lieut. COTTON wounded, and 1 of the Tripods was destroyed. Of these 2 Crews one eventually joined Lieut. PEVERLEY: the other with only 4 Men left out of 11, and its Tripod Carrier missing, was ordered back to re-equip and get the Gun into condition for firing.

The Guns under Lieut. HALL operating with the 72nd C.I.Bn., on the 12th C.I.B. Left, had an unfortunate time. The Sub-section left our Lines at Zero Hour and made straight for their Objective. When across the German Lines Lieut. HALL was hit, receiving 5 wounds in the head and body. He, however, kept going until having grown too weak to proceed further, he was persuaded to go to an Advanced Dressing Station. Both Tripods of this Sub-section were knocked out by Shell Fire, 4 Other Ranks were killed and 5 wounded. The Tripods were replaced by 2 sent up from the 12th Company Barrage Battery. Lieut. J.A. RIDDELL replaced Lieut. HALL and Other Rank Casualties were made up as far as possible from Men in Reserve. In the meantime 1 of the Guns had been taken forward by L/Cpl. MUNNOCH, who found, on arrival at the Objective, that he was the only Man left of his Crew. He at once placed himself under Orders of a 72nd Battalion Officer and gave great assistance in establishing Infantry posts.

The 2 Guns were eventually placed for Consolidation in the vicinity of the old GUNNER CRATER.

The other 2 Left Flank Guns under Lieut. BEVAN went straight for the new CRATER, formed by a Mine exploded at Zero, and were in Position for Consolidation.

#### **16th Company.**

In order to give additional strength to the Machine Gun Defences of the 12th C.I.B. Sector, 2 Guns of the 16th Company (Captain E.W. SANSOM) were sent up from "M" Battery to No. 2 CRATER at 10.00 A.M. The Guns were ably commanded by Lieut. GAUVREAU and engaged many Targets of Opportunity.

#### **Black and Red Line Barrage Batteries.**

The Task of those Batteries firing the BLACK and RED LINE Barrages was comparatively simple and straightforward with the single exception of "G" Battery. The Positions were prepared, stored with Ammunition and occupied prior to Zero. Owing to the extreme care taken in camouflaging the Work, few Casualties were sustained during the Operation: 5 Batteries had no Casualties. It is doubtful if any of the Battery Positions had been located by the Germans.

#### **"G" Barrage Battery.**

"G" Battery consisting of 8 Guns of the 15th Company (Captain W.N. MOORHOUSE) had a more difficult Task. The Position for the Battery, which fired for the Capture of the RED Objective only was chosen in the German Front Line to the Right of the Sunken Road leading out of NEUVILLE ST VAAST in a N.-easterly direction over the Ridge. This Position could not be occupied until after the German front System of Trenches was carried. Also, the Guns had to be ready to open Fire at Zero plus 105. Lieut. HARTLEY, in charge of the Battery, by a skilful reconnaissance discovered a Gap in the hostile Barrage as soon as it was laid down. Taking advantage of this Gap, he left the Assembly Position immediately and conducted the Personnel of his Battery, numbering 100, through the German Barrage, arriving at his Battery Position at Zero plus 20 with the loss of only 1 Other Rank, slightly wounded. All Guns were in Positions and ready to fire 1 hour after Zero.

#### **Blue and Brown Line Barrage Batteries.**

The Task of the BLUE and BROWN LINE Batteries, on the First and Second Divisional Fronts, was a most difficult one and called for a very high degree of skill and leadership on the part of the Officers, and a maximum of determination and endurance on the part of All Ranks.

The 8 BLUE LINE Batteries viz: (Right to Left), Y1, X1, A1, B1, C1, D1, E1 and F1 had all supported the Capture of the BLACK Objective. On completion of firing the BLACK LINE Barrage, they moved forward, under cover of our RED LINE Supporting Fire, to their BLUE LINE Barrage Positions. These were situated in the vicinity of the Captured BLACK LINE. During the pause of our Infantry on the RED LINE, emplacements were dug, Ammunition was brought up and the Guns got ready to fire at Zero plus 4½ hours.

4 of these Batteries, viz. X1, A1, B1, and C1, carried out a second move forward to BROWN LINE Positions X2, A2, B2, and C2, situated about mid-way between the RED and BLUE Objectives. This move was conducted in Echelon, one Battery at a time. The 5th BROWN LINE Battery, Y2, moved direct to its



Barrage Position from the Brigade Assembly Area. As soon as possible after arrival, all Guns opened Fire on their BROWN LINE Targets in accordance with Fire Organisation Orders.

The 4 Batteries which fired 3 Barrages and made 2 moves with Equipment, Guns and Ammunition, over rough-shell-torn ground and under very trying weather conditions, performed one of the most arduous feats of the whole Operation. The total distance covered from the First to the Third Positions was between 3,500 and 4,000 yds. The Composition of these Batteries was as follows:

Name	Unit	Officer Commanding
X2	½ 13th C.M.G. Company	Lieut. A. MacKENZIE
A2	'A' 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade	Major M.A. SCOTT
B2	'B' 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade	Capt. E.H. HOLLAND
C2	½ 6th C.M.G. Brigade	Lieut. WADDINGTON

Casualties in these Guns were relatively slight with the exception of X2 Battery. Lieut. MacKENZIE had the misfortune to come under very heavy shell fire when leading his Battery across our own Front Trench System. 5 Other Ranks were killed and 3 Guns were put out of Action. For the Barrage at X1 Position the Battery had only 5 Guns as a result of these Casualties. The Targets of the Guns destroyed were covered by the other Guns of the Batteries and the Rate of Fire speeded up to compensate for the reduction in the number of Guns. This loss was made up by 3 Guns sent up to X2 in time for the BROWN LINE Barrage, from other Crews of the 13th Company at Y1 Position.

#### **Barrage Guns Diverted.**

During the Advance of the 1st Brigade through the BLACK and RED Objectives to their Attack on the BLUE and BROWB Objectives, considerable enemy Sniping and Machine Gun Fire was met with coming from the XVII, Corps Area on the Right. In order to stop this Fire, which was causing him Casualties, the Brigadier ordered 4 of the 1st Company Barrage Guns into Action. These Guns were on their way to Y2 Battery Position advancing with the Infantry. After effectively engaging the Flank Targets, they moved up to Y2 where they joined the other 4 Guns of the Battery already in Position in time to fire the BROWB LINE Barrage.

#### **Switch of Barrage Battery Fire.**

While the Infantry were halted on the RED LINE, a Counter-Attack was threatened on the Left of the Second Division Front at the foot of BONVAL RAVINE. The G.O.C. 5th Brigade at once ordered a Concentration of Machine Gun Fire to be applied to the danger Area. Major WATSON, O.C., 5th Company, Commanding the 5th Brigade Barrage Group at once had the Fire of FS Battery switched to this Target, and engaged it from Zero plus 150 to Zero plus 200 when word was received that conditions were again normal. FS Battery resumed Fire on the RED LINE Protective Barrage.

#### **Move of Barrage Guns.**

About 2.00 P.M. on the 9th, after the Capture of the BLUE LINE, in accordance with the Plans for the Operation, the Eaton M.M.G. Battery (8 Battery), which had fired the BLACK BARRAGE, and the Borden and Yukon Batteries (E and F Batteries), which had fired the RED Barrage, moved overland from the Second to the Fourth Division Areas, about 4,000 yds. with Guns and Equipment. On arrival there the Eaton Battery was ordered into Corps Reserve, and proceeded to LE PENDU, near VILLERS AU BOIS. The other 2 Batteries came under Orders of the 12th C.I.B. The Borden Battery occupied "R" Position, in rear of SOUCHEZ Cemetery; the Yukon Battery relieved 8 Guns of the 205th Company (British) at "Q" Position.

#### **Protective Barrage Raised.**

In the late afternoon of the 9th, the Machine Gun protective Barrage was raised on the First Divisional Front and on the Right of the Second, in order to fall clear of our Patrols sent out through FARBUS WOOD, the village of FARBUS and STATION WOOD to the FARBUS-VIMY Railway.



### **Use of Pack Trains.**

The Divisional Machine Gun Pack Trains of the First and Second Divisions gave invaluable assistance to the Forward Batteries by bringing up S.A.A. and Water to the Battery Positions and to Dumps established in the captured ground. By 3.00 P.M. on April 9th, Lieut. HAYWOOD, 1st C.M.G. Company, in charge of the First Divisional Pack Train, had established a Dump of 100,000 Rounds of Ammunition and a supply of Water in Petrol Tins, 300 yds. E. of the RED Objective and central to the Machine Gun Batteries on the Divisional Front. Altogether, during the same day 400,000 Rounds of S.A.A. were delivered at this Dump by the Pack Train, and besides this, a considerable amount was taken direct to the Battery Positions.

Capt. FERRIS of the Canadian Light Horse was in command of the Second Divisional Pack Train. This Officer succeeded in getting forward a large amount of Ammunition and Water for the BLUE and BROWN LINE Barrage Guns.

### **Carrier Sections.**

Special arrangements were made by the Divisional M.G. Officer of the First and Second Divisions for the employment of Infantry Carriers, supplied by Brigades on a basis of 2 per Gun Crew. In the case of the Barrage Guns, 1 of these Men per Gun, or 8 per Battery, were detached from the Gun Crew. All the Men so detached were placed together as a Carrier Section under the Command of an Officer and used to carry Ammunition forward at Zero hour, co-operating with and supplementing the work of the Divisional Pack Trains.

Lieut. MILNER, (13th Company) for the First Division, and Lieut. NORTHGREAVE (4th Company) for the Second Division, in charge of the Carrier Sections did such excellent service. By 8.00 A.M. on the 9th, Lieut. NORHGREAVE had established an Ammunition Dump 1,600 yds. in advance of our original Front Line.



**SUBSEQUENT EVENTS – APRIL 10th to APRIL 14th, 1917.****Remainder of Objectives Captured.**

By the night of April 9th/10th, the whole of VIMY RIDGE in the Area of the First, Second and Third Divisions was in our hands. On the Fourth Division Front the Germans still held HILL 145 and most of the ground between the BLACK and RED Objectives. A Protective Barrage of Artillery and Machine Guns was established across the entire Corps Front. During the evening of the 9th, our Machine Guns replied to a number of S.O.S. Calls sent up from our own Front Line. Harassing Fire was carried on throughout the night of the 9th/10th. HILL 145 was captured during the night, by the 85th and 47th C.I.Bns., and BEER TRENCH, on the Forward Slope of the HILL, was occupied by 6.00 A.M., April 10th.

At 3.15 P.M. on the 10th, the 10th C.I.B. which had been in Reserve on the previous day, attacked and captured the remainder of the RED LINE to the E. The Fourth Division Machine Gun Batteries fired in accordance with Fire Organisation Orders originally issued for the Operation on the previous day.

**Consolidation.**

Consolidation was now carried out along the whole Front. The 13th Brigade (British) was withdrawn and rejoined the Fifth Division on the 10th. Inter-Divisional and inter-Brigade Boundaries were altered and Tasks and Frontages assigned to Formations in accordance with plans for Consolidation.

**Machine Gun Withdrawals and Reliefs.**

Machine Gun Moves and Reliefs were carried out in conformity with the requirements of the Machine Gun Defence of the captured Ground. Those Gun Crews which had done the severest work in the Attack were relieved by Guns whose Tasks had been less exacting, or were withdrawn where possible.

'A' and 'B' Batteries 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade, at A2, and B2 Positions were withdrawn on the night 11th.12th and returned to their Billets at GOUY SERVINS and DIVION respectively.

By the evening of the 10th all the Barrage Guns of the 13th, 15th and 95th Machine Gun Companies (British) had rejoined their Brigades. These Batteries had done everything possible to make the Operation a Success and their assistance was very greatly appreciated by the First and Second Divisions with whom they had co-operated. The 205th Machine Gun Company (British) also did excellent work with 8 Guns at Battery Position, under the Fourth Division, where they were relieved on the afternoon of the 9th, by the Yukon Motor M.G. Battery.

**Redistribution of Targets.**

The Machine Gun Protective Barrage, to be laid down in response to our own S.O.S. was redistributed under Divisional arrangements among the Guns remaining in Position.

**Harassing Fire.**

A regular Program of Indirect Harassing Fire was persistently carried out during these days by the Machine Guns of all Divisions; while Mobile Guns, well-sited on the high Eastern slope of the Ridge, denied overland movement to the Germans within effective Machine Gun Range.

**Capture of PIMPLE.**

In addition to the work of Consolidation, the Fourth Division was given the Task of completing the Capture of the Ridge by taking the PIMPLE. The Operation was successfully carried out by the 10th C.I.B., on April 12th. The Twenty-fourth Division, I Corps, on the Left, at the same time attacked the high ground called the BOIS-en-HACHE immediately N. of the SOUCHEZ RIVER. The Attack took place at 5.00 A.M. during a blinding snow-storm, and resulted in the capture of all Objectives, in spite of determined Opposition. The 12th C.I.B. pushed forward their Line under the same Barrage to make it conform to the Advance of the 10th C.I.B. on their Left.

**Machine Gun Co-operation.**

8 Mobile Guns of the 10th Company (Lieut. BRITTON), went forward with the Infantry. One of these Guns was destroyed early in the Action; the other 7 occupied Positions beyond the German Front Line and had many good Targets with Direct Fire.



**Harassing Fire.**

A Supporting and Protective Barrage was fired by 5 Batteries of Machine Guns disposed as follows, Right to Left, in the neighbourhood of SOUCHEZ:-

Name	Unit	No. of Guns
Q	Yukon M.M.G. Battery	8
R	Eaton M.M.G. Battery	6
T	Borden M.M.G. Battery	8
V	½ 205th M.G. Company (British)	8
S	½ 205th M.G. Company (British)	8
	TOTAL	38

At the same time, the 5 Barrage Batteries on the 11th and 12th C.I.B. Fronts, viz., L, M, N, O and P, fired on their own S.O.S. Targets, while 8 Consolidation Guns, 4 of the 12th Company (Major L.F. PEARCE) and 4 of the 16th Company (Captain SANSOM), harassed enemy Communication Trenches and Strong Points in rear of the Ground attacked.

**Plans for Further Attack.**

On the same day as the PIMPLE was captured, Instructions were issued for a further Attack in conjunction with the XII Corps, on the Right. Our Patrols had ascertained that the enemy were holding VIMY and the Line of VIMY-FARBUS Railway in Strength. The First, Second and Third Divisions were to undertake the Attack on this Line; the date was not fixed but was likely to be April 14th.

**Enemy Retirement.**

The Germans, however, anticipated this Operation by a hurried withdrawal on the 13th. Our Line was at once advanced and by the evening of the same day was pushed out more than 100 yds. E. of the Ridge along the whole Corps Front, and included the Village of WILLERVAL, VIMY and GIVENCHY-en-GOHELLE. The Fourth Division was relieved along their portion of this new Front by the Fifth Division (British) as soon as their Line was established.

**Reliefs and Withdrawal of Machine Guns.**

After being relieved by Guns of the Fifth Division (British), the Fourth Division Machine Guns were withdrawn to Machine Gun Camp, 1 mile E. of GOUY-SERVINS on the South-Western edge of the BOIS de ROUVIGNY. On the same day, the Borden, Eaton and Yukon M.M.G. Batteries were withdrawn to huts in LE PENDU.

**Further Advance.**

On April 14th, our Line was further advanced to a depth averaging 1,000 yds. and including the whole of the BOIS de l'HIRONDELLE, on the Left. Stiff enemy Opposition was met with and, from this date. Fighting resumed the aspect of Trench Warfare.



**Casualties to Machine Gun Personnel, April 9th to 14th, 1917.**

The following table shows the Casualties to Canadian Machine Gun Companies in the Battle of VIMY RIDGE, April 9th to 14th, 1917:-

Unit	Officers			Other Ranks			TOTAL	
	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Officers	O.R.s
1st C.M.G. Company		1		1	6		1	7
2nd C.M.G. Company		1		4	13	4	1	21
3rd C.M.G. Company				7	14			21
13th C.M.G. Company								
4th C.M.G. Company				4	3	2		9
5th C.M.G. Company				3	9			12
6th C.M.G. Company		1		3	14		1	17
14th C.M.G. Company				3	9			12
7th C.M.G. Company		1		11	15			26
8th C.M.G. Company		1		4	10		1	14
9th C.M.G. Company				3	6		1	9
14th C.M.G. Company					1			1
10th C.M.G. Company				3	6			9
11th C.M.G. Company		3		5	3		3	3
12th C.M.G. Company					11			16
16th C.M.G. Company					1			1



1st C.M.M.G. Bde		1			11		1	11
Borden M.M.G. Battery					1			1
Eaton M.M.G. Battery					1			1
Yukon M.M.G. Battery								
TOTAL		9		51	134	6	9	191



## **GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.**

### **Physical Difficulties Overcome.**

The Attack on VIMY RIDGE took place under very adverse weather conditions. The Battle began in a heavy snow-storm and snow again fell on the afternoon of the 11th. The weather throughout was cold and stormy. The strenuous firing Schedule for Machine Guns entailed a great deal of Belt Filling and the weather conditions added very materially to the difficulty of filling Belts and keeping them dry and clean. Rain and Snow made the ground heavy and almost impassable. All Ranks had little or no sleep for 72 hours. The work of getting Guns and Equipment forward, of digging Emplacements and constructing Shelters, and for carrying out the Fire Programme under these conditions, placed a heavy strain on the vitality and endurance of all who took part in the Advance. No words could adequately describe the cheerfulness of spirit with which all hardships were borne, and the keenness and determination which surmounted every obstacle.

### **Divisions Pleased with Work of Machine Guns.**

All Divisions expressed their satisfaction with the part the Machine Guns played in the Operation. In the SOMME Fighting the Infantry became familiar with and gained confidence in Machine Gun Overhead Fire: any mistrust still remaining was dispelled by the excellent service rendered by the Barrage Guns in the VIMY Operations. On the Front of the Third Division, it was reported that the enemy were seen to run from our Artillery Barrage into our Machine Gun Barrage. During the pause of the First and Second Divisions on the BLACK LINE, the Machine Gun Protective Barrage effectively assisted in "*blinding*" the enemy occupying the ZWISCHEN STELLUNG 400 to 500 yds. in front.

### **Moral Effect of Barrage Guns.**

The Continued Fire of our Guns gave great encouragement to the Infantry during their Advance and exercised an incalculable moral effect on our men, quite apart from its destructive effects upon the enemy. Also the immediate response of Machine Guns to our S.O.S. Signals gave an additional sense of security to our Troops in the Front Line.

### **Completeness of Our Victory.**

The Battle of VIMY RIDGE constitutes one of the most complete and decisive Engagements of the War. The Germans were utterly defeated and driven from the Field. No serious attempt at a Counter-attack was made. So disorganised were they that it was unnecessary to apply the Final Barrage beyond the time laid down in Fire Organisation Orders. The Ground won was never again re-occupied by the Germans.

### **A Landmark in Machine Gun Development.**

In the History of Machine Gun Science the Battle will always hold a unique place, for it proved beyond question the value of the Machine Gun as a Light Artillery Weapon, as well as a Weapon of Opportunity used in close support of the Infantry. Its employment hitherto for Overhead Supporting and Barrage Fire had been to a great extent experimental: its potential powers were understood and made use of by very few soldiers and most of them were themselves Machine Gun Officers. Lieut-Colonel BRUTINEL, with the support of the Corps Commander at every Stage, had been instrumental in introducing the practice of Overhead Indirect Fire into all Machine Gun Units of the Canadian Corps: but outside the Canadian Corps, the use of the Machine Gun for Indirect Fire was not generally believed in; and it was definitely discouraged in British Schools of Machine Gun Instruction at CAMIERS, in FRANCE, and at GRANTHAM in ENGLAND.

### **Increase in Use of Barrage Fire.**

The entire success of the VIMY Operations, and the unquestioned important contribution of Machine Gun Barrage Fire to that success, marked the beginning of a new era in Machine Gun Work. Machine Gun Methods of the Canadian Corps at one became the object of study of Staff Representatives and Machine Gun experts sent from other Corps of the British Army and from the French Army. By the end of 1917, the Machine Gun had taken its proper place in the Instruction and Practice of the British Army, as a weapon intermediate between Infantry and Artillery.



## **PASSCHENDAELE.**

**OCTOBER 7TH to NOVEMBER 20TH, 1917.**

### **GENERAL PLAN OF OPERATIONS.**

#### **Nomenclature.**

The Allied Operations in the YPRES Area, beginning on June 7th, 1917, and culminating with the Capture of PASSCHENDAELE by the Canadian Corps in November, are generally known as the Third Battle of YPRES. That portion of these Operations in which the Canadian Corps took part is conveniently described as the Second Battle of PASSCHENDAELE.

#### **Stages of the Battle.**

This Battle was fought in 4 successive Stages constituting the 6th, 7th, 8th & 9th Phases of the Third Battle of YPRES. Each Phase consisted of an Attack with limited Objectives on a 2-Division Frontage. The Third and Fourth Canadian Divisions carried out Phases VI and VII on October 26th and 30th, respectively. They were then relieved by the First and Second Canadian Divisions, which continued the Advance in Phase VIII and IX on the 6th and 10th November. The intervals between these Stages or Phases, were occupied in Consolidation, and in preparations for the succeeding Attack.

#### **Flanking Corps.**

The Canadian Corps was on the extreme Left of the Second Army. The 1 ANZAC Corps was on the Right of the Canadian Corps during the whole Battle. On the Left, in the Fifth Army Area, were the XVIII Corps for Phases VI and VII and the II Corps for Phases VIII and IX. These Corps were responsible for protecting the Canadian Corps Flanks, during each stage, and attacked simultaneously with the Canadian Corps, when it was necessary to do so, in order to give adequate flank protection.

#### **Objective.**

The Objective of the Canadian Corps Operation was the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE in the centre of which stands the Village of PASSCHENDAELE. The Village itself had been strongly fortified by the Germans, and the whole Ridge was held in great strength as it commanded enemy territory to the E. beyond ROULEWRS and as far as DIXMUDE to the N. Its possession by us would very considerably weaken the German Position in that portion of the Front. The stubbornness of the enemy Defence during our Attacks, and the frequent Counter-attacks by which they attempted to throw back our Line, bore eloquent testimony to the importance by the Germans to holding the Ridge.

#### **Tactical Conditions: Pill Boxes.**

The tactical conditions in this Area, differed widely from those to which the Canadian Corps had grown accustomed during the Spring and Summer of 1917 on the VIMY Front. The nature of the ground was such that deep Dugouts could not be constructed for the protection of the Troops. The Germans had solved this difficulty by constructing strong buildings of re-enforced concrete, above ground. These structures, called Pill Boxes, were usually erected inside already existing buildings and in many cases their position was only revealed when the bricks or other materials were knocked away from the outside by our Artillery. In the course of Operations here, every Farm House had come to be regarded as a possible Strong Point.

#### **Defence System.**

There was no connected system of Trenches. Short lengths of Trench were dug, where the ground was suitable; these trenches were often connected by Barbed Wire. Protection for the Garrison was afforded by the Pill Boxes in the vicinity and that portion of the Garrisons not on duty found an effective shelter there. Great numbers of Machine Guns were employed by the Germans in this Defence System; the Guns were fired either through the loop-holes of Pill Boxes or from the shelter of Trenches or Shell-holes close by. These Strong points were found very difficult to deal with. They were placed in commanding Positions, and as they presented a small Target, it was almost impossible to destroy them, even with the heaviest Artillery.



**Methods of Attack.**

The policy adopted in dealing with them was to direct a destructive Bombardment against them 24 to 36 hours before Zero, with the object of shell-shocking the Garrison and destroying its Morale; the Bombardment was followed by continuous and intense Harassing Fire of Field Artillery and Machine Guns, in order to prevent the relief of the Garrison before the Infantry kept as close up to our Barrage as possible, and worked rapidly round to Flanks of these Strong Points. These Tactics minimised our losses very greatly and in some instances, were brilliantly successful.

**Area Captured.**

The ground over which the Canadian Corps attacked was exceptionally difficult. The Area captured was, roughly speaking, bee-hive in shape. The base, 2,700 yds. in length lay N.-W. and S.-E. The right corner of the base rested on the YPRES-ROULERS Railway, at the junction of the Railway and the ZONNEBEKE-PASSCHENDAELE Road; the left corner was at WALLEMOLEN. The Apex was  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a mile N. of PASSCHENDAELE and 300 yds. E. of the PASSCHENDAELE WESTROOSEBEKE Road. From the centre of the base to the Apex was 3,000 yds; this formed the deepest penetration made during the Canadian Corps Operations from October 26th to November 11th.

In the centre of this Area and coinciding with the inter-Divisional Boundary was the RAVEBEEK, a small Stream with its source at the foot of the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE. On the Right was the high ground along which ran the ZONNEBEKE-PASSCHENDAELE Road, with the strongly entrenched Spur of CREST FARM jutting out from it towards the RAVEBEEK about 500 yds. W. of PASSCHENDAELE. The chief feature of the left portion of this area was the BELLEVUE SPUR, a Ridge extending along the N. Bank of the RAVEBEEK at right angles to the line of our Advance. The WIELTJE Road followed the high ground of this Ridge through BELLEVUE, MEETCHEELE and MOSSELMARKET.

**Obstacles Natural and Artificial.**

Cleverly constructed Pill Boxes commanded the Valley of the RAVEBEEK from both Flanks and the entire ground over which our Troops had to pass in the attack. Nature and the Season of the year aided the Defence. The wet season had set in before the Battle of PASSCHENDAELE commenced, and the ground, stirred up by Shell Fire, made movement difficult. The river-bed was choked as a result of Shelling, and the water flowed out over the low ground creating great marshy and impassable tracts. Shell-holes were soon filled with water, and rendered useless for shelter.

**Communications.**

Communication Trenches could not be dug owing to the condition of the ground, so that all movement backwards and forwards between the Line and Rear Areas took place overland, on walks made of Trench-mats. These walks or Tracks, as they were called, were carried forward with great energy by the Canadian Engineers prior to the commencement of our Operations, and as our Advance progressed, they were continued quite close up behind our Front Line. All Roads communicating with the rear were in a deplorable condition after undergoing 4 months of continuous Artillery Fire.

**Completeness of Canadian Corps Victory.**

Never were attacking Troops faced with conditions more baffling; never were adverse conditions more cheerfully or more successfully met and overcome. Each stage of the Battle was carried out to time as planned. All Objectives were captured and held. PASSCHENDAELE Village was taken in Phase VIII. The finest example of Co-operation was shown between all Branches of the Service in the face of their common difficulties.



## RELIEFS AND MOVES FROM FIRST TO SECOND ARMY.

### Relief of Canadian Corps.

The first intimation of the intended employment of the Canadian Corps in the Third Battle of YPRES was received on October 7th. On this date the Canadian Corps, with Headquarters at CAMBLAIN L'ABBE, was holding the line with the First and Second Divisions, opposite LENS and MERICOURT, respectively. These 2 Divisions had just completed the Relief of the Fourth and Third Canadian Divisions, respectively, on the previous day. Preparations had already been going on for some weeks for the Capture of SALLAUMINES-MERICOURT by the Canadian Corps, and the squeezing of the Germans out of Lens.

This Operation was immediately abandoned, and arrangements commenced for the transfer of the Corps from the FIRST to the SECOND ARMY. The 2 Divisions out of the Line were selected for the first half of the PASSCHENDAELE Battle. The Canadian Corps was relieved by the V Corps on October 12th and established its Headquarters at POPERINGHE on the 15th.

### Move of Third and Fourth Divisions.

The Third and Fourth Divisions, moving N. by Train, Lorries and Marching, were completely established by October 16th in the CAESTRE-HONDEGHEM-HAZEBROUCK Area, 30 miles to the N.W. On October 18th, the Canadian Corps took over the II ANZAC Corps Front, with Headquarters at TEN ELMS CAMP on the North-Western outskirts of POPERINGHE. On the 22nd the Third Division completed the Relief of the New Zealand Division and established its Headquarters at CANAL BANK, 1,000 yds. N. of YPRES. On the same day the Fourth Division completed the Relief of the Third Australian Division, with its Headquarters in the RAM, close to the MENIN GATE, YPRES.

### Move of First and Second Divisions.

Meantime the First and Second Divisions had remained in the Line on the LENS-MERICOURT Front under Orders of the V Corps. On October 14th, the First Division was relieved by the 59th Division (British) and on the 18th, the Relief of the Second Division by the 48th Division (British) was completed. After a week's rest in the Rear Areas of this portion of the Front the Divisions moved to the rest Area of the SECOND ARMY already vacated by the Third and Fourth Divisions. First Division H.Q. opened at EECKE on October 22nd, Second Division H.Q. at CAESTRE on the 24th. Thus the whole Canadian Corps was in BELGIUM ready for the Attack, 2 days before Operations commenced.

### Third Divl. M.G. "Battalion."

The Reliefs and Moves of Divisional M.G. "*Battalions*" corresponded with the Reliefs and Moves of their Divisions. The Third and Fourth "*Battalions*" had all Companies out of Line after their Relief by the Second and First "*Battalions*" respectively, on the night of October 6th/7th. The Third "*Battalion*" (Major MOORHOUSE), less the 9th Company, was billeted in Villages in the MAGNICOURT Area, the 7th Company, at HOUVELIN, the 8th Company, at BETHONSART, the 15th Company, by BETHENCOURT. The 9th Company remained at AUX RIETZ until October 11th, when it joined the 7th Company in HOUVELIN. On the 14th and 15th, all Companies journeyed to BLEGIUM by Train, the 7th and 8th Companies entraining at SAVY, the 9th and 15th Companies, at TINKUES. On arrival at their destinations, Companies marched to Billets in the CAESTRE Area. Points of detraining, and Location of Billets were as follows:

Unit	Detrained at	Billeted at
"Battalion" H.Q.	CAESTRE	CAESTRE
7th Company	CAESTRE	Le BREARDE (On HAZEBROUCK ST.SYLVESTER CAPPEL Road.)
8th Company	CAESTRE	HONDEGHEM
9th Company	GODEWAERSVELLE	CAESTRE (Farm nearby)
15th Company	BORRE	BORRE



**Fourth Divl. M.G. "Battalion".**

The Fourth "*Battalion*," after being relieved by the Companies of the First "*Battalion*" had marched to Billets in GAUGHIN-LEGAL. On October 12th, the "*Battalion*" Personnel proceeded by Motor Lorries to HAM-en-ARTOIS, 2 miles N. of LILLERS. On the following day, all Companies marched to HONDEGHEM, a distance of 17 miles. Here the 10th, 11th, 12th and 16th Companies were billeted, in the Village itself and in the houses and barns of neighbouring farms. "*Battalion*" H.Q. was in HAZEBROUCK at Fourth Divisional H.Q.

**First Divl. M.G. "Battalion".**

On October 7th, the First "*Battalion*" was disposed as follows:

Unit	Disposition of Guns	Location of Rear H.Q.
1st Company	8 Guns LENS Sector 8 Guns out of Line	CARENCY
2nd Company	16 Guns out of Line	CARENCY
3rd Company	8 Guns LENS Sector 8 Guns out of Line	CARENCY
13th Company	16 Guns MERICOURT Sector	CARENCY

On October 8th, the 2nd Company relieved the 8 Guns of the 1st Company and 8 Guns of the 3rd Company in the LENS Sector, so that there were now 2 M.G. Companies in the Line on the First Divisional Front and 2 Companies out. The Rear H.Q. and Transport Lines at CARENCY were those taken over from the Fourth "*Battalion*" on October 6th. This situation continued until the 12th. On the night of the 12th/13th the 2nd Company was relieved by the 174th M.G. Company (British). On the 13th, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Companies moved to new Billets leaving their quarters at CARENCY to the M.G. Units of the Fifty-ninth Division (British). The 1st and 3rd Companies found Billets in HERSIN COUPIGNY, the 2nd Company, in GRAND SERVINS. The 13th Company were relieved in the MERICOURT Sector on the night of October 14th/15th and, on the day following the Relief, joined the 2nd Company at GRAND SERVINS. All Companies made the journey to the SECOND ARMY Area by Road, in 4 stages on 4 successive days. Leaving their Billets on the LENS Front on October 20th, they marched by way of DIVION-l'ECLEME-THIENNES-TANNAY, arriving at Billets in HONDEGHEM Area on the 23rd.

**Second Divl. M.G. "Battalion".**

The Reliefs and Moves of the Second "*Battalion*" corresponded, in a general way, with those of the First. On October 7th, the M.G. Situation on the Second Divisional Front, MERICOURT Sector, was as follows: the 4th and 14th Companies were in the Line; the 5th and 6th Companies were billeted in MAISNIL-BOUCHE, where the Transport Lines of all 4 Companies were located. On the 10th, the Companies and all Details out of the Line moved to the camp at AUX RIETZ vacated by the Third M.G. "*Battalion*." The 5th Company relieved the 14th Company on the night of October 11th/12th. The Second M.G. "*Battalion*" was relieved a few days later, the 4th Company by the 143rd M.G. Company (British), on the night of 15th/16th, and the 6th Company by the 144th Company (British) on the night of 16th/17th. Upon Relief by these M.G. Units of the Forty-eight Division (British), the Second "*Battalion*" proceeded to the following Billets in the Rest Area: 4th and 14th Companies, to HOUVELIN, 5th Company to BETHENCOURT, 6th Company to BETHONSART. On October 23rd, all Companies moved by Train to BELGIUM and were billeted there in accordance with the following table:-

Unit	Entrained at	Detrained at	Billeted at
4th Company	LIGNY	GODEWAERSVELDE	CAESTRE
5th Company	TINQUES	CAESTRE	le BREARDE
6th Company	SAVY	CASSEL	HONDEGHEM
14th Company	SAVY	CASSEL	HONDEGHEM



**1st C.M.M.G. Brigade.**

The 1st C.M.M.G. Bde., with the Borden, Eaton and Yukon Batteries, was the last of the M.G. Units of the Corps to move N. The Brigade made the journey on October 20th, covering in a single day, the entire distance of 42 miles from BARLOIN, their H.Q. on the LENS front, to York Camp, 2 miles E. of POPERINGHE, on the main POPERINGHE-YPRES Road. YORK CAMP remained the Brigade Headquarters throughout the Battle of PASSCHENDAELE.



## MACHINE GUN PREPARATIONS.

### Special Training.

The Third and Fourth M.G. "Battalions" were established in the HAZEBROUCK-HONDEGHEM-CAESTRE Area by October 16th; by October 22nd, they had taken over the Line from ANZAC Machine Gun Units. The intervening 6 days gave little opportunity for special Training for the Battle of PASSCHENDAELE. All Ranks were in excellent physical condition, after their vigorous Summer on the VIMY Front; efficiency in Machine Gun work was at a high level, as a result of the continual use of the Guns in Minor Operations, daily Harassing Fire, and the HILL 70 Attack. There was, therefore, less need now for all the special Training undertaken prior to the Capture of VIMY RIDGE, when Machine Gun Personnel was less experienced, particularly in the use of Machine Guns for Barrage Fire. Before going into the Line, an opportunity was given to a number of Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers from each Company to view, at Corps Headquarters, a model, Scale 1/400, of the PASSCHENDAELE Area, including the ground over which the Advance was to take place. This served to supplement the study of Maps and information regarding the District, and greatly aided those who saw the model in visualising the Battle Area. The period in the Rest Area was spent in Drill, in practising the use of Pack Mules, and, quite generally, in keeping all Ranks fit for the heavy tasks before them.

### Infantry Carriers.

32 to 40 Infantry Other Ranks were attached to each Company from the Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp; these Men were to act as Carriers, to assist the Machine Gun Personnel in getting up supplies of Ammunition to the Guns, and to Forward Dumps which could not be reached by Pack Mule Transport. One Officer and 84 Other Ranks of the Canadian Light Horse were attached to the 1st C.M.M.G. Bde. for the same purpose. As in the VIMY RIDGE Battle, these Infantry Carriers proved indispensable.

### Moves to Battle Area.

Movement of Units to the Line from the Rest Area began on October 21st. On this date, the 7th Company (Major WEIR), Third "Battalion," proceeded to YPRES by Train and marched to CAMP "X," about 500 yds. W. of St. JEAN, where they were accommodated in the quarters of the 5th New Zealand Machine Gun Company. On the 21st also, the 10th Company (Major BRITTON), Fourth "Battalion," moved by Bus to the Western outskirts of YPRES and marched through the ruined City to POTIJZE,  $\frac{3}{4}$  of a mile E. of the MENIN GATE on the YPRES-ZONNEBEKE Road. On October 22nd, the 9th and 15th Companies moved to Camp "X" St. JEAN, whither they were followed, on the 23rd, by the 8th Company. The remaining Companies of the Fourth "Battalion," viz., the 11th, 12th and 16th, moved to POTIJZE on the 22nd.

### Fourth "Battalion" Guns Take Over the Line.

The 10th Company was the First Canadian M.G. Unit to take over the Line. On the 21st, immediately after their arrival at POTIJZE, all 16 Gun Crews marched into the Line and relieved the 10th and 11th Australian Machine Gun Companies, 8 Gun Crews to the Right of BEECHAMN, and 8 Crews on ABRAHAM HEIGHTS. On the 22nd and 23rd, the remaining Machine Guns of the II ANZAC Corps were relieved, and additional Machine Guns placed in Positions to give Defence in Depth. In the Fourth Divisional Sector, on the Right of the Corps Frontage, the 16th Company (Major SANSOM) relieved the eight 10th Company Guns at BEECHAM and these moved 500 yds. forward to Positions near HAMBURG. The other 8 Guns of the 16th Company were placed for the Defence of the high ground to the left of ZONNEBEKE STATION, forming the WINDMILL CABARET-DOCHY FARM Ridge. Headquarters of the 10th and 16th Companies were in LEVI COTTAGES, a former German Pill Box.

### Third "Battalion" Guns Take Over the Line.

In the Left Sector, the 7th Company relieved the 5th New Zealand Company, in Positions on the GARVENSTAFEL RIDGE, N.W. of Abraham Heights, on the afternoon of October 22nd. On the following day, the 15th Company placed all its 16 Guns in the Line on the N. side of GRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE to the Left of the 7th Company Guns, to protect the Left portion of the Third Divisional Front.



### **Principles of Employment of Machine Guns.**

Preparations for the first Stage of the Battle Phase VI, now began in earnest. The Machine Gun Resources consisted of 166 Guns, composed of the Third and Fourth Divisional Machine Gun "*Battalions*," 64 Guns each, and the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade with 38 Guns. The Principle of Employment were similar to those governing the use of Machine Guns at VIMY RIDGE. Each attacking Division was supported by a number of 8-Gun Batteries giving Supporting and Barrage Fire. For each stage of the PASSCHENDAELE Battle, Barrage Guns were distributed on the basis of 1 Gun per 30 yds. of Attack Frontage. During the periods intervening between Attacks, machine Guns were thinned out to 1 Gun for every 50 yds. of Front. The Fire of Barrage Guns was co-ordinated by the Corps Machine Gun Officer. A certain number of Guns were detailed to Brigades, to go forward with the Infantry and assist in Consolidation. All arrangements for these Guns were made by Brigades and Divisions concerned.

### **Sniping Batteries.**

In addition to Barrage and Mobile Guns, Batteries of opportunity, know as Sniping Batteries, were sent forward to assist the Attack. The objects of these Batteries were:

1. To give close support, by Direct Fire, to the Infantry in case of Counter-attacks.
2. To supplement and stiffen the Defence System of the Area newly captured.
3. To engage bodies of hostile Troops within easy Range.
4. To engage low-flying enemy Aeroplanes.

1 or 2 Batteries were allotted to each Divisional Front: each Battery consisted of 4 Guns (under the Command of an Officer), as experience had shown this number to be the most effective Unit for dealing with Opportunity Targets at medium and long Range. As a rule Sniping Guns moved forward so as to reach points from which good forward Observation was obtainable, early after the Capture of the Final Objective. When his Guns were in Position, the Officer Commanding a Sniping Battery informed the nearest Infantry Commander of his whereabouts, and, when possible, established Liaison with an Artillery Observation Post.

### **Control.**

Arrangements for Control of Machine Guns were the same, in principle, as obtained in the VIMY RIDGE battle. Barrage and Sniping batteries came, for all purposes, under the control of the Formation whose areas they covered. While the final Barrage always remained the primary consideration, Divisions could allot special Secondary Targets to Barrage Batteries under their control provided that firing directed against these Targets did not interfere with the Final Barrage. Any alterations in the Final Barrage Line were at once reported to Corps Headquarters. Batteries covering a Brigade Frontage formed a Group with a Group Commander at Brigade Headquarters and a Sub-Group Commander with his Headquarters close to the Guns. Communication was established by Runners between the Guns and Buried Cable Head: from here Communication with Brigade, Divisional and Corps H.Q. was by telephone. For Phases VI and VII Mobile Guns were left entirely to Brigades and Infantry Battalions with which they co-operated. Owing to the difficulty experienced in Phase VI and VII in getting early information about these Guns at Rear, an Officer was appointed, in each Divisional Sector, for Phases VIII and IX whose duty it was to visit all Mobile and Sniping Guns as soon as possible after they were in Position and, quite generally, to keep the Divisional Machine Gun Commander informed with regard to these Guns.



**S.A.A. Supply; Use of Transport.**

One of the heaviest Tasks devolving upon the Machine Gun Units was the getting forward of their S.A.A. supply. The Third and Fourth "*Battalions*" each took forward and maintained in the forward Dumps 1,500,000 Rounds for the first 2 Stages: 1,000,000 Rounds were maintained by the First and Second "*Battalions*" for the final Stages of the Attack. As at VIMY the animals of Company Transport Sections were pooled in each "*Battalion*" to form a Divisional Machine Gun Pack Train. An Officer was placed in charge and was made responsible for keeping up the S.A.A. supply. Conspicuous service was rendered in this work by the following Officers.

First "Battalion"	Lieut. MILNER	13th Company
Second "Battalion"	Lieut. CREIGHTON	5th Company
Third "Battalion"	Capt. DICKIESON )	7th Company
	Lieut. DIXON )	
Fourth "Battalion"	Capt. FOWLER	10th Company
	Lieut. RAINBOTH	16th Company

**Roads and Dumps.**

Owing to the muddy and broken condition of all roads and on account of enemy Shelling directed against them, this work called for a maximum of determination and courage on the part of those in charge of Pack Trains. Cross-country Tracks were quite impassable. On both Divisional Sectors there was but a single way of approach for Transport from the Rear. On the Right all Traffic had to go forward by the YPRES-ZONNEBEKE Road. Pack Transport for the Fourth Divisional Front left this Road at its junction with the YPRES-ROULERS Railway and proceeded from this point by a very muddy third-class Road made passable for mules by the lavish use of Fascines laid under supervision of Canadian Engineers. The end of this Road was at SEINE Corner where the main S.A.A. Dump was established. In the Left Divisional Sector, the Forward Area could be approached only by the planked WIELTJE Road, by way of St. JEAN, WIELTJE, SPREE FARM (1,000 yds. S. of St. JULIEN), KANSAS CROSS, GRAVENSTAFEL, etc. For Phases VI and VII Pack Trains could not proceed beyond WIMBLEDON where the chief Forward Dump was established: for the 2 last Stages the main Dump was advanced to WATERLOO. From the main S.A.A. Dumps, Ammunition was carried by hand to more forward Dumps and to the Gun Positions.

**Advanced Armourer's Shops.**

An important feature of the M.G. preparations was the establishing of an Advanced Armourer's Shop in charge of an Officer, in each Divisional Sector. At each of these, 2 Armourers were placed to effect minor repairs: there was also a supply of Spare Parts which were found of very great use, throughout the Operations, in replacing breakages and Guns destroyed by Shell Fire. In the Right Sector the Advanced Armourer's Shop was at LEVI COTTAGES for PHASES VI and VII and at TYNE COTTAGE for Phase VIII and IX; in the Left Sector, it was situated at NILE HOUSE for the whole Battle.

**Supply of Reinforcements.**

Special arrangements were made for the supply of Reinforcements. The C.M.G.C. R.D. was situated at DIVION convenient to the VIMY Front. When the Corps moved N. this Depot was too far away to keep up a constant and immediate supply of Officers and Other Ranks to replace Casualties. To meet the situation a special Advanced Reinforcement Depot was established at YORK CAMP, in the same Lines with, and under the control for Discipline and Rations, of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade. 150 Other Ranks were maintained here and despatched to Units in the Line as required. The Advance Depot was formed a few days prior to the beginning of operations.



**Reduction of Casualties.**

Every effort was made by the Corps Machine Gun Officer in his arrangements for these Operations, to minimise Casualties to Machine Gun Personnel. As at VIMY RIDGE, the Minimum of Personnel was actually with the guns: the remainder were kept in reserve. As soon as the Attack Barrages were fired the Line was thinned out, as many Machine Guns as possible being withdrawn. Also an issue of 2,600 empty Belts was made to Machine Gun Units in the Line, with a view to having a sufficient number of filled Belts at each gun Position, at the commencement of the Operation, to enable one gunner to be released from each crew. These Belts were treated as Trench Stores, and handed over on relief. In spite of every effort to avoid them, however, the casualties in these Operations were greater on proportion than those experienced by Canadian Machine Gun Units in any previous Engagement.

**Anti Air-Craft Defence.**

Careful preparations were made for dealing with enemy low-flying Aeroplanes. One of the most striking characteristics of hostile tactics in this Area was the determined and persistent effort of German Aeroplanes to oversee our Trenches and Preparations, and to bump our Camp, and Lines of Communication. Prior to occupying the Line, the Canadian Corps issued detailed instructions for Lewis and Machine Gun defence against hostile Aircraft. Each infantry and M.G. Unit was made responsible for the A.A. protection of its own Transport Lines. Each Division was instructed to arrange for Lewis and Machine Gun Defences of its forward Areas, by the Infantry and Machine Gun Units holding the Line. Special Units were told off for the Protection of Artillery and Ammunition Dumps. In all these preparations a careful study was made of the experience lately gained by other troops in the PASSCHENDAELE Area, and in this way many difficulties were overcome and many errors avoided.



## **INTERVAL BETWEEN TAKING OVER LINE AND PHASE VI.**

### **Harassing Fire.**

During the days preceding the first Attack, in the interval between taking over the Line and the Operation itself, Machine Guns in the Line carried out a schedule of Indirect Harassing Fire. Ammunition supply was completed and Barrage Positions constructed for those Guns Firing Supporting and Barrage Fire during the Operation. On October 25th, Lieut. RUTLEDGE, 12th Company, was killed at Barrage Positions.

### **Infantry Battle Order.**

The Battle Order of Brigades Right to Left, was as follows: 10th Brigade, 9th Brigade, 8th Brigade. Attacking Battalions from Right to Left were 46th (10th Bde.), 58th and 43rd (9th Bde.), 4th C.M.R. (8th Bde.). The First Australian Division was on the Right of the Fourth Canadian Division and the Sixty-third Naval Division was on the Left of the Third Canadian Division. The Boundaries and Jumping-off Line are shown on PASSCHENDAELE Operations Map.

### **Mobile Guns.**

Mobile Machine Guns were disposed as follows prior to Zero Hour on October 26th:- On the Fourth Divisional Front, 2 Sections – 8 Guns – under Lieut. WEAVER of the 10th Company (Major BRITTON), were placed between HAMBURG and TYNE COTTAGE. 2 of these Guns were held in Reserve in HAMBURG HOUSE, Lieut. WEAVER's Headquarters; the remaining 6 Guns were in Defensive Positions and ready to move forward with the 46th C.I.Bn. as the situation should require. The 9th Company (Major McFAUL) furnished all the Mobile Guns, detailed to co-operate with the 8th and 9th C.I.Bs. on the Third Divisional Front. 6 of these Guns operated with the 9th C.I.B. on the Right, the remaining 2 with the 8th C.I.B. on the Left. On the 9th C.I.B. Guns, 2 under Lieut. MADGETT, operating with the 58th C.I.Bn. assembled beside the WIELTJE Road near PLENT COTTAGE: the other 4, under Lieut. ELLIS, operating with the 43rd C.I.Bn., assembled in the Jumping-off Trench 400 yds. to the Left. Lieut. SEARLES was in command of the 2 Guns detailed to co-operate with the 4th C.M.R. Bn., on the 8th C.I.B. Frontage, and took up Positions in the Jumping-off Trench. 16 Mobile Guns in all advanced in Support of the entire Attack Infantry Sections were, in some cases, especially detailed for the Local Protection of Machine Guns, e.g., Section of "D" Company, 4th C.M.R., was detailed to accompany the Guns under Lieut. SEARLES.

### **Sniping Guns.**

3 Sniping Batteries of 4 Guns each were employed for the Operation. Lieut. LADLER (10th Company) commanded 1 of these Batteries situated near the Jumping-off Line, immediately in rear of AUGUSTUS WOOD. A second Sniping Battery under Lieut. DRINKWATER (9th Company) took up Positions 50 yds. in front of HAMBURG HOUSE Both these Batteries were sited so as to command the BELLEVUE SPUR with a view to engaging any Targets of Opportunity which might present themselves during the course of the Operation. The third Sniping Battery, commanded by Lieut. DUTHIE (9th Company) assembled with the 4th C.M.R. Bn. in the Cemetery on the Jumping-off Line, 300 yds. to the Left of WOLF FARM. This Battery was to advance with the Attack and occupy Positions in the captured area from which Opportunity Targets might be engaged.

### **Barrage Guns General.**

Machine Gun Supporting and Barrage Fire was provided on the basis of 1 Machine gun for every 30 yds. of Frontage. Fire Organisation Tables were prepared by the Corps Machine Gun Officer who was responsible for co-ordinating the Machine Gun Barrage. Arrangements were also made by him with the XVIII Corps, on the Left, and the 1 ANZAC Corps on the Right for Co-operating Fire on either Flank.

80 Guns, in all, were employed by the Canadian Corps for Barrage Fire. These were divided, as usual, into 8-Gun Batteries, and were distributed equally between the attacking Divisions, 5 Batteries supporting the Fourth Division, and 5 Batteries, the Third. All 5 Batteries supporting each Division were under the command of a Group Commander, with his Headquarters at Brigade Headquarters. Sub-Group Commanders were appointed with their Headquarters close to the Barrage Gun Positions. In this way a chain of control was established between the Guns and the Corps Machine Gun Officer, while Brigade and Divisional Commanders also could quickly effect any changes in the Fire Schedule required by the Situation of the Battle.



**Fourth Division.**

The Fourth Division Batteries were designated and composed at Zero Hour, October 26th, as follows:-

Name of Battery	Unit
No. 1	8 Guns 11th C.M.G. Company
No. 2	(4 Guns 11th C.M.G. Company 4 Guns 12th C.M.G. Company)
No. 3	8 Guns 12th C.M.G. Company
No. 4	8 Guns 16th C.M.. Company
No. 5	8 Guns Borden M.M.G. Battery

Batteries 1 to 4 situated roughly on a line 400 yds. W. of SEINE-BEECHAM. The Borden Battery (Capt. NICHOLSON) was in Position on the Right Shoulder of ABRHAM HEIGHTS. Major BRITTON, O.C., 10th Company, was appointed Group Commander with Headquarters at 10th C.I.B., KINK CORNER, Batteries 1 to 4 were under Major CLERK (11th Company), as Sub-Group Commander, with Headquarters at SEINE CORNER.

**Third Division.**

Barrage Batteries of the Third Division were designated and composed as follows:-

Name of Battery	Unit
No. 6	8 Guns Yukon M.M.G. Battery
No. 7	8 Guns 8th C.M.G. Company
No. 8	( 4 Guns 8th C.M.G. Company 4 Guns 15th C.M.G. Company)
No. 9	8 Guns 15th C.M.G. Company
No. 10	8 Guns 7th C.M.G. Company

Batteries 6 and 7 formed the Right Sub-Group on positions on the Left Shoulder of ABRAHAM HEIGHTS; Batteries 8, 9, and 10 composed the Left Sub-Group occupying Positions on the Northern Slope of GRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE, to the Left of KOREK, Major PARKES, O.C., 8th Company, was appointed Group Commander with Headquarters at 8th C.I.B., KANSAS HOUSE; Capt. THOMSON, 8th Company, was made Sub-Group Commander and established his Headquarters at KOREK, 250 yds. to the Left of GRAVENSTAFEL, close to the Left Sub-Group.

October 25th and the night of 25th/26th were spent in completing arrangements. Barrage Guns were finished and stocked with S.A.A.; as many belts as possible were filled for these Guns. Stores were brought up to the Advance Armourer's Depots at LEVI COTTAGES and NILE HOUSE: forward S.A.A. Dumps were filled. Sniping Guns took up their Positions and Mobile Guns assembled for the Advance in their allotted places. The allotment of Machine Guns for the various Tasks, during Phases VI and VII, is shown, for the Canadian Machine Gun Units taking part, in the following Table:-



## Tasks of Machine Guns – PASSCHENDAELE

Phase VI, October 26th, and Phase VII, October 30th, 1917.

UNIT		Phase VI				Phase VII			
		Barrage	Mobile	Sniping	Reserve	Barrage	Mobile	Sniping	Reserve
1st C.M.M. G. Bde.	'A' Battery				8	8			
	'B' Battery				8	8			
	Borden Battery	8							8
	Eaton Battery				6				6
Third Divisional M.G. Bn.	Yukon Battery	8							8
	7th C.M.G. Company	8			8	4	6		6
	8th C.M.G. Company	12	8	8	4	6	2		8
	9th C.M.G. Company	12			4	8		4	4
Fourth Divisional M.G. Bn.	15th C.M.G. Company					6		4	6
	10th C.M.G. Company	12	8	4	4	4			12
	11th C.M.G. Company	12			4	12			4
	12th C.M.G. Company	8			8	8	4	4	
	16th C.M.G. Company						6		2
	TOTAL	80	16	12	58	72	18	12	64

Total Available Machine Guns, C.M.G. Corps:- 166



**PHASE VI: OCTOBER 26th, 1917.****General; Infantry Attack.**

The Attack was launched at 5.40 A.M. on the Fourth Division Front; all Objectives were taken. A great deal of enemy Machine Gun Fire was encountered coming from CREST FARM, HAALLEN COPSE and DECK Wood. The 46th C.I.Bn. established themselves early in the day on the Final objective. On the Front of the Third Division heavy and determined opposition was met with at LAAMKEEK, at DAD TRENCH to the Left of LAAMKEEK, and on the Crest of BELLEVUE SPUR. Enemy Machine Gun Fire was very severe and heavy enemy Artillery Fire was directed on the Area. Some of our Troops were obliged to fall back; others took up positions and held out in Shell-holes and captured Pill Boxes. Early in the afternoon the Attack was renewed and the German Resistance overcome. LAAMKEEK Pill Box and DAD TRENCH were taken with their garrison, and our Men forced their way over the Crest of BELLEVUE SPUR, establishing a strong Line somewhat in rear of the Final Objective of the Attack. The captured ground was subjected to vigorous enemy Counter-attack at 4.00 P.M. along the BELLEVUE SPUR. The enemy were caught in our Artillery and Machine Gun Fire and their Attack was broken up, 60 Germans were made Prisoners. At 4.40 P.M. the enemy counter-attacked the Fourth Division and gained a footing in our Line. The Line was completely restored on the following day. The captured ground was consolidated on the night 26th/27th.

**Fourth "Battalion" Mobile Guns.**

Machine Guns rendered conspicuous service in the day's Fighting. The 46th C.I.Bn. on the Right made good progress, and by 10.00 A.M. had established themselves on the new Line. Lieut. WEAVER (10th Company), in charge of the 8 Mobile Guns co-operating with the Infantry moved 2 Guns up to the Right and 2 Guns to the Centre of the Battalion Frontage. The 2 Right Guns, under Lieut. AIRD were placed in a Sunken Road, 200 yds. to the Right of the ZONNEBEKE-PASSCHENDAELE Road, so as to cover the Right Flank and the low ground to the Left of the Railway, in the neighbourhood of VIENNA COTTAGE. The other 2 Guns, under Corporal CAREY were sited in front of HILLSIDE FARM to command the high ground to the Left of the PASSCHENDAELE Road, and the Left Flank.

**German Counter-attack Checked.**

Lieut. AIRD's Guns were handled with the utmost skill and daring and did fine execution during the German counter-attack at 4.40 P.M. About 3.30 P.M. the enemy opened a terrific Bombardment on the Sunken Road where the Guns were. After 20 minutes of this, Lieut. AIRD sent all the Gunners to the Junction of the Sunken Road with the PASSCHENDAELE ROAD, where there was less Shelling and a certain amount of shelter. He himself along with Cpl. THURSBY remained at the Guns. Shortly afterwards Fire was opened on the Germans who were seen massing for the counter-Attack in a field near VIENNA COTTAGE about 200 yds. off. Lieut. AIRD operated one Gun, Cpl. THURSBY the other. The Germans scattered and numerous Casualties were observed. When the Guns had been firing for 10 minutes, Lieut. AIRD's Gun was put out of action by a large Shell exploding close to it, and Lieut. AIRD joined Cpl. THURSBY at the other Gun. The Gunners were now ordered to report with the damaged Gun, to Cpl. CAREY at the Centre Gun Positions as they could no longer be used where they were.

Meanwhile the German Counter-attack was developing and the enemy were seen advancing in extended Order. Several Shells exploded near Lieut. AIRD's Gun splashing the Gun and M.G. Belts with mud and it became more and more difficult to maintain Fire. At length the Mechanism became clogged that only single Shots could be fired. Lieut. AIRD continued to operate the Gun until the Germans were within 100 yds. of his Position on the Left. Realising the danger of being cut off, he withdrew the Gun, with Cpl. THURSBY's help, and mounted it near HILLSIDE FARM along with the other 2 Guns: Cpl. CAREY in charge of these Guns, had already been killed. The German Attack had now been broken up and the 3 Guns were dug in Defensive Positions. Unfortunately, Lieut. AIRD was killed the same night during a heavy enemy Bombardment.



### **Third "Battalion" Mobile Guns, Right Flank.**

On the Third Division Front, where the Fighting was more bitter and continuous, Machine Gunners had many difficult Tasks to perform. Lieut. MADGETT (9th Company), with 2 Guns operating with the 58th C.I.Bn., on the extreme Right of the Third Division, advanced with the Third wave of Infantry. The advance was met with very severe Rifle and M.G. Fire from LAAMKEEK Pill Box and DAD TRENCH, and, after repeated efforts to get forward, the Infantry withdrew to the Jumping-off Line, where they were again established at 7.45 A.M. Lieut. MADGETT's Guns had proceeded about 100 yds. when the Infantry Advance was checked. There was no Field of Fire for the Guns where they had been halted, and it was impossible either to advance or withdraw to a Position from which the Guns could be operated, owing to enemy Machine Gun and Rifle Fire. Lieut. MADGETT decided to make a stand with his 2 Gun Crews. They remained where they were and were eventually relieved when the Infantry attacked successfully at 1.05 P.M. By this time only the Officer and 2 other Ranks were left and they withdrew with their Guns, which were both out of Action.

### **Centre Guns.**

The 4 Guns under Lieut. ELLIS (9th Company), with the 43rd C.I.Bn., in the centre of the Attack, left the Jumping-off Line with the Second Wave. Lieut. ELLIS was wounded in the shoulder after leaving the Humping-off Line, but refused to go out. On the way forward, 2 of the 4 Guns were put out of Action; Lieut. ELLIS had the other 2 Guns taken forward and, after reconnoitering the ground, placed them in commanding Positions about 400 yds. from the Jumping-off Line, and the same distance from the Corps Left Boundary. These 2 Guns were in Position by 6.30 A.M. When the Line was withdrawn, on the Right, these 2 Guns formed a rallying point; Lieut. ELLIS with his Crews were joined by Lieut. SHANKLAND of the 43rd C.I.Bn. and a few Infantrymen, about 40 in all. When Lieut. SHANKLAND proceeded to his Battalion Headquarters to make a report on the Situation, Lieut. ELLOD took command of his Position. This little Party held out throughout the morning and until the Attack was renewed at 1.05 P.M. Numerous Casualties were inflicted on the Germans attempting to re-organise 250 yds. from the Gun Positions.

When the Position was consolidated, Lieut. ELLIS went out to the Dressing Station, handing over his Guns to the Number One Gunners C.N. SCOTT and F. GALLANT. These Men did excellent work throughout the day. At 10.00 A.M. Fire was opened on a party of the enemy, estimated at 2 Companies, on the WIELTJE Road. Numerous Casualties were inflicted and the party dispersed. At various times throughout the day parties of Germans were engaged and scattered while attempting to assemble for Counter-attacks from MEETCHEELE and FURST FARM. Good Targets were obtained during the enemy Counter-attack at 4.00 P.M.

### **Left Guns.**

The 4th C.M.R. Battalion (8th Bde.) attacked on the Right. Lieut. SEARLES (9th Company) proceeded with his 2 Guns and Crews straight up to the Position previously selected, and had his Guns in action by 7.00 A.M. One Section of "D" Company, 4th C.M.R. Battalion, had been detailed to accompany Lieut. SEARLES as a Guard for his Guns. The Positions occupied were about 250 yds. N. of WOLF COPSE and near the Right of the 4th C.M.R. Frontage. In the Centre, the Infantry had made good progress but the Flanks had been held up by heavy M.G. Fire, and could not get forward. In order to straighten and improve his Line Major HART, 4th C.M.R., in command of the Troops on the ground, swung his Centre and Left back a short distance and proceeded to Consolidate. This happened at 8 A.M.

Lieut. SEARLES, who was unaware of this plan, and was not notified of the proposed withdrawal found his Guns isolated and unsupported, for they were already dug in front of the new Line and the Infantry had withdrawn through the Gun Positions. Unable to understand the withdrawal of our Troops or to find an Officer to explain it, he took steps to rectify the situation and check what he had good reason to consider unauthorised withdrawal. He collected about 2 Platoons of the 4th C.M.R., led them forward again to a commanding Position and proceeded with Consolidation. While this was going on 2 Platoons of the 1st C.M.R. arrived as Reinforcements and Lieut. SEARLES handed over to their Commanding Officer, Capt. CLARK, acting O.C. "A" Company, 1st C.M.R. Bn. 8 enemy Machine Guns were captured by Lieut. SEARLES's Crews in Pill Boxes near their Gun Positions. The Line occupied under this Officer's direction was consolidated and held.



### **Reinforcing Guns Sent Up.**

In the afternoon, at the request of the G.O.C., 8th C.I.B., 4 Guns of the 8th Company, under Sgt. ROCKE, were sent up to strengthen the Left Flank. They arrived in the Line at 4.00 P.M. and were immediately placed in Position, 2 in the CEMETERY in the Jumping-off Line, close to the Corps Left Boundary, and at WOLF FARM, on the Right Flank of the 8th Left C.I.B., Guns were also sent up on the 9th Brigade Front to replace those destroyed in Action.

### **Sniping Guns.**

The 3 Sniping Batteries met with varied fortune during the day's Fighting. Neither of the right Batteries were able to observe Opportunity Targets on the BELLEVUE SPUR. The Guns under Lieut. DRINKWATER (9th Company) and Lieut. LADLER (10th Company), from Positions in the vicinity of HAMBURH and AUGUSTIS WOOD, respectively, fired on MEETCHEELE and GRAF WOOD during the morning Attack and again during the Third Division Attack in the afternoon. Both Batteries were heavily shelled. Lieut. LADLER was badly shell-shocked in the course of the morning and his Guns were taken over by Lieut. WEAVER.

On the Left Division front, Lieut. DUTHIE (9th Company) moved up from the Jumping-off Line, in rear of the 4th C.M.R. and brought his 4 Guns into Action at the previously selected Position, close to the Left Boundary of the Corps. Shortly after arriving at the Position, Lieut. Duthie was wounded and handed over his command of his Battery to Sgt. LOVE. About the same time 2 of the Guns were destroyed, with their Crews. When the Infantry fell back at 8.00 o'clock, Sgt. LOVE withdrew to the Rear. Here they remained until the successful renewal of the Attack in the afternoon, when Sgt. LOVE, after reconnoitering the Line, advanced his Guns again to their original Positions. Throughout the whole Operation this N.C.O. displayed great courage and presence of mind.

### **Barrage Guns; Fourth Division Front.**

The Barrage Guns had a very strenuous time, firing almost continuously throughout the day. When the Attack Barrage was completed all Guns on the Fourth Division Front laid on their S.O.S. Line. At 10.30 A.M., at the request of the Infantry, Major BRITTON (O.C. 10th Company) Group Commander, had Nos. 4 and 5 Batteries open Fire on HAALEN COPSE and CREST FARM Areas, respectively, in an effort to neutralise enemy Rifle and M.G. Fire. The S.O.S. Line was advanced to conform to the Position of the Infantry who had established Posts in front of the Final Objective. Lieut. FOSTER, 11th Company was wounded at No. 1 Battery Position. All Guns responded to the S.O.S. Signal when the Germans counter-attacked at 4.40 P.M. The G.O.C., 10th C.I.B., in his Report on PASSCHENDAELE Operations spoke in the highest terms of the M.G. Fire delivered on this occasion.

*"The barrage work of all guns was particularly evident during the counter-attack on the 26th inst., when they responded immediately to the S.O.S. and caused considerable loss to the attacking forces during the period the Artillery failed to respond."*

### **Barrage Guns; Third Division Front.**

The Barrage Guns covering the Third Division Front carried out the Program of Fire without serious obstruction. 1 Gun was knocked out but was quickly replaced from the Advanced Armourer's Shop. When the Line withdrew in the early morning, Fire was opened on the S.O.S. Line and continued, intermittently throughout the morning. As soon as the exact situation was known, after the Infantry withdrawal, the S.O.S. Line was rearranged to conform with the new Line. The Guns were fired for the Infantry Attack at 1.05 P.M., and, during afternoon, Area Shoots were carried out on points where the enemy were reported massing. Approximately 500,000 Rounds were fired during the day by the 5 Barrage Batteries.



**INTERVAL BETWEEN PHASE VI AND PHASE VII.****Operations.**

A Programme of Harassing Fire was carried out by Guns in Barrage Positions during October 27th, 28th and 29th. Mobile Guns were disposed in the most advantageous Defensive Positions. On the night of 27/28th the Fourth Division Batteries fired in support of the 44th C.I.Bn.'s successful Attack on DECLINE COPSE, an important Position on the extreme Right Boundary of the Corps. No special Barrage was ordered for this Operation but the rate of Harassing Fire was increased at Zero to 4,000 Rounds per Gun per hour. 1 Gun of the 12th Company, under Corporal BOOTH, and 1 of the 16th Company, under Corporal DEWAR, went forward with the 44th C.I.Bn., in the Attack.

*"They were placed in position in the forward line and did excellent work throughout the following day holding positions."*

All Barrage Guns in Position carried out Harassing Fire on selected Targets. On October 28th, Lieut. RODNIGHT, 15th Company, was killed at the Barrage Gun Position, and Lieut. HARVIE, 7th Company, was wounded. On October 29th, Lieut. SHIELDS was wounded, and Lieut. STAVELEY gassed; both were 11th Company Officers.

**Fourth Division M.G. Reliefs.**

On the Fourth Division Front the following Reliefs and replacements were carried out:

- a. The 8 Mobile Guns and 4 Sniping Guns of the 10th Company (Major BRITTON) were replaced by 1 Section of Sniping Guns from the 12th Company (Major L.F. PEARCE) and 6 Mobile Guns from the 16th Company (Major SANSOM).
- b. Barrage Batteries Nos. 1 to 4 were partly relieved by their Sections held in Reserve at POTIJZE. No. 5 Battery, composed of the Borden M.M.G. Battery (Capt. NICHOLSON), was relieved by 'A' Battery, 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade (Capt. BROTHERTON).
- c. The Sniping Battery at HAMBURG, composed of 9th Company Guns, was relieved by a composite Section of 4 Guns, under Lieut. CLARK of the same Company.

**Third Division M.G. Reliefs.**

On the Front of the Third Canadian Division the following Reliefs and replacements were effected:

- a. The 8 Mobile Guns of the 9th Company (Major McFAUL) were replaced by 6 Guns of the 7th Company (Major WEIR) and 2 Guns of the 8th Company (Major PARKES).
- b. 4 Guns of the 15th Company (Capt. HARTLEY) replaced the Sniping Battery of the 9th Company.
- c. 1 Barrage Battery was withdrawn: No. 7 Battery, composed of the Yukon M.M.G. Battery (Capt. HARKNESS), was relieved by "B" Battery, 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade (Lieut. W. BLACK). Reliefs of the other 3 Barrage Batteries were arranged by the Divisional Machine Gun Commander.

**Changes of Command.**

Capt. W.G. WILLIAMS, 12th Company, relieved Major BRITTON as group Commander upon Relief of the 10th by the 12th C.I.B., night of October 28th/29th, and moved with 12th C.I.B. Headquarters to BOETHOEK Pill Box. Capt. LOGAN (16th Company) replaced Major CLERK (11th Company) as Sub-Group Commander and established his Headquarters at TYNE COTTAGE.

Major PARKES, O.C., 8th Company, remained at 8th C.I.B. Hdqrs., KANSAS HOUSE, as Group Commander, Major WEIR, O.C., 7th Company, was appointed Liaison Officer for Barrage and Mobile Guns, with Headquarters at 7th C.I.B. Hdqrs., CAPITOL near GALLIPOLI. He was instructed to detail an Officer to go forward immediately after the Attack and ascertain the Location of all Mobile Guns. Capt. HARTLEY (15th Company) relieved Capt. THOMSON (8th Company) as Sub-Group Commander at KOREK.



**Composition of Barrage Batteries; Fourth Division Front.**

The Forth Division Barrage Batteries were composed as follows:

Battery	Unit
No. 1	8 Guns 11th C.M.G. Company
No. 2	( 4 Guns 10th C.M.G. Company ( 4 Guns 11th C.M.G. Company
No. 3	8 Guns 12th C.M.G. Company
No. 4	8 Guns 16th C.M.G. Company
No. 5	8 Guns 'A' Bty., 1st C.M.M.G. Bde.

All 5 Batteries were in Position 200 yds. E. of a Line between DASH CROSSING and HAMBURG. Batteries 1 to 4 prepared their Positions on the night of October 28th/29th, and occupied them during the night 29th/30th. No. 5 Battery prepared and occupied their Gun Positions on the 29th/30th prior to the Attack.

**Composition of Barrage Batteries; Third Division Front.**

The following Batteries supported the Third Division, on October 30th:

Battery	Unit
No. 7	8 Guns 'B' Bty., 1st C.M.M.G. Bde.
No. 8	8 Guns 9th C.M.G. Company
No. 9	( 2 Guns 8th C.M.G. Company ( 6 Guns 15th C.M.G. Company
No. 10	( 4 Guns 7th C.M.G. Company ( 4 Guns 8th C.M.G. Company

These Batteries were situated close to the Jumping-off Line for the Attack on October 26th, 2 Batteries (7-8) being placed in Position 250 yds. to the Right of PETER PAN, and 2 Batteries (9-10) 200 yds. in Rear of WOLF FARM.

**S.A.A. Supplies.**

Supplies of Ammunition and Water at forward Dumps were replenished by the Pack Trains and man-handled forward to the Gun Positions. Iron Rations for 48 hours were supplied and stored at Sub-Group Headquarters. All Barrage Positions were prepared, occupied, stocked with S.A.A., Water, and everything was in readiness for the Operation at Zero Hour, October 30th.



**PHASE VIII: OCTOBER 30th, 1917.**

The Corps and Divisional Boundaries and Objectives for the Attack are shown on the PASSCHENDAELE Operations Map, Opp. The Final Objective, or BLUE LINE, corresponded roughly with the Jumping-off Line for the succeeding Attack on November 6th.

**Order of Battle.**

Phase VII was carried out by the 12th C.I.B., on the Right, the 7th C.I.B., in the Centre, and the 8th C.I.B., on the Left. The Sixty-third Naval Division, XVIII Corps, attacked on the Left of the Canadian Corps. The Order of Battle of Battalions from Right to Left was as follows:-

12th C.I.B.	( Right	85th C.I.Bn.
	( Centre	78th C.I.Bn.
	( Left	72nd C.I.Bn.
7th C.I.B.	( Right	P.P.C.L.I.
	(Left	49th C.I.Bn.
8th C.I.B.	Left	5th C.M.R.

**Weather.**

The Attack was launched at 5.40 A.M., October 30th. The weather had been fine though cloudy, on the 29th and on the night of 29th/30th. This condition greatly facilitated the preparations of our Troops, getting up Stores, and moving to the Assembly Areas. In the early morning of the 30th it was very cold and a strong wind was blowing. At 11 A.M., a rain storm occurred, and rain fell intermittently throughout the day.

**Infantry Attack.**

The Fourth Division after hard fighting broke through the German Main Line of Resistance and by 6.35 A.M. all Objectives were taken. Heavy Machine Gun Fire was encountered, particularly from the Right Flank, from the KEIBERG SPUR. The 72nd C.I.Bn., by a brilliant Flanking Movement, captured DECK WOOD with its German Garrison. CREST FARM, which had dominated our Position in this Sector was captured. Several enemy Machine Guns taken in this Strong Point were used with good effect by our own Men. The Third Division met with determined resistance at many points but succeeded in capturing most of their Objectives. GRAF MEETCHEELE, VAPOUR FARM and SOURCE FARM were occupied and consolidated.

**Counter-Attacks.**

Several Counter-attacks were delivered by the Germans with great determination during the day, but they completely failed to gain a footing in the captured ground. At 8.00 A.M., the Third Division was counter-attacked by the enemy Support Battalion coming from the direction of MOSSELMARKT. The Germans were caught by our Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage, and Direct Fire was brought to bear on them from our Machine Guns on CREST FARM. The Attack was dispersed and the enemy were seen retiring in disorder to the N. of PASSCHENDAELE. At 10.00 A.M., a Second Attack delivered against our Troops in MEETCHEELE was broken up; further attempts to dislodge our Men, one at 11.45 A.M., and one again at 5.00 P.M., met with no more success than the others. The captured ground was organised for Defence and the Line consolidated.

**Fourth "Battalion" Mobile Guns.**

The Mobile Machine Guns of the Fourth M.G. "Battalion," assembled with the attacking Infantry Battalion prior to Zero Hour, were distributed as follows: 2 Guns of the 12th Company, under Lieut. LEACH, with the 85 C.I.Bn.; 2 Guns of the 12th Company under Lieut. FLEMING, and 2 Guns of the 16th Company, under Sgt. R.H. BURBRIDGE, M.M., with the 78 C.I.Bn.; 4 Guns of the 16th Company under Lieut. MONTAGNON, with the 72nd C.I.Bn.

Gun Crews advanced with the Rear Waves of Infantry. Lieut. LEACH early got his Guns into Positions covering the Right Flank. Of the work of these Guns the O.C., 85th C.I.Bn. writes:-

*"the Vickers Guns ... were most helpful during the whole operation particularly during consolidation and holding."*



Lieut. FLEMING's Guns covered the Right Flank of the 78 C.I.Bn., advancing to good Defensive Positions, where they were dug in. Shortly after arriving here 1 Gun was destroyed. The Officer was later wounded and evacuated. Sgt. BURBRIDGE (16th Company), in command of 2 Guns operating on the Left Flank of the 78th C.I.Bn., fought his Guns well throughout the day and inflicted heavy Casualties on the enemy during their Counter-attacks. At the end of the day only 4 Men were left of his 2 Gun Crews.

Early in the day the G.O.C., 12th C.I.B. requested 4 more Guns to be sent forward to strengthen the Right of the Brigade Line where there was a Gap between the Canadian and Australian Positions. These Guns were supplied by the 12th Company from their Sniping and Barrage guns: they were divided between Lieut. LEACH and Lieut. Fleming, and placed in Position to the Right of PASSCHENDAELE Road opposite the Line VIENNA COTTAGES—GRUN.

At 5 P.M., on the following day, Lieut. LEACH's Guns were discovered apparently, by hostile Aircraft, which were very active and a heavy concentration of Artillery Fire was directed against them. 2 Guns were destroyed by direct hits. Lieut. LEACH was carried out, suffering from severe Shell-shock, and his Crews suffered heavy casualties.

#### **Fine Co-operation with Infantry.**

The Machine Guns under Lieut. MONTAGNON, 16th Company, were handled with exceptional brilliance and courage by that Officer. In conjunction with the O.C. 72nd C.I.Bn., it was arranged that certain of these Guns should fire during the first Stages of the Attack, on selected Targets, and that when opportunity offered, Guns should be brought up to forward Defensive Positions in the captured ground. This plan was carried out. 4 Guns as arranged gave Indirect Fire on the Area on the Left Flank of the Battalion beginning at Zero Hour.

*"As soon as it was no longer possible to fire on this area, Lieut. B.C. MONTAGNON moved two Vickers Guns forward and placed them on a very commanding position on CREST FARM, from which not only the front of our own Battalion could be enfiladed but also that of the Right and Left (Third Division) Battalions. These latter (Guns) were in position at 7.30 A.M. The work of the Machine Gunners attached from the 4th Canadian Machine Gun Battalion is worthy of the highest praise."*

#### **Death of Lieut. MONTAGNON, M.C.**

Lieut. MONTAGNON displayed great personal courage in getting his Guns forward and after they were in Position. The Gun Emplacements were on the forward Slope of CREST FARM and, with the Germans, less than 200 yds. away, were exposed to Machine Gun and Rifle Fire, as well as to the enemy's Artillery Fire. This Officer moved about among his Gun Crews quite regardless of his own safety, seeking to cheer his Men and encouraging them to constant effort. He was unfortunately severely wounded by Shell-Fire during an enemy Bombardment in the course of the day. After being hit, he crawled to one of the Guns and refused to leave it; he thought the Germans were attempting a Counter-attack and declared he would operate the Guns himself. He was carried out by a Stretcher Party and died in Hospital a fortnight later. Lieut. MONTAGNON was posthumously awarded a Military Cross for his conspicuous gallantry in this Action.

Command of Lieut. MONTAGNON's Guns upon Sgt. CRITES, who carried on, during the succeeding days with courage and determination.

#### **Third "Battalion" Mobile Guns.**

Mobile Guns of the Third Divisional M.G. "Battalion" assembled with Infantry Battalions as follows: on the Right, Lieut. Lieut. HUGH McKENZIE, D.C.M. (7th Company), with 2 Guns, assembled with the P.P.C.L.I.; in the Centre, were 2 Guns under Sgt. H. HOWARD, M.M. (7th Company); Lieut. G.F. DOUGLAS (8th Company) commanded 2 Guns co-operating with the 5th C.M.R., on the Left.



**Gallant Death of Lieut. McKenzie, V.C., D.C.M.**

Lieut. McKENZIE started at Zero Hour from the Right Flank, and went forward in a series of bounds, making a detour to the Right to avoid a heavily shelled Area. After advancing about 400 yds. the Infantry were brought to a halt by Machine Gun and Rifle Fire from a Pill Box to their Left front on the Crest of BELLEVUE SPUR.

*“Lieut. McKENZIE, after first handing over a map to A11078 Corporal T. HAMPSON and instructing him as to his next move stated his intention of going forward to lead an Attack against the Pill Box which was holding them up. The Position in the which the Guns were left was shortly afterwards shelled heavily and Corporal HAMPSON moved forward to about D.5.c. Central and seeing Lieut. McKENZIE said that all the Officers of the Company of P.P.C.L.I. had become Casualties, and that he had reconnoitred the ground and was about to lead the men forward. He had apparently detailed parties to attack from different flanks, but after a few yards advance he was seen to fall, and was found later shot through the head. Meanwhile the Pill Box had been taken.”*

Lieut. McKENZIE received the posthumous award of the Victoria Cross for his outstanding gallantry.

**Guns Placed in Forward Position.**

After his Officer's death, Cpl. HAMPSON along with L/Cpl. S.H. Copping

*“went forward to reconnoitre the ground and found that the Infantry has established posts just over the ridge. He then moved his two guns to approximately D.5.c.4.7. (just to the Right of the WIELTJE Road, about midway between BELLEVUE and MEETCHEELE) where he could command the left flank and have a good field of fire to the right. He tried also to get in touch with guns on his left, but he could find no trace of them.”*

Meantime these Guns, in the Centre of the Third Division Attack, had moved off at Zero Hour under Sergeant HOWARD. They left the Jumping-off Line with the First Wave of the 49th C.I.Bn. starting

*“from the left of the two pill boxes near the BELLEVUE. They advanced about 200 yds. and waited until the third wave had passed them. From there on the M.G. and Shell fire was very heavy and they advanced from Shell-hole to Shell-hole suffering very heavy Casualties on the way. Sgt. HOWARD was mortally wounded and they were led by a No. 1 till he too became a Casualty. They finally came to a stand with only 4 gunners and 3 carriers to man the 2 guns, and only 2 belt-boxes per gun left. Their position was on a forward slope and within 150 yards of the enemy.”*

to the Left of the WIELTJE Road, midway between FURST FARM and MEETCHEELE. The Guns were moved to commanding ground which was less exposed and at night 2 Men went back to Advanced Company H.Q. to report. At this time there were but 4 Men left of the 2 Gun Crews.

On the morning of October 30th, the total Strength of the 4 Mobile Gun Crews of the 7th Company was 1 Officer and 27 Other Ranks: by night-fall Lieut. McKENZIE was dead and only 11 Other Ranks were left with the Guns; the remainder were either killed or wounded.

Lieut. DOUGLAS, in command of the 28th Company Guns on the Left of the Attack, acting in conjunction with the O.C. 5th C.M.R., placed his Guns in or near the Jumping-off Line, about 200 yds. N.-E. WOLF COPSE, in Positions which commanded the whole Front.

*“They were used entirely for covering fire for Advance of Infantry, and protective fire when Infantry reached their objective. They also did much effective work by direct observation, dispersing with casualties a party of the enemy bringing a Machine Gun into action near VINE COTTAGE, and engaging enemies parties during the day by direct fire with good results.”*

Towards evening these Guns were used to cover an Advance of British Troops on the Left Flank, but the results of their Fire could not be seen owing to darkness.



### **Sniping Guns.**

The Sniping Batteries for this Operation were situated as follows:-

4 Guns of the 9th Company, under Lieut. CLARK, between HAMBURG and AUGUSTUS WOOD: 4 Guns of the 12th Company under Corporal MacMILLAN at HEINE HOUSE. Both these Batteries, in the Fourth Divisional Area, were sited to engage Targets on BELLEVUE SPUR to the Left Front. The 3rd Battery from the 15th Company, commanded by Lieut. H.F. SMITH, took up Positions on the high ground about 200 yds. to the Left of BELLEVUE and about the same distance in rear of the Jumping-off Line. Owing to poor visibility neither of the 2 right Batteries were able to engage Targets of Opportunity during the day's Fighting. Both Batteries fired on selected Targets of Opportunity during the day's Fighting. In the Course of the morning, Cpl. MacMILLAN's Guns were moved over to the Right Flank and placed in forward Defensive Positions.

Lieut. Smith's Guns had some excellent Targets.

*"Just after Zero hour good shooting was done on enemy seen on the sky-line of the ridge running from pill-boxes and shelters. Enemy shelling was very heavy on the area where this battery was placed, but by keeping only two men at the guns and the remainder in the pill-boxes many casualties were avoided. In the earlier part of the action observation was impossible on account of the smoke, but later several Targets were engaged with good results. Enemy planes were also engaged on the 30th and 31st October. Two guns were knocked out by Shell-fire on the 30th October, early in the action. About 2,000 rounds S.A.A. were fired by this battery at direct fire Targets and enemy planes."*

### **M.G. Barrage.**

The Guns firing Barrage suffered very heavily on October 30th. No stronger proof could be had of the effectiveness of our Machine Gun Barrage Fire than the attention which the enemy gave to locating and dealing with our Barrage Batteries. It would seem that low-flying Aeroplanes were especially detailed by the German High Command to locate our Battery Positions and communicate their Location to their Artillery.

### **Fourth Division Barrage Batteries.**

On the Fourth Division Barrage Front the Barrage Guns opened Fire and carried on according to Fire Instructions issued. 1 hour after Zero, however, the enemy put down a very heavy Barrage which inflicted heavy Casualties and destroyed or buried a large number of Guns. Batteries 1 to 4, after losing 6 Guns, managed to move to the rear and take up new Positions in the vicinity of SEINE. Of these 4 Batteries, that of the 16th Company suffered most severely. Lieut. GAUVREAU, in charge, was killed by Shell Fire shortly afterwards. Lieut. BALL of the same Company was badly gassed and shell-shocked. 5 Other Ranks were killed and 9 wounded. Lieut. FRENCH (15th Company) took command of the Battery, ably re-organised the Gun Crews, and got the Guns into Action again in their new Position at SEINE CORNER. Lieut. BARBER-STARKEY, 10th Company, Lieuts. CONNOLLY and JOHNSTON, 11th Company, and Lieuts. BEVAN and DUNCAN, 12th Company, carried out the difficult Task of moving their Batteries to new Positions under heavy enemy Shelling and appalling conditions of ground and weather. Low-flying enemy Aeroplanes fired on the Crews while carrying their guns to the Rear. As a result of the loss of Guns it was necessary to redistribute the Target Areas among those that remained. By 2.00 P.M. the 26 remaining Guns were in Action in new Positions.

Battery No. 5 (1st C.M.M.G. Brigade) was completely disabled in a very short time. Capt. BROTHERTON, O.C. the Battery, had been killed while reconnoitering his Battery Positions the night previous to the Attack. Lieut. YOUNG, sent up as a reinforcing Officer, was wounded early in the day; 7 Other Ranks were killed, 14 wounded by Shell fire, and 6 gassed. Lieut. GILLMAN, who was left in charge, although himself slightly wounded, and suffering severely from enemy gas, carried on admirably and, having only 10 Men left, very capably withdrew these to ABRAHAM HEIGHTS, taking the 8 Guns and 1 Tripod.



### **Third Division Barrage Batteries.**

The Programme of Firing as laid down was carried out during the Attack by Barrage Guns covering the Third Division.

*"At 10.00 A.M. 30th October, enemy planes drove our planes back and flying low over Batteries No.1 and 2 (i.e. 7 and 8) directed Artillery which shelled these batteries heavily with 5.9" and 8" shells. This concentration was so heavy and sudden and the condition of ground on both sides of the battery so marshy that the guns and personnel were greatly reduced before the batteries could be moved. Only two guns were left in action in each battery. No. 1 ('B' Battery, 1st C.M.M.G. Bde.) had only one officer and 11 O.R.'s left, and No. 2 (9th Company), 1 officer and 16 O.R.'s."*

*"Nos. 3 and 4 (i.e. 9-10) were laid on the whole S.O.S. Line while new positions were located at D.9.b.2.2. barrage lines worked out, and guns and reinforcements brought up and placed in position. By 7.00 P.M. all four batteries were complete and again in action. About 1 P.M. No. 3 Battery (2 Guns 8th Company, 6 Guns 15th Company) was heavily shelled, but though they suffered heavy casualties, they remained in action throughout the whole operation, the supernumerary officer from No. 4 Battery being put in command, both Officers of No. 3 Battery being casualties. No. 4 Battery (4 Guns each from 7th and 8th Companies) was heavily shelled, but they also remained in action throughout the operation. Three guns of this Battery were put out of action by shell fire, but owing to the proximity of the advanced Armourer's depot, no gun was out of action more than 30 minutes."*

*"Stoppages were mainly caused by wet and dirty belts in spite of the greatest precautions. Stoppages caused through breakages were few. Telephone communication was kept up throughout between Group H.Q. at KOREK and No.'s 3 and 4 Batteries. Lines to Batteries No. 1 and 2 were frequently out. S.A.A. expended by the Barrage Group (32 Guns) throughout this operation was 350,000 rds."*

Of the Casualties suffered, Lieut. FENWICK, 7th Company, and Lieut. COLLINS, 9th Company were killed. No. 8 Battery (9th Company), had 8 Other Ranks killed and 12 wounded. In No. 7 Battery, Lieut. BRUNEAU, 'B' Battery, 1st C.M.M.G. Bde., was wounded.

No. 7 Battery ('B' Battery, 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade) was relieved by the Eaton M.M.G. Battery, under Capt. G.T. SCROGGIE, on the night of 30th/31st.

### **Effectiveness of M.G. Barrage.**

In spite of the temporary disorganisation of our Barrage Batteries during this Operation, their Fire was of great service to the Infantry in the actual Attack, and subsequently in warding off Counter-attacks. The Officer Commanding the 72nd C.I.Bn. referred in highest terms, in his Report, to the Machine Gun Barrage. It was also remarked by Officers Commanding Infantry Units in the Line that, during the frequent enemy Counter-attacks following our Operations, our Machine Guns were invariably the first to begin firing in answer to the S.O.S. Signal. Information from Prisoners taken on October 30th confirms the effectiveness of our Barrage Fire. Prisoners taken on November 2nd stated that an Attack of 2 Companies at 5.00 A.M. that day was stopped by our M.G. and Artillery Fire.



## INTERVAL BETWEEN PHASE VII AND PHASE VIII.

### Operations October 30th to November 2nd.

Between Phases VII and VIII there was an interval of 6 days. In this interval the Third and Fourth Divisions were relieved by the First and Second Divisions, who carried out the last 2 Phases of the Battle. In the 3 days following the Operation, and prior to handing over the Line, there was considerable activity, both of ourselves and the enemy. There were isolated Counter-attacks by the enemy on the Fourth Division Front throughout the 31st: One Counter-attack was attempted against the Third Division at 3.20 A.M. on the same day. Efforts were directed by our Troops towards strengthening and improving our Line. At 1.15 A.M., November 2nd, a party of the 1st C.M.R. attacked and captured VANITY HOUSE near the Corps Left Boundary. On this day also the Fourth Division Posts S. of PASSVHENDAELE were advanced and GRUN occupied. Our Barrage Machine Guns in this period fired in answer to our S.O.S. Signals, and carried our Harassing Fire. Mobile Guns remained in Defensive Positions.

### First and Second Divisions in Rest Area.

While the Third and Fourth Divisions had been engaged in the Operations of the 6th and 7th Phases, the First and Second Division were in the Rest Area. During this time a close Liaison was maintained between these Divisions and their opposite Divisions in the Line. All details of the Operation from day to day, were communicated to Brigades and were closely studied in preparation for Phases VIII and IX. All information was made use of which could in any way assist in forming a plan of Attack.

### Infantry Reliefs.

At the conclusion of Phase VII these Divisions moved up into the Battle Area and relieved the Third and Fourth Divisions. The 4th C.I.B. relieved the 12th C.I.B. in the Line on the night of November 2nd/3rd; on the night of the 3rd/4th the 7th and 8th C.I.Bs. were relieved in the Line by the 3rd C.I.B. Command of the Right Divisional Sector passed to the G.O.C. Second Division, on November 3rd, at 11.00 am The G.O.C. First Division assumed command of the Left Divisional Sector at 11.00 A.M., November 4th.

### First M.G. "Battalion" Moves to Battle Area.

Machine Gun Reliefs took place prior to the Reliefs of Infantry Units. On October 31st, the following units of the First Divisional M.G. "*Battalion*" (Major WATSON, D.S.O.) moved by Bus from HONDEGHEM to YPRES:-

1st C.M.G. Company (Major LALOR, M.C.)	2 Sections
2nd C.M.G. Company (Major STEWART)	1 Section
3rd C.M.G. Company (Capt. MORRIS)	3 Sections
13th C.M.G. Company (Major KAY, M.C.)	3 Sections

On arrival at YPRES these Details marched, under the command of Major LALOR, to "X" Camp, where they were accommodated in the Lines of their opposite Companies of the Third M.G. "Battalion." The Gun Limbers of these Sections and the Transport necessary for their requirements proceeded by Road the same day. The remainder of the Personnel of Companies moved by Bus to Ypres and marched from there to Camp "X," on November 1st, their Transport going by Road. "*Battalion*" H.Q. moved to CANAL BANK on November 2nd.



**First M.G. "Battalion" Takes over Line.**

On November 1st, the Sections which moved to Camp "X" on the preceding day relieved Third M.G. "Battalion" Guns in the Left Divisional Sector as follows:-

- a. Mobile Guns. 8 Guns of the 1st Company relieved 6 Guns of the 7th Company and 2 Guns of the 8th Company in forward Positions. Capt. DONALD (1st Company) was in command of these Guns and also acted as Liaison Officer at Brigade H.Q., at CAPITOL.
- b. Sniping Guns. 4 Guns of the 2nd Company, under Lieut. LAING, relieved 4 Guns of the 15th Company near WOLF COPSE.
- c. Barrage Guns.

Battery	No. of Guns	Composition	Unit Relieved
No. 8	8	8 Guns, 3rd Company	9th Company
No. 9	8	( 4 Guns, 3rd Company 4 Guns, 13th Company	( 2 Guns, 7th Company 6 Guns, 8th Company
No. 10	8	8 Guns, 13th Company	15th Company

Major KAY, O.C. 13th Company, relieved Capt. HARTLEY, O.C. 15th Company, as Sub-Group Commander at KOREK.

**Second M.G. "Battalion" Moves and Takes Over Line.**

The Second M.G. "Battalion" (Major GOODFELLOW, M.C.) moved from CAESTRE to YPRES by Train, on November 2nd. Companies took over the Transport Lines of their opposite Companies of the Fourth M.G. "Battalion" at POTIJZE. On the same day the following Reliefs were carried out in the Right Divisional Sector:-

- a. Mobile Guns. The 4th Company (Major W.M. PEARCE) relieved all the Fourth "Battalion" Mobile Guns, viz., 6 of the 16th Company and 2 of the 12th Company. The other 2 Mobile Guns of the 12th Company has been relieved by Australian Guns on the previous night, when the 1 ANZAC Corps took over a One-Battalion Frontage from the 12th C.I.B. Right. 2 Mobile Guns of the 4th Company were held in reserve at TYNE COTTAGE. Major W.M. PEARCE was in command of Mobile Guns with his Headquarters at TYNE COTTAGE, Lieut. LAURIE (4th Company), in command of 4 Mobile Guns, was killed by Shell Fire on the way into the Line, and command of his Guns fell upon Sgt. E.J. WHITE. This N.C.O. showed great initiative and judgement, while in charge of the Section, during the completion of Relief and the following days.
- b. Sniping Guns. No Sniping Guns were placed in Position on the Right Division Sector at the time of this Relief. The 4 12th Company Sniping Guns at HEINE HOUSE had been sent to Forward Defence Positions, on October 30th, and on the night of October 31st/November 1st the 9th Company Guns at HAMBURG had been withdrawn.
- c. Barrage Guns.

No. of Guns	Composition	Unit Relieved
4	5th Company	16th Company
4	6th Company	12th Company
12	14th Company	( 2 Guns, 11th Company 4 Guns, 10th Company

The Guns occupied Positions at SEINE CORNER. Capt. GRANTHAM, O.C. 6th Company, relieved Capt. LOGAN (16th Company) as Sub-Group Commander at TYNE COTTAGE.



### **Third and Fourth M.G. "Battalions" To Rest Area.**

Upon Relief, the Units of the Third and Fourth M.G. "*Battalions*" proceeded to the Rest Area. The 7th, 8th, 9th and 15th Companies spent the night of November 1/2nd at Camp "X," and moved, on the 2nd, by Train, to ABEELE. From here each Company marched independently to Billets which were widely scattered in the Area between the ABEELE-POPERINGHE Road and WATOU. The Personnel were accommodated in Tents and Barns. Upon Relief, on November 2nd, the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 16th Companies remained during the night at POTIJZE and proceeded by Train from YPRES to CAESTRE, where they were billeted together in Tents.

### **Preparations for Phase VIII.**

After taking over the Line, the First and Second Divisions were busily engaged in preparations for the impending Attack. Preparatory Barrages were fired by our Artillery and invariably replied to heavily by the enemy. Hostile Artillery also shelled our Forward and Artillery against the 4th C.I.B. just on completion of their taking over the Line, on November 3rd. After severe Fighting this Attack was driven off. Some Prisoners were taken. Our S.O.S. was responded to at 4.00 A.M., on November 4th; the enemy shelled our Line heavily till 6.45 P.M., but no Counter-attack developed. Harassing Fire was carried out nightly by our Artillery and Machine Guns.

During these days Machine Gun preparations were energetically pushed forward. Divisional M.G. Pack Trains and parties of Carriers filled the S.A.A. Dumps and took forward all Stores of drinking Water, Oil, Spare Parts, etc., required for the Operation. Barrage Positions were reconnoitred and prepared. Duties and Tasks were allotted and Instructions issued.

### **Boundaries Objectives and Ground.**

The Jumping-off Line and Canadian Corps and Inter-Divisional Boundaries are shown on PASSCHENDAELE Operations Map XXX. The Village of PASSCHENDAELE itself was included in the Objectives of the Second Division. The ground over which the Second Division Attack was to be made was high and included comparatively little marshy ground. On the Right Flank of the First Division large tracts of mud and water and in front of the Centre and Left the ground was practically impassable for Infantry. The only good ground was the narrow BELLEVUE-MEETCHEELE Spur which was 350 yds. wide at its narrowest point W. of MEETCHEELE. The line of Advance of the First Division, therefore, lay along the Spur from GRAF-MEETCHEELE, avoiding the wet ground to the Left in the GOUDBERG VALLEY. A subsidiary Attack was made against VINE COTTAGE on the Right, starting from VANITY HOUSE.

### **Action of Flanking Corps.**

As in Phases VI and VII, Flanking Corps assisted the Canadian Corps in their Operations. The 1 ANZAC Corps on the Right kept a heavy Fire of Shrapnel, Machine Guns and Heavy Artillery on the KEIBERG SPUR and EDDY HEIGHTS during the Attack and Consolidation, and also blinded this locality with Smoke. The II Corps, on the Left, similarly fired on the whole of the VAT COTTAGE SPUR up to HILL 52. Both these Corps continued our Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage on their own Frontage, simulating an Attack at the same time. Subsidiary Attacks were carried out by Corps further S.

### **Order of Battle.**

The Battle Order of Brigades and Battalions from Right to Left was as follows:-

5th C.I.B		26th C.I.Bn.
	( Right	27th C.I.Bn.
6th C.I.B.	( Centre	31st C.I.Bn.
	( Left	28th C.I.Bn.
	( Right	1st C.I.Bn.
1st C.I.B.	( Centre	2nd C.I.Bn.
	( Left	3rd C.I.Bn.



### Employment of Machine Guns.

The Principles of Employment of Machine Guns remained the same as in the previous Phases. Minor changes were made in applying these Principles.

### Assembly of Second Division Mobile Guns.

16 Mobile Guns were employed on the Second Divisional Front. 9 Guns were given an entirely defensive role. They were placed in Forward Positions prior to Zero Hour and remained there throughout the Operation. 6 of these were supplied by the 5th Company and 3, by the 6th Company. 7 Guns went forward for Consolidation in the captured Area, assembling prior to Zero as follows: 2 Crews of the 5th Company and 1, of the 6th, commanded by Lieut. GIBSON (5th Company), with the 26th C.I.Bn., on the extreme Right of the Corps Frontage: 2 Crews of the 6th Company, under Lieut. TUCKER, with the 27th C.I.Bn., and the other 2 Mobile Crews, under Lieut. H.J.L. PEARCE, with the 28th C.I.Bn., on the Left Front of the Division. Major W.M. PEARCE, O.C., 4th Company, was in charge of all Mobile Guns, with his H.Q. at TYNE COTTAGE, near Buried Cable Head.

### Assembly of First Division Mobile Guns.

8 Mobile Guns of the 1st Company were placed under Orders of the G.O.C. 1st C.I.B. Lieut. HEATH (1st Company) was put in charge of these Guns. 6 of them under Lieut. TREBILCOCK assembled with the 1st C.I.Bn. on the Right, and 2, under Lieut. VINING, with the 3rd C.I.Bn. on the extreme Left of the Corps Attack. Lieut. HENRY, with H.Q. at KOREK, was responsible for maintaining LIAISON between Mobile Guns and Brigade H.Q.

### Sniping Guns.

No Sniping Guns were employed by the Second Divisional M.G. "Battalion." 4 Guns of the 2nd Company (Major STEWART), under Lieut. McPHERSON, took up Positions on CREST FARM on November 4th, and were instructed as follows:-

*"During the initial stages of the attack the battery will be In Action on the MEETCHEELE Spur; a vigilant watch will be kept, and fire will be opened up on the slightest sign of enemy movement."*

### M.G. Barrage Batteries.

The Machine Guns available for Massed Action were:-

Second Cdn. Divl. M.G. "Battalion"	32 Guns
First Cdn. Divl. M.G. "Battalion"	32 Guns
1st Cdn. M.M.G. Brigade	16 Guns
TOTAL Cdn. Corps	80 Guns
Right Flank, 1st ANZAC Corps	26 Guns
Left Flank II Corps	8 Guns
Grand TOTAL	114 Guns

The Tasks assigned to Machine Gun Barrage Batteries during the 8th Phase were as follows:-

- To participate in the rolling barrage during the attack in accordance with the Artillery Programme.
- To neutralize by heavy concentrated fire areas and localities from which hostile Machine Gun Fire would originate.
- To establish a protective barrage in front of the final objective.



### Co-operation of Flanking Corps.

The Corps Machine Gun Officer, Lt.-Col. BRUTINEL, arranged for M.G. Co-operation of the II ANZAC Corps on the Right and the II Corps on the Left, as follows:-

*"The 1 ANZAC Corps have agreed to prolong the Canadian Corps Machine Gun Barrage from ... to ... with a Machine Gun Battery of 8 Machine Guns: this Battery will be designated X Battery. They will also provide 18 Machine Guns to neutralise observation and hostile fire from EDDY HEIGHTS and keep a Sniping Battery of 3 Machine Guns on observation at ... X Battery will remain in action for 48 hours after Zero Hour. All necessary ammunition for X Battery and I ANZAC Sniping Battery will be drawn from the Second Canadian Division Forward S.A.A. Dumps. The II Corps have agreed to provide a M.G. Battery of 8 Machine Guns to neutralise observation and hostile fire from the VAT COTTAGE SPUR."*

### Composition and Organisation of Batteries.

The Canadian M.G. Batteries firing Barrage were designated and composed as follows:-

#### Second Division.

Battery	No. of Guns	Composition
No. 1	8	8 Guns, 14th C.M.G. Company
No. 2	8	( 4 Guns, 14th C.M.G. Company 4 Guns, 6th C.M.G. Company
No. 3	8	8 Guns, 4th C.M.G. Company
No. 4	8	( 4 Guns, 4th C.M.G. Company 4 Guns, 4th C.M.G. Company
No. 5	8	8 Guns, Borden M.M.G. Battery

Nos. 1 and 2 were situated 100 yds. S. of AUGUSTUS Wood; Batteries 3, 4, & 5 were in Position on either side of HEINE HOUSE. Capt. GRANTHAM, O.C. 6th Company, was in command of all 5 Batteries with H.Q. at TYNE COTTAGE. He was in touch with the G.O.C.s 5th and 6th C.I.Bs. through M.G. Liaison Officers at respective Brigade H.Q.

#### First Division.

Battery	No. of Guns	Composition
No. 6	8	8 Guns, Yukon M.M.G. Battery
No. 7	8	8 Guns, 2nd C.M.G. Company
No. 8	8	( 4 Guns, 3rd C.M.G. Company 4 Guns, 13th C.M.G. Company
No. 9	8	8 Guns, 3rd C.M.G. Company
No. 10	8	8 Guns, 13th C.M.G. Company

Batteries 6 and 7 were located immediately S. of WOLF COPSE; Nos. 8, 9, & 10 were on the vicinity of YETTA HOUSES. Major LALOR, O.C. 1st Company, was appointed Group Commander at 1st C.I.B. H.Q., CAPITOL. Major STEWART, O.C. 2nd Company, was Sub-Group Commander with H.Q. at KOREK.



The following Table shows the Tasks assigned to Machine Guns of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps for Phases VIII and IX:-

Tasks of Machine Guns – PASSCHENDAELE.

Phase VIII, November 6th, and Phase IX, November 10th, 1917.

	UNIT	Phase VIII				Phase IX			
		Barrag e	Mobil e	Snipin g	Reserv e	Barrag e	Mobil e	Snipin g	Reserv e
1st C.M.M.G. . Bde.	'A' Battery				8 8				8 4
	'B' Battery	8			6	4 8			2
	Borden Battery	8				4 8			
	Eaton Battery								
	Yukon Battery								
	Battery								
1st Div'l. M.G. Bn.	1st C.M.G. Compan y	8 12 12	8	4	8 4 4 4		6 4		10 12 4 4
	2nd C.M.G. Compan y								
	3rd C.M.G. Compan y								
	13th C.M.G. Compan y								
2nd Div'l. M.G. Bn.	4th C.M.G. Compan y	12 4 4 12	8 8		4 4 4 4	8 4 4 8	4 4 4 4		4 8 8 4
	5th C.M.G. Compan y								
	6th C.M.G. Compan y								
	14th C.M.G. Compan y								
	TOTAL	80	24	4	58	72	26		68

Total Available Machine Guns, C.M.G. Corps:- 166



**PHASE VIII; NOVEMBER 6TH, 1917.****Progress of Attack.**

Zero Hour was 6.00 A.M. The weather was dull with occasional heavy showers throughout the day. The Attack progressed well along the whole Corps Front to the Final Objective, or GREEN LINE. By 7.10 A.M., Second Divisional Men were in PASSCHENDAELE Village in large numbers. At 8.45 A.M., all Objectives had been reached by the Second Division and Consolidation was being carried out. Stiff Fighting took place at some of the Pill Boxes in the N. end of PASSCHENDAELE. The First Division reached their Final Objective, at 7.45 A.M. The Garrison of MOSSELMARKT was surprised and surrendered with little Opposition. Hostile Troops holding organised and well camouflaged shell-holes, supporting MOSSELMARKT, offered a stiff Resistance: 4 Machine Guns were captured here and put into Action against the Germans. 3 Platoons of the 3rd C.I. Bn. had  $\frac{3}{4}$  of an hour's stubborn Fighting at VINE COTTAGES before the Garrison surrendered. 5 Machine Guns and 40 Prisoners were taken here.

*"Very material assistance was given throughout the day by the Artillery and Machine Guns of the Corps on the Right and Left. M.G.'s of the Corps on our Right were effective in keeping down enemy fire, previously troublesome, from KEIBERG SPUR."*

**Counter-attacks.**

At 8.50 A.M., the enemy attempted a Counter-attack with 1 Battalion N. of PASSCHENDAELE against the Second Division. This Attack was beaten off, and no further Counter-attacks took place on the Corps Front. At 9.50, 10.30 and 11.45 A.M., enemy Troops, in process of assembling, were dispersed by Canadian Corps and II Corps Artillery. The enemy shelled the captured ground very heavily throughout the day.

**Mobile Guns Situation at 12.00 Noon.**

Mobile Machine Guns moved after Zero Hour, to the Positions previously decided upon. At 12.00 Noon, November 6th, the Situation of Mobile Guns, as reported to the Corps Machine Gun Officer, was as follows:

*"2nd CANADIAN DIVISION (Reported by Major PEARCE, O.C. Group, and 4th Cdn. Inf. Bde. H.Q. Telephoned by 2nd Cdn. Division to C.M.G.O.): 27th Cdn. Inf. Bn. reports that Machine Guns supporting them are in position and digging in. Liaison established. No news of other Mobile Guns, but reports are expected at any moment."*

*"1st CANADIAN DIVISION (Reported by Lieut. HENRY, M.G. Liaison Officer through Major STEWART "KOREK," and 1st Cdn. Inf. Bde. H.Q. Telephoned by 1st Cdn. Division to C.M.G.C.): All Machine Guns have reached localities assigned to them. One Machine Gun knocked out has already been replaced. Casualties light up to 12.00 Noon. Lieut. O'CONNOR, 1st C.M.G. Company, sent to inspect Mobile Machine Guns position for confirmation of situation not yet returned."*

**Second Division Mobile Guns.**

The 3 Crews, under Lieut. GIBSON, 5th Company, on the Right of the Second Division, went forward at Zero Hour with the First Wave of the 26th C.I.Bn. 2 Guns were placed in Position immediately E. of PASSCHENDAELE Church in the centre of the Village; the 3rd Gun was sited 300 yds. to the Right commanding the South-eastern Slope of the Ridge to the Railway and the ground beyond. These Guns reached their Positions with few Casualties. Lieut. GIBSON was wounded shortly after reaching the Final Objective and Sgt. CHAMBERLAND took command of the Guns. This N.C.O. remained in command until his Guns were relieved on the evening of November 8th. The 2 Guns of the 6th Company, under Lieut. TUCKER, were in Position in good time and maintained Liaison with the 27th C.I.Bn.



**Experience of 2 Guns, 6th C.M.G. Company.**

The 2 6th Company Mobile Guns, under Lieut. PEARCE, advanced with the First Wave of the 28th C.I.Bn. and reached their allotted location by 8.00 A.M. They were sited on high ground about 500 yds. N.-E. of GRAF WOOD, close to the inter-divisional Boundary and placed so as to command a Field of Fire of 1,000 yds. to their Front and Left Flank. Lieut. PEARCE's Report gives a vivid account of the conditions under which Machine Gun work was carried on, and of the difficulties met with in these Operations:

*"We left the Transport Lines, POTIJZE, at 2.30 P.M., on the 5th Nov., with Nos. 5 & 6 crews No. 2 Section, 6th Cdn. M.G. Coy., to take up positions of 8 and 9 Guns shown on Secret Map M.G. B 5, after the objective had been gained. The guns, tripods, etc., were sent as far as SEINE CORNER (South) by pack animals under the command of Corporal MORRISON. The crews went by the way of the YPRES-ZONNEBEKE Road to a point where "H" Track came to within 50 yds. of this Road, thence by "H" Track to MANX CORNER, thence to SEINE CORNER to pick up guns, tripods, spare parts, oil and rations. Here we found that, owing to the foresight of Sgt. EUSTACE, members of his Barrage gun crews had been detailed to help the Transport unload and 2 piles were made, one of Lieut. TUCKERS's guns etc., and one of my own."*

*"We were told here that the Transport had encountered shell fire on the road and suffered Casualties to the extent of 2 men killed and 7 wounded together with 5 pack animals killed. All guns, tripods and spare parts were got through; 4 filled belts and boxes, and rations for 24 hours were lost. These crews were thus short 4 filled belts and boxes and 24 hours rations. I reported to Major PEARCE (W.M.), O.C. mobile guns, at his H.Q., and through his kindness and that of Capt. GRANTHAM received 6 times corned beef and biscuits."*

*"We left SEINE CORNER at 10.45 P.M. to take up a position in rear of the 28th Battalion at the jumping off trench near CREST FARM. I reported to a Company Commander of the 28th Battalion that we would start over with their first wave. The time of reporting to the 28th was 12.30 A.M. Shelling was encountered on "H" and "K" tracks at SEINE CORNER and on the way to CREST FARM, which was got through without casualties."*

*"Dug funk holes and rested there without casualties until 6.00 A.M. when we went over with 2 crews about 25 yds. apart, Sgt. BIERD taking command of No. 9 gun crew and Cpl. OWENS of No. 8 crew. We were able to get into position at approximately D.6.a.50.49 and D.6.a.55.39 at 8.00 A.M. The guns were mounted and remainder of crews put into shell holes. From the position of the guns the field of fire extended to 1,000 yds. These guns were dismounted as soon as it was seen that the Infantry had reached the objective and consolidated. Guns were mounted at dusk and dismounted at daybreak. The funk holes that the men rested in were holes for 2 or 3 men dug out of the bottom of shell holes and just behind a fold in the ground where they seemed to be comparatively safe from shells. Although they burst extremely close only one man was buried and he easily got out, and one wounded, when they had finally dug themselves in."*

*A message was sent back as soon as the enemy barrage on CREST FARM and vicinity was seen to let up. This message never got through and at 3.40 P.M. another messenger was sent who never returned, but from information received he delivered his message. We underwent a very heavy enemy Artillery bombardment and by dusk on 6th Nov. only 2 gunners and 1 carrier were left on No. 8 gun. At 6.00 A.M. 7th Nov., only 1 gunner and 1 carrier were left on No. 8 gun L/Cpl. J.M. DONALD, No. 1 on the gun and the only gunner left, showed extreme coolness and cheerfulness. Though himself wounded in the leg when jumping off and again in the face and shoulder on the morning of 7th Nov., he would not leave his post. He carried on until both crews were relieved at 6.00 P.M. 8th Nov."*



### **First Division Mobile Guns.**

While waiting for Zero Hour in the Jumping-off Trench 1 of Lieut. TREBILCOCK's Guns (1st Company) was destroyed by Shell Fire and the Crew almost wiped out. 3 Other Ranks were killed and 1, wounded. This Gun was quickly replaced. Lieut. TREBILCOCK led his Crews forward  $\frac{3}{4}$  of an hour after Zero. At Noon, all 6 Guns were reported in Positions arranged for prior to the Operation; these Positions were on the highest ground of the BELLEVUE-MEETCHEELE Ridge, on either side of the WIELTJE Road between MEETCHEELE and MOSSELMARKT. At 10.05 A.M., Lieut. TREBILCOCK was seriously wounded and taken to the Dressing Station; he died of wounds in the afternoon. Lieut. MARTIN took command of the 6 Mobile Guns the same evening. Lieut. VINING's 2 Guns (1st Company) got up to their Positions at VANITY HOUSE without Casualties. Here they remained until relieved by the 1st Machine Gun Company (British) on the following night.

### **Sniping Guns.**

The 4 Sniping Guns of the 2nd Company, under Lieut. McPHERSON, remained on CREST FARM from November 4th to 7th. During the Attack on the 6th, they were laid on MEETCHEELE SPUR. Each evening at dusk the Guns were mounted and laid on an S.O.S. Line. Throughout the Tour the Crews were subjected to Enemy Sniping, Shelling and considerable Machine Gun Fire from Aeroplanes. In spite of the intense Shelling on the 6th, these Guns had no Casualties. They were withdrawn on the evening of the 7th. When the Crews were preparing to leave, a number of large Shells fell in the Trench occupied by one of the Crews, burying Men, Guns and Equipment. 4 Other Ranks were killed, one O.R. was dug out, badly wounded, and 2, could not be found.

### **Second Division Barrage Batteries.**

All Barrage Batteries carried out the Programme of Firing laid down. Nos. 1 and 2 Batteries in the vicinity of AUGUSTUS WOOD, came in for a lot of Shelling. No. 1 Battery (14th Company) was forced to move and returned to their original Emplacements at SEINE CORNER. No. 2 Battery (6th and 14th Company), although very heavily shelled after 8.00 A.M., remained in Position. 1 Gun was destroyed and 5 Other Ranks wounded. Batteries 3, 4 and 5 near HEINE HOUSE were shelled throughout the day, but had comparatively few Casualties. A Carrying Party for No. 3 Battery (4th Company) met with disaster while bringing up S.A.A. to the Positions. Out of 12 Other Ranks, 6 were killed and 4 wounded when the Party were overtaken by enemy Artillery Fire. The S.O.S. Signal was responded to at 10.00 A.M. and 6.45 P.M. No. 5 Battery alone (Borden M.M.G. Battery) fired 35,000 Rounds in reply to the S.O.S. at 10.00 A.M..

### **First Division Barrage Batteries.**

Batteries 6 and 7, under the control of Capt. MEURLING M.C., O.C. Yukon M.M.G. Battery, were heavily shelled. Suffering 23 Casualties. These 2 Batteries expended 44,000 Rounds S.A.A. during the Attack Barrage, No. 8 Battery (3rd and 13th Companies) had 1 Gun destroyed early in the day, but, within 30 minutes, this Gun was replaced from the Advanced Armourer's Depot. A 2nd Gun destroyed in the evening, was similarly replaced. All Batteries fired in response to our S.O.S. Signal at 10.00 A.M. and again at 6.45 P.M.

### **Effectiveness of our M.G. Barrage.**

The effectiveness of the work done by Barrage Machine Guns was quite generally spoken of by Infantry Officers. The G.O.C. 5th C.I.B., in his report on these Operations writes:-

*"Our Machine Gun Barrage was perfect and, according to reports from prisoners, caused the enemy heavy casualties. When the S.O.S. Signal went up, our Machine Guns opened up so promptly that they were all firing before the flare reached the ground. This was very favourably commented on, on all hands, by the Infantry. The Machine guns of the Australian Corps kept down fire from the KEIBERG SPUR."*

Prisoners captured on November 6th stated that Men of Second Line Battalion, coming up in Support of the German Front Line Troops, between 6.45 and 7.00 A.M. were literally mown down by our Machine Gun Barrage. Our Barrage also had the effect of keeping enemy Machine Gunners from operating their Guns. Many of these were sited in Shell-holes and in many cases Crews were forced by our Artillery and Machine Gun Fire to remain under cover. Captured German Machine gunners belonging to the 3rd M.G. Kompanie, 10th Gren. Regt., said that, owing to our M.G. and Artillery Fire and the rapidity of our Infantry Advance, not one of their 10 Machine Guns got into Action.



## INTERVAL BETWEEN PHASE VIII AND PHASE IX.

### Infantry Reliefs and Withdrawals.

On the night November 6th/7th, following Phase VIII, the 5th C.I.B. extended its Front, taking over the remainder of the Second Divisional Line from the 6th C.I.B. Two days later on the night 8th/9th the 5th C.I.B. was relieved by the 4th C.I.B. On the night 7th/8th, the 3rd C.I.B. relieved the 1st C.I.B., and on the following night the 2nd C.I.B. took over the First Divisional Line from the 3rd C.I.B. The Corps Frontage was shortened considerably on the night 7th/8th, when the First Division (British) took over a large portion of the Left Divisional Sector including VALOUR FARM, VEGETABLE FARM, VANITY HOUSE and VINE COTTAGE.

### M.G. Reliefs and Withdrawals.

Machine Gun Reliefs were carried out in both Sectors. The 2nd Company Sniping Guns on CREST FARM were withdrawn on the evening of November 7th. The same night, Lieut. VINING's 2 Guns (1st Company) at VANITY HOUSE were relieved by 2 Guns of the 1st M.G. Company (British). On the 8th, the Mobile or Local Defence Guns of the 2nd Canadian Divisional M.G. "*Battalion*" were relieved by arrangements of Company Commanders concerned in accordance with the D.M.G.C.'s Orders.

Owing to the heavy losses suffered by Barrage Batteries in the intervals between previous Phases and because of the great strain upon the Personnel who had to remain in the Line in some of the Cases as long as 8 days without Relief, the Corps Commander, acting on the recommendations of Lt.-Col. BRUTINEL, gave Orders that Barrage Batteries be withdrawn 48 hours after an Operation, leaving only sufficient Guns in Position for Harassing Fire and dealing with S.O.S. signals. In accordance with this order Barrage Batteries were readjusted on November 8th. The Borden and Yukon M.M.G. Batteries (Nos. 5 and 6) were withdrawn, and Machine Gun Company Barrage Guns rearranged, leaving in the Line 4 Guns per Company, or 16 Guns on each Divisional Front, for Harassing Fire and S.O.S. calls. Each of these Guns had instructions to fire 2,000 Rounds each night. Fire concentrations were arranged for by Group Commanders. Guns were dismounted 1 hour after dawn and Crews and Guns were kept under cover during the day in Pill Boxes or improvised Shelters.

Major BASEVI, O.C., 14th Company, relieved Major PEARE as Mobile Gun Commander at TYNE COTTAGE on November 8th. On the same day, Capt. MORRIS, O.C., 3rd Company, relieved Major LALOR as Group Commander at CAPITOL, and Capt. DENHOLM, 13th Company, relieved Major STEWART, O.C., 2nd Company as Sub-Group Commander at KOREK.

### Operations Nov. 7th to Nov. 9th.

November 7th, 8th and 9th, the 3 days intervening between Phases VIII and IX, were exceptionally quiet. No Operations were undertaken against our new Positions by the Germans. On the 8th and 9th, our Patrols were active, endeavouring to establish the location of the enemy Line. Our Machine Guns carried out Harassing Fire each night.

### Objectives and Order of Battle for Phase IX.

The Operation comprising Phase IX of the Battle of PASSCHENDAELE was fought on November 10th by the First and Second Cdn. Divisions. The First Division (British), II Corps, attacked on the Left and the II ANZAC Corps gave supporting Fire on the Right of the Canadian Corps. The direction of the Advance was along the PASSCHENDAELE Ridge. Owing to the First Division's (British) taking over a portion of our Line on the Left, the Frontage of Attack was considerably shorter than in the other 3 Phases. Corps and Inter-Divisional Boundaries and Jumping-off Line are shown on Canadian Corps PASSCHENDAELE Operations Map. Attacking Brigades and Battalions from Right to Left were:-

4th C.I.B.		20th C.I.Bn.
2nd C.I.B.	(Right	7th C.I.Bn.
	(Left	8th C.I.Bn.



### Second Division Local Defence Guns.

No Sniping Machine Guns were used for Phase IX. On the Second Divisional Front no Mobile Guns were sent forward with the Infantry. As the Attack was of such shallow Depth on this Sector it was not thought desirable to send Machine Guns forward. Their Tasks of aiding in Consolidation and Defence of the Line could be done equally well from Positions in which the Guns were already sited prior to Zero. All Guns other than those firing Barrage were termed Local Defence Guns, in the 2nd Canadian Divisional M.G. "Battalion" Operation Order for this Attack.

These Guns were designated, composed and situated as follows, prior to Zero Hour, November 10th:-

No.	UNIT	Location
1	5th Company	) 150 yds. N.-W. of TIBER.
2	5th Company	)
3	14th Company	250 yds. S. of PASSCHENDAELE Church.
4	14th Company	300 yds. N. of PASSCHENDAELE Church.
5	14th Company	) In Northern outskirts of PASSCHENDAELE,
6	4th Company	) 500 yds. N. of Church.
7	4th Company	)
8	4th Company	) 400 yds. in Rear of 6 and 7.
9	4th Company	)
10	6th Company	At GRUN.
11	14th Company	400 yds. S. of PASSCHENDAELE Church.
12	6th Company	On CREST FARM.
13	6th Company	Mounted for Anti-Aircraft Firing.
14	6th Company	)
15	5th Company	) In Reserve in the Line.
16	5th Company	)

A Line of Machine Gun Defences was provided by these Guns an average distance of 200 yds. from the new Front Line. Guns 1, 2, 3, 10, 11 and 12 protected the Eastern Slope of the PASSCHENDAELE Ridge; Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 were sited for the Defence of PASSCHENDAELE itself and that part of the RIDGE immediately N. of the Village. On the Second Divisional Front, therefore, 12 Guns were in Local Defence Positions for the Operation, 2 on Anti-Aircraft duty and 2 held in Reserve. Major BASEVI (O.C., 14th Company) was in command of all Local Defence Guns and responsible for co-ordinating their work. His H.Q. were at TYNE COTTAGE.

The following Officers were in command of Local Defence Guns:-

Gun Number	Officer in Command.
1, 2 and 10	Lieut. MacLAREN (5th Company)
3, 4 and 5	Lieut. BADGLEY (14th Company)
6 and 7	Lieut DUFF (4th Company)
8 and 9	Lieut. MAHAFFY (4th Company)
11 and 12	Lieut. SALISBURY (14th Company)



### First Division Local Defence and Mobile Guns.

In the First Division, 6 Guns were assigned to Local Defence, 4 were sent forward as Mobile Guns. The Local Defence Guns, all belonging to the 1st Company, were in Position on the N.-E. and N. Slope of the BELLEVUE-MEETCHEELE SPUR. They were sited on either side of the WIELTJE Road, from a point 250 yds. S. of MOSSELMARKT to MEETCHEELE. These Guns were commanded by Lieut. MARTIN (1st Company), who had relieved Lieut. TREBILCOCK when he was fatally wounded on November 6th.

The 4 Mobile Guns, provided by the 2nd Company, were under the command of Lieut. LAING, and came "for all purposes under orders of the G.O.C., 2nd Inf. Bde." The general Task assigned these Guns is set forth in the following Order of the G.O.C., 2nd C.I.B.:-

*"One Section of four Vickers Guns has been allotted to this Brigade as Mobile Guns to be used in Defensive positions for Flank and Frontal Fire. Lieut. J.G. LAING, the Officer in charge of these guns, will report to the O's.C. 7th and 8th Canadian Infantry Battalions. Battalions will issue orders to him for the disposition of his guns, this disposition to be a defensive position in the vicinity of MOSSELMARKT, from or in rear of the present front line where they will have as much protection as possible. When the situation permits and there is an opportunity to have them placed to the best advantage for Flank and Frontal observed fire down the Eastern Slope of the Ridge, they will be moved forward."*

*All the above orders to be given by the Battalion Commanders. Battalions will include these guns in their orders. They will be in touch with them at all times, and look after them in every way as though they were part of their own unit. On the relief of the line by the 5th and 10th Battalions, these guns will be turned over to the Commanders of the 5th and 10th Battalions, who will administer these guns as laid down."*

These Guns joined the Infantry Battalions in the Jumping-off Trench at 12.30 A.M., November 6th, 2 Guns each with the 7th and 8th C.I.Bns.

### Barrage Guns: Resources.

The Machine Gun Resources employed for the Massed Action in Phase IX were as follows:

2nd Cdn. Divisional M.G. "Battalion"	24 Guns
1st Cdn. Divisional M.G. "Battalion"	24 Guns
1st Cdn. M.G. Brigade.	24 Guns
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>72 Guns</b>
Right Flank, I ANZAC Corps	16 Guns
<b>Grand TOTAL</b>	<b>88 Guns</b>

This number provided a Final Barrage on the approximate basis of 1 Machine Gun for every 30 yds. of Front, as in the other Phases. The 1 ANZAC Corps gave flanking assistance. They prolonged the Cdn. Corps M.G. Barrage with a Battery of 8 Guns, and neutralised enemy observation from EDDY HEIGHTS with a second Machine Gun Battery of 8 Guns. The Machine Gun Barrage of the II Corps on the Left was Co-ordinated with the Canadian Corps M.G. Barrage. Of the 72 C.M.G. Corps Barrage Machine Guns, 32 Guns supported the Second Division, and 40, the First Division, organised, as usual, into 8-Gun Batteries.



**Second Division Barrage Batteries.**

The Batteries on the Second Division Front were designated and composed as follows:-

Battery	Unit
No. 1	8 Guns, 14th C.M.G. Company
No. 2	4 Guns, 5th C.M.G. Company 4 Guns, 6th C.M.G. Company
No. 3	8 Guns, 4th C.M.G. Company
No. 4	4 Guns, 'B' Battery, 1st C.M.M.G. Bde. 4 Guns, Eaton Battery, 1st C.M.M.G. Bde.

Batteries were situated in Rear of HAALEN COPSE and DECK Wood. Positions were occupied night November 9th/10th. Capt. GRANTHAM, O.C., 6th Company, remained in command of the Group with his H.Q. at TYNE COTTAGE.

**First Division Barrage Batteries.**

The First Division Barrage Batteries were designated and composed as follows:-

Battery	Unit
No. 5	8 Guns, 13th C.M.G. Company
No. 6	8 Guns, 3rd C.M.G. Company
No. 7	4 Guns, 3rd C.M.G. Company 4 Guns, 13th C.M.G. Company
No. 8	8 Guns, Borden M.M.G. Battery
No. 9	8 Guns, Yukon M.M.G. Battery

Batteries 5, 6 and 7 were in Position in the vicinity of SNIPE HALL. Nos. 8 and 9 were located 150 yds. to the Left of BELLEVUE Pill Box. Positions were occupied night November 9th-10th. Major STEWART, O.C., 2nd Company, was appointed Group Commander with H.Q. at 2nd C.I.B. Hdqrs., CAPITOL. Capt. MORRIS, O.C., 3rd Company, was at KOREK, as Liaison Officer with the Batteries for Major STEWART.



**PHASE IX, NOVEMBER 10TH, 1917.****The Attack.**

The Attack began at 6.05 A.M. November 10th. Rain had fallen during the night and the weather was wet during the greater part of the day. Our Troops made rapid progress. By 8.00 A.M. all Objectives were reported taken. The Second Division encountered none of the enemy and quickly established themselves on the Final Objective. In the Left Sector, the 7th C.I.Bn., being greatly worried by Rifle and Machine Gun Fire from VENISON TRENCH, about 300 yds. beyond the Final Objective, went forward and captured a portion of the Trench, with Prisoners. Later this Battalion fell back to conform with the general Situation. After reaching the original Objective, shortly after 6.50 A.M., the 8th C.I.Bn. found their Left Flank exposed; Troops of the First Division (British) were held up by heavy enemy M.G. Fire from VOCATION and VOX Farms. As these Troops were unable to get forward, the 8th C.I.Bn. had to refuse its Left Flank and formed a Defensive Flank, facing W., bending the Line back from the Final Objective to a point 100 yds. E. of VENTURE FARM. From 9.00 A.M. until late in the afternoon the new Line was subjected to the most intense hostile Shelling our Men had ever experienced. At 2.36 P.M., an enemy Counter-attack was driven off with heavy loss to the Germans.

**Second Division Local Defence Guns.**

Local Defence Machine Guns had little firing throughout the day as very few Targets presented themselves. Positions were subjected to a large amount of Shelling. 3 Guns of the 14th Company Nos. 3, 4, and 5, were kept out of Action by enemy Shelling during the whole Operation. The Guns with all Equipment were destroyed at these Positions, (300 yds. N. of PASSCHENDAELE Church), on the 9th inst. 7 Other Ranks were killed, and the Officer in charge, Lieut. BADGELY, with 2 Other Ranks, wounded. Lieut. BADGLEY remained on duty until the 10th, when he reported to Hospital.

Other 3 Guns with fresh Crews were got together by Major BASEVI, O.C. Local Defence Guns, and Group H.Q. When they were ready to start for their Positions at 2.00 A.M., November 10th, enemy Artillery suddenly shelled TYNE COTTAGE, again destroying Guns and Equipment and killing 2 Other Ranks. Major BASEVI, wired the D.M.G.C., Major GOODFELLOW, for fresh Guns and Equipment and had the remainder of the Crews go under cover to await Orders. The Guns arrived from the D.M.G.C. about 4.30 P.M., but on account of the severity of enemy Shelling, it was decided to hold the Guns until daylight next morning, when Sgt. BALL (6th Company), with 2 Guns and crews started, at 6.00 A.M., for the Positions. At Noon, both Guns with their Ammunition were blown up and destroyed by enemy Shell Fire and Sgt. BALL reported back at TYNE COTTAGE at 1.30 P.M. with the Crews. The attempt to place Guns in these Positions was then definitely abandoned.

Lieut. MACLAREN (5th Company) at Positions 1 and 2 had an unfortunate Tour. 2 Guns were destroyed on the way into the Line on November 8th. These were replaced. On November 9th, 4 Other Ranks were killed and 2 wounded at these Positions during severe Shelling.

All the Local Defence Guns remained in positions occupied before Zero Hour, with the exception of Gun 8 and 9 under Lieut. MAHAFFY (4th Company). In the course of the morning of the 10th, this Officer moved his Guns up to the Left of, and in Line with the other 2 Forward Guns of the 4th Company, Nos. 6 & 7 (under Lieut. DUFF). In the new Positions Guns 8 & 9 were placed immediately W. of the PASSCHENDAELE-WESTROOSEBEKE Road, close to the Inter-Divisional Boundary.



### **First Division Local Defence and Mobile Guns.**

The Local Defence Guns of the First Division, under Lieut. MARTIN, came in for a lot of Shelling, but had comparatively few Casualties. The 4 Mobile Guns under Lieut. LAING got forward with the Infantry into previously selected Positions, and had numerous Targets, but by the evening all but one had been destroyed or put out of Action by enemy Shell Fire.

*"The Section (4 Guns) moved off from 'X' Camp at 12.30 P.M., November 9th. Lieut. LAING had gone ahead and the following disposition had been arranged in conference with the Battalion Commanders: Nos. 2 and 3 guns under Lieut. LAING to one battalion, and Nos. 1 and 4 guns under Sgt. COATES to the other battalion. The Guns moved up to the jumping off trench and dug in about 12.30 A.M. on the 10th. On the way up to the jumping off trench No 2 gun had 3 Casualties, arriving in position with only one man and a corporal."*

*"At Zero Hour the four guns went forward with the Second wave and dug in about 200 yds. behind the final objective. When the guns were all in position Lieut. LAING left the crew he had gone forward with to visit the other guns and to report his dispositions to Battalion Headquarters. This is the last definite information regarding this Officer who has since been reported 'Missing and believed killed.'"*

### **Brave Conduct of Crews.**

*"This then left the N.C.O. and one man alone with No. 2 Gun. At about 3.30 P.M., this man was sent out sick and the N.C.O., L/Cpl. FROST, was the only man left with the gun. This soldier worked his gun, sniping at enemy parties, until his ammunition ran out. He dismounted his gun and put it under cover in a shell hole, and went back and brought up more ammunition. With this new supply he kept his gun in action until the battalion was relieved, when he carried out his gun safely to 'X' Camp and reported. During this period he was without food or water, and stayed with his gun under the worst discomforts possible."*

*No. 1 gun arrived at its objective without casualties. Shortly after getting into position one man was wounded and was being assisted out when the gun was put out of action. The remaining men of this crew eventually made their way to 'X' Camp. No. 4 gun got up into position. All the crew except one man and Sgt. COATES became Casualties on the way up. They kept this gun in Action until 3.20 P.M. when it was also knocked out of action. Sgt. COATES and the remaining man were badly shaken up, but managed to get back to the rear. No. 3 gun got into position, and when last seen was being operated by the only survivor of the crew, L/Cpl. SHARPLES. This man also became a casualty later, so nothing definite about his gun is available."*

### **Mobile Gun Reinforcements.**

Owing to Lieut. LAING's disappearance before the disposition of his Guns was known to the Infantry Commanders, and on account of the subsequent disorganisation caused by enemy Shelling, no official work of these Mobile Guns was received through the regular channels. Major WATSON, D.M.G.C., First Division, hearing indirectly, that the Mobile Guns had suffered heavily in getting forward, had 4 Crews with Guns and 48 hours Rations proceed to the Line as Reinforcements, leaving "X" Camp at 10.20 P.M. that night.

For the reasons just given, no information as to the whereabouts of the Mobile Guns could be obtained in the Line. The Sergeant in charge of the Reinforcements reported to the O.C., 10th C.I.Bn. and went on to the "Report Centre." No one had seen Lieut. LAING nor knew the location of the Forward Guns. There was no shelter for the reinforcing Crews where they were and no definite job for them to do. After a consultation with Lieut. MARTIN (O.C. Local Defence Guns) and later with Major STEWART at 2nd C.I.B. Hdqrs., it was decided to send the Men and Guns back to the Transport Lines, where they arrived at 10.00 A.M., November 11th.



### **Mobile Guns Supplied from Barrage Battery.**

At 6.00 P.M., on the 10th, the Bde. Major 2nd C.I.B. had told Major WATSON (D.M.G.C.) over the Telephone, that 4 more Mobile Guns were required at once by the G.O.C. As the Reinforcements were not yet on the way from "X" Camp, Major WATSON's only alternative was to draw 4 Guns from the Barrage Batteries. Major STEWART M.G. Liaison Officer at 2nd C.I.B. Hdqrs., CAPITOL, then received instructions from the G.O.C. Brigade for these Guns to proceed to the 5th C.I.Bn. Hdqrs., which they did. On arrival there, Lieut. LUNHAM, the Officer in charge, could get no Instructions, and the Guns and Crews were replaced again in their Barrage Positions.

Through lack of information regarding the Dispositions and fate of the 4 Mobile Guns which attacked with Battalions on the morning of the 10th, it turned out that no Vickers Guns were in close support of the Infantry on the First Divisional Front during the night following the Attack. (Lieut. MARTIN's Local Defence Guns were 500 to 800 yds. in Rear of the Front Line). This Situation was rectified as soon as it was fully understood, and 4 Forward Guns were placed in Position on the 11th, 2, at VINDICTIVE CROSS ROADS, firing N.-E. and 2, N. of VENTURE FARM, to assist in defending the exposed Left Flank.

### **Barrage Guns.**

Barrage Guns carried out the Programme of Fire laid down for the Operation. The S.O.S. was responded to when the Germans counter-attacked at 2.36 P.M. The intensity of the enemy Shelling, the activity of enemy low-flying Aeroplanes, and, perhaps, more than anything else, the wet weather made Barrage work unusually difficult on November 10th. At most Barrage Positions it was impossible to dig serviceable Trenches because of the ground. Where these were dug, the rain and Shelling combined to loosen the soil and caused the Trenches to fall in.

### **Difficulties in Keeping Barrage Guns in Action.**

The conditions made it difficult to keep Belts clean and dry. 6 Guns of No. 5 Battery (13th Company) answered the S.O.S. signal in the afternoon of the 10th. After firing 3 Belts, 4 of these Guns went out of Action on account of wet and dirty Belts, caused by the rain and by mud thrown up over Guns and Equipment by Shell Fire. After 20 minutes all Guns were out of Action from the same cause. This was a common experience among the Barrage Batteries on November 10th. The Men worked hard to keep their Guns and Equipment in good condition, all kinds of devices being tried, but the difficulties were found almost insurmountable. Fortunately the rain did not fall heavily until 10.00 A.M. so that it interfered very little with the Attack Barrage, when Batteries fired an average of 20,000 Rounds each. In his Report on the Phase the G.O.C., Second Cdn. Division writes:- "*Our M.G. Barrage on Nov. 10th was very effective and satisfactory.*"

All Battery Positions were shelled, for German Artillery Fire was general over the whole Forward Area. 11 Barrage Machine Guns were destroyed by Shell Fire during the day.

### **Barrage Battery Shelled Out.**

One hour after Zero, No. 1 Battery (14th Coy.) near HAALEN COPSE, after having 2 Guns blown up, moved to new Positions 200 yds. in Rear. Lieut. LYON was killed at the original Positions. The Action of this Battery is described as follows, by the O.C., 14th Company:-

*"In accordance with orders received, the Barrage Guns of No. 1 Battery opened fire at Zero (6.05 A.M.) and continued firing for 55 minutes when enemy Shelling became so intense that Lieut. TWEDDELL, 14th C.M.G. Company, who was in charge of the Battery, withdrew the remainder of the Battery about 200 yards, after 1 gun and equipment had been destroyed by a direct hit and another gun put out of action by hostile shell fire. During this heavy shelling Lieut. D. LYON, 14th C.M.G. Company, 2nd in command of the Battery, was killed and 2 Other Ranks, wounded."*

*"Guns were then laid on the S.O.S. Line. Later on a message was received to lengthen range 300 yards as our Infantry had gone ahead that distance. Guns were laid accordingly. Whilst in these new positions, the guns were subjected to a very heavy shelling, causing 2 guns to be put out action and wounding Lieut. TWEDDELL. Sgt. BRADFORD, 14th C.M.G. Company, who was then in charge of the Battery, repaired the 2guns and got them into the action again. Sgt. BRADFORD remained in charge until the arrival of Lieut. WHITE, 14th C.M.G. Company."*



### **Casualties.**

In spite of the Shelling, Casualties were light by comparison. No. 4 Battery, under Capt. HARKNESS, M.C., O.C., Eaton M.M.G. Battery, had no Casualties during the Tour. The soft and muddy state of the ground was no doubt responsible for keeping down the number of Casualties. Shells went into the soil before exploding, so that flying fragments of metal were contained and retarded by the mud.

All Batteries were not equally fortunate in respect of Casualties. At No. 8 Battery (Borden M.M.G. battery) Lieut. KILL was killed 30 minutes after fire was opened. 2 Guns were put out of Action. At 1.30 P.M., 3 Other Ranks were killed and 3, wounded; 15 minutes later, Capt. NICHOLSON, O.C., Borden Battery, was wounded. At the adjoining Battery, No. 9 (Yukon M.M.G. Battery), 2 Guns were put out of Action in the course of the morning. At 11.15, Lieut. BLACK (a/O.C., Yukon M.M.G. Battery) and 5 Other Ranks were buried in their Section of Trench by the earth thrown back from a bursting Shell. All were so badly shaken that they had to proceed to a Dressing Station.



**SUBSEQUENT EVENTS, NOVEMBER 11TH TO NOVEMBER 20TH, 1917.****General.**

The successful Operation of November 10th brought the Battle of PASSCHENDAELE to a close; the Canadian Corps had accomplished the Task assigned to it in the General plan of operation for this Area; the whole of the PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE was in our hands. The Weather continued wet on the day following the Attack but cleared up on November 12th, and throughout the remainder of the Tour was generally fair.

During the days following Phase IX and until the Canadian corps was relieved by the VIII Corps on November 18th, our Troops were employed in the work of Consolidation, Construction of Defences and strengthening our Positions. The Line was thinned out to the greatest possible extent compatible with safety and as many Men as possible were kept under shelter. Orders were issued not to engage the enemy actively except in so far as it was necessary to do so in routine Patrol work. As a preparatory step to further Operations of the SECOND ARMY in this Area, the II Corps on our Left was ordered to carry out a Minor Operation for the capture of VIRILE, VOCATION, VIX and VIRTUE Farms. Our Left Division co-operated in this Operation.

**Divisional Reliefs.**

Meantime, the Divisions which had carried out Phases VIII and IX were relieved by the Divisions from the SECOND ARMY Rest Area, the Fourth Division relieving the Second, and the Third Division relieving the First. Relief of the Second by the Fourth Cdn. Division was completed at 10.00 A.M., November 13th. The G.O.C., Third Cdn. Division assumed command of the Left Sector from the G.O.C., First Cdn. Division, at 10.00 A.M., November 12th.

**First and Second Divisions Move to VIMY Front.**

Upon relief the First and Second Divisions returned to the VIMY Front under the First Army. Here the First Division relieved the Fifty-ninth Division (British) in the AVION and LENS Sector coming under Orders of the I Corps. Divisional H.Q. were established at the CHATEAU de la HAIE on November 17th. The Second Division completed the Relief of the Forty-eighth Division (British) on November 18th with H.Q. at the CHATEAU d'ACQ. The Second Division came under Orders of the XIII Corps.

**Reliefs and Moves of Second M.G. "Bn."**

The Second Canadian Divisional M.G. "*Battalion*" (Major GOODFELLOW, M.C.) was relieved by the Fourth Cdn. M.G. "*Battalion*" (Major M.A. SCOTT, D.S.O.) on the night November 11th/12th, and proceeded to the XIII Corps Area, arriving at Billets in MAISNIL-BOUCHE on the 15th. The journey of 55 miles (by Road) was made by Motor Lorries in 4 stages, by way of BRANDHOEK (12th), St. FLORIS (13th), LAUGNOY (14th) and on to MAISNIL-BOUCHE on the 15th. On the following day the 4th and 14th Companies followed them on November 18th.

The 4th and 14th Companies took over Machine Gun Positions in the Line, MERICOURT Sector, on the night of their arrival at AUX RIETZ, November 16th/17th. The 4th Company relieved the 143rd M.G. Company (British). The 14th Company relieved the 144th Company (British).

**Reliefs and Moves of First M.G. "Bn."**

The First M.G. "*Battalion*" (Major WATSON, D.S.O.) was relieved by the Third "*Battalion*" (Major MOORHOUSE) in two stages; Barrage Batteries (3d and 13th Companies) on November 11th; Forward Guns, on night November 12th/13th. The 3rd and 13th Companies moved as soon as relieved arriving in Billets in BOUVIGNY Huts on November 14th. The journey was made in Lorries by way of MERVILLE (12th) and VENDIN-lez-BETHUNE, OBLINGHEM (13th). The 1st and 2nd Companies moved from Camp "X" to MERVILLE on November 14th, and came on to OBLINGHEM on the 15th. By the 19th, all 4 Companies were back in Machine Gun Camp, CARENCY, which they had left on October 13th.

The 3rd and 13th Companies, as was the case with the 4th and 14th Companies, had no rest. On the night November 16th/17th, the 13th Company relieved the 177th M.G. Company (British) in the LENS Sector. The 3rd Company carried out the Relief of the 174th M.G. Company (British) in the AVION Sector on the night 17th/18th. Both Companies went into the Line from BOUVIGNY HUTS. Their Transport proceeded to M.G. Camp, CARENCY, on the 17th.



**Transport.**

The Transport of both "*Battalions*" made the journey from the YPRES Area by Road, independently of the Companies.

**Fourth and Third M.G. "*Battalions*" Second Tour at PASSCHENDAELE.**

On night November 11th/12th, the Fourth M.G. "*Battalion*" (Major M.A. SCOTT, D.S.O.) relieved the Second Battalion (Major GOODFELLOW, M.C.), under orders of the D.M.G.C., as follows:- the 11th Company relieved all Local Defence Guns, 16 Barrage Gun Positions were taken over, 8 Guns by the 10th Company, 4 Guns by the 12th Company, and 4 by the 16th Company; the 4 16th Company Guns relieved Guns of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade which withdrew to YORK CAMP. Lieut. A.G. SCOTT, M.C. (11th Company) relieved Major BASEVI, as O.C. Local Defence Guns, and Major L.F. PEARCE (O.C. 12th Company) assumed command of the Barrage Group, relieving Capt. GRANTHAM. Inter-Company Reliefs were carried out on November 15th. The 10th and 16th Companies took over the Local Defence Positions from the 11th Company. Capt. LOGAN (16th Company) relieved Lieut. SCOTT in command of these Guns. Major PEARCE remained in charge of Barrage Guns.

As previously stated the Third M.G. "*Battalion*" (Major MOORHOUSE) relieved the First "*Battalion*" (Major WATSON, D.S.O.) in 2 stages: 24 Barrage Gun Positions were taken over on night of November 11th/12th, 16 Positions by the 15th Company, and 4 each, by the 7th and 8th Companies.

On the same night, 4 additional Forward guns were placed in Position on the Left of the Divisional Sector by the 8th Company. First Division Forward guns were relieved by the 8th Company of the night 12th/13th. Barrage Batteries 8 and 9, composed of the Borden and Yukon Batteries, had been withdrawn to YORK CAMP at 9.30 A.M. on the 11th. Capt. HARTLEY (O.C. 15th Company) was appointed O.C., Barrage Group, with H.Q. at CAPITOL; Lieut. BURNHAM was Liaison Officer at KOREK. Major PARKES (O.C., 8th Company) assumed command of Forward Guns. Inter-Company Reliefs were effected on November 15th. The 9th Company (Major McFAUL) relieved the 8th Company at all 14 Forward Gun Positions, Major WEIR (O.C., 7th Company) took place of Capt. HARTLEY, and Lieut. DRINKWATER relieved Major PARKES in command of Forward Guns.

**Operations Nov. 11th to 18th.**

In accordance with the Canadian Corps Policy during this Period, no active Operations were undertaken. Our Patrols were busy and captured a few Prisoners. Our Artillery fired in conjunction with the II Corps successful Minor Operation on November 16th. On this day, patrols were put out by the 42nd C.I.Bn, on the Left of the Corps Front, between VENTURE and VOCATION Farms, when the latter had been occupied by the First Division (British). Enemy Artillery harassed our forward and rear areas unceasingly with 5.9", 8" and Gas Shells. A Counter-attack against the Third Division, at 4.35 P.M., November 13th, was broken up with great loss to the enemy.

Activities of our Machine Guns were normal during these days. Local Defence Guns improved their Positions, got up Ammunition Supplies, but did little Firing. Barrage Guns answered S.O.S. Signals and carried out Harassing Fire each night. Forward S.A.A. Dumps were replenished and a plentiful supply of S.A.A. was provided at the Gun Positions - an average of 20,000 Rounds per Gun.



### **11th Company Local Defence Guns, Nov. 11th to 15th.**

The experience of our Forward Machine Guns during this period are well illustrated by the following extracts from the 11th Company War Diary:-

*"Nov. 11th.*

*"Transport moved (from CAESTRE) to our old lines in POTIJZE at 9.30 A.M., arriving at 11.30 A.M. The Sections moved by train to YPRES at 12.00 noon, from which place we marched to POTIJZE, arriving at 2 P.M.*

*"Lieut. JOHNSTON and Lieut. SCOTT went on ahead to TYNE COT to make arrangements to relieve 13 guns of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th C.M.G. Coys. in the forward area.*

*"At 4 P.M. the relieving party consisting of Lieuts. CONNOLLY, CARPENTER, and EATON with four crews of 'A' Sect., and three crews from each of 'B', 'C' and 'D' Sections moved into the Line. Lieut. SCOTT remained at TYNE COT to act as O.C. of 'A' Group consisting of our 13 guns located as shown on the attached map.*

*"The relief was completed by 10.45 P.M. About 8 P.M. Lieut. CONNOLLY and seven other ranks were gassed and had to be evacuated.*

*"Nov. 12th.*

*"On the morning of the 12th enemy aeroplanes flew over our lines at a height of about 75 feet firing at every possible target with machine gun fire. On the afternoon a direct hit was made on no. 7 position, burying the gun and destroying the ammunition. The gun and equipment were, however, afterwards recovered and quickly put into working order again.*

*"Intense shell fire was experienced at all positions, especially in the vicinity of the PASSCHENDAELE BREWERY, where two of our guns, Nos. 8 and 13, were located. Many direct hits were made on this building, one shell bursting in the cellar killing 6 men and wounding 6 others ... Lieut. KILLIP arrived as reinforcement.*

*"Nov. 13th.*

*"Lieut. KILLIP went into the line with two gun crews on the morning of the 13th, placing one gun in the immediate support line, which was then held by the 54th Battn., and formed the right flank of the Canadian Sector. The Second gun was placed in an advanced position slightly to the left. In the afternoon No. 13 gun was blown up and the tripod of No. 8 gun destroyed. The crews of these guns then withdrew.*

*"About 5 P.M. our S.O.S. went up when the enemy immediately put a heavy Barrage on our lines. L/Col. EASTLAND was killed, and Ptes. YOUNG, JOHNSON and FRENCH wounded, a direct hit being made on their Position No. 12. Pte WALTON was also wounded by shrapnel.*

*"Nov. 14th.*

*"On the morning of the 14th, the position in the immediate support line under Lieut. KILLIP received a direct hit ... The shelling was intense all day. (1 O.R. was killed and 2 O.R. wounded) ...*

*"Nov. 15th.*

*"The Company was relieved in the line by Sections of the 8th Machine Gun Coy. under Lieut. DOUGLAS; by Sections of the 10th Company under Lieut. THOMPSON; and by Sections of the 16th Company under Lieut. FRENCH. Heavy shelling was experienced on the way out, one man being killed and two others wounded."*



### **7th Company Barrage Guns, Nov. 11th to 17th.**

The following extracts from the 7th Company (Major WEIR) War Diary illustrate the daily routine of the Barrage Guns during this Tour. The 7th Company had 4 Guns in Barrage Positions November 11th to 15th and 12 Guns, November 15th to 17th.

*"Nov. 11th.*

*" 'C' Section under Lieut. MOTHERSHILL relieved 4 Guns of the 13th Canadian Machine Gun Company. Belts were not taken over owing to a report that they were wet and almost unserviceable. 1 carrier wounded on the way in.*

*"The Positions are in shell-holes and very wet. It is almost impossible for the men to get any sleep, and at times they are heavily shelled. Relief complete by 11.30 A.M.*

*"Nov. 12th.*

*"Sand bags, rum and dry sox sent up to the 4 Gun Crews in the line.*

*"Nov. 13th.*

*"6 Gunners and 1 Carrier with Lieut. MOTHERSGILL wounded, and 6 reinforcements sent up. Lieut. MOTHERSGILL reports shelling severe and weather conditions very bad. The men were practically unable to get any sleep and are wet to their knees. We are continuing to send dry socks up daily ... and returning the wet ones to Division. Pack train of 16 animals called for this A.M. Lieut. SPALDING took charge of party. 64,000 rounds S.A.A. taken from WATERLOO DUMP to near the gun positions.*

*"No movement allowed at gun positions due to low-flying enemy planes which fire at our men and direct their artillery against any movement.*

*"Nov. 14th.*

*"Orders received to relieve some of the guns in the line. 16 pack animals again sent forward to take S.A.A. from WATERLOO to dumps on road near gun positions. Our guns last night answered S.O.S. call and it is reported that they caused heavy casualties to the enemy who attempted to counter attack.*

*"Nov. 15th.*

*"Relief started at 7.30 A.M. Each man instructed to carry 1 pr. Dry sox and to return their wet sox when dry ones were sent up to them. Every man rubbed whale oil on his feet before moving off. Relief complete 10.25 A.M. Casualties during relief 1 O.R. killed and 4 wounded. This happened near KOREK on the way in when a salvo of 5.9's caught the tail of the line going over the ridge (GRAVENSTAFEL RIDGE).*

*"We took over nearly 10,000 rounds S.A.A. at each position ... The enemy harassing fire seems heavier and steadier than during the previous tour in ...*

*"Nov. 16th.*

*"All guns at positions are dug in as well as possible and section officers are living with the men. There are no dug-outs or pill-boxes available. The guns are about 5-10 yards apart.*

*"Great care has to be taken as regards movement by day owing to enemy aeroplanes which come over frequently flying very low. The weather has improved greatly, not so much rain and it is quite misty in the morning. Enemy shelling is particularly severe at time upon the plank road which parallels the SPREE FARM-GRAVENSTAFEL Road.*

*"At about 4.00 P.M. to-day, Capt. SIMMONDS, O.C. the 25th Imperial Machine Gun Company (8th Imperial Division), arrived at CAPITOL to arrange for relief of the barrage group of guns.*

*"Nov. 17th.*

*"During the operation last night our guns answered an S.O.S. and fired 19,000 rounds. At about 10.30 P.M. the enemy Artillery opened up heavily with H.E. and gas shells. Our crews had the following casualties; 2 killed, 3 wounded, and 4 gassed.*

*"Barrage group relieved this A.M. by 15 guns of the 25th Imperial Machine Gun Company. Relief complete at 11.00 A.M. No casualties during relief. 10,000 rounds S.A.A. handed over at each position, 500,000 rounds in dump at Waterloo, 100,000 rounds at Transport Lines. 10 belt*



*boxes per gun handed over. The morning was quite misty so that no observation could be obtained by enemy aeroplanes.*

*"Extra guns, belts, spare water cans, stored for emergency at NILE HOUSE, brought out by this Company."*

### **Third and Fourth Divisions Relieved.**

The Third and Fourth Divisions were relieved on November 18th, the Fourth Division by the Thirty-third Division (British) and the Third by the Eighth Division (British). Upon Relief both Divisions moved S. and went into Rest in the FIRST ARMY Area; Fourth Divisional H.Q. moved to MERVILLE on the 18th and went on to AUGHEL on the 24th, remaining there during the rest period. Third Divisional H.Q. moved to NORRENT FONTES, 6 miles S. of AIRE, on the 18th.

### **Relief and Move of Fourth M.G. "Bn."**

Machine Gun Companies of the Thirty-third Division (British) relieved the Fourth Cdn. Divl. M.G. "Battalion" Companies as follows:-

Fourth Canadian M.G. "Battalion" Unit.	Thirty-third Division Relieving Unit.	Date
10th C.M.G. Company	100th M.G. Company	Nov. 19
11th C.M.G. Company	98th M.G. Company	Nov. 17
12th C.M.G. Company	99th M.G. Company	Nov. 18
16th C.M.G. Company	248th M.G. Company	Nov. 19

Companies proceeded on Relief, to Rest Area, part of the journey being made by Motor Lorry and part by Marching. The 11th and 12th Companies arrived at their Billets in BEUGIN, 4 miles S. of BRUAY, on November 22nd, by way of BRANDHOEK (11th Company on the 17th), CAESTRE (20th), MERVILLE (20th) and BUSNES (21st). The 10th and 16th Companies reached BUSNES on the 22nd, journeying by way of CYCLING and TAY Camps, near POPERINGHE (19th) and MERVILLE (21st). From BUSNES, these Companies marched on the 23rd to their final destination, the 10th Company to CAMBLAIN-CHATELAIN, the 16th Company to DIEVAL.

### **Relief and Move of Third M.G. "Bn."**

The Third Cdn. Divl. M.G. "Battalion" was relieved by Companies of the 8th Division (British), viz., the 23rd, 24th, 25th and 218th. Barrage Guns were taken over on November 17th, Local Defence Guns on the following day. Companies moved, on relief, to the Rest Area. The 8th and 15th Companies were billeted together in rest, at the village of FIEFS, where the 15th Company arrived on the 18th and the 8th Company, on the following day. These Units moved S. by way of VLAMERTINGHE (16th) and ROBECQ (17th and 18th). The 7th and 9th Companies journeyed together by way of St. FLORIS (19th) to NEDON (20th). Here they remained until the 23rd, when they marched to their permanent Billets, the 7th Company to LAIRES and the 9th to AUMERVAL.

### **1st C.M.M.G. Bde. Moves South.**

The 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade moved from York Camp to Billets in PERNES on November 18th. The Route S. was through MARBECQUE, ST. VENANT and LILLIERS. The Brigade left YORK CAMP at 11.30 A.M. and arrived at their destination at 8.00 P.M.

The G.O.C. Canadian Corps handed over command of the Line in the PASSCHENDAELE Sector to the G.O.C. VIII Corps on November 18th. On the same day, Canadian Corps H.Q. opened at CAMBLAIN L'ABBE. The Canadian Corps assumed Command of the LENS, AVION and MERICOURT Sections from the I and XIII Corps at 12.00 Noon, November 20th.



## CONCLUSION.

### M.G. Organisation Tested.

Canadian Machine Gunners put to good use, at PASSCHENDAELE, the "*Spurs*" which they had won at VIMY RIDGE. During the relatively quiet months of Trench Warfare in the Summer of 1917, they had not been idle, and the constant Training and Instructions carried out in these months bore abundant fruit in the Operations of October and November. Machine Gun Organisation, being gradually evolved under the direction of the Corps Machine Gun Officer, Lt.-Col. Brutinel, D.S.O., proved its worth and efficiency at every step. Divisional H.Q. "*Battalions*," formed on August 23rd, 1917, were for the first time subjected to a thorough test in the various moves entailed by these Operations, and in the Operations themselves. The advantages of this Organisation were clearly demonstrated: its weaknesses also, were revealed.

### Effects of Battle on Tactical Theory.

The Theory of Tactical Handling of Machine Guns, which had undergone such radical changes since 1916, was now being stabilised. The experience of our Machine Gunners at PASSCHENDAELE helped very greatly in giving Tactical Theory a definite form and content. Principles of Employment of Machine Guns in Attack and Defence, hitherto in a more or less experimental stage, were now established beyond question.

Our Machine Gun Barrages were never more effective than in the Battle of PASSCHENDAELE. The system of Communications and methods of Control of these Guns previously employed were again proved sound. Consolidation Guns, going forward with the Infantry, contributed greatly toward the Defence of captured ground. These Guns were employed to the best advantage when a close Liaison was maintained between Forward Guns and the Infantry Battalions with which they co-operated.

### Liaison With Infantry.

Successful Co-operation of machine Guns with Infantry depends as much upon the knowledge of Machine Gun tactics possessed by the Infantry Commander concerned, and the interest which he takes in the employment of these weapons, as upon the energy and ability of the Machine Gun Officer in charge of the Guns. No finer example could be found of Liaison between Mobile Machine Guns and Infantry in Action, than that of the 16th Company Guns, under Lieut. MONTAGNON, M.C., operating with the 72nd C.I.Bn., on October 30th.

### Uses of Vickers Gun Crystallised.

The special Characteristics of the Vickers Gun, and the work which those special characteristics fitted it to do, were made still more obvious by the weather and consequent ground conditions at PASSCHENDAELE. The success of our Machine Gun Barrage Batteries and the fine achievements of our Mobile and Sniping Guns showed alike the scope and the limitations of the Vickers Gun. Once in Position the Vickers Gun could deliver Fire, either Indirect or Direct, with equal efficiency, but it could not compete with the Lewis Gun, its lighter contemporary, in rapidity either of reaching initial Positions or of changing from one Position to another. The difficulties of movement caused by the muddy condition of the ground at PASSCHENDAELE, made the contrast between the Vickers and Lewis Guns more marked, and subsequent to these Operations, there was less and less tendency, on the part of the higher Infantry Command, to confuse the functions of these two weapons.

### Why Casualties Were Heavy.

Casualties suffered were heavy, for various reasons. The Frontage of Attack was relatively narrow; as the Attack progressed our Front became more and more of a Salient into the German Line. Artillery Fire could therefore be brought to bear upon the Canadian Corps on a narrow Front from 3 sides. The severity of hostile Shelling was mainly responsible for the large number of Casualties. There was no means of getting away from enemy Artillery Fire; no Communication Trenches, few serviceable Fire Trenches, no Dugouts. Only a small proportion of the Personnel could be accommodated in the limited amount of Shelter provided by captured Pill Boxes.

Enemy Gas Shelling accounted for a large toll of Casualties. The wet soil retained the poisonous Gases long after Gas-shell Bombardment had ceased. The low, marshy ground in the valleys of the RAVEBEEK and HAVEBEEK was never quite free from gas while the Canadian Corps was in the Area, so that, quite apart from Casualties inflicted during enemy gas Shelling, a great many Men were evacuated, gassed or sick, as a result of breathing a gas-polluted atmosphere for several successive days.



Even the Transport Lines were the scene of numerous Casualties to the Men and horses. Both POTIJZE and Camp "X," ST. JEAN, were frequently shelled by enemy High Velocity Guns. On the night of November 4th/5th, 70 Rounds, High Velocity Shells, were fired on POTIJZE and its vicinity between 11.30 P.M. and 4.30 A.M. In the 5th Company, 5 Casualties to Other Ranks occurred during the night. In the same Company, 2 Saddle Horses and 2 Light Draught Horses were killed and 1 Saddle Horse and 11 Light Draught Horses, wounded. The 6th Company had 7 other ranks wounded by this Shelling. On November 11th, while sitting in the Officers' Mess at Camp "X," ST. JEAN, Lieut. HEATH (1st Company) was mortally wounded by a fragment from a Shell exploding close by. A Mess Orderly was also wounded by this Shell.

German Aeroplanes bombed the Rear Areas day and night whenever the weather permitted. In fine weather, Gotha Squadrons, with protective Aeroplanes, flew over our Billeting Area as many as 3 times in daylight, dropping Bombs on Road Traffic, Tents and Transport Lines. At 11.00 A.M., Nov. 12th, a Bomb, dropped at POTIJZE, wounded 3 Other Ranks of the 14th Company and 2 of the 11th Company. On the same day 1 Other Rank in the 1st Company was killed and 1 Other Rank wounded by enemy Bombs.

### Casualties Illustrated.

All these cause combined to make our losses heavy. Conditions remained unchanged throughout the Canadian Corps Tour. The following Tables show Machine Gun Casualties to the Fourth "*Battalion*" for Phases VI and VI, and to the First "*Battalion*" for the last 2 Phases:-

a. Fourth M.G. "*Battalion*" Casualties from October 25th to November 1st:-

UNIT	Killed		Wounded		TOTAL	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
10th C.M.G. Company	1	6	2	50	3	56
11th C.M.G. Company		1	3	28	3	19
12th C.M.G. Company	1	4	1	13	2	17
16th C.M.G. Company	1	7	1	26	2	33
TOTAL	3	18	7	107	10	125

a. First M.G. "*Battalion*" Casualties from Midnight, November 1st/2nd, to Noon, November 15th:-

UNIT	Killed		Wounded		Missing		TOTAL	
	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.	Off.	O.R.
1st C.M.G. Company	1	7	5	22		1	6	30
2nd C.M.G. Company		10		27	1	1	1	38
3rd C.M.G. Company		7	1	41		2	1	50
13th C.M.G. Company		2		32				34
TOTAL	1	26	6	122	1	4	8	152



### Resume of Casualties.

The Following is a resume of Casualties to Active Units of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps during the 4 Phases of the PASSCHENDAELE Operations:-

UNIT	Period	Off.	O.R.	TOTAL
First Cdn. Div'l. M.G. Bn.	Nov. 2nd to 15th.	8	152	160
Second Cdn. Div'l. M.G. Bn.	Nov. 2nd to 12th.	8	159	167
Third Cdn. Div'l. M.G. Bn.	Oct. 26th to Nov. 1st.	9	133	142
Fourth Cdn. Div'l. M.G. Bn.	Oct. 26th to Nov. 1st.	10	125	135
1st C.M.M.G. Brigade and Attached Batteries	Oct. 25th to Nov. 15th.	9	86	95
	TOTAL Casualties	44	655	699

### Supply of Reinforcements.

Arrangements made for the supply of Reinforcements worked excellently. Officers and Other Ranks were sent up to Units in the Line from the Advanced Reinforcement Depot, at YORK CAMP, a few hours after Casualties in Units had occurred. In the period from November 2nd to November 12th, the 6th Company had 17 Other Ranks, killed, and 1 Officer and 48 other Ranks wounded, a total of 1 Officer and 65 Other Ranks Casualties. In the same period, 3 Officers and 35 Other Ranks were received by this Unit as Reinforcements.

### Excellence of Fresh Drafts.

By the end of Phase VII the allotted number of Reinforcements maintained in France, viz. 10% of the Strength of Active Units, had been used up: from this time on, reinforcements consisted of Men freshly arrived from England, a large proportion of whom had never been under Fire. In one case a Barrage Battery was reduced to 2 Gunners per Gun and these Gunners were fresh Drafts. Lieut.-Col. BRUTINEL, in a letter to the Corps Commander, pays a high tribute to these Men and to the Canadian Machine Gun Depot at SEAFORD, Commanded by Lieut.-Col. BALFOUR, D.S.O.:-

*"All Batteries remained in action, under the severest conditions ever experienced ... This does the greatest credit to the energy and resourcefulness of the Officers and N.C.O.'s of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps, but it was rendered possible chiefly by the very high standard of training attained in the Canadian Machine Gun Depot in England, and the Discipline, and Esprit de Corps with which the fresh Drafts were imbued."*

### The Corps Commander's Tribute to Machine Gunners.

The Battle of PASSCHENDAELE was a test of M.G. Organisation, of M.G. Instruction and of the Machine Gun itself. But more than anything else, it was a test of the physical and moral fibre and Discipline of our Men, and they stood the test in superhuman fashion, rising magnificently Superior to every difficulty placed in their way, whether by Nature or a contriving foe. At the conclusion of Operations the Corps Commander, addressed the following appreciative letter to the Corps Machine Gun Officer:-

*"Canadian Corps Headquarters,  
10th November, 1917.*

*"Dear Brutinel,-*

*"I have read with great interest and profound pride, your report of the 9th instant with reference to the part played by the Machine Gun Units in our Recent Operations.*

*"I regret that the Casualties have been so high, but these have resulted from the special efforts made by the enemy to destroy the Machine Gun Crews from whom they had suffered so much.*

*"All prisoners have testified to the great losses caused the enemy by our Machine Gun Fire, while our own Infantry are loud in their praises as to the support rendered by our Machine Gunners.*



*"That the men of the Machine Gun Corps kept their guns in action under the conditions experienced, testifies in the highest possible manner to their splendid discipline and fine fighting spirit.*

*"I am glad to receive and will communicate to the authorities in England, your testimony as to the high standard of training and discipline noticeable in recent drafts.*

*"I would like to have an opportunity of personally conveying to Machine Gunners my appreciation of the splendid part played by them in the winning of our recent battles.*

*Ever Yours Faithfully  
(sgd) A.E. CURRIE.*

*"Lieut. Colonel Brutinel, D.S.O.  
Corps Machine Gun Officer."*

### **C.M.G.O.'s Letter of Appreciation.**

The following letter was sent by the Corps Machine Gun Officer to each Commanding Officer of the Cdn. M.G. Corps, along with copies of the Corps Commanders letters:-

*"H.Q. Canadian Corps,  
C.M.G.C.,  
Nov. 16th, 1917.*

*"I am sending you herewith copies of a letter I have received from the Corps Commander and which he has authorised me to circulate through the Units of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps.*

*"That letter is a very high tribute paid to the discipline, energy and unfaltering courage of the Machine Gunners, and I am sure that they will be very proud of the early recognition given to their valour by the Corps Commander.*

*"The high standard of efficiency obtained by all Machine Gun Units in all branches of training and organisation, has been brought sharply in evidence by the severity of the test to which it was submitted.*

*"The fine example of daring, initiative, and fruitful leadership on the part of the Officer commanding Mobile Machine Guns stands out with particular brilliance.*

*"By their physical and moral endurance, their spirit of sacrifice and absolute devotion to duty, the Barrage Machine Gun Batteries succeeded in maintaining their Batteries in action regardless of the most adverse conditions of ground and weather, and of the awful losses inflicted on them by the Hostile Artillery.*

*"There is plentiful evidence of the severe casualties that the Machine Gun batteries inflicted on the enemy.*

*"The standard set by the Canadian Machine Gunners, during the operations leading to the capture of PASSCHENDAELE RIDGE, can possibly be equalled, - it cannot be surpassed.*

*"Yours Sincerely,  
(Sgd.) R. BRUTINEL"*



## CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADES

NOVEMBER 18th TO JULY 30th, 1918.

### 1ST CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADE AND ATTACHED BATTERIES:

#### NOVEMBER 18th, 1917, TO MARCH 22nd, 1918.

##### 1st C.M.M.G.B. Nov. 18th to Dec. 31st 1917.

The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade and the 3 attached Batteries remained in their Billets in PERNES from November 18th, 1917, until December 31st, 1917 when they moved to a new Camp at VERDREL, a small Village about 2 miles S. of BARLIN. Advantage was taken of the time spent in PERNES to rest and refit the Units and to train the Officers and Men who arrived as Reinforcements during and immediately after the Battle of PASSCHENDAELE.

##### Defensive Positions Occupied, Jan., 1918.

For the greater part of January, 1918, a Battery of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade occupied Defensive Positions behind the Canadian Corps on the VIMY Front in accordance with the following Instructions:-

1. *"1st Cdn. M.M.G. Bde., will place 6 Machine Guns with their Detachments at the disposal of the G.O.C., 3rd Cdn. Div., as a temporary measure, from the night 28th/29th December inclusive.*
2. *"These Machine Guns will take up positions in the RED Line in the Northern part of the 3rd Cdn. Divl. Area, under instructions to be issued by the G.O.C., 3rd Cdn. Div.*
3. *"These Guns will only be attached to the 3rd Cdn. Div. till such time as the Forward Defences, particularly wire and new Machine Gun Emplacements in the Northern area of the 3rd Cdn. Div. have been put into such state as to permit of the re-adjustment of the Machine Guns of the 3rd Cdn. Divl. M.G. Battalion. The 3rd Cdn. Div. will report to Corps Headquarters when this re-adjustment has been carried out. The Machine Guns of the 1st C.M.M.G. Bde. will then be withdrawn."*

The Yukon Battery was the first Battery to be placed under the Tactical Control of the Third Canadian Division, and, on December 29th, 1917, its Guns were placed on the E. side of LOOS to strengthen the Defences of HILL 70. This Battery was relieved by "A" Battery, 1st C.M.M.G. Bde., on the evening of January 6th, 1918, and 8 days after "B" Battery relieved "A" Battery in the Line. During these Tours. The Batteries carried out Harassing Fire at night, and during the day improved the Emplacements, Dugouts and Trenches occupied by them. On January 25th, "B" Battery was relieved by Machine Guns of the First Cdn. Division. Enemy Shelling was comparatively light on the area occupied by the Motor Machine Gunners and no Casualties were suffered. The Batteries out of the Line were kept busy in completing the construction of their new Camp, in Training in the Vickers gun, in Indirect and Barrage fire, and in Physical and Infantry Drill.



**VIMY RIDGE Defences.**

Early in 1918, in preparation against the very obvious offensive intentions of the enemy, the Canadian Corps began to organise and construct a comprehensive Area of defences of great Depth, in the VIMY RIDGE Sector. The Scheme consisted of successive Defensive systems running roughly parallel to the Front and connected with one another by Switch Lines. The preparation and execution of this Plan of Defence in Depth was based upon a framework of Machine Gun Positions. Numerous Machine Gun Emplacements and Dugouts to accommodate the Gun Crews were built at carefully sited points. The Emplacements were protected by Wire Entanglements, which were so placed as to be enfiladed over their entire length by the Fire of the Machine Guns.

**Construction of M.G. Emplacements.**

In connection with the construction of the Machine Gun Emplacements of these Defences, the B.O., G.S. Canadian Corps wrote to the Corps Machine Gun Officer, Lieut.-Col. BRUTINEL, as follows:-

*"With reference to the ... proposed machine gun emplacements for the VIMY defences, I consider it urgent to get some sort of emplacements completed without delay.*

*"As the concrete situation is not promising, and as tunnellers are fully employed at present further forward, I think we should, as a temporary measure, construct the sleeper and rail type whenever this can be done without sacrificing concealment, and this condition obtains in most of the sites in question.*

*"The Division at present has its hands full with work further forward on account of the damage to trenches following the recent thaw, so I think it would be advisable to employ the Motor Machine Gun Brigade on constructing this work."*

On February 6th, 1918, the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade received Orders to construct 10 Machine Gun Emplacements in the VIMY Defences. The Batteries proceeded independently to Billets in Dugouts and small Huts in or near VIMY, the Yukon Battery being the first to start work on the 8th. Each Battery returned to the Camp at VERDREL on completion of the work allotted to it. The Yukon and "A" and "B" Batteries had already finished their Tasks, when new Instructions were given to the Motor Brigade to construct an additional series of M.G. Emplacements in the VIMY RIDGE Defences. On March 1st, "A" and "B" Batteries, followed later by the Borden and Eaton batteries, moved into Billets on the ridge conveniently near to their work. The Guns and all other fighting Equipment were taken to the Forward Area by the Batteries. In case of a hostile Offensive the Batteries were to occupy Positions in the VIMY Defences until Orders to move were received from Cdn. Corps H.Q. Arrangements for occupying these Positions were made in advance in consultation with the Senior Officer of the Machine Gun Company in that Area. The Yukon Battery remained at VERDREL in Reserve and carried on with Machine Gun Training and Drill.

**Corps Commander Inspects M.M.G.B. Camp.**

While 4 of the Motor Batteries were building Emplacements on VIMY RIDGE, the Cdn. Corps Commander, General SIR ARTHUR CURRIE, on March 9th, inspected the Yukon Battery, the Motor Brigade Camp and Transport at VERDREL.



**GERMAN OFFENSIVE : MARCH 21ST, 1918, TO APRIL 10TH, 1918.  
1ST CANADIAN MOTOR MACHINE GUN BRIGADES AND ATTACHED BATTERIES.**

**1st C.M.M.G.B. Ordered to the AMIENS Front.**

Most unexpectedly, the 1st C.M.M.G. Bde, received in the afternoon of March 22nd, 1918, an Order from Canadian Corps Headquarters to "*proceed tomorrow to AMIENS and on arrival come under Orders of Fifth Army.*" The Brigade and the attached Batteries were to leave the Canadian Corps Area before 6.00 A.M., March 23rd. Steps were immediately taken to withdraw the Batteries from the Forward Area, and to prepare the 8 Armoured Cars and all the Transport for Action on the AMIENS-St. QUENTIN Front.

**THIRD and FIFTH ARMIES' Front, Morning, March 21st.**

By mid-March, 1918, the possibility of a German Attack had ceased to be a matter of speculation, and on March 19th, its imminence became very pronounced on the Fronts of the THIRD and FIFTH ARMIES, holding the 2 Southernmost portions of the British Front. At 4.00 A.M. March 21st, 1918, just prior to the German Attack, the Line held by these 2 Armies, from S. to N., ran roughly as follows:-

From 2 miles W. of ST. GOBAIN (junction of FIFTH ARMY with the THIRD FRENCH ARMY) - W. and N. of la FERRE - along the E. side of the Road to HAMEGICOURT - across the CANAL de l'OISE at BERTHENICOURT - W. of ITANCOURT - S.-W. and W. of ST. QUENTIN - E. of HARGICOURT W. of GONNELIEU (junction of FIFTH and THIRD ARMIES) - W. of MARCOING - S. of GRAINCOURT S. and W. of QUEANT - W. of FONTAINE-les-CROISILLES- E. of SHERISY, MONCHY-le-PREUX and ROEUX (junction of THIRD and FIRST ARMIES.)

The intentions were to separate the British Army from the French Army, and then destroy the former as a Fighting organisation. The Germans assaulted the British Line from the OISE RIVER, on the S. to the SCARPE ROVER, on the N. - about 50 miles. The Attack was made in considerable strength along the whole Front, but it was delivered with special violence on the Front of the FIFTH ARMY. The Sector between St. GOBAIN and GONNELIEU was held from Right to left, by the III, XVIII, XIX and VII Corps, which formed the FIFTH ARMY under the command of General SIR HUBERT GOUGH. The Defences in each Corps Front were organised into 2 Systems: the Forward Zone and the Battle Zone extending to a Depth of 1,200 yds. and 1,000 yds., respectively.

**Initial German Attack, March 21st, 1918.**

Favoured by dense fog and supported by a 6-hour intense Artillery and Trench Mortar Bombardment, the assaulting German Infantry Columns reached the Line of Resistance in the Forward Zone of the FIFTH ARMY at about 10.00 A.M., March 21st, 1918. Notwithstanding the strenuous and determined Resistance offered by the British Troops, the overwhelming numerical superiority of the enemy enabled him to overrun the Forward Zone early on in the first day. Out of 8 whole Battalions in the Forward Zone of the XVIII Corps, less than 50 Men ever got back to the Battle Zone; the remainder were either killed, wounded or taken Prisoners. It soon became manifest that the first stages of the Battle were going in favour of the enemy. The main Task of the Troops at close grips with the enemy was to delay the advance of the Germans as long as possible, thus upset his carefully laid Plans of Attack and also gain time for our hard-pressed Infantry to withdraw gradually to a strong Line of Resistance.



**FIFTH ARMY Line, Evening March 21st.**

In the evening of March 21st, the FIFTH ARMY Line ran approximately as follows:-

The original Line S. of LA FERE - through FARGNIERS and LIEZ, E. of the CROZART CANAL - thence N.-E. to VENDEUIL - thence N.-E. to LY-FONTAINE - Railway Embankment between LIZEROLLES and ESSIGNY-le-GRAND (junction of III and XVIII Corps) - thence N.-W. across the SOMME between CONTECOURT and FONTAINE-les-CLERCS - S. and W. of ROUPY - W. of SAVY - E. of HOLNON WOOD - N.-W. across the OMIGNON RIVER opposite BIHECOURT (junction of XVIII and XIX Corps) - through le VERGUIER - W. of the BOIS du GRAND PRIEL - E. of TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD (junction of XIX and VII Corps) - W. of EPEHY - in front of Railway between GOUZEAUCOURT and VILLERS-POUICH (junction of VII and V Corps, THIRD ARMY).

**Withdrawal to SOMME Line, Night March 22nd/23rd.**

Most of the Infantry Brigades in Action on the FIFTH ARMY Front had been reduced to fighting with only 2 Battalions each. On March 22nd, the enemy continued to advance through the Battle Zone and during the night March 22nd/23rd the FIFTH ARMY Line was generally withdrawn to the Left Bank of the SOMME. On the Right, the III Corps held the Line of the CANAL de ST. QUENTIN as far N. as JUSSY. The XVIII Corps extended the Line with the Thirty-sixth Division (including the 61st Inf. Brigade of the Twentieth Division) in Positions between JUSSY and SOMMETTE-EAUCOURT, the Thirtieth Division, between SOMMETTE-EAUCOURT and CANIZY and the Sixty-first Division, between CANIZY and the Left Boundary of the Corps mid-way between VOYENNES and BETHENCOURT. The Twentieth Division, which had been in G.H.Q. Reserve, was placed at the disposal of the XVIII Corps on the opening day of the Battle. The remaining 2 Brigades of this Division, the 60th and 59th covered the withdrawal of the XVIII Corps to the SOMME Line, and on the morning of March 23rd they took over the Front held by the Sixty-first Division, which was withdrawn into Corps Reserve. The XIX Corps conformed to this movement by gradually withdrawing to the SOMME from the Line MONCHY-LAGACHE - VRAIGNES - E. of BEAUMETZ - E. of BRUSLE. The VII Corps also started to move back to the Line DOINGT - BOIS des FLACQUES - BUSSU - AIZECOURT - NURLU - EQUANCOURT (in touch with V Corps, THIRD ARMY).

**Enemy Across the SOMME; March 23rd.**

On the morning of March 23rd, the enemy effected a Crossing over the SOMME, through the Town of HAM, and forced 1 of the Thirtieth Division Brigades to retire in the direction of EHMERY-HALLON. In the afternoon, the 60th Inf. Brigade, Twentieth Division, counter-attacked in a South-Easterly direction to drive the enemy back across the CANAL. The Counter-attack progressed well as far as the SUCRERIE, 500 yds. W. of the HAM Bridge, but it was held up there by Machine Gun Fire coming from the HAM Railway Station and from across the SOMME. The enemy made numerous unsuccessful attempts to effect other Crossings on the XVIII Corps Front, notably at OFFOY and BETHENCOURT. In view of the enemy pressure in this Area, the 182nd Inf. Bde., Sixty-first Division, was placed at the disposal of the Thirtieth Division, and the other 2 Brigades of the Sixty-first Division, the 183rd and 184th Brigades, were placed under the Orders of the Twentieth Division for Counter-attack Purposes. In the afternoon, the III Corps was placed under the Orders of the THIRD FRENCH ARMY, and the Ninth French Division was advancing to support the Fourteenth Division, holding the Left Flank of the III Corps. At the same time, the Tenth, Twenty-second and Sixty-second French Divisions were on the way from NOYON to support the XVIII Corps.



**FIFTH ARMY Line; Evening March 23rd.**

By the evening of March 23rd the enemy had forced back the Left Flank of the III Corps from JUSSY to CUGNY. This movement compelled the Thirty-sixth Division, on the Right of the XVIII Corps, to draw back its Right Flank. The XVIII Corps Front then ran roughly along the Line CUGNY - EAUCORT - AUBIGNY - FLAMICOURT - EPPEVILLE - CAHIZY - thence along the Western Bank of the SOMME to BETHENCOURT. The XIX Corps had completed its withdrawal to the Left Bank of the SOMME and continued the Line as far N. as PERONNE, where the Situation was uncertain. The enemy had been exerting, throughout the day, a strong pressure against the VII Corps, which had retired to the Line SAINTE RADEGONDE - W. of MONT ST. QUENTIN - across the CANAL DU NORD to E. of CLERY-sur-SOMME. Near VAUX WOOD the enemy held the Line of the CANAL du NORD at MOISLAINS. The Germans continued to press hard with large Forces against the FIFTH ARMY, whose Task was to delay the enemy advance until the arrival of Reinforcements. As the Battle developed and Reinforcements became available, the French and the THIRD ARMY (British), respectively, were to take over the Left and Right Flank of the FIFTH ARMY. British Troops were already moving from the Northern part of the Front to reinforce the THIRD ARMY. The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun brigade and attached Batteries were placed at the disposal of the FIFTH ARMY to assist in checking the enemy advance.

**1st C.M.M.G.B. Moves from VIMY to AMIENS Front.**

In the afternoon of March 22nd, 1918, when the 1st C.M.M.G. Bde. received Instructions to move the following morning to the FIFTH ARMY Area, 4 of the Motor Batteries were on the VIMY RIDGE and the remaining Battery was in Camp at VERDREL. At about 2.00 A.M., March 23rd, the 4 Batteries from the Forward Area arrived at VERDREL, and at 5.30 A.M., the whole of the Brigade moved as 1 Column to AMIENS. The 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade was commanded by Lieut.-Col. WALKER, D.S.O., M.C., who, up to March 17th, 1918, had been in charge of the Machine Gun Squadron of the Canadian Corps Cavalry. Lieut.-Col. WALKER's Command consisted of the following Units:-

- "A" Battery, 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade, 8 Vickers Guns, mounted on 4 Armoured Cars.
- "B" Battery, 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade, 8 Vickers Guns, mounted on 4 Armoured Cars.
- "C" Battery, Borden M.M.G. Battery, 8 Vickers guns, carried in light Box Cars.
- "D" Battery, Eaton M.M.G. Battery, 8 Vickers guns, carried in light Box Cars.
- "E" Battery, Yukon M.M.G. Battery, 8 Vickers guns, carried in light Box Cars.

All 5 Batteries were grouped together under the 1 Command, known as the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade.

**Message from Corps Commander.**

Just before leaving the Canadian Corps Area, the 1st C.M.M.G. Bde. received the following message from the Canadian Corps Commander, SIR ARTHUR CURRIE:-

*"The Corps Commander wishes you the best of luck and has every confidence that you will do more than well."*

**Tasks of Motor Brigade.**

The Motor Batteries proceeded through DIVION, ST. POL, and FREVEN and arrived at the outskirts of AMIENS at about 12.45 P.M., March 23rd. In accordance with further Instructions received from the AMIENS Town-Major, the Brigade drove through the City of AMIENS, to the FIFTH ARMY H.Q., at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, where they arrived at 4.00 P.M. The Commanding Officer and his Second in Command (Major BATTERSBY, M.C.) had gone ahead to report to the FIFTH ARMY H.Q. After the Situation had been explained, it was decided to utilise the Motor Machine Gun Brigade in filling dangerous Gaps at any point on the ARMY Front. The Army Commander, General GOUGH, expressed his satisfaction at the timely arrival of the Batteries, which, he said, were his only available Reinforcements. He also expressed a wish to see the Men of the Brigade before they went into Action; but this was impossible as most of the Batteries were despatched forward during the afternoon and evening.

Immediately after the arrival of the Motor Machine Gunners at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX (4.00 P.M.), the Eaton and Yukon Batteries, under Capt. MEURLING, M.C., were detailed to report to the G.O.C., XVIII Corps, at ROYE. A few hours later, in compliance with an Order from the FIFTH ARMY, the 1st



C.M.M.G. Brigade and Borden Battery, under Capt. HOLLAND, M.C., proceeded to CORBIE, where they came under the Orders of the VII Corps. "A" Battery was held in Reserve at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX until the following day, March 24th, when it was hurriedly sent forward to fill a Gap on the XIX Corps Front.

At 9.30 P.M., March 23rd, the Eaton and Yukon Batteries reported to the XVIII Corps H.Q., at ROYE. After the Officers and Men had had a hot meal, Capt. MEURLING was instructed to take his Group to NESLE, where it would come under the Orders of the Twentieth Division. Owing to the great confusion on the Roads caused by numerous disorganised Lines of Traffic running in both direction, the 2 Batteries were delayed on the way and did not reach NESLE until 2.00 A.M., March 24th. Billeting arrangements were made, and after insuring that the Guns, Transport and all other equipment was ready for immediate Action, the Men were allowed to retire.

#### **Tasks allotted to the Eaton and Yukon Batteries.**

At 5.00 A.M., Capt. MEURLING accompanied the G.O.C., 183rd Infantry Brigade, on a reconnaissance of the Twentieth Division Front. The enemy had gained a footing on the Western Bank of the CANAL N. of BETHENCOURT, thus threatening the Left Flank of the Twentieth Division and creating a Gap between the XVIII and XIX Corps. To re-establish the Line at this point the 183rd Brigade was to launch a Counter-attack, late in the morning with the object of retaking BETHENCOURT and driving the enemy back across the CANAL. The right half of the Twentieth Division Front, held by the 60th infantry Brigade, was being hard pressed by the enemy, who was trying to effect Crossings at CANIZY, OFFOY and VOYENNES. As a result of his reconnaissance of the Line, and in compliance with orders received from the Twentieth Division Headquarters, Capt. MEURLING detailed 4 Machine Guns of the Yukon Battery, under Lieut. BABB, M.C., to report to the 60th Inf. Brigade Headquarters at BACQUENCOURT and the remaining 4 Guns, under Lieut. VOSBURGH, were to cover an Artillery Brigade N.-W. of NESLE. Capt. HARKNESS, M.C., in charge of the 8 Guns of the Eaton battery, was to support the 183rd Brigade in its Counter-attack near BETHENCOURT. The 3 Detachments left NESLE for their different destinations between 10.00 and 11.30 A.M. March 24th. Capt. MEURLING established his Group Headquarters at NESLE in close touch with the Twentieth Division.

#### **4 Yukon Battery Guns on Twentieth Div. Right.**

When Lieut. BABB reported to BACQUENCOURT at 10.45 A.M. March 2th, the Situation on the 60th Infantry Brigade Front was not clear. The enemy was exerting a continual pressure in an endeavour to break through towards NESLE from the direction of HAM. Farther S., he was attempting to approach GRECOURT from the S.-E. and E. Under the Instructions of the G.O.C., 60th brigade, the 4 Machine Guns of the Yukon battery were placed, at about 11.30 A.M., in Positions in front of the HOMBLEUX Cemetery. At Noon, 1 of the Guns was taken forward to reinforce the Infantry in the Front Line, which was little more than a line of Skirmishers. Shortly after, the Thirtieth Division, on the right, began to retire and the Right Flank of the 60th Brigade was exposed. In view of the Situation on the Right and the excessive pressure of the enemy at VOYENNES and BETHENCOURT, the Infantry began to fall back to the Line of the LIBERMONT CANAL - MESNIL - St. NICAISE. No warning of this move had been given to the Motor Machine Gunners operating on the 60th Brigade Front. Noticing the retirement of the Infantry, Lieut. BABB immediately rushed ahead to get in touch with his forward Gun Crew. Unfortunately, he was severely wounded and taken Prisoner before he reached his Man. The Gun was destroyed and all the members of the Crew became Casualties.

The intense Fighting and intermittent retirements of the last 3 days completely tired and disorganised the Infantry, who were now glad to rally around the other 3 Machine Guns E. of the HOMBLEUX Cemetery. This Position was held and the enemy advance checked until 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The 3 Guns obtained excellent Targets, especially on the HAM-NESLE Road, where the enemy advanced in Column. Several belts were fired at Ranges between 800 and 300 yards. Very heavy Casualties were inflicted on the enemy and on several occasions our well-directed Fire prevented German Machine Gunners from bringing their Guns into Action. By 4 P.M. our Infantry had withdrawn to the W. Bank of the CANAL. The enemy had forced his way on both Flanks of the Machine Gun Positions: his forward elements advancing from GRECOURT were 300 yds. S. of HOMBLEUX and a number of German Machine Guns located on HILL 70, between CANIZY and HOMBLEUX, had opened Fire on the Village and Cemetery. The Motor Machine Gunners were, therefore, withdrawn across the CANAL by Lieut. W.J. CAMPBELL, who had assumed command of the Detachment after Lieut. BABB had become a Casualty. In the evening of March



24th, the 3 Yukon Battery Guns were in Positions N.-W. of BREUIL to cover the BACQUENCOURT Bridge.

#### **4 Yukon Battery Guns in Twentieth Div. Centre.**

At about Noon March 24th, Lieut. VOSBURGH, in charge of the other half of the Yukon battery, proceeded, in accordance with Orders from the Twentieth Division, to occupy Positions N.-W. of NESLE. But on arrival at his destination he found out that the Artillery he was to protect had already withdrawn to new Positions farther back. Early in the evening, Capt. MEURLING ordered Lieut. VOSBURGH to join Capt. HARKNESS and reinforce the 18rd Brigade, which was then operating in the vicinity of MAISNIL - ST. NICAISE.

#### **Eaton Battery on Twentieth Division Left.**

While Lieut. BABB's Detachment was going into Action on the Right of the Twentieth Division in front of HOMBLEUX, the Eaton battery. 45 All ranks, commanded by Capt. HARKNESS, M.C., had reported to the 183rd Infantry Brigade Headquarters at MESNIL - ST. NICAISE. The Task allotted to the Eaton Battery is described by Capt. HARKNESS in his account of the Operation:-

*"General SPOONER in command of the 183rd Infantry Brigade outlined the position as follows:- The Germans are crossing the SOMME at BETHENCOURT, supported by Artillery Fire from the vicinity of MATIGNY, VILLECOURT and the Wood W. of the Village were concentration points of enemy Troops. The 183rd Infantry Brigade, about 600 Rifles strong, were to move in a North-Easterly direction from MESNIL-St. NICAISE to launch a counter-attack against BETHENCOURT at about 12.00 noon. A Company of a battalion of the Royal Scots were to advance simultaneously on BETHENCOURT from the W. As time was very limited and only small scale maps were available, it was impossible to arrange a Barrage to cover the advance of our own Infantry. It was, therefore, decided to send 2 Machine Guns to assist the Royal Scots and the remainder of the Battery to proceed in rear of the attacking Infantry to the forward slope of Hill 80 and support them with direct overhead fire and at the same time harass VILLECOURT.*

*"Sgt. J. ANDERSON, D.C.M, in command of 2 Guns, proceeded to support the Royal Scots and Lieut. G.A. MARSHALL, with 6 Guns, proceeded to support the Infantry marching on BETHENCOURT from the S.-W. Each Gun carried 2,000 rounds of ammunition in belts, An ammunition dump of belt boxes was established on the northern outskirts of MESNIL - St. NICAISE."*

GENERAL SPOONER ordered Capt. HARKNESS to remain at his Headquarters.

Coincident with the formation of this plan, the enemy laid a heavy Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage round MESNIL - ST. NICAISE in preparation for a further Advance Westwards from BETHENCOURT. The Eaton Battery had just arrived at the Village when the Barrage came down. Capt. HARKNESS ordered his Men to dismount and to off-load the Guns and Equipment. He then sent his 8 Gun Detachments forward: 6, under Lieut. MARSHALL, to support the Counter-attack on BETHENCOURT, and 2, under Sgt. ANDERSON, to co-operate with Scottish Troops reported to be along the Road leading to PARGNY. The M.T. Drivers were instructed to return with the Cars to Group Headquarters at NESLE. With skilful initiative and daring, the Drivers rushed the Cars one by one through the Barrage. On their arrival at NESLE the Cars were found to be riddled with Shrapnel and Machine Gun Bullets through the hoods and sides; but none of the Drivers were injured and no engine was damaged.

#### **Action of Eaton Battery Near BETHENCOURT.**

On arrival at the Plateau, W. of BETHENCOURT, at about Noon march 24th, Lieut. MARSHALL got in touch with the few Infantry on the ground. Not only were the Infantry unaware of the intention of the 183rd Brigade to counter-attack, but the Germans had already begun to advance from BETHENCOURT towards the Plateau. Our 6 machine Guns were immediately brought into Action and their Fire was a few minutes later supplemented by the Fire of the 2 Guns under Sgt. ANDERSON. This N.C.O. had proceeded along the MESNIL - ST. NICAISE - PARGNY Road past the intersection of this Road with the MORCHAIN - FONTAINE-les-PARGNY Road. He noticed that the Germans had effected a Crossing at PARGNY but as he had been unable to find the Detachment of Royal Scots, whom he was to assist, he, with his 2 Guns, joined Lieut. MARSHALL's Group. The Fire of the Eaton Battery Machine Guns was to a very large degree responsible for temporarily checking the enemy Advance. Many Casualties were inflicted on the



assaulting Forces and on the German Troops crossing the CANAL at BETHENCOURT. At the same time, the Motor Machine Gunners fired on and dispersed Enemy Infantry Groups moving from BETHENCOURT in a South-Westerly direction. The few Infantrymen on the Right of our Machine Guns had withdrawn during this Action without advising the Gunners. At about 1.00 P.M., Lieut. MARSHALL, who was the only Officer with the Battery, endeavoured to get in touch with the Infantry on his Left. Instead of friendly Troops, he discovered, in the low ground between the Battery Positions and FONTAINE-les-PARGNY, a large Group of about 500 Germans sitting on the ground and apparently resting. The 8 Machine Guns of the Eaton battery concentrated at once their Fire on this exceptional target and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, who was completely taken by surprise. Shortly after our guns stopped firing, German Machine Guns located in front and on both sides of the Plateau began to fire on our Gun Crews. In about 15 minutes 50% of the Personnel of the Battery had become Casualties. As the Infantry had withdrawn the Eaton Battery found itself isolated on the Plateau and threatened with the danger of being surrounded.

Messages were sent to Capt. HARKNESS at MESNIL - ST. NICAISE, but the messengers did not return. Lieut. MARSHALL decided to withdraw his Battery and in his account of the Operation he writes: *"I sent one of the Gunners back on my motor cycle asking for more ammunition. He failed to return. After the Infantry had withdrawn we were alone. We could see no British Troops on our right and there were none on our Left. We were under heavy fire. Our Ammunition was very low and our usefulness had really ceased until we could get more ammunition. Our surprise on the massed Germans had played itself out. Everyone seemed to have gone but us."*

The withdrawal was made by half-batteries Westward toward DRESLINCOURT, the direction of withdrawal of the 183rd Infantry brigade Troops with whom Lieut. MARSHALL had Orders to co-operate. During this move, 1 Gun Crew, under Corporal McKENNA, got detached from the battery and eventually, after wandering for several hours, joined Capt. HARKNESS. The withdrawal of the Eaton battery, which commenced between 1.30 and 2.00 P.M., was necessarily slow. Of this withdrawal Lieut. MARSHALL says:-

*"We went in with 4 men per Gun; at this time we did not have more than 2 per Crew. Each man's load was double, besides, we lent such aid to our wounded as we could."*

*"As we withdrew towards DRESLINCOURT, we failed to find any Infantry with which to co-operate. We halted for a while at about 1,500 yds. S. of MORCHAIN. Here we were informed by an Infantryman that MESNIL-ST. NICAISE was in the hands of the enemy and that NESLE also had fallen. When we reached the Wood in front of DRESLINCOURT we were told the same story about MESNIL and NESLE by an Infantry Captain who was in command of about 50 Men in the Wood."*

The 7 Machine Guns of the Eaton Battery were placed E. and N. of the Wood, which was in the XIX Corps Area. These Positions were occupied only for a short time. The Battery and the Group of 50 Infantrymen moved to new Positions immediately N.-W. of DRESLINCOURT, where a Line was established behind an old Belt of Wire.

At this time the Situation was very obscure. In spite of many efforts, Lieut. MARSHALL was unable to get in touch with Capt. HARKNESS, Capt. MEURLING or the Twentieth Division Troops. His Gun Crews were greatly reduced in numbers and the Ammunition supply had been reduced to only 9 Belts for the whole Battery. The Guns of the Eaton Battery were the only Machine Guns which had been operating that day in that Area. They undoubtedly saved a critical Situation at BETHENCOURT, the junction of the XVIII and XIX Corps. When the Motor Machine Gunners reached the Plateau W. of BETHENCOURT, circumstances demanded a sudden change of plans from Offensive to Defensive. The rapidity with which the guns were then brought into Action against the advancing enemy bears testimony to the high standard of Training maintained in the Canadian Machine Gun Corps. The steadiness of the gun Crews in holding their Positions after the Infantry had retired, and the successful withdrawal to new Positions, when closely engaged by the enemy, are examples of a high sense of duty and good Discipline. The nature of the Fighting and the exhausted condition of our Infantry gave the Machine Gun Officers an opportunity to exercise initiative and leadership.



### **Situation Between XVIII and XIX Corps.**

To ascertain the Positions of our Troops N. and S. of his Guns near DRESLINCOURT, Lieut. MARSHALL sent 2 small patrols to reconnoitre the ground on both Flanks. Sgt. T.S. CLARK, was sent back with a few Men to get in touch with the Troops in Rear and, if possible, to secure a supply of Ammunition. An Observation Post was established on a near-by haystack. While these parties were being detailed and the Field of Fire of our Machine Guns was being arranged, the Officer in charge of the Group of Infantrymen, N.-W. of DRESLINCOURT, withdrew his Men, for no apparent reason, to positions farther back. The Motor Machine Gunners remained in their places, throughout the afternoon. It was later learned that these Positions were about 2,000 yds. in front of the Positions held by our Infantry. Thinking that these Positions were occupied by the enemy, the pilot of one of our Aeroplanes dived down and fired his machine Gun into them; but, fortunately none of our Gunners was hit. The two Patrols, which Lieut. MARSHALL had sent out to the Right and Left, reported that there were no British Troops for a mile on either Flank. Evidently, the Left Flank of the XVIII Corps had been withdrawn South-Westward and the Right Flank of the XIX Corps, North-Westward, thus creating a Gap of about 3,000 yds. between MESNIL - ST. NICAISE and POTTE. It was through this Gap that the Eaton Battery had withdrawn earlier in the afternoon. Sgt. CLARK returned in the evening with the information that the Twenty-fourth Division (XIX Corps) was organising a Line behind HYENCOURT-le-PETIT. The Troops of this Division were unaware of the presence of our Gun detachments in front of them.

### **Eaton Battery on XII Corps Front.**

Owing to the lack of close Infantry support and the approach of darkness it was thought unwise to maintain the advanced position held by the Eaton Battery. A Machine Gun is not a Weapon of self-defence: the value of direct M.G. Fire on open warfare is lost at night, unless direct observation can be replaced by an Infantry escort to warn the Machine Gunners of the approach of the enemy. Lieut. MARSHALL, therefore, who had failed to get in touch with the Twentieth Division, decided to withdraw his Guns and co-operate with the Twenty-fourth Division in the defence of the new Line they were organising. The Eaton Battery Guns were placed in positions E. and N. of HYENCOURT-le-PETIT to cover the infantry, who were digging a trench 500 yds. behind the Village. A small amount of Bulk S.A.A., 16 ammunition belts and a few tins of "*Bully Beef*" were secured from the O.C., 24th Battalion, Machine Gun Corps. At 1.00 A.M., march 25th, when the Infantry were well advanced in the preparation of the new line of Defence, 5 of the Eaton Battery Guns were moved to new positions along the FONCHETTE - OMIECOURT Road. The remaining 2 Machine Guns were left N.-E. of HYENCOURT-le-PETIT to cover 3 Guns of the Twenty-fourth Divisional Artillery, which were still maintaining their Positions in the Village.

### **Capt. HARKNESS Reinforced by 4 Yukon Battery Machine Guns.**

The 183rd Infantry Brigade had suffered heavy Casualties in the Action near BETHENCOURT and its Troops had fallen back rapidly. During the afternoon of March 24th, the Situation in front of MESNIL - ST. NICAISE was very critical. General SPOONER himself went over the right half of his Brigade Front and Captain HARKNESS went over the Left Section to obtain information as to the dispositions of the enemy and our own Troops. Enemy Machine Guns located in ROUY-le-PETIT and on Hill 80 were very active. It was decided to establish with the few remaining Infantry a Line running along the ROUY-le-PETIT - MESNIL - ST. NICAISE Road to DRESLINCOURT. No sooner had this decision been reached than the Germans attacked under a comparatively heavy Barrage and established themselves on a Line in front of MESNIL - ST. NICAISE.

At about 5.00 P.M., Lieut. VOSBURGH and Lieut. L. BLACK with 4 Machine Guns and Crews of the Yukon Battery reported to Capt. HARKNESS. While waiting for the Situation to clear. These 4 Guns were placed about 500 yds. N.-E. of the NESLE Railway Station to cover the approaches to NESLE. The 1 Gun of the Eaton battery, under Capt. HARKNESS, was posted on the high ground about 700 yds. S.-E. of MESNIL-le-PETIT to enfilade the ground E. of the MESNIL-le-PETIT-POTTE Road and also to stop any enemy attempt on NESLE from the direction of MESNIL - ST. NICAISE. It became evident by 8.00 P.M. that the enemy would attempt a flanking movement on NESLE from the N. either during the night or early the following morning. The Infantry Commander decided to hold a new Line along the DRESLINCOURT-NESLE Road with outposts in front of it. Capt. HARKNESS got into touch with the elements of the 183rd Infantry Brigade on the Left and helped them to organise the new Line by placing his Machine Guns in positions in front of the Railway between the NESLE Railway Station and the intersection of the NESLE-DRESLINCOURT and the MESNIL-le-PETIT-MANICOURT Roads. General SPOONER moved his Headquarters to the Southern outskirts of FAUBORG ST. LEONARD (NESLE).



**"A" Battery reports to XIX Corps; March 24th.**

While the Eaton battery was in action in the plateau W. of BETHENCOURT, early in the afternoon of March 24th, elements of the Eighth Division holding the Right Flank of the XIX Corps between BETHENCOURT and PARGNY, were being pressed back by the enemy. The 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade received an Order from FIFTH ARMY H.Q. to place at once 1 Battery at the disposal of the XIX Corps. "A" Battery, which had been held in Reserve at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, was hurriedly despatched forward. In accordance with Instructions received from the XIX Corps, and, later, from the Eighth Division Headquarters, Major BATTERSBY in charge of "A" Battery, reported to the Commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade (Eighth Division), Brigadier-General HAIG, at MARCHELOT. The 8 Guns of "A" Battery were mounted 2 on each of 4 Armoured Cars.

At that time the enemy was endeavouring to cross the SOMME between St. CHRIST and FALVY. At about 5.30 P.M., after a consultation with the Infantry Brigadier, major BATTERSBY proceeded with 2 Armoured Cars, via LICOURT to CIZANCOURT. Major BATTERSBY himself was in one of the Cars and Lieut. CUTTLE, in the other. At LICOURT the 2 Cars were shelled, but by backing up and remaining under cover for about 20 minutes they were able to drive ahead although the German Artillery gunners had obtained 3 direct hits on the LICOURT-CIZANCOURT Road. On reaching CIZANCOURT the Detachment turned S. along the Road by the SOMME CANAL, towards EPENANCOURT. An Enemy Aeroplane dived down towards the Cars and fired on the Crews. The 4 Machine Guns on the 2 Armoured Cars immediately opened Fire and drove back the Aeroplane, which was seen to crash some distance away. On seeing the Armoured Cars, the enemy began to sweep the Road with Artillery and Machine Gun Fire, but none of the Cars was hit.

**"A" Battery Armoured Cars in Action.**

A Motor Cyclist Scout, who had been sent ahead by the O.C., "A" Battery, reported seeing about 50 Germans near the Road junction N. of EPENANCOURT. This report was corroborated by an Officer of the SHERWOOD Foresters (24th Inf. Brigade) who met this Armoured Car about 1,500 Yds. S. of CIZANCOURT and informed the Machine Gunners that the enemy was preparing to attack a Position held by the Sherwood Foresters N. of the Road junction. The Road being too narrow to operate 2 Cars, it was immediately arranged with the Officer of the Sherwood Foresters, to send 1 Car forward to co-operate with our Infantry in driving the enemy back or breaking up his Attack. Major BATTERSBY went ahead with his Car and soon came into contact with a party of the enemy behind a clump of brush, S. of the Road Junction. The 2 Machine Guns on the Car opened Fire simultaneously, killing and wounding many of the party and scattering the remainder. Our Machine Gunners had gone so far forward, that the enemy used Hand-Grenades against them. Several of these Grenades exploded close to the Car, but without effect. The Car remained in this Area for about 3 Hours firing at enemy parties across the CANAL and searching with Machine Gun Fire EPENANCOURT and the fields near the Village. About 8,000 Rounds were fired. This Armoured Car with Lieut. CUTTLE's Car rejoined the other 2 Cars at MARCHELPOT, where "A" Battery spent the night. During the evening's encounter the Barrel Casing of 1 of the 2 Guns of Major BATTERSBY's Car was pierced, but Casualties were suffered by the Personnel of the 2 Cars in Action.

**Situation on Northern Section of Fifth Army Front.**

The Left Flank of the XVIII Corps had been drawn back in a South-Westerly direction from BETHENCOURT towards MESNIL-ST. NICAISE. At the same time the enemy forced back the Eighth Division troops on the Right Flank of the XIX Corps in a North-Westerly direction from PARGNY. The Twenty-fourth Division had been thrown in by the XIX Corps near HAYENCOURT-le-PETT to fill in the Gap. On the Left Flank of the XIX Corps, behind PERONNE, the Situation was not clear. In the evening of March 23rd, the enemy had rapidly followed the withdrawal of the VII Corps to the Line running Northward from the N. Bank of the SOMME, immediately W. of PERONNE. The VII Corps Front was held from Right to Left by the Thirty-ninth, Twenty-first and Ninth Division, CLETY-sur-SOMME was closely behind the Centre Division, which was being hard pressed by the enemy advancing down the Valley of the TORTILLE RIVER.



**"B" Battery and Borden Battery Report to VII Corps.**

At 11.00 P.M., March 23rd, 1918, a few hours after the arrival of the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, "B" Battery (Captain HOLLAND, M.C.) and the Borden Battery (Capt. NICHOLSON, M.C.) were despatched to CORBIE to operate with the Left Corps of the FIFTH ARMY. The 2 Batteries reported to VII Corps H.Q. at CORBIE, at Midnight March 23rd/24th. At 2.00 A.M. March 24th, they were instructed to proceed to Maricourt and there come under the Orders of the Twenty-first Division. Owing to the congestion of traffic on the Roads, the Batteries were greatly delayed and did not reach MARICOURT until 6.00 A.M. The Battery Commanders reported to the Twenty-first Division Headquarters and also saw the Officer Commanding the 21st Battalion, Machine Gun Corps. They received Instructions to take their Commands to CLERY-sur-SOMME and on arrival there report to Lieut.-Col. SETTLE. The 8 Guns of "B" Battery like those of "A" battery were mounted on 4 Armoured Cars, each of which carried 2 Guns and their Crews. The 8 Guns and Personnel of the Borden Battery were conveyed in Light Box Cars.

**Enemy Advance N. of the Somme.**

It was about 8.00 A.M. March 24th, when the Batteries reached the junction of the MARICOURT - CLERY and HEM - CLERY Roads. At that time a heavy smoke cloud was blowing from the German Lines towards our Lines, but there were few other signs of hostile activity. The Armoured Cars and Transport were stopped just below the Crest of the slightly rising ground between BOIS de HEM and CLERY. Capt. HOLLAND and Capt. NICHOLSON went forward to CLERY and reported to Lieut.-Col. SETTLE, who wished to have 2 Machine Guns placed in the Village, 2 Guns, about 500 yds., left of the Village to fire in the direction of ALLAINES, and 2 Guns, on the slight rise, back of the Village to fire up the Valley of the SOMME in the direction of BIACHES. The Borden Battery, which was ready to go into Action dismounted, was ordered forward, and 2 of its Guns, under Lieut. WEST, were placed in CLERY. Enemy Shelling and Machine Gun Fire had now increased, and before the other Guns got into Action our Infantry were seen falling back over a slight Ridge on the Left of CLERY. On Instructions from Lieut.-Col. SETTLE, Capt. HOLLAND and Capt. NICHOLSON tried to rally the Infantry and with them organise for Defence a Trench running half-way up the Ridge back of the Village. The Infantry Commander, however, issued Orders to fall farther back to a Line just in front of the small Wood E. of BOIS de HEM. The hostile Artillery was now heavily shelling CLERY and the MARICOURT Road and masses of the enemy came out of the Smoke Cloud and were following our retreating Infantry. As soon as the German Troops broke through the Left, the enemy Fire on CLERY Ceased and the village was overrun.

**"B" Battery and Borden Battery Co-Operation With Twenty-First Division March 24th.**

The 2 Guns of the Borden Battery which were in Action on the Eastern outskirts of CLERY inflicted heavy Casualties on the Germans as their advancing Columns emerged from the Smoke Cloud and rushed forward across the Ridge N. of CLERY. A German Shell blew up 1 of these 2 Guns and either killed or wounded all its Crew. The members of the other Crew had also become Casualties but the Gun was kept in Action by Lieut. WEST and Corporal JOHNSON until the enemy Troops had entered the Village from the N. With the Fire of their Revolvers this Officer and N.C.O. kept the Germans at bay until they were able to get their Gun out of the Village. The Gun was then taken with the other 6 Guns of the Borden Battery and 8 Guns of "B" Battery to the top of the Ridge in front of the small Wood, E. of the Bois de HEM. The Machine Guns were placed in Positions on both sides of the CLERY-MARICOURT Road, along an old shallow Trench in front of a strong Belt of Wire. From these Positions the Guns covered by Fire the Valley of the SOMME, CLERY, and the ground to the Left of the Village.

The Motor Machine Gunners, who had an excellent view of all the Ground in front of them poured an intense Fire into the Ranks of the advancing enemy, breaking up their formation and inflicting heavy Casualties. But, as the Germans continued to approach the Positions, the Infantry who were in the shallow trench fell back. Capt. HOLLAND and Capt. NICHOLSON rallied them again and managed to induce a few of them to return to the Trench to co-operate with the Machine Gunners in the Defence of the Ground. There was, in all, a Garrison of about 100 men in the Trench holding a stretch of 500 yds. The determined Resistance offered by the Motor Machine Gun Batteries at this point considerably delayed the advance of the enemy. The Germans made several unsuccessful attempts to debouch from CLERY and to outflank our Gun Positions from the N. During one of these encounters, when the Germans were approaching on the Left Flank, Corporal JOHNSON was wounded by a Sniper while endeavouring to bring into Action the Gun which he had rescued from CLERY. Capt. HOLLAND was seriously wounded while going out, under direct enemy observation and intense Machine gun Fire, to render aid to a wounded Man in a Shell-hole on front of the Trench occupied by our Machine Gunners and the small group of Infantry. It was largely due to



the great example of courage and disregard for personal safety set by this Officer, earlier in the day, that our Machine Gun Detachments with a handful of tired Infantrymen were able to frustrate the efforts at advance made by an enemy overwhelmingly superior in numbers.

#### **Hostile Artillery Activity.**

In the meantime, the Shelling on the MARICOURT-CLERY Road had become very heavy. The Motor Transport was ordered back to MARICOURT, and 3 Armoured Cars were taken a short distance back to a bend in the Road to avoid the Shelling. The 4th Armoured Car could not be moved back then, owing to its proximity to a Dump of Explosives which had been set of Fire by a German Shell and was still burning. Eventually the Fire was extinguished, and Corporal HICKS and Private RUMFORD ("B" Battery), who had gone back with the other 3 Armoured Cars, returned to start the stranded Car. But, as they approached the Car, a Shell burst beside them instantly killing Private RUMFORD and fatally wounding Corporal HICKS. In spite of the heavy Shelling, Pte. J.A. HENDERSON (Borden Battery) and a "B" Battery Man volunteered to start and drive the Armoured Car away. Capt. HOLLAND, Corporal JOHNSON, Corporal HICKS, and several other wounded Men were placed in this Car and taken to the nearest Dressing Station. Capt. HOLLAND dies as he was being moved from the Car to a Stretcher.

#### **Casualties Suffered By M.M.G. Batteries; VII Corps Front March 24th.**

Owing to the heavy Artillery and Machine Gun Fire and the great activity of enemy Snipers, the Casualties suffered by "B" and "C" Batteries in the Forward Trench were extremely heavy. The Gun Positions were very exposed and the Trench was so wide and shallow that Men observing at the Guns were shot through the head. Lieut. SNYDER of "B" Battery and Lieuts. WEST and WALDRON of the Borden Battery, who had undertaken the arduous task of observing for the Guns of which they were in Command, were all shot through the head and instantly killed. The Fire of enemy Snipers and Machine Guns prevented the 2 Batteries from maintaining at the guns a proper supply of Ammunition, which was beginning to get very low. The Germans had gradually crept up close to our Gun Positions and were throwing Hand-Grenades into the Positions occupied by the Motor Machine Gunners. 3 or 4 of our Machine Guns had either been blown up or put out of Action by enemy Shells or Machine Gun Bullets. A few Infantry Reinforcements also came up and took up Positions in a fairly good trench behind a strong Belt of Wire. This Trench was about 50 yds. in rear of the Trench occupied by the Motor Machine Gunners. Earlier in the morning, our Machine Guns had been placed in front of the Wire to obtain a better Field of Fire for the guns and enable the Gunners themselves to watch all the movements of the enemy. This bold employment of Machine Guns was entirely responsible for holding up the enemy advance W. of CLERY. During the 4 or 5 hours spent in their Positions in the Shallow Trench in front of the Wire, the Gunners of the 2 Motor Machine Gun batteries were almost constantly firing at groups of Germans and inflicting heavy losses on them.

At 2.00 P.M. March 24th, the enemy was dangerously close to our Gun Positions, the Ammunition supply was very low, and our Gun Crews had been greatly depleted in numbers. Capt. NICHOLSON, who was then the only officer in Command of the 2 Machine Gun Batteries and the Infantry, decided to withdraw to the Trench behind the Wire. A few Casualties were suffered during this withdrawal, which had to be made under enemy observation and through a narrow Gap in the Wire. In their new Positions, the Machine Gun Detachments were more or less screened from direct enemy observation and they could, therefore, manage to maintain a good supply of Ammunition from a Dump, which had been established on the MARICOURT Road, during the morning. The Infantrymen in this Line belonged to the 15th Cheshire Regiment (Thirty-fifth Division) and were commanded by Colonel COCHRANE. The enemy Shelling was still causing us many Casualties in men and Guns. At about 4.00 P.M., Capt. NICHOLSON had, in all, 4 Guns left; the others had either been blown up or had been put out of Action. With the 4 Guns there were then only 1 Officer. Capt. NICHOLSON had sent a few Messages by Despatch Riders to the Twenty-first Divisional Headquarters and to the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade Headquarters explaining the Situation and asking for Reinforcements but received no response. At 3.00 P.M., he sent Lieut. INCH back to try and get in touch with Headquarters. In the meantime, Colonel COCHRANE had received Orders to withdraw his Men to a Line running approximately from HEM towards MAUREPAS. The Motor Machine Gunners were to cover this withdrawal, which was to take place at 8 o'clock in the evening. At 5.00 P.M., there were only 2 Machine Guns in Action, manned by 1 Officer, 2 N.C.O.s and a few Men.



### **Withdrawal to HEM-MAUREPAS Line.**

Shortly afterwards the enemy launched a strong Attack, breaking through on the Left Flank and advancing in large numbers from the Front. Our Infantry withdrew, but the Motor Machine Gunners remained in Action until practically surrounded. 1 of the 2 Guns was put out of Action a few minutes after the Attack commenced, and the other was fired with telling effect by Pte. FINLAYSON until the Germans were within 50 yds. of him. The few Machine Gunners, who were the last to leave the Trench, withdrew then down the Road in the direction of HEM. During this Action, Capt. NICHOLSON received a very severe wound, causing the loss of his right Arm. Battery S.M. FRECHETTE ("B" Battery) then assumed command of the 4 Men left and the few Other ranks, who had been carrying Messages and evacuating the wounded during the day. With these Men he proceeded to MARICOURT, where the Armoured Cars and Transport were. The Men spent the night March 24th/25th at MARICOURT and Lieut. INCH went to the 1st C.M.M.G. Bde. Headquarters at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX. "B" Battery and the Borden Battery had not had a rest since the night of March 21st/22nd, when they had withdrawn from the Line on the VIMY Front.

### **1st C.M.M.G. Bde. in the Line on FIFTH ARMY Front; March 24th.**

Throughout March 24th, the enemy continued to press hard against the FIFTH ARMY, which was holding an irregular Line with Troops exhausted by hard Fighting and incessant exertion. The 40 Machine Guns of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade had been thrown into the Battle and were spread over a Front of about 35 Miles. By fighting an obstinate Rear-guard Action, the Motor Machine Gunners were helping the Infantry to preserve a continuous Line and to retard the German Advance until Reinforcements became available.

In conjunction with the German Attacks, enemy agents, dressed in mufti or in British Uniforms, were very active behind our Lines spreading rumours that greatly tended to demoralise both the French Civilians and our Rear Echelons. At about 12.30 P.M. March 24th, a false rumour was spread around NESLE that large bodies of German Cavalry were advancing on the City. The result was a hurried withdrawal of the Ordnance, Supply and other Columns stationed in NESLE. This added confusion to the Roads already crowded with Traffic, and made Communication very difficult. Frequently the Forward Echelons were unaware of the movements of the Rear Echelons, on whom Line Troops depended for their Supplies of Rations and Ammunition.

### **Move of Twentieth Division H.Q., March 24th.**

Foreseeing that Rations and Supplies would be difficult to obtain in the next few days, Capt. MEURLING, M.C., the Commander of the Eaton and Yukon Batteries, whose Headquarters were in NESLE with the Twentieth Division Headquarters, loaded all the available space in his Light Box Cars with Ammunition, Rations, Gasoline and other stores that might be required. During the afternoon of March 24th, Twentieth Division H.Q. moved CARREPUITS, E. of ROYE, with Advanced Headquarters at RETHONVILLERS. Capt. MEURLING sent the Transport of his 2 Batteries to CARREPUITS and opened his own headquarters on the main Road to ROYE, immediately N. of BETHONVILLERS.

In the evening of March 24th, unconfirmed reports of an Advance by enemy Cavalry were received at Twentieth Division Headquarters. At the request of Divisional Headquarters, Capt. MEURLING manned 2 reserve Vickers Guns with Batmen and Cooks and mounted them on the NESLE-ROYE Road, N. of BETHONVILLERS. Battery S.M. FOREST (Yukon Battery) was placed in command of the 2 Guns, but no Action developed as the report about the German Cavalry proved untrustworthy.

### **XVIII Corps Line, Morning March 25th.**

At BUVERCHY along the LIBERMONT CANAL on the XVIII Corps Front, the German Infantry advanced in great numbers, during the night of March 24th/25th. This compelled the Right Flank of the Twentieth Division to fall back a little distance Westward. The 3 Machine Guns of the Battery, under Lieut. CAMPBELL, in Positions near BREUIL and covering the BACQENCOURT Bridge, were ordered to move to the high ground about 1,200 yds. E. of CRESSY. On the Left Flank of the Twentieth Division the enemy also made heavy Attacks upon MESNIL-ST. NICAISE with the result that our Infantry withdrew a little distance to a Line facing N.-E., close to MESNIL-le-PETIT. Early in the morning of March 25th, the Twentieth division was holding the Line from BUVERCHY along the LIBERMONT CANAL as far N. as QUIQUERY in conjunction with the Twenty-Second French Division, and from QUIQUERY to MESNIL-le-PETIT. On the Right of the Twentieth Division, the Thirtieth Division with part of the Sixty-second



French Division carried on the Line Southwards as far as the bend in the CANAL. The Thirty-sixth Division, which was on the Southernmost part of the XVIII Corps Front had been relieved by the Sixty-second French Division.

#### **M.M.G. Detachment On Left Flank of Twentieth Division; March 25th.**

In spite of French Reinforcements the Situation on the XVIII Corps Front remained critical. At 5.30 A.M. March 25th, a heavy Machine Gun and Rifle Fire and Artillery Bombardment commenced to come from all quarters of the German Lines opposite the Left of the Twentieth Division. As was to be expected, our line held by worn-out Men without officers and few N.C.O.s began to give way under pressure of the enemy, who was well supported by Machine Guns and Artillery. The G.O.C., 183rd Infantry Brigade ordered Capt. HARKNESS to proceed to the outskirts of NESLE in the vicinity of St. LEONARD to collect all stragglers and unattached Men and organise them under any officers he could find to form a local Defensive Line. General SPOONER himself undertook a similar task in the vicinity of FROIDMOND.

The object of the enemy Attack in this Area was to keep open and enlarge the Gap between the XVIII and XIX Corps. During this Attack the 4 Yukon Battery Machine Guns, under Lieuts. VOSBURGH and BLACK, and the 1 Eaton Battery Gun under Battery S.M. HERSEY, D.C.M., did excellent work inflicting Casualties on the enemy and covering the withdrawal of our Infantry. 2 of the Yukon Battery Guns, under Lieut. L.M. BLACK, were dug in the Slot Trenches on a flat to the left of NESLE. The Gunners withheld their Fire until the enemy was within a Range of 500 yds. They then opened Fire with good effect; many Germans fell and their line broke as a result of our steady and continuous Machine Gun Fire. A "Whiz-bang" Battery was brought into Action by the enemy against our Gun Crews. The Infantry had withdrawn and our Machine Gun Positions were outflanked by enemy snipers and Light Machine Gunners. The Motor Machine Gunners then withdrew their Guns to the Railway line. Several Casualties from enemy Enfilade Rifle and Machine Gun Fire were suffered during this withdrawal. Sgt. BLAIKIE, D.C.M., M.M., who handled 1 of Lieut. BLACK's Guns with great courage, was killed. The Eaton Battery Gun and 1 of the 2 Yukon Battery Guns, under Lieut. VOSBURG, were damaged beyond repair.

Lieut. BLACK enlisted the services of a number of Infantrymen belonging to an Argyle and Sutherland Battalion to help him man his machine Guns. The Highlanders refilled Belts while Lieut. BLACK and his 4 Men kept the Guns in Action. Eventually, this small Group retired through NESLE at 8.30 A.M. and joined Capt. HARKNESS on the NESLE-RETHONVILLERS Road about 600 yds. S.-W. of St. LEONARD. With the help of these 2 Machine Guns and the Infantry which Capt. HARKNESS had collected, a line was formed between NESLE and HERLY overlooking the RIVER d'IGNON. This line was extended to the Right along the River as far as LANGUEVOISIN. 4 other Machine Guns all out of Action belonging to a British Unit were found S. of NESLE. Capt. HARKNESS' account of the Action in the morning of March 25th is in part as follows:-

*"We managed to make 2 good Guns out of the 4 and placed them in the line under Lieut. BLACK to assist the Infantry. Lieut. VOSBURGH and his Detachment had not reported; they evidently withdrew through MANICOURT and later reported to Capt. MEURLING in ROYE. He had suffered 4 Casualties out of 8 Gunners. The 1 Eaton Battery Gun was badly damaged in the German Attack delivered in the early morning. Battery S.M. HERSEY, D.C.M., was reported "Missing, believed killed" and 2 Other Ranks, wounded; Corporal McKENNA, who was with this Gun, returned badly wounded bringing with him the Lock of the Gun. Lieut. BLACK reported 6 casualties out of the 10 Other Ranks in Action under him.*

*"With the exception of some scattered shelling, the situation remained comparatively quiet until Noon. Lieut. BLACK carried out harassing fire on the approaches to NESLE. The 2 repaired Guns went out of Action."*

During the morning of March 25th, NESLE was reported to have fallen and at 12.45 P.M. enemy Troops had forced the LIBERMONT CANAL at BREUIL. The enemy's Turning Movement forced back the left of the Twentieth Division from the N. of NESLE and QUIQUERY to a line on the high ground 1,000 yds. W. of NESLE. Meanwhile Troops of the 133rd French Division had moved up in Support to the Twentieth Division and were digging themselves in on the line BILLANCOURT-HERLY. At 12.00 Noon, our Infantry withdrew to this Line and Lieut. BLACK's 2 Machine Guns were placed on the left of the NESLE-ROYE Road, half-way between NESLE and RETHONVILLERS. Two French Machine Guns were in Positions across the Road from Lieut. BLACK's Detachment. At the same time, the 183rd Infantry Brigade was amalgamated with the 59th Infantry Brigade of the Twentieth Division and the command passed to Brigadier-General HISLOP of the latter Brigade. Capt. HARKNESS' Detachment also came under the Orders of the G.O.C., 59th Inf. Brigade.



**M.M.G. Detachment on Right Flank of Twentieth Division; March 25th.**

Early in the afternoon, the Germans were observed massing on the W. side of BREUIL and at the same time his Advanced Parties were seen moving Westward from the Village. The Yukon Battery Guns, in Positions on the high ground E. of CRESSY, concentrated their Fire on them at a Range of 2,000 yds. killing and wounding many of them and breaking up their Formation. The Guns remained in Action throughout the afternoon covering the Infantry, who were withdrawing on both Flanks. Late in the afternoon, to avoid being cut off by the enemy advancing Westward from the direction of BREUIL and MOYENCOURT and from NESLE toward ROYE, Lieut. CAMPBELL withdrew his Guns from the Position E. of CRESSY. This Detachment fell back to ROYE with the Infantry, on the night of March 25th/26th, but not without considerable Fighting.

At about 1.00 P.M., March 25th, the enemy, employing the same Tactics as before, gradually pressed back our BILLANCOURT-HERLY Line at certain selected points and outflanked our Machine Gun Positions. But the Motor Machine Gunners, co-operating with the British and French Troops throughout the day, kept their Guns in Action until completely outflanked, thus delaying the enemy and easing the pressure upon our tired and weak Infantry. The enemy occupied HERLY and LANGUEVOISIN and advanced rapidly towards CRESSY; but his repeated efforts during the afternoon to make progress along the NESLE-ROYE Road were unsuccessful.

**Ammunition & Rations.**

The Headquarters of the 59th Infantry Brigade were established about 500 yds. S.-W. of BILLANCOURT. Capt HARKNESS, who was in close touch with Brigade Headquarters, arranged for a supply of Rations and Ammunition for his Gun Crews and for the entire 59th Brigade, which was a little over 500 Rifles strong (including the 183rd Brigade). A Napier Box Car was sent to an Ammunition Dump with Orders to take forward 40,000 Rounds of S.A.A. Two trips were necessary to carry this amount. The Car Driver, Pte. MEDVASKES, took the first 20,000 Rounds forward and unloaded it at a pre-arranged spot, from which the Gunners were to replenish the Ammunition Supply at the Guns. When Pte. MEDVASKES returned with his second load he found that his first load was already in the hands of the Germans. Under Machine Gun and Rifle Fire, he turned his Car around and reported back safely to his Group Headquarters. This incident is a good illustration of the confusion caused by the rapid changes in the Situation. After dark, Capt. MEURLING sent forward another Car full of Rations. Pte. MOWAT, the Driver, drove his Car at full speed to the Outpost line, where it was quickly unloaded by some of the Crews of the Yukon Battery Guns. The Motor Machine Gunners divided their Rations with the Infantrymen, who had not had regular food and uninterrupted rest for 3 days. In fighting with the enemy, in Organising Defensive Positions, in withdrawing and in many other ways, the Infantry invariably rallied around the Canadian Motor machine Gun Detachments.

**Capt. MEURLING Withdraws his Group from the Line.**

During the afternoon of March 25th, Capt. MEURLING sent forward Battery with S.M. FOREST in command of 2 Vickers Guns manned by Cooks and Batmen. Capt. HARKNESS ordered this Detachment to join Lieut. BLACK, who in the meantime had had 1 of his 2 Guns put out of Action. The Germans continued their Advance from HERLY and established themselves on the Left of RETHONVILLERS. Lieut. BLACK moved his Guns to Positions 500 yds. S.-W. of RETHONVILLERS to protect the Left Flank of our Line. These Positions were occupied until Midnight March 25th/26th, when Capt. HARKNESS received Orders from the 59th Infantry Brigade to report to Capt. MEURLING in ROYE. After the French had taken over the Line and our Infantry had withdrawn, our Machine Gunners moved back arriving to the E. of ROYE at 3.30 A.M. March 26th. From here Capt. MEURLING withdrew his Group to BOUCHOIR and at 7.00 A.M. he moved again to the vicinity of LE QUESNEL where the Headquarters of the Twentieth Division had been established.

**Twenty-fourth Division Counter-attack; March 25th.**

When the enemy attacked the Positions of the 183rd Infantry Brigade at MESNIL-ST. NICAISE, on the night of March 24th/25th, he also advanced rapidly Westward. By the morning of March 25th the Right Flank of the Eighth Division (XIX Corps) had been bent back from the SOMME towards LICOURT. The Situation on the Front between the Right Flank of the Eighth Division and NESLE was critical. At 7.00 A.M., the Twenty-fourth Division launched a Counter-attack from their Positions near HYENCOURT-le-PETIT in the direction of DRESLINCOURT. The Eaton Battery, under Lieut. G.A. MARSHALL, supported the 73rd Infantry Brigade (Twenty-fourth Division) in the Counter-attack with Direct and Overhead Fire. Of this Action Lieut. MARSHALL writes as follows:-



*"I saw the 73rd Brigade Commander, whose Headquarters were at PUZEAUX. We were to assist in the attack as much as possible with our 7 Machine Guns, but we were to maintain strong positions to cover a possible withdrawal. Knowing the exhausting condition of his troops, this withdrawal seemed almost a certainty. They had been fighting since the morning of March 21st and the whole Brigade was not now as strong as one Battalion. None of our Machine Guns moved forward; 5, were in excellent Positions along the FONCHETTE-OMIECOURT Road and 2, about 400 yds. N.-E. of HYENCOURT-le-PETIT. From all the Positions we had a splendid view of the ground over which our Infantry advanced. We fired at 3 different ranges - 2,000, 2,500 and 3,000 yds. The Fire was lifted as our troops advanced. The Infantry progresses about half-way between BERSAUCOURT and DRESLINCOURT, when we saw them coming back in places. This grew rapidly until we could see that the whole line was withdrawing. We then repeated our firing programme backwards endeavouring to cover their retirement in accordance with the Orders of the G.O.C. 73rd Infantry Brigade. We had ample bulk S.A.A. but our belts were so few that the No. 2 Gunners had to fill the expended end of the belt as it went through the Gun."*

The 73rd Brigade, which was on the Left of the Attack, made a little headway, but the Troops on the Right, as they went up for the Attack, were themselves heavily attacked near CURCHY and retired to their original Positions. After this withdrawal, the 2 Guns N.-E. of HYENCOURT-le-PETIT were moved back to Positions on the Right of the other 5 Guns along the FONCHETTE-OMIECOURT Road. The Infantry withdrew again and Captain MARSHALL conformed to this movement by placing his Machine Guns in Positions along the Railway Line N. of the Wood E. of PUZEAUX. In the afternoon the Infantry were ordered to withdraw farther back and take up the HATTENCOURT-CHAULNES Line.

#### **Eaton Battery Withdrawn from the Line.**

The Eaton battery had suffered several Casualties from Shell Fire and had only 15 Other Ranks left: 4 of these were British Machine Gunners and 2 others were Infantrymen. The Crews had been reduced to fighting with 1 or 2 Men per Gun. The Battery had been closely engaged with the enemy since the morning of the previous day and the Men had had no rest since the morning of March 22nd. The Guns, Equipment and Ammunition had to be carried across country by greatly depleted Crews; in some cases this was done with only a few hundred yards between them and the hard-pressing enemy. At Noon, March 25th, the Battery had practically no Ammunition left and no Transport or Personnel to send for a fresh Supply of S.A.A. The Men were tired and without Rations. Lieut. MARSHALL therefore, withdrew his Detachment out of the Line to reorganise and refit. The Crews marched back through CHAULNES to BAYONVILLERS, where they arrived at about Midnight March 25th/26th. After securing a little food and Billets in BAYONVILLERS for his Men, Lieut. MARSHALL proceeded to VILLERS-BRETONNEUX to get in touch with the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade Headquarters.

On arrival at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX he found out that the Brigade H.Q. had moved during the evening, but no one was able to tell him where they had gone. He finally got in touch with the Brigade H.Q. at HEBECOURT, on the morning of March 25th, and in accordance with orders received from Lieut.-Col. WALKER, the Eaton battery was moved that day from BAYONVILLERS to HEBECOURT for re-organisation and re-equipment.

#### **"A" Battery Armoured Cars on Eighth Division Front, March 25th.**

On the night of March 24th/25th and the following day, the main effort of the enemy opposite the central part of the FIFTH ARMY Front was directed, against the Right Flank of the Eighth Division between EPENANCOURT and St. CHRIST. At about 4.00 A.M. March 25th, "A: Battery (Major BATTERSBY), 1st C.M.M.G.B., which was co-operating with the 24th Infantry Brigade (Eighth Division), left MARCHELPOT for CIZANCOURT via LICOURT. Lieut. W.H. SMITH and Lieut. CUTTLE in charge of 2 Armoured Cars of "A" Battery stopped near a Factory, about half-way between LICOURT and GIZANCOURT. They were to be in readiness to support a Counter-attack to be delivered by our Infantry at 9.15 A.M. Major BATTERSBY and Lieut. ADAMS with the other 2 Cars went to CIZANCOURT and the proceeded down the Road toward EPENANCOURT. A short time after their arrival at the Factory, the Armoured Cars under Lieuts. SMITH and CUTTLE were subjected to heavy enemy Artillery Fire. To avoid the Shelling the Cars were moved to a Sunken Road half-way between the Factory and CIZANCOURT. From this Position, Lieut. CUTTLE moved with his Car to the outskirts of CIZANCOURT and took up a new Position there.



At 8.50 A.M., the enemy Infantry attacked under cover of an intense Shrapnel, High Explosive and Machine Gun Barrage. Our Infantry began to fall back. The 2 Guns of Lieut. SMITH's Car were placed on the high Bank of the Sunken Road, and from these Positions the Gunners fired very effectively and delayed the Germans for a short time. The other 3 Cars were slowly backing up the Roads and covering with the Fire of their 6 Machine Guns the retirement of our Troops. When Lieut. SMITH was forced to withdraw, owing to the advanced Positions held by the enemy on both Flanks, he found out that by an outflanking movement the Germans had entered MARCHELPOT. He was, therefore, compelled to retire by way of LICOURT and OMIECOURT. Lieut. CUTTLE was wounded while moving back from CIZANCOURT. While the 2 Armoured Cars with Major BATTERSBY were withdrawing through LICOURT, the Germans were entering the Village from the S. Both Crews put up a splendid Fight firing on the Germans at very close Range until Major BATTERSBY together with the Driver and 2 Gun Crews were killed. The other Armoured Car, under Lieut. ADAMS, made an effort to rescue Major BATTERSBY's Car, but owing to a very intense enemy Fire, the attempt proved fruitless and the Car was left in the hands of the enemy. During this Action Lieut. ADAMS was severely wounded. His Car and the Car which Lieut. CUTTLE had commanded withdrew to OMIECOURT. At the request of an Infantry Brigadier General, 1 of these Cars was employed for a short time in carrying Ammunition to the Troops in the Front Line. The 3 remaining Armoured Cars were then withdrawn by Lieut. W.H. SMITH to the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade H.Q. at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX to replenish the Ammunition supply and reorganise the Gun Crews.

### **XIX and VII Corps Front March 25th.**

In the afternoon of March 25th, all of the Divisions in the XIX Corps, were ordered to withdraw to the Line HATTENCOURT-CHAULNES-ABLAINOURT-ESTREES-ASSEVILLERS-HERBECOURT-FRISE. During the 25th, command of the XVIII Corps passed from the FIFTH ARMY to the THIRD FRENCH ARMY. The FIFTH ARMY now commanded only the XIX Corps, which was holding the Front from HATTENCOURT N. to the SOMME. On the same day, all Troops of the VII Corps N. of the SOMME were transferred to the V Corps and became part of the THIRD ARMY (British). The enemy maintained a great pressure against the V Corps making several Attacks, during the afternoon of March 25th, in the vicinity of GUINCHY and THONES WOOD, places which had become famous since the SOMME BATTLE of 1916. During the night 25th/26th, the Line of Defence was taken back to a new Position between BRAY-sur-SOMME and ALBERT.

### **"B" Battery and Borden Batteries Withdrawn from Line.**

The few Men of "B" Battery and the Borden Battery, who spent the night 24th/25th in MARICOURT, were withdrawn to BRAY on the morning of the 25th. Lieut. INCH organised an 8-Gun Battery with this Personnel and a few Reinforcements Lieut.-Col. WALKER had sent up under Lieut. GEEEN and Lieut. LYNCH. This Composite Battery consisting of 3 Officers and 40 or 50 Other Ranks, remained in Reserve at BRAY throughout the day. At 5.00 A.M. March 26th, the Armoured Cars of "B" Battery, under Lieuts. GREEN and LYNCH, went into Action and operated during the day along the Road leading N. from BRAY and also between BRAY and MORLANCOURT. The Cars were of great assistance to the Infantry in protecting their Flanks as they fell back from the BRAY-ALBERT Line. Many good Targets were obtained by the Machine Gunners in the Cars and a considerable number of Casualties were inflicted on the enemy. After dark, Lieuts. GREEN and LYNCH withdrew from the Line and joined Lieut. INCH, who had moved to CORBIE in the morning with the Transport of the Borden Battery and the Personnel of the Composite Battery not in Action with the Armoured Cars. On the morning of March 27th this Detachment of the 1st C.M.M.G., Brigade was withdrawn to the Brigade H.Q. at HEBECOURT to reorganise.

### **Carey's Force.**

The British Line N. of the SOMME, on the morning of the 26th, ran generally from BRAY to ALBERT. S. of the SOMME the Left Flank of the FIFTH ARMY or XIX Corps, resting on the Left Bank of the SOMME, near FRISE, remained uncovered and was about 5 miles E. of the Right Flank of the THIRD ARMY. The British Troops on the XIX and XVIII Corps Fronts were greatly exhausted. There were no Reserves behind them. A mixed Force, consisting of Details, Stragglers, Personnel of Army Schools, Canadian and American Engineers, etc., which had been organised by General GRANT, the Chief Engineer of the FIFTH ARMY, was placed in Positions along the Line MEZIERES-MARCELCAVE-HAMEL. On the 26th, General GRANT handed over to General CAREY the command of this mixed Force, which later became widely known as Carey's Forces. Lieut.-Col. WALKER (O.C., 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade), on the same day, organised a 10-Gun Machine Gun Battery to support Carey's Force, which totalled 2,200 All Ranks and was holding the last organised Line of Defence before AMIENS. These 10 Guns together with



all the other necessary Equipment were drawn from Carey's Force Stores at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, and the Battery Personnel consisted of 4 Officers and 35 Other Ranks Reinforcements, who had just arrived from the Cdn. M.G. Corps Reinforcement Depot at DIVION. Lieut. T.A. SMITH was placed in command of the whole Battery, with Lieuts. SAMUELS and H. SMITH commanding 4 Guns each, and Lieut. MILLWARD, 2 Guns. On the evening of March 26th, these Guns were placed in Positions in AUBERCOURT, MARCELCAVE and HAMEL.

The Line held by Carey's Force was the only organised Line of Resistance behind the FIFTH ARMY Front.

*"Except for General Carey's Force there were no reinforcements of any kind behind the Divisions which had been fighting for the most part continuously since the opening of the battle. In consideration of this fact and the thinness of our Fighting Line, the Fifth Army Commander did not deem it practicable for our Troops to attempt to maintain the HATTENCOURT-Frise Positions if seriously attacked. Accordingly, orders had been given on the night of the 25th March that in the event of the enemy continuing his Assaults in strength, divisions should fall back, fighting rearguard Actions to the approximate Line Le Quesnoy-Rosieres-Proyart. This Line was intended to link up with the right of the Third Army at Bray."*

#### **Withdrawal From ROYE.**

On the morning of March 26th, the enemy, who had entered ROYE during the night, recommenced his Attacks from the direction of LIANCOURT with the object of breaking them much coveted ROYE-AMIENS Road. The Twentieth Division withdrew that morning to the LE QUESNEL Area, with Divisional Headquarters established in the Village itself. 2 of its Brigades, the 59th and 60th, took up a Line just E. of LE QUESNEL and the 61st Brigade concentrated at BEAUFORT where it was in touch with elements of the Twenty-fourth Division (XIX Corps). The Thirtieth Division (XVIII Corps) was holding the Village of BOUHOIR, FOLIES and ROUVROY. Capt. MEURLING, with the remnants of the Eaton and Yukon M.M.G. Batteries as well as the Transport of the 2 Batteries, was located on the Southern outskirts of LE QUESNEL.

#### **Situation XVIII Corps Front: Morning March 26th.**

The Situation W. and N.-W. of ROYE was very critical. The French Twenty-second and Sixty-second Divisions were withdrawing in a South-Westerly direction towards the valley of the AVRE RIVER and S. of it. The British Troops, after fighting a strong rearguard Action, had managed to extricate themselves from a critical Situation and were marching in a North-westerly direction. A Gap had thus been left between the British and French. The enemy was very active and threatened to drive in a wedge between the 2 Armies. On the Right of the Main Road, ANDECHY was in the hands of the enemy, whose troops were close to ERCHES. On the N. side of the Road the Germans were taking advantage of a Gap S. of ROSIERES and were pushing forward between MEHARICOURT and FRESNOY-les-ROYE. The Twentieth and Thirtieth Divisions, which were supposed to have been relieved by the French the night before, found themselves again in the thick of a Battle. Elements of the Thirty-sixth Division (XVIII Corps) also were facing the enemy S. of the ROYE Road. The Motor Machine Gunners in this Area were thrown hurriedly into the Fight. They greatly helped to check the German Advance in spite of the heavy Casualties they had suffered in Men and Guns during the afternoon and evening of the previous day in the withdrawals from NESLE, RETHONVILLERS and CARPEPUTS to ROYE.

#### **Eaton and Yukon Batteries in Action on XVIII Corps Front March 26th.**

At 11.00 A.M. March 26th., Capt. MEURLING was told by the G.O.C. Twentieth Division, that his tired and depleted Machine Gun Crews were to be kept out of the Line for 24 hours. But 20 minutes afterwards, circumstances forced the Divisional Commander to make immediate use of the limited Machine Gun Resources at his disposal. He, therefore, sent for Capt. MEURLING and told him that as the enemy had again broken through and taken FOUQUES-COURT, it was imperative that his Machine Guns be placed in the Line at once. Instead of 24 hours, the remnants of the Eaton and Yukon Batteries had less than 24 minutes rest. The Detachment had only 7 Guns in working order. These Guns had been salvaged by Capt. MEURLING on the way back from there NESLE-ROYE Front to LE QUESNEL. All the original Guns of these 2 Batteries, with the exception of those commanded by Lieut. MARSHALL, had been destroyed, or put out of Action during the Operations of the 2 previous days. As already narrated, Lieut. MARSHALL's Guns had operated independently and were now withdrawn. The 7 Guns collected by Capt. MEURLING were mounted on Light Auxiliary Tripods as the Mark IV Tripod proved too heavy for use in a Rearguard Action, where the Line was moving constantly and rapidly. Owing to the small number of Men available, the Gun Crews consisted of 2 Men each.



By 12.30 P.M. March 26th, the 7 Machine Guns were in forward Positions: 4, under Lieut. VOSBURGH, in front of ROUVROY, and 3, under Lieut. CAMPBELL, in front of WARVILLERS. Capt. HARKNESS, M.C., was in command of the entire Detachment. The Defence of ROUVROY was in charge of a Captain of the Royal Engineers, who had under him a Company of Men belonging to the Royal Engineers, Labour Battalions, Entrenching Battalions, Men returning from leave or hospital, stragglers, etc. This mixed Company held a Line in front of ROUVROY along the PARVILLERS-VRELY Road. During the afternoon, the enemy made several unsuccessful attempts to advance N.-W. and W. from PARVILLERS and FOUQUESCOURT, respectively. Excellent work was done by the Motor Machine Gunners in this Area, where they not only inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy but held him in check for the remainder of the day while our exhausted Infantry were taking up new Dispositions. At about 5.30 P.M., Capt. HARKNESS, assisted by the Officer of the Royal Engineers, reorganised the Defence of ROUVROY. Outposts were established in front of the PARVILLERS-VRELY Road, and S.-E. and S. of ROUVROY. A system of Patrols and Reliefs was also arranged. Comparative calm prevailed during the night March 26th/27th. Capt. MEURLING, M.C., organised an independent Patrol, under Battery Sgt.-Major FOREST, to proceed along the ROUVROY-PARVILLERS Road to obtain information as to the enemy's movements. This Patrol made 2 trips from ROUVROY during the night and reported that large enemy working parties were seen digging a line between and W. of PARVILLERS and FOUQUESCOURT and that tractors moving along the Roads were heard. The Germans were evidently bringing up their Heavy Artillery. This information was at once transmitted to the Twentieth Division Headquarters.

During the night Capt. MEURLING managed to collect 5 more Vickers Guns with Auxiliary Tripods and 1 Lewis Gun with 12 Ammunition Drums. 5 new Crews of 2 Men each were organised from the remnants of the Eaton and Yukon Batteries still at LE QUESNEL. 1 Gun was sent to reinforce Capt. HARKNESS' Detachment at WARVILLERS and, the following morning, the other 4 Guns were placed in Positions in front of HANGEST, S. of the ROYE Road, under Lieut. VOSBURGH, who had been relieved during the night by Lieut. CAMPBELL. The Lewis Gun, under Sgt. HENEY and 1 Other Rank, was placed in front of ROUVROY at the intersection of the FOUQUESCOURT-ROUVROY and PARVILLERS-VRELY Roads. At dawn and just before it got light, a German Staff Car was driven along the FOUQUESCOURT-ROUVROY Road towards our lines by a Driver who had apparently lost his way. When the Car came within 75 yds. of our Positions, Sgt. Henry opened Fire on it with his Lewis Gun, badly wounding or killing the occupants of the Car and damaging the engine. Lieut. CAMPBELL and 2 Men then tried to reach the Car but were driven off by heavy Rifle and Machine Gun Fire from the direction of FOUQUESCOURT.

#### **General FOCH Appointed to Command Allied Forces.**

*"On this day, the 26th March, the Governments of France and Great Britain decided to place the supreme control of the operations of the French and British forces in France and Belgium in the hands of General Foch, who accordingly assumed control."*

#### **M.M.G. Detachment With Twentieth Division heavily Engaged March 27th.**

Early in the morning of March 27th, the enemy Artillery became very active and his Troops attacked unsuccessfully in the direction of ROUVROY. Another Attack during the morning was repulsed with severe losses to the German Infantry. In addition to the observed good effect of their well-directed Fire, the presence of the 8 Motor Machine Gun Crews in front of ROUVROY and WARVILLERS was a great moral support to our weak Infantry Detachments holding the 2 Villages. S. of the ROYE Road the Situation was full of menace. Very early in the morning German Cavalry, working through the Woods along the AVRE RIVER pushed through the Outposts of the Thirty-sixth Division and advances against GUERBIGNY. At 10.40 A.M., ERCHES was in the hands of the enemy, and BOUCHOIR was lost at 12.30 P.M. ARVILLERS and FOLIES were still held by us.

As the enemy pressure increased and as our Infantry withdrew, Lieut. CAMPBELL moved his Guns back from ROUVROY to WARVILLERS. The Ammunition supply being very low, Capt. HARKNESS went back to ROUVROY on his Motor Cycle to get a few Ammunition Belt Boxes which had been left in the Village. He strapped 2 Belt Boxes to the rear of the Motor Cycle and 2 other Boxes to the handle-bars. While riding between ROUVROY and WARVILLERS, however, a Shell landed within 5 feet of him blowing both Motor Cycle and rider into the air. After regaining consciousness, Capt. HARKNESS walked on to WARVILLERS and then to LE QUESNEL, where he reported the condition of his Gun Crews to Capt. MEURLING.

Early in the afternoon, the enemy made another effort against ROUVROY and finally succeeded in entering the Village. The 4 Guns under Lieut. CAMPBELL had been subjected to shelling and Machine Gun Fire; 5 out of his original 8 Men had become Casualties. The other 4 Guns in front of WARVILLERS had also



been hotly engaged all day and the Crews had suffered a few Casualties. Twice during the afternoon the Advance of the enemy from ROUVROY towards WARVILLERS was brought to a standstill by the Fire of the 8 Guns, under Capt. HARKNESS, who had only 10 Men left to man the same number of Guns that were usually kept in Action by 32 Men.

Capt. MEURLING sent forward to Lieut. CAMPBELL at WARVILLERS all the Drivers and Cooks he could spare, together with a few Infantry Stragglers he had collected. A supply of Ammunition was also sent up. These Reinforcements reached WARVILLERS just in time to help a small force of Infantry, who had been rallied by Lieut. CAMPBELL, to repel another German Attack and eventually check the enemy Advance at this point. Capt. HARKNESS, who acted with conspicuous gallantry since his Battery first went into Action on March 24th, and who was called "CANADA" by all the Infantrymen with whom he had co-operated, was evacuated to hospital.

Earlier in the afternoon, the 4 Machine Guns, under Lieut. VOSBURGH, in front of RANGEST, obtained an exceptionally good target. German Cavalry tried to advance from the S.-E. towards WARVILLERS and HANGEST, but the Fire of these Guns definitely checked their progress. Later in the afternoon, the Germans were pressing on in great numbers near BOUCHOIR. Lieut. BLACK with 4 Guns and Crews from WARVILLERS were at once despatched to take up a Position at the Cross-roads about 1 mile W. of BOUCHOIR with Orders to hold up the enemy at all costs. This Detachment was rushed forward by Car through Beaufort and LE QUESNEL and was in position within half an hour from the time it left WARVILLERS. The Guns had splendid Targets for about an hour and a half and succeeded in checking the enemy. The G.O.C. Twentieth Division specially thanked this Detachment for their excellent work.

#### **Remnants of Eaton and Yukon Batteries Relieved; Morning March 28th.**

With nightfall enemy activity decreased considerably and during the night March 27th/28th, the French 133rd Division relieved the Twentieth Division. The Divisional Orders for this Relief contained the following reference to Capt. MEURLING's Group.

*"Canadian M.G. Brigade will be the last to be withdrawn from the Line and will assemble and move to HEBECOURT under special instructions already issued."*

The Relief was completed on the morning of March 28th and in accordance with Instructions the Motor Machine Gunners came out of the Line after all the elements of the Twentieth Division had been relieved. Out of the 12 Vickers Gun Crews on the previous day and night, only 8 Vickers Guns were taken out. The remainder of the Guns (without crews) were left in WARVILLERS at the request of Brigadier-general MORGAN, Commanding the 72nd Infantry Brigade, Twenty-fourth Division. At about 9.30 A.M. March 28th., the remnants of the Eaton and Yukon Batteries moved to HABECOURT, the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade Headquarters. All the Officers, N.C.O.s and Men needed a well earned rest. In his report on these Operations Capt. MEURLING writes:-

*"Everybody at once went to bed, as no man had had any rest since the morning of the 22nd - with the exception of two hours on the morning of the 24th and two hours on the morning of the 26th."*

#### **Situation on Left Flank of XIX Corps; Morning March 27th.**

During the night March 26th/27th, the Line on the XIX Corps Front ran roughly in front of BOUCHOIR, ROUVROY, ROSIERES, VAUVILLERS and PROYART. N. of the SOMME the Right of the THIRD ARMY withdrew to the Line SAILLY-le-SEC-MERICOURT l'ABBE. The enemy gained possession of ALBERT and obtained a footing in BOIS d'AVELUY. In view of the dangerous Situation created along the SOMME by the withdrawal of THIRD ARMY Troops from BRAY Westwards, the XIX Corps ordered a Detachment of 300 men under Lieut. Col. MORNE, at BOIS de VAIRE, and another Detachment of 1 Officer, 50 men and 6 Lewis Guns, at MARCELCAVE (both from Carey's Force) together with an Armoured Car Battery of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade to report to the G.O.C. Sixteenth Division at HAMEL in order to guard the Crossings over the SOMME at CRISY and thus prevent the enemy from outflanking the Left of the XIX Corps Front at PROYAT.



**"A" Battery in Action on Exposed Flank of XIX Corps; March 27th.**

"A" Battery of the 1st C.M.M.G. Bde., which had been attached to the XIX Corps on march 25th and had then operated with the Eighth Division, was now detailed by Lieut.-Col. WALKER (O.C., 1st C.M.M.G. Bde.) to report to the Sixteenth Division. Lieut. W.H. SMITH was placed in command of the Battery, which consisted of the 3 remaining Armoured Cars of "A" Battery. Lieuts. R.M. THOMSON and TRENWITH were each in charge of 1 Armoured Car. T about 4.00 A.M. March 27th, Lieut.-Col. HORNE, with the greater portion of his Force, and Lieut. W.H. SMITH, with "A" Battery, arrived at HAMEL.

The Motor Machine Gunners received Orders to take their Guns forward to the outskirts of CERISY and guard the 2 un-destroyed Bridges over the SOMME at the Village. 4 Guns, under Lieuts. W.H. SMITH and TRENWITH, were placed in Position close to the Northern outskirts of the Village to cover the Left Brigade, and 2 Guns, under Lieut. R.M. THOMSON, were posted close to the Southern outskirts to cover the Right Bridge. After the Guns and Ammunition had been unloaded and taken to their Positions, the Cars were withdrawn a little distance under cover. At about 10.00 A.M., the enemy, who was rapidly following the withdrawal of the Right Flank of the THIRD ARMY, appeared to be massing his Troops N. and N.-W. of CHIPILLY preparatory to an attempt to force a Crossing Southwards over the CANAL. At that time, the 4 Machine Gun Crews, under Lieut. W.H. SMITH, noticed a large Group of the enemy on the opposite (Right) Bank of the CANAL. From their Formation, they were judged to be Machine Gun Sections. The Germans were given time to mount their Guns and then our Machine Gunners opened an intense Fire on them at a Range of 12,000 yds. killing and wounding many of them and scattering the remainder. The Action of Lieut. SMITH's 4 Guns at this point is an excellent illustration of the demoralising effect of the Fire of Machine Guns, one of the Chief Characteristics of which is Surprise. "A" Battery Guns remained in Action in CERISY for about 3 hours. During this time 15,000 Rounds were fired.

Lieut. W.M. SMITH was then ordered to move his Battery from CERISY to MORCOURT, *"but owing to the condition of the roads and the tactical features of the ground"* he was unable to take his Guns into Action. The Battery, therefore, went back to VILLERS-BRETONNEUX (XIX Corps H.Q.) for further Instructions, picking up on the way a number of wounded Men and leaving them at Dressing Stations. From VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, Lieut. R.M. THOMSON's Armoured Car returned to HEBECOURT, 1st C.M.M.G. Bde. Headquarters, for repairs. Lieut. W.H. SMITH, O.C., "A" Battery, writes as follows of the Action of his 2 remaining Armoured Cars during the afternoon and evening of the same day, march 27th:-

*"Our next orders were to proceed to HAMEL, as the enemy had then crossed the bridges in the vicinity of CERISY. This was at 4.00 P.M. At 5.00 P.M. we met the enemy in large numbers between CERISY and HAMEL, and, operating two cars, with four Machine Guns at a range of about 600 yds. had some very good shooting. While there I noticed a man lying in No Man's Land, waving his hand. I asked for volunteers to go and see who it was. Sgt. VICKERS and Pte. VANDYKE, under heavy M.G. fire, went out and found it was an Imperial Tommy wearing the Mons Ribbon, who had been lying out there for four hours with a shattered leg. They brought him up on to the road and put him on a side-car and sent him back to the dressing-station.*

*"After expending my Ammunition I went into HAMEL and reloaded by belts, while Lieut. TRENWITH remained and kept up the fire on the enemy. I returned and relieved him, and he did the same. Continuing in this way we must have caused hundreds of casualties. There was very little fire at this time."*

The Gunners on the 2 Armoured Cars continued to check the enemy advance in front of HAMEL until darkness, when they withdrew to VILLERS-BRETONNEUX for the night. The British Line S. of the SOMME on night March 27th/28th ran generally W. of BOUCHOIR, E. of WARVILLERS, VRELY, ROSIERES, thence N.-W. to vicinity of HARBONNIERES, W. of WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT, and close to HAMEL.



**"B" Battery Armoured Cars Report to XIX Corps; Evening March 27th.**

At about 8.30 P.M. March 27th, "B" Battery (8 Machine Guns, mounted on 4 Armoured Cars), 1st C.M.M.G. Bde., under Capt. R.C. CLARK, was sent from HEBECOURT to VILLERS-BRETONNEUX to report to the XIX Corps. Capt. CLARK's Instructions were to get in touch with the enemy on every possible occasion and report his Location and Strength. The nature of the Fighting and the rapid Change in the Locations of Units and Formations made Communications between Forward Units and Headquarters of Divisions and Corps erratic, and reliable information was difficult to get. Owing to their Equipment and great mobility, the Motor Machine Gunners were assigned this all important Task. On arrival at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX Capt. CLARK assumed command of "A" Battery also, thus adding the 2 Armoured Cars, under Lieut. W.H. SMITH, to his Command. During the night, the following wire was received by Capt. CLARK from the XIX Corps H.Q.:-

*"You will detail 4 Armoured Cars to remain at XIX Corps Headquarters VILLERS-BRETONNEUX ready for immediate action. Also 2 Cars to report at 24th Division at CAIX by 4.00 A.M."*

The 2 Armoured Cars of "A" Battery were detailed to report to the Twenty-fourth Division. The third Armoured Car of "A" Battery, under Lieut. R.M. THOMSON, reported to VILLERS-BRETONNEUX on the morning of March 28th, after it had been repaired.

**2 Armoured Cars Co-operate with Twenty-fourth Div; March 28th.**

Lieut. W.H. SMITH, who was in charge of the 2 Armoured Cars (4 Machine Guns) operating with the Twenty-fourth Division, gives the following account of the Operations of his Detachment on March 28th:-

*"The next day (March 28th), I went into ROSIERES, VRELY and back into CAIX, where I was ordered to take up positions. British and French Troops were here fighting side by side. The Line was held up to 2.00 P.M., when they retired. We covered their withdrawal with 4 Machine Guns. During this time we were attacked by 11 enemy aeroplanes, whose business was apparently to locate a Battery of French "Seventy-fives" located in a Wood. We opened fire with our 4 Guns and drove them off. Our 4 No. 1 Gunners, Privates NASH, TAYLOR, MEISTER and another, continued to operate their Guns in spite of the hostile Machine Gun fire. We then moved our positions about 200 yds., and immediately afterwards our former positions were shelled with 'Whizzbangs' and High Explosive Shells. After taking up our second position the aeroplanes returned and once more located us, signalling to their artillery by flying Zig-Zag up the road. We at once moved back to our first positions, dismounted 2 Guns and operated the other 2 from the Car, catching the Hun coming overland between VRELY, ROSIERES and CAIX. After holding them until the Infantry were well to the rear, we moved down into CAIX, where we noticed the Germans on the outskirts. We engaged them again, inflicting severe Casualties, and having our own Cars riddled with Machine Gun Bullets. This was at about 7.00 P.M. The Infantry were now well to our Rear; so we picked up about a dozen wounded men - some of whom who died on the way - and returned to GENTELLES."*

The Headquarters of the Group consisting of "A" and "B" Batteries, had been moved during the day from VILLERS-BRETONNEUX to GENTELLES.

**2 Armoured Cars in Front of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX.**

In the meantime, Capt. CLARK, O.C., Group, during the morning of March 28th, had sent 2 Armoured Cars, under Lieut. R.M. THOMSON, to operate on the Road between VILLERS-BRETONNEUX and WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT, and 2 Other Armoured Cars, under Lieut. GREEN, to operate on the AMIENS-ROYE Road. Lieut. THOMSON's Detachment with their 4 Machine Guns engaged several enemy Aeroplanes during the day, but as no hostile Attacks developed on that part of the Front the Armoured Cars did not get into Action.



### **Enemy Pressure Against XIX Corps Right Flank.**

The British Line between the AVRE and LUCE RIVERS had assumed the shape of a narrow Salient on the morning of March 28th. During the previous night, the enemy had worked his way Southwards from MORCOURT and CERISY and had entered BAYONVILLERS and WARFUSE-ABANCOURT. To meet this situation our Infantry had occupied a Line between ROSIERES and MARCELCAVE facing N. Early in the morning of March 28th the enemy had begun to push Southwards from GILLAU COURT and Westwards from VRELY and ROSIERES. S. of the AMIENS-ROYE Road, the enemy had entered CONTOIRE, on the River AVRE, and was pressing the French Troops back upon HANGEST. A very gallant but fruitless attempt had been made by the Sixty-first Division in Position between WIENCOURT-L'EQUIPE and MARCELCAVE to lessen the enemy pressure from the N. The Position of the British Divisions in the ARVILLERS-CAIX Area became untenable. In the course of the afternoon and evening, therefore, our Infantry withdrew to the Rear of the Southern Portion of the AMIENS Defence Line, MEZIERES-DEMUIN, held by the Twentieth Division, which has already stated had been relieved early that morning by the French in the FOLIES-WARVILLERS Area.

### **2 Armoured Cars Operate Along AMIENS-ROYE Road.**

Lieut. GREEN, with 2 Armoured Cars of the 1st C.M.M.G. Bde., operated along the AMIENS-ROYE Road and his 4 Machine Guns did fine execution during the German Advance from BOUCHOIR towards MEZIERES. The Detachment inflicted severe Casualties on the enemy and their work on this part of the Front considerably assisted our Infantry in their withdrawal from a most difficult Position. To avoid hostile Shelling, which at times assumed the proportions of a Bombardment, the Cars were kept moving up and down the Road, but close enough to the Front to enable the Crews on the Cars to engage the enemy at Medium Range with the Fire of their Machine Guns. While thus manoeuvring along the Highway, 1 of the Cars ran into the ditch on the side of the Road and under intense enemy Machine Gun and Rifle Fire the Crew succeeded in getting it back on the Road. Lieut. TRENWITH, who was in Command of this Car, was severely wounded at this time. After this, Lieut. GREEN received Orders to report with his Detachment back to GENTELLES, Group Headquarters. From GENTELLES this Officer went on a Side-car, driven by Sgt. MORRISON down the VILLERS-BRETONNEUX-WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT Road to bring in Lieut. THOMSON's 2 Armoured Cars. The Side-car ran into the Fire of a German Machine Gun firing from the direction of WARFUSEE and both Officer and N.C.O. on the car were wounded. In spite of the intensity of the German Fire, Pte. T. McKENSIE went forward on his Solo Motor Cycle and succeeded in bringing back Lieut. GREEN on the rear of his Cycle. This soldier went forward a second time to get Sgt. MORRISON, but found that he had already gone to a First Aid Post, which had been established in that vicinity by the Infantry.

### **AMIENS Defence Line; Evening March 28th.**

At nightfall March 28th, British Troops held approximately the AMIENS Defence Line S. of the SOMME from MEZIERES to IGNAUCOURT and HAMEL. The Twentieth Division held the Front S. of the River LUCE and Carey's Force, the Front between the LUCE and SOMME Rivers. The 10 Machine Guns of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade, under Lieut. T.A. SMITH, co-operated with Carey's Force in holding the Line. In the evening of the 28th, the Motor Machine Gunners inflicted many Casualties on the enemy, when he attacked and captured MARCELCAVE. They also assisted our Infantry in establishing a new Line just W. of the Village. Lieut. T.A. SMITH's Detachment was reinforced during the day (28th) by 4 Officers and 27 other ranks, British Machine Gunners, who came from the Machine Gun Base Depot at CAMIERS and were temporarily attached to the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade. Along with these Reinforcements, a number of British Machine Gunners collected from the various Stragglers Posts were also sent into the Line.

### **Motor Machine Gunners Co-operate with Carey's Force; March 29th.**

Enemy pressure against the XIX Corps Front recommenced on the morning of March 29th. On the Right MEZIERES had to be abandoned, but on the extreme Left the enemy Attacks E. and S.-E. of HAMEL were repulsed. The Guns of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade in position near HAMEL helped by their Fire to check the enemy Advance. The remnants of the Eaton and Yukon Batteries, which had been relieved in the Line in the QUESNEL Area on the morning of March 28th together with the Detachment of the Eaton battery, under Lieut. MARSHALL, which had been withdrawn from the CHAULNES Front on the morning of the 26th were reorganised into 1 Battery of 16 Guns, under Capt. MEURLING, M.C., and were sent into the Line on the afternoon of March 29th to relieve the Detachment under Lieut. T.A. SMITH. This 16-Gun Battery arrived at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX at 3.30 P.M., and Capt. MEURLING reported for Instructions to the H.Q. Carey's Force, at the Prisoners of War Cage 1 mile W. of the Town. After an



interview with General CAREY and his Chief of Staff, Lieut.-Col. HARVEY, the O.C. of the joint Eaton and Yukon batteries disposed his Guns in accordance with the requirements of the Situation. In addition to the 16 Machine Guns he had brought from HEBECOURT, Capt. MEURLING secured another 16 Guns from Carey's Force, and also collected a number of British Machine Gunners and Infantrymen Stragglers to help him man the extra Guns. By 7.00 P.M. March 29th, the 32 Machine Guns were occupying Positions in co-operation with Carey's Force, along the Front between the LUCE and SOMME RIVERS. 10 Guns, under Lieut. MARSHALL, were in Positions on the high ground above AUBERCOURT to cover the LUCE Valley and the approaches into DEMUIN, 10 Guns, under Lieut. W.J. CAMPBELL, just W. of MARCELCAVE, 4 Guns astride the Main Road E. of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, 4 Guns under Bty. S.M. FOREST (Yukon Battery), at the Cross-roads about 1½ miles S. of HAMEL, and 4 Guns, under Lieut. L.M. BLACK on the heights of HAMEL. Each of the 32 Guns was manned by 2 Men. Lieut. T.A. SMITH, on completion of Relief, withdrew his Detachment to 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade H.Q. at HEBECOURT.

During the night March 29th/30th, the enemy established a footing in MOREUIL WOOD, between the AVRE RIVER and the AMIENS-ROYE Road, and farther N. along the LUCE RIVER his Troops were concentrating in IGNAUCOURT. In order to meet a possible enemy Attack next morning in the direction of DEMUIN, against the Right Flank of Carey's Force, all the available Infantrymen of the Force were ordered to get into Position on the Left Flank of the LUCE to cover DEMUIN from the E. and Capt. MEURLING, to strengthen his Machine Gun Defence at AUBERCOURT, directed Sgt.-Major FOREST to move his 4 Guns from VILLERS-BRETONNEUX to the Right Flank.

#### **Action on the LUCE RIVER; Morning March 30th.**

The Front between the AVRE and the LUCE became very active again at daybreak on March 30th. The enemy was gradually pushing back the French out of MOREUIL WOOD and, by sheer weight of numbers and regardless of losses, he succeeded in driving our Infantry off the Left Bank of the LUCE and occupying DEMUIN. Lieut. MARSHALL's 14 Guns did most effective work from the N. Bank of the River by bringing Enfilade Fire to bear, at a Range of 1,700 to 2,000 yds., on German Infantry advancing on DEMUIN. Lieut. MARSHALL had disposed his 10 Machine Guns in front of the DEMUIN-MARCELCAVE Road, between the intersection of the AUBERCOURT-HANGARD and DEMUIN-VILLERS-BRETONNEUX Roads and the junction of the AUBERCOURT-MARCELCAVE and DEMUIN-MARCELCAVE Roads. 4 Guns, under Corporal BRADLEY, were on the Right of this Line, looking into the Valley Southwards. 4 Guns, manned by British Machine Gunners and under direct control of Lieut. MARSHALL, were placed about 200 yds. N.-E. of the first 4 Guns, and could direct their Fire on the approaches to AUBERCOURT and into the River Valley. 2 Guns, under Corporal McLAUGHLIN, were sited in the Centre of the Line. The remaining 4 Guns, under Corporal McKENNA were on the extreme Left of the Line, with Fields of Fire to the N. and E. Lieut. MARSHALL ordered Sgt.-Major FOREST to place his 4 Guns on the Right of Corporal BRADLEY's Detachment to cover DEMUIN and the high ground S.-E. of the Village.

Lieut. MARSHALL gives the following account of the Action of his Machine Guns on the morning of March 30th:-

*"The Germans were in platoons marching in fours along the top of the ridge in a Westerly direction. They presented their flank to us. They were visible to my 4 Guns (manned by British Machine Gunners) and two of Corporal BRADLEY's 4, and we all opened up. We had about 16 Belts per Gun, and the Infantrymen filled them for us as soon as they were exhausted. The enemy did not succeed in his efforts to effect crossings in the direction of COURCELLES, AUBERCOURT or DEMUIN, while we were in the positions above mentioned. Our fire did not entirely check the march of the enemy platoons on the South side of the LUCE, but we inflicted quite a lot of casualties. We could see them fall and some turn and walk back.*

*"Our Infantry now received Orders to withdraw to the higher ground in rear and they gave as a reason that the enemy were crossing the river LUCE farther West. This retirement began on the right of the line for the reason that the left was a salient on the highest ground and controlled the rest of the line. When the right of the line began to fall back our gunners went too; the infantry assisted in carrying belt-boxes.*

*"After the guns on the right had withdrawn, I went along to the centre guns, under Corporal McLaughlin. When I reached his positions, a sniping fire had already broken out from the direction of the road running through V.20a. and c. (the Road running due N. from AUBERCOURT), We could see groups of the enemy going along this road but only in places as the road was mostly sunken. We fired on these and we fired at sniper whom we located, but*



*there was no definite attack made on our positions. The enemy was evidently making a demonstration just to engage our attention. All but about 5 infantrymen had left this bit of trench (trenches were about waist deep and were in sections of 25 to 40 yds. long). We were now the right of the line, so after firing for some time with rifles and Machine Guns we withdrew from there one man at a time.*

*"When these 2 guns had moved out of their forward positions, I went along to Corporal McKENNA's guns which were in the salient on the left of the line. The German artillery had located the salient and had inflicted heavy casualties on the infantry who were still there, but none of our men had been hit; they had, however, for some time been unable to do anything as a heavy and continuous Machine Gun fire was sweeping the parapets from the North and North East. This retirement of the infantry had already begun from this sector and so our guns went out, one man at a time. Fire was very heavy and there were quite a few casualties in getting out.*

*"Our new line was established in U.24.a and b and U.18.d (about 1,000 yds. W. of the original line and running diagonally across the DEMUIN-VILLERS-BRETONNEUX Road, S. of the Wood, E. of the BOIS de HANGARD)."*

Lieut. MARSHALL was wounded during the withdrawal of the last 4 Guns of his Group, and after his Gun Detachments had taken up their Positions in the new Line, he proceeded to a Casualty Clearing Station and on his way was reported to Capt. MEURLING, whose Headquarters were on the main AMIENS Road about 1 mile W. of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX. Battery Sgt.-Major FOREST was left in command of the Motor Machine Gun Detachments in the AUBERCOURT-HANGARD Area.

The Detachment, under Lieut. CAMPBELL, was heavily engaged W. of MARCELCAVE in the enemy advance in this Area. His Guns covered the withdrawal of the Infantry.

#### **Operations Along the AVRE March 30th.**

The situation along the AVRE River was considerably improved during the course of the morning by the presence in that Area of the Second Cavalry Division. A brilliant Counter-attack carried out by the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade in Support, had restored our Line in MOREUIL WOOD, but a Gap appeared to exist between the Cavalry and the Twentieth Division on the Left. Capt. CLARK, O.C. "A" and "B" Batteries, 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade, who had used his Detachment on March 29th in patrolling the Roads and obtaining information as to the enemy Dispositions, detailed 2 Armoured Cars on the morning of the 30th to co-operate with the Canadian Cavalry Brigade along the RIVER AVRE. Lieut. W.H. SMITH, who had command of these 2 Cars was ordered to place his 4 Machine Guns in Positions near CASTEL from which he could cover the River Valley, the Railway Track and the Bridge at CASTEL. This was, perhaps, a precaution against an advance by an enemy between the Cavalry and the Twentieth Division. The Machine Gunners stayed in their Positions until 7.30 P.M. but had no opportunity of getting into Action.

Capt. CLARK also detailed 2 Other Armoured Cars to work under the Orders of Capt. MEURLING, O.C. Eaton and Yukon Batteries. Lieut. PEEBLES was in charge of these 2 Cars, which operated on the Roads around HANGARD, AUBERCOURT, MARCELCAVE, VILLERS-BRETONNEUX and HAMEL.

#### **Carey's Force Broken Up.**

The progress of the enemy N. of the LUCE was checked and, in the afternoon (March 30th), his Troops were finally driven back to about the Line of the AUBERCOURT-MARCELCAVE Road by determined Counter-attacks carried out by elements of the Sixty-sixth Division and the 9th Australian Brigade. In the evening, our Line S. of the LUCE was somewhat re-established by successful Counter-attacks delivered by Troops of the Twentieth and Fiftieth Division. Hostile Attacks delivered by the enemy on both sides of the SOMME, the same evening, were repulsed by the First Cavalry Division and the Third Australian Division. During the night March 30th/31st, the Sixty-First Division took over command of the Line S. of the AMIENS-WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT Road from General CAREY, and the First Cavalry Division took command of the Line N. of the same Road. March 30th saw the arrival of the first British Reserve (Third Australian Division) on the FIFTH ARMY Front. That night Carey's Force was broken up after it had served a most useful purpose, viz., the Organisation and Defence of the AMIENS Line, with the double effect of having checked the enemy advance and allowed our exhausted and greatly weakened Infantry Divisions to withdraw and reorganise in Rear of this Line. Although Carey's Force was broken up, the



Motor Machine Gunners remained in the Line to reinforce the relieving Divisions, which were tired and very much depleted in numbers from the previous 8 days fighting.

#### **Armoured Cars; March 31st.**

The Fighting between the AVRE and LUCE RIVERS continued on March 31st and our Troops were driven back to the Line from MOREUIL Railway Station to HANGARD. Lieut. R.M. THOMSON operated, during the day, along the AMIENS-ROYE Road. When returning from a dash down the Road, the Detachment was caught in a heavy enemy Artillery Barrage just S.-E. of HOURGES, and unfortunately 1 of the Armoured Cars ran into a Shell-hole on the Road, and 3 of its Crew became Casualties. After the 2 Guns on it had been taken off, the Car was temporarily abandoned. In the evening, after dark, a party went forward and found that the car had been hit by enemy Shells and was burnt up. It was, therefore, left there and later fell into enemy hands. The same day, March 31st, Lieut. W.H. SMITH operated with 2 Armoured Cars between HANGARD and DOMART. No serious Attacks developed during the day between the LUCE and the SOMME, our Line from HANGARD to the W. of WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT was maintained.

#### **1st C.M.M.G.B. March 31st to April 4th.**

During the night March 31st/April 1st, the Borden Battery, under Capt. O'REILLY, left HEBECOURT and went into the Line to relieve the Guns and Personnel of the Eaton Battery. On completion of this Relief Lieut. CAMPBELL took the Eaton Battery to HEBECOURT, Brigade H.Q.

With the exception of another successful Attack by the Second Cavalry Division between the AVRE RIVER and the AMIENS-ROYE Road which further improved our Position there, nothing new developed on April 1st on the XIX Corps Front. April 2nd and 3rd were quiet days in front of the British Line S. of the SOMME. On April 2nd, the FIFTH ARMY ceased to exist as such and became the Reserve Army. General SIR HENRY RAWLINSON had taken command of all the British Troops S. of the SOMME, now known as the FOURTH ARMY. On April 3rd, elements of Carey's Force still in the Line were withdrawn and that night the Machine Gun Detachment, under Capt. MEURLING, was relieved in the Line by the British and Australian Machine Gun Companies. Just before being relieved, the Borden Battery was subjected to heavy Shelling, and had 2 Other Ranks, wounded, 1 Gun destroyed and another Gun damaged. "A" and "B" Batteries (Capt. CLARK) of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade, which, since March 27th, had been operating on the Roads along the British Front between the AVRE and the SOMME obtaining valuable information as to the Dispositions and Strength of the enemy and frequently engaging favourable Targets, were also withdrawn from the Line on the night April 3rd/4th. By the morning of April 4th, all the Motor Machine Gun Batteries were out of the Line and concentrated at HEBECOURT, 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade H.Q. The Brigade, now under the Orders of the FOURTH ARMY, expected to return to the Canadian Corps on the 6th.

#### **XIX Corps Front; April 4th.**

The XIX Corps Front had undergone no alteration since April 1st. When the Motor Machine Gunners were relieved on the night April 3rd/4th, the Line ran:- Cemetery E. of HANGARD, thence N. for 500 yds., thence N.-E. in front of Wood E. of BOIS de HANGARD, 2,000 yds. W. of MARCELCAVE. 1,500 yds. W. of WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT, through BOIS de TAILLOUX and due N. to the SOMME RIVER. French Troops had relieved the British Division S. of the LUCE. The Eighteenth Division and 9th Australian Infantry Brigade held the Line between the LUCE and the AMIENS-WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT Road and the Fourteenth Division was in the Line N. of this Road. Early on the morning of April 4th, this Line was driven back by strong enemy Attacks preceded by heavy Artillery Bombardments. The Attack S. of the AMIENS-VILLERS-BRETONNEUX Road was repulsed but the enemy penetrated our Line in the vicinity of BOIS d'ACCROCHE, thus affecting the remainder of the FOURTH ARMY Front. HAMEL was lost and at Noon our Troops held roughly the Line: VAIRE-sous-CORBIE-500 yds. W. of BOIS de VAIRE - 2,000 yds. E. of WILLERS-BRETONNEUX-W. of MARCELCAVE-HANGARD. During the afternoon the enemy who had made some progress against the French on both sides of the AVRE RIVER, heavily attacked the Eighteenth Division causing the withdrawal of the FOURTH ARMY Right in the vicinity of BOIS de HANGARD. This movement on the Right and the penetration of the enemy on the N. exposed the Flanks of the 9th Australian Infantry Brigade, which then withdrew to a point 500 yds. S. of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX.



**1st C.M.M.G. Bde. April 4th.**

At 3.00 p.m. April 4th, Lieut.-Col. WALKER (O.C., 1st C.M.M.G. Bde.) received Orders from the FOURTH ARMY H.Q. to send his Brigade into Action to assist the Infantry to check the enemy Advance and to "*hold VILLERS-BRETONNEUX at all costs.*" Thus the reorganisation of the Motor Machine Gun Batteries preparatory to their move back to the Canadian Corps was hurriedly altered into preparations to proceed to the Line. By 4.00 P.M., "A" and "B" Batteries, under Capt. CLARK, and the Eaton and Yukon Batteries, under Capt. MEURLING, were operating in the neighbourhood of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX. The Borden Battery was kept in Reserve at HEBECOURT. Lieuts. T.A. SMITH and R.M. THOMSON, with 2 Armoured Cars each, operated on the Main Road between VILLERS-BRETONNEUX and WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT and the other 2 Armoured Cars, under Lieut. LYNCH were in Action on the VILLERS-BRETONNEUX-HAMEL Road. Many good Targets were engaged and numerous Casualties were inflicted on the enemy, particularly by the Machine Gunners working S.-W. of BOIS-de-WAIRE. All the enemy attempts at further Advance from this direction were frustrated by the Fire of our Artillery, Machine Guns and Rifles.

In the meantime, Capt. MEURLING detailed the Machine Guns of his 2 Batteries to take up positions E. and N.-E. of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX and to cover all approaches to the Town. 4 Guns of the Yukon Battery under Lieut. L.M. BLACK were dug in Front of the Town. The remaining 4 Guns of the Yukon battery and the 8 Guns of the Eaton Battery, under Lieut. CAMPBELL, were to occupy Positions on the Left. At this time the enemy was heavily shelling our Positions astride the AMIENS-WARFUSEE Road. While going forward to take up their Positions, Lieut. CAMPBELL's Detachment suffered many Casualties from this Shelling: 4 Other Ranks were killed and 26, wounded. There were sufficient Gunners left to man only 2 Guns which were placed in Positions to the Left of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX. Lieut. PEEBLES was in charge of these 2 Guns.

During this Bombardment, an enemy Shell exploded and set on fire a Motor Machine Gun Brigade 3-ton Lorry, full of S.A.A. (Bulk and in Belts) which was being unloaded by the gun Crews of the Eaton and Yukon Batteries prior to their going to forward Positions from the Eastern outskirts of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX. Two Char-a-banc Cars (Men's Transport) standing close to the burning Lorry were in grave danger of being set on fire too; but, in spite of the great risk he was taking in approaching the burning lorry and Ammunition, Private WEGG, a member of the Motor Machine Gun Crews, voluntarily went forward and drove both the *Charabanc Cars* away into safety.

Just before dusk, Lieut. BLACK, who had no Men left to handle his Guns, joined the Armoured Car Detachment operating on the Main Road E. of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, and took 1 Armoured Car forward to a point about 1½ mile W. of WARFUSEE-ABANCOURT. The 2 Machine Guns of this Car were fired from their Mounts on the Car, enfilading the enemy Positions on either side of the Road. Excellent Targets were obtained and many Casualties were inflicted on the enemy. After the Guns had fired about 2,500 Rounds each, the Car withdrew without suffering a single Casualty.

Capt. MEURLING, who had sent a message, earlier in the evening, to Lieut.-Col. WALKER, asking for more Guns and Men, was reinforced at about 6.30 P.M. that evening, April 4th, by the Borden Battery consisting of 6 Machine Guns and Crews and commanded by Capt. O'REILLY, M.C. These Guns were immediately placed N.-E. of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX. Shortly after the Borden Battery had taken up its Positions, the enemy laid down an Artillery Barrage along our Front. Expecting an enemy Attack to follow this Artillery activity, Capt. MEURLING ordered the Borden Battery to Fire with all their Guns on enemy Positions at a range of 2,500 yds. It was later reported that this Machine Gun Fire broke up a large body of the enemy who were, perhaps, concentrating for an Attack.



**FOURTH ARMY Line; April 5th and 6th.**

No Attack developed on the XIX Corps Front during the night April 4th/5th. The following day, the enemy directed his effort against the THIRD ARMY, N. of the SOMME. There was little Fighting on the British Front S. of the SOMME, but there was no appreciable change in the Line which ran approximately as follows:- N. of HANGARD (held by the French) -- through BOIS de HANGARD -- thence N.-E. to midway between MARCELCAVE and VILLERS-BRETONNEUX -- 500 yds. E. of BOIS de VAIRE --- along the road to VAIRE-sous-CORBIE. With the exception of a few minor changes, this was the general Line held by the British troops between the LUCE and SOMME RIVERS until August, 1918, the commencement of the British and French Offensive.

There was no change in the Situation on April 6th. The Borden Battery and the remnants of the Eaton and Yukon Batteries maintained their Positions in front and on the Left of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX. Capt. MEURLING and Capt. CLARK (O.C., "A" and "B" Batteries) established their H.Q. on the Western outskirts of the Town. The 6 Armoured Cars of "A" and "B" batteries moved along the roads behind the FOURTH ARMY Front but they had no occasion to get into Action against the enemy. Capt. CLARK's Detachment worked in conjunction with 4 French Armoured Cars operating behind the French Divisions S. of the LUCE.

**Relief of XIX Corps by III Corps.**

On April 5th, FOURTH ARMY H.Q. moved from DURY to FLEXECOURT and 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade H.Q. moved from HEBECOURT to DURY. In the evening of the same day, the III Corps relieved the XIX Corps. Command of the Divisions in the Line and the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade passed from the XIX Corps to the relieving Corps.

**Events April 7th to 9th.**

April 7th and 8th were 2 uneventful days on the III Corps Front. On the 7th, the Australian Corps was transferred to the FOURTH ARMY and Australian Divisions were gradually moving into the Line S. of the SOMME. On the 8th, H.Q. 1st C.M.M.G. Bde. was moved from DURY to MONTIERS, 2 miles N.-W. of AMIENS. The Borden, Eaton and Yukon Batteries, under Capt. MEURLING, were relieved during the night April 8th/9th by Machine Guns of the Australian Divisions, and the following morning "A" and "B" Batteries, under Capt. CLARK, were withdrawn from the Line. All 5 Batteries moved from the Line back to Brigade H.Q. at MONTIERES.

**1st C.M.M.G. Bde. Returns to Canadian Corps.**

Early on the Morning of April 10th, the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade received Orders from the FOURTH ARMY through the III Corps, to return to the Canadian Corps in the FIRST ARMY Area. Accordingly, the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade and attached Batteries, under Lieut. Colonel WALKER, left their Billets in MANTIERES at 10.00 A.M. the same day and arrived at their old Camp in VEDREL, 2 miles S. of BARLIN, at 4.00 P.M. The journey was made by Road through FREVENT, ST. POL, DIVION, HOUDAIN and RESNICOURT. As soon as it reached VEDREL, the Motor Machine Gun Brigade was placed in FIRST ARMY Reserve.

**Casualties.**

The Casualties suffered by the 1st C.M.M.G.B. and the Borden, Eaton and Yukon Batteries during the period March 24th - April 7th. were:-

Officers			Other Ranks			Total		TOTAL
Killed	Wounded	Missing	Killed	Wounded	Missing	Officers	Other Ranks	All Ranks
5	8	1	20	100	10	14	130	144

The Total of 144 does not include the Casualties suffered by the British Machine Gunners attached to the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Batteries during the same period.



### General Remarks and Observations.

Throughout the period the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade ("A" and "B" Batteries) and the Borden, Eaton and Yukon Batteries were in Action on the Fronts of the FIFTH, FOURTH and THIRD ARMIES, the Canadian Motor Machine Gunners played an important part in delaying and checking the Advance of the enemy, in covering the withdrawal of our Infantry and in strengthening with their Machine Guns the Lines of Resistance organised at various stages of the Battle. During the night March 22nd/23rd, 1918, the 1st Canadian Machine Gun Brigade was in the Canadian Corps Area with 4 of its Batteries employed in the construction of Machine Gun Emplacements in the VIMY RIDGE Defences. By 4.00 P.M. March 23rd, the Batteries had been withdrawn from the Forward area and the whole Unit had reported for duty to the FIFTH ARMY H.Q. at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX. On the morning of March 24th, 4 Batteries were already heavily engaged with the enemy and were co-operating with Troops of the Right and Left corps of the FIFTH ARMY. In the afternoon of the same day, the remaining battery was also thrown into the Battle with the Centre Corps of the ARMY. In less than 36 hours the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade had withdrawn from the VIMY Front, had travelled by Road over 70 miles to the SOMME Front and had all of its 40 Machine Guns spread over a Line of about 35 miles where a fierce battle was raging.

Well supported by Artillery, Machine Guns, Trench Mortars and other auxiliary weapons, a large number of specially trained enemy Divisions were making a tremendous effort on March 24th to further exploit the success they had already gained on the first 3 days of the Battle. Our exhausted and very much depleted Divisions were fighting stubbornly against heavy odds. A large percentage of their Artillery and Machine Guns had been put out of Action, destroyed or captured by the enemy. The FIFTH ARMY had practically no Supports, Reserves or Reinforcements to strengthen or relieve its Divisions in the Line. It was at this stage of the Battle, when the enemy in over whelming numbers was pressing hard against our weakened Infantry, that the 1st C.M.M.G.B. joined the XVIII, XIX and VII Corps. The timely arrival of the Motor Machine Gun Batteries was greatly appreciated by the G.O.C., FIFTH ARMY, and the Commanders of the Corps, Divisions and Brigades to which they were attached.

In modern warfare, the Machine Gun has proved itself to be an essential weapon; and without it no Defence Scheme can be considered complete. The value of the 40 Machine Guns of the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade will be more readily understood when it is remembered that a Machine Gun is equivalent in Fire Power to about 80 Rifles. The great mobility of the Brigade and their 8 Armoured Cars further increased the value of the Fire Power concentrated in their Guns. Lieut.-Col. WALKER, D.S.O., M.C., Officer commanding the 1st C.M.M.G.B., makes the following comments on the above Operations:-

*"The fire power of 40 mobile Machine Guns meant a great deal to the exhausted troops of the Fifth Army, and during the fighting in March and April, they co-operated with all the Corps in the Fifth Army. Scattered remnants of the tired Infantry were always ready to rally round the Machine Guns and Armoured Cars, and make determined stands against desperate odds.*

*"In a fight of this kind Armoured Cars and Motorcyclist Scouts are of great value. They can always keep in touch with the enemy, break up his patrols, and interfere with his reconnaissance work. Motor-cyclist Scouts were also invaluable for inter-communication work. One of the advantages of Armoured Cars is that they may be withdrawn at night, and their mobility permits of their being sent well back of our lines to re-equip, and if necessary to bring forward again new and rested gun teams."*

The above account of the Operations of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. during the period March 24th - April 10th contains outstanding examples of good leadership, initiative, skill, boldness and steadiness on the part of All ranks in the handling of Detachments and Guns and in carrying out difficult tasks under unprecedented conditions. The qualities displayed by Officers and Men together with the Fire Power of the 40 Machine Guns, made the work of this comparatively small Unit effective and of great assistance to the exhausted and disorganised Divisions of the FIFTH ARMY. In this connection Lieut.-Col. WALKER writes:-

*"Had it not been that both Officers and Men alike had been trained to fight on their own initiative at such a time when orders could not reach them, the Unit would have been a failure, and its tremendous fire power would not have been effective, for it so often happened that the Headquarters of Divisions and Brigades, being continually on the move, could not be found. The task allotted to the Unit, and to the various Batteries in the line, was a big one, and gave ample scope for initiative. The task was to fight a rear-guard action, strengthen the line at any dangerous point on the Army front, and to delay the advance of the enemy as much as possible."*



Throughout the whole of the ABOVE Operations, Batteries kept in touch with Brigade Headquarters by means of Motor-cyclists. The information received from the Batteries in the Line, giving the Dispositions of our own and the enemy's Troops, was at once forwarded to ARMY H.Q. by Lieut.-Col. WALKER, thus helping to a large extent to clear up doubtful situations. Lieut.-Col. WALKER also sent daily reports to the Canadian Corps Machine Gun Officer. Copies of these reports were distributed among the Units of the Canadian Corps. The mobility of the Brigade was such that it was able to operate on the whole of the ARMY Front, and often filled critical gaps in our Line and prevented the enemy from breaking through. Batteries and Sections being self-contained Fighting Units were easily detached to deal with any special Situation.

The moral support of the Armoured Cars and Machine Guns was very great. Their unexpected help on many occasions put fresh heart into the Infantry, who were fighting against overwhelming odds.

The following is an extract from the XVIII Corps Narrative of Operations, March 21st to March 28th, 1918:-

*"Assistance was forthcoming in the shape of 2 Canadian Motor Machine Gun Batteries, which on arrival were placed at the disposal of the G.O.C., 20th Division. In all subsequent operations up to the 31st march, these Batteries performed yeoman service in holding the extended fronts allotted to the 20th Division."*

Similar remarks are passed by the G.O.C., Twentieth Division, in his report on the same Operations, which also contain the following:-

*"Touch was obtained (March 26th) by the 61st Brigade at BEAUFORT with the 24th Division at WARVILLERS. To assist in delaying the enemy, 4 Motor Machine Guns were ordered to occupy a position near the Cross Roads N.W. of MOUVROY. These Guns proved to be most valuable, not only in delaying the enemy advance, but also in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy."*

Under date April 4th, 1918, reference to the 1st C.M.M.G.B. is made in the FOURTH ARMY War Diary:-

*"The Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade was ordered into action at 2 p.m. with instructions to hold VILLERS-BRETONNEUX at all costs. One Battery suffered considerably from shell fire while passing through the village but the remainder took up their positions without incident. There is no doubt that the enemy suffered severe casualties especially in the vicinity of HAMEL where oblique Fire practically annihilated his attacking Infantry."*

The surprise effect of our Armoured Cars and Machine Guns operating on various parts of the Front is illustrated by references made to them in the German Wireless messages of March 26th and 27th, 1918, respectively:-

*"All along the roads of approach our troops have pressed forward against newly brought division and numerous armoured cars."*

*"The enemy have fought with great tenacity to regain Albert, and on the heights S. of the town sanguinary battles took place, supported by armoured cars."*



**Messages Received by 1st C.M.M.G.B.**

Many messages of congratulations were received. One from General WATTS, commanding the XIX Corps reads:-

*"Please accept and convey to all ranks who have been engaged in the recent battle my thanks for their excellent work. They have given invaluable service to the XIX Corps."*

On March 30th, SIR ARTHUR CURRIE, the Canadian Corps Commander, wrote to Lieut.-Col. WALKER:-

*"I thank you so much for your reports. They are so inspiring. What good quality and deadly work you and your gallant gunners are doing. We are all so proud of you. More power to you, keep up the good fight. The only thing to do is to stick to it. We'll win yet. We're winning now."*

Lieut.-Col. R. BRUTINEL, Canadian Corps Machine Gun Officer, also addresses a letter to Lieut.-Col. WALKER which reads in part as follows:-

*"I am very proud that the Brigade set such a splendid example of determination and bravery in their fight against overwhelming odds. I knew you could place your entire confidence in the steadfastness and stubborn courage of all ranks under you."*

*"The knowledge of the good work done by the Brigade assuages somewhat the sorrow brought about by the heavy losses you have suffered in gallant officers and men."*

**Lessons Learnt.**

Some of the Lessons learnt by the 1st C.M.M.G.B. from the Operations on the SOMME in March-April, 1918, are given in the following circular which was sent to all the Canadian Machine Gun Units in France:-

- Tactical.
  - Enemy Tactics.

*"The enemy invariably screened the advance of his Infantry by use of smoke bombs thrown by hand.*

*"Under cover of this smoke screen which resembled a mist the hostile Infantry advanced deployed, or in small columns, preceded by a large number of light machine guns.*

*"When held up by our Machine gun fire the enemy sent up coloured flares as a signal to the artillery in the vicinity, to clear the way by shelling any possible machine gun positions on our side. At the same time hostile machine guns were employed sweeping hedges and other possible machine gun positions. These flares also seemed to be a signal to the Infantry on the flanks to commence outflanking and enveloping movements, which through lack of support on our flanks nearly always compelled our machine guns to withdraw.*

*"Concealment is of primary importance. The enemy will not advance against machine gun fire. As soon as he located the approximate positions of our Batteries he worked around and outflanked them.*

*"If the enemy is massing within reasonable range, fire should at once be opened up, if not the opportunity of killing the enemy may be lost, owing to his working around in such a manner as to deny a good field of fire.*

*"If possible positions should be sited so that they command a good view of both flanks.*

*"The shortage of machine guns was very badly felt. If machine guns had been in sufficient numbers, the tactics of the enemy could not have succeeded as well nor as early as they did.*

*"A large number of excellent enemy marksmen were used as snipers, who worked around the flanks of machine gun positions and picked off the Crews. Certainly 50% of our Casualties at Gun positions were due to such marksmen."*

- Our Tactics.

*"These were of necessity very simple. They consisted chiefly in giving all concerned a free hand in checking the advance of the enemy and inflicting as many casualties as possible. The order that no machine guns were to withdraw until out-flanked was rigorously enforced. Particular attention was*



*also paid to communications. Under all circumstances guns had to be in communication with their H.Q.*

*Owing to lack of man and fire power, due to the Infantry sometimes having rifles and sometimes not, and more often than not no ammunition, and the lack of success in forming an organised line, the guns were compelled to work for days and nights with crews of only 2 men, in order that fire power of some sort could be obtained at critical points.*

*"The enemy was easily checked by fire and as a rule did not try to advance under machine gun fire until the machine guns had been outflanked.*

*"Even though the Infantry were sometimes unable to fire a shot through lack of rifles and ammunition, or to being on the move, great difficulty was experienced in pressing them into service with the Machine guns for the purpose of carrying ammunition or loading belts. In a few days, however, it became apparent that the only practicable fire power available was that of machine guns, and this difficulty was then overcome, the men falling to and helping without orders. In a few instances the Infantry officers showed knowledge of the importance of keeping the machine guns in action and helped without being asked. In the majority of cases, however, they showed a complete lack of understanding as to the role of machine guns in defensive action.*

*"Groups of machine guns in echelon at visible distances, and in contact with one another would have undoubtedly checked the advance of the enemy providing such guns, whether on a large or small front, were well protected on the flanks. Outflanking of machine gun positions was a special feature of the enemy advance.*

*"The following tactics in a fight of the above nature would give the best results, both as regards the checking of the enemy advance and economy in man power:-*

- *"A thin line of Lewis Guns in front with small Infantry escort.*
- *"Vickers Guns in groups, in echelon extending from 500 to 1,000 yards. In rear of the Lewis Gun line, with small Infantry escort.*
- *"A strong line of Infantry a few hundred yards in rear of the Vickers Gun line, well rested and fresh for vigorous counter-attacks."*
- Technical.

*"In mobile fighting of this nature as distinct from fighting in battery positions, the following equipment was found to adequately meet all requirements.*

- *"Gun and Tripod.*

*"Mark IV Tripod whenever possible, with a light tripod always attached.*

*"Early in the battle it became evident that the heavy Mark IV tripod would have to be discarded owing to the number of available men per gun, the mobile nature of the fighting and the necessity of carrying as much ammunition as possible. All guns were therefore fitted with the auxiliary tripod, which gave good service, but not as satisfactory as could be desired. For point blank firing without special aiming it served the purpose as a rest for the gun, but if accurate shooting had been required it would have failed. As it was, however, the target presented were so dense that no real aiming was required.*

- *"One First Aid Kit per Gun.*

*"All Guns worked remarkably well, stoppages being generally due to defective or dirty ammunition, not to breakages in the gun.*

- *"One Second Aid Kit (Oil Kit) per 2 Guns.*

*"This should be carried by the Sergeant or Corporal, who should be trained to take advantage of any lull in the fighting to see that gunners "oil up."*

- *"No gun water need be carried, except in stationary positions. The gunners should fill with water wherever possible.*
- *"No spare barrels are required with the gun. They should be kept at some central headquarters to be available when required. The actual amount of firing is not so great as to warrant this extra load.*



- *"Each gunner to carry, if possible, four 50-round belts empty as an emergency supply, which can be filled from ammunition picked up from casualties.*
- *"Each gunner including N.C.O.s but excluding Nos. 1 and 2 on the guns, to carry in the initial stages of the battle 2 loaded belt boxes.*
- *"Condenser tube always to be carried. No condenser bag is needed, but the end of the tube should be buried in the ground.*
- *"Clinometers very necessary at the rate of at least one to every two guns.*
- *"Compasses as now laid down, each officer to carry one. These should be liquid compasses. Other kinds are too slow for this kind of fighting, as they force the observer to expose himself for too long a period.*
- *"Field glasses must be carried by every officer and at least one N.C.O. for every two guns. A more powerful kind that at present issued would be a decided advantage.*
- *"The entrenching tool now carried by our gunners is too slow and was found of no value in hard ground. It is recommended that a small spade, such as is carried by the French machine gunners be supplied at the rate of one per gun. Such spades were picked up by our men on the battlefield and used in preference to our own entrenching tools.*

*"Short-handled shovels as used by the tunnellers would also answer the purpose."*



**CANADIAN MOTOS MACHINE GUN UNITS : APRIL 11TH, 1918, TO JULY 30TH, 1918.**

The 1st C.M.M.G.B. and the Borden, Eaton and Yukon Batteries spent the time between April 10th, and June 8th, 1918, in cleaning and overhauling their fighting Equipment and Transport, in Machine Gun Training, in Infantry and Physical Drill, and on games and sports. On the latter date, the 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade was organised and the Borden, Eaton and Yukon Batteries ceased to be Administrative Units on being absorbed by the 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades. On June 7th, 1918, the Eaton and Yukon batteries moved from VERDREL to OLHAIN taking over the Billets occupied by the 18th Canadian Machine Gun Company, which moved to VERDREL. On June 13th, the Headquarters and 5 Batteries of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. concentrated at DIVION.

The 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades spent the period June 8th-July 30th in General Machine Gun and Infantry Training, in Overhead, Indirect and Barrage Machine Gun instruction and drill, and in carrying out Tactical Exercises. On July 14th, the 1st C.M.M.G.B. moved from its Camp at VERDREL to Billets in TILLOY-les-HERMAVILLE and on the 15th, the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. moved from DIVION to HERMAVILLE. Both Units remained in these locations until July 30th, 1918, when they proceeded to the FOURTH ARMY Area on the AMIENS Front.



**AMIENS.****JULY 30TH to AUGUST 25TH, 1918.****INTRODUCTORY.****General Plans for Allied SOMME Offensive.**

While the Canadian Corps was holding the Line astride the RIVER SCARPE, in the second fortnight of July, 1918, events were taking place on other portions of the Front which presaged the final victory of the Allies in the Field. On July 15th, the enemy launched 2 powerful Attacks, one E. and one W. of RHEIMS. Some progress was made S.W. of RHEIMS, but both Attacks were contained and overwhelming losses inflicted on the Germans. On July 18th, the Allied Counter-offensive was launched, and, on July 26th, the Germans, with their Right Flank in danger and the Communications of the Crown Prince's Armies threatened, ordered the withdrawal from the MARNE Salient to the RIVER AISNE.

The success of these Operations created a Tactical situation which enabled Marshal FOCH to continue the Offensive elsewhere. Plans were soon matured for an Attack on the SOMME Salient, with the object of freeing the AMIENS-PARIS Railway and ultimately straightening the Line on the whole Front of the German Offensive against AMIENS in march-April, 1918. It was then decided to use the Canadian Corps for these Operations.

On July 30th, 1918, the Corps was disposed as follows:-

Corps H.Q. was at DUISANS. The First and Fourth Divisions were holding the Line E. of ARRAS, from NEUVILLE-VITASSE to OPPY; the Second Canadian Division was in G.H.Q. Reserve in the LE CAUROY Area, 15 miles W. of ARRAS; the Third Division was in G.H.Q. Reserve in the HERMAVILLE Area, 8 miles W. of ARRAS.

**Canadian Corps Moves South.**

The move of the Canadian Corps to the AMIENS Area began on July 30th, when Corps H.Q. handed over to XVII Corps and move to MOLLIENS-VIDAME, 40 miles S.-W. of ARRAS and 10 miles W. of AMIENS. The move of the 2 Divisions in Reserve to the AMIENS Area began the same day. Second Divisional H.Q. moved to FOURDRINOY, 8 miles W. of AMIENS, on the 30th, and to CAVILLON, 1 mile W. of FOURDRINOY, on the following day. Third Divisional H.Q. moved to BOUQUEMAISON, 4 miles N. of DOULLENS, on the 30th, and to HORNOY, 17 miles W. of AMIENS on the 31st. The First and Fourth Divisions were relieved in the Line on the nights July 31st/August 1st and August 1st/2nd, by the Fifty-sixth, Fifty-seventh and Fifty-second Divisions, XVII Corps. Relief was completed by daylight on August 2nd. Upon Relief the First and Fourth Divisions proceeded to the AMIENS Concentration Area. First Divisional H.Q. moved to HORNOY on AUGUST 3rd; Fourth Divisional H.Q. moved to HALLENCOURT, 20 miles N.-W. of AMIENS, on the same day.

**Secrecy Maintained.**

Every effort was made to preserve the utmost secrecy regarding the move to the FOURTH ARMY Area. Certain ruses were employed to mislead our Troops as to their destination until the move was actually under way. The FIRST ARMY Order, detailing the Relief of the Canadian Corps by the XVII Corps on the ARRAS Front, stated that the Canadian Corps would be prepared to move to the SECOND ARMY which was then holding the Section of the British front to the N. of the FIRST ARMY. This Order was published on July 29th. In order further to spread a belief among our Troops that a move N. was impending, the 27th C.I.Bn. from the Second Division, and the 4th C.M.R. Bn. From the Third Division, were moved N. by Strategical Train, and placed in the Line for a few days in the SECOND ARMY Area. Steps were taken to ensure, also, that the enemy received word of the presence of Canadian Troops on the SECOND ARMY Front.

The Intention of the move S. was kept from the Lower Command until the move was completed. The actual Corps letter, giving to Divisions their first intimation of the move, made no mention of the intended Operations. The letter stated that, on transfer to the FOURTH ARMY, the Canadian Corps would be held in G.H.Q. Reserve, and be prepared, in case of Attack, to support either the French FIRST ARMY or the British FOURTH ARMY, or to move S. at short notice, to assist the French on the RHEIMS-SOISONS Front. The move itself took place under conditions of the greatest possible secrecy. Troops entrained or



embussed and detrained or debussed under cover of darkness. Brigades moved under sealed Orders. The large tracts of wooded country in the Area of Concentration made easier the concealment of our Troops from observation by hostile Aeroplanes.

### **Second and Third BNs., C.M.G.C., Move South.**

The moves S. of the 4 M.G. Battalions corresponded with the moves of the Divisions, The Second and Third Battalions, C.M.G.C., in G.H.Q. Reserve with their respective Divisions, were the first to move to the AMIENS Concentration Area. The First and Fourth Battalions made the journey after being relieved, in the Line, by British M.G. Units.

The Second Battalion (Lt.-Col. WEIR, M.C.) was billeted at LIENCOURT and the neighbouring village of DENIER (No. 2 Coy.). At 1.30 A.M., July 30th, Orders were received for the move to the FOURTH ARMY. At 9 P.M., the same day, the Battalion reached Billets in FERRIERES, 5 miles W. of AMIENS, Personnel of the Battalion entrained at LIGNY-ST. FLOCHEL, detraining at LONGPRE, on the SOMME RIVER, 10 miles S.-E. of ABBEVILLE, From here the Battalion marched to Billets.

On the same day, July 30th, Companies of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. (Lt.-Col. MOORHOUSE), left their Billets at WALRUS (Bn. H.Q.), GOUVES (No. 1 Coy), WANQUENTIN (No. 2 Coy) and SIMENCOURT (No. 3 Coy), 4 to 6 miles W. of ARRAS, and joined their Brigade Group at POMMERA, 4 miles E. of DOULLENS. From here the Personnel proceeded on the 31st by Strategical Train to Billets at LUNATIC ASYLUM 1 mile S. of AMIENS.

The bulk of the Transport of these 2 Battalions made the journey by Road, joining their units on August 2nd. Only Transport necessary to provided Water and Rations for the Troops, during the 2 days interval, was brought with Units on the Train.

### **Fourth and First BNs., C.M.G.C., Move South.**

The First and Fourth Battalions C.M.G.C. were relieved in the Line nights July 31st/August 1st and August 1st/2nd. The First Battalion, C.M.G.C. (Lt.-Col. WATSON, D.S.O.), was relieved by elements of the 56th and 57th M.G. Battalions (British), the Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C. (Lt.-Col. M.A. SCOTT, D.S.O.), by elements of the 52nd and 57th M.G. Battalions. Upon Relief, the First Battalion moved from "Y: Huts, DUISANS, to LIENCOURT (Bn. H.Q., Nos 1 and 2 Nos) and DENIER (No. 3 Coy): The Fourth M.G. Battalion H.Q. moved from MADAGASCAR CORNER, 2 miles N. of ARRAS, to HERMAVILLE; the 3 Companies joined their respective Brigade Groups for the journey S. (No. 1, 10th Bde.; No. 2, 11th Bde.; No. 3, 12th Bde.).

The Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., was in Billets in the AMIENS Area by the night of August 3rd/4th, Battalion H.Q. with Fourth Cdn. Division H.Q., at HALLENCOURT, No. 1 Company at HOCQUINCOURT, one mile W. of HALLENCOURT, Nos. 2 and 3 Companies at FORCEVILLE, 4 miles to the S.-W. Nos. 1 and 3 Companies moved by Train via ABBEVILLE; No 2 Company made the journey by Bus.

The First Battalion entrained on August 4th at LIGNY-ST. FLOCHEL, detraining at SENARPONT, on the RIVER BRESLE, 15 miles S. of ABBEVILLE. From here the entire Battalion marched 4 miles to Billets in BEAUCHAMPS-le-VIEUX, situated on high ground between the Rivers BRESLE and LIGER, 22 miles W. of AMIENS.

The Transport of the First and Fourth Battalions made the journey S. by Train.



### General Plan of Operations.

The Attack was made by the French FIRST ARMY on the Right and FOURTH ARMY on the Left with the Canadian Corps and the Australian Corps on the Right and Left, respectively. Frontages were allotted as follows, from Right to Left:-

- a. French FIRST ARMY - MOREUIL to THIENNES (incl.)
- b. Canadian Corps - THIENNES (excl.) to the AMIENS-NESLE Railway.
- c. Australian Corps - AMIENS-NESLE Railway to the SOMME.
- d. III Corps - The Left Flank of the Australian Corps was covered by the III Corps, attacking in the direction of MARLANCOURT, with its Left on the ANCRE at VILLE-sur-CORBIE.

The Frontage of the entire Attack was approximately 20,000 yds. All Troops taking part, including the French FIRST ARMY, were under Orders of the Commander-in-chief, BRITISH ARMY. The object of the Attack was to push forward as quickly and as deeply as possible in the general Easterly direction of ROYE-CHAULNES, and so to assist the Operations of the French Forces, facing N., on the Line MONTDIDIER-NOYON.

### Canadian Corps Frontage, Boundaries and Objectives.

The Canadian Corps, in the Centre of the Attack, was allotted a Frontage of 8,500 yds., extending from a point about 800 yds. S. of HORGES to the AMIENS-NESLE Railway. The Front Line crossed the RIVER LUCE about 800 yds. N.-E. of HORGES and, running almost due N., passed through the W. portion of HANGARD WOOD. From here it bore the E. joining up with the Australian Right, on the AMIENS-NESLE Railway, 1,800 yds. E. of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX. The Corps Right Boundary, adjoining the French lay along the HORGES-VILLERS-aux-ERABLES Road for 2,600 yds., S. of the AMIENS-ROYE Road; thence E. to the AMIENS-ROYE Road N. of MEZIERES; thence along the AMIENS-ROYE Road, inclusive to the Canadian Corps. The Left Boundary was the AMIENS-NESLE Railway inclusive to the Canadian Corps.

Three Objectives were set for the first day's Operations:-

- a. GREEN LINE - Immediately E. of Line HAMON WOOD (on the AMIENS-ROYE Road, 2,000 yds. W. of MAISON BLANCHE)-COURCELLES-MARCELCAVE.
- b. RED LINE - E. of Line, MAISON BLANCHE-CAMPVERMONT FARM-high ground E. of GUILLAUCOURT.
- c. BLUE DOTTED LINE - E. of LE QUESNEL-CAIX-HARBONNIERES (in Australian Corps Area). This Line was wired and entrenched and had formed the outer Defences of AMIENS prior to the German Offensive in March 1918.

The average Depth of penetration to the BLUE DOTTED LINE was 14,000 yds. This Line was not regarded as a Final Objective; the Cavalry was to exploit beyond it in the direction of ROYE-CHAULNES, as soon as released by the Infantry from the BLUE DOTTED LINE.

### The Ground.

*"The greater part of our forward area consisted of bare slope exposed to enemy observation from the high ground south of the River Luce and east of Horgues; The trenches were very rudimentary.*

*"On the right, the River Luce, and the marshes, varying on that portion of the front from 200 to 300 yards wide, created an obstacle impassable to troops. Here the only practicable access to the jumping-off line was by the bridge and the road from Domart to Horgues - a narrow defile about 200 yards long. This was commanded absolutely from the high ground immediately to the east, and more particularly from Dodo Wood (on the Right of the AMIENS-ROYE Road, 1,200 yds. E. of HORGES and MOREUIL WOOD).*

*"These conditions made the assembly of troops prior to the attack very difficult, while the siting of the forward field batteries was not an easy task.*

*"Some distance west of the front line a small number of woods, villages and sunken roads afforded a certain amount of cover from view. Gentelles Wood in particular was used very extensively for the Assembly of Tanks as well as troops.*



*"Opposite our front the ground consisted of a rolling plateau cut diagonally by the deep valley of the River Luce. This river flows almost due west through a strip of wooded marsh land some 300 yards wide, from which the sides of the valley rise steeply. Numerous ravines running generally north and south cut deep into the plateau, the ground between these ravines forming, as it were, tactical features difficult of access and more or less inter-supporting. Woods and copses are scattered over the area, and many compact and well built villages, surrounded by gardens and orchards, formed conspicuous landmarks. The remainder was open, unfenced farm land, partly covered with field of standing grain.*

*"The hostile defences consisted chiefly of unconnected elements of trenches, and a vast number of machine gun posts scattered here and there, forming a fairly loose but very deep pattern."*

### **Our Troops.**

In addition to the 4 Canadian Divisions, the following Troops were placed at the disposal of the Corps:-

5th Squadron, R.A.F.  
4th Tank Brigade.  
3rd Cavalry Division.

The 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades, the Canadian Corps Cyclists Battalion, and a Section of 6" Newton Trench Mortars were placed under the tactical command of Brig-Gen. BRUTINEL, C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C., Canadian M.G. Corps; this Group of Units was named the Canadian Independent Force.

The Corps Commander was notified that 2 British Divisions were held in ARMY Reserve, and could be made available if required, as the Situation developed.

The Artillery operating under the Canadian Corps consisted of 17 Brigades of Field Artillery, 9 Brigades of Heavy Artillery, and 4 additional Batteries of long-range Guns.

### **Battle Order of Divisions.**

The Order of Battle of Divisions was as follows:-

Left.	Centre.	Right.
Second Canadian Division.	First Canadian Division.	Third Canadian Division.
	In Corps Reserve.	
	Fourth Canadian Division.	

### **Tasks.**

The Task of the First, Second and Third Canadian Divisions, on the first day, was to capture and hold the RED LINE, except on the Left of the Second Division Front, where the Task included the Capture and holding of the BLUE LINE. It was laid down that if the First and Second Divisions had sufficient Troops available on completion of their Tasks on the first day, these Troops should go forward to relieve the Cavalry in, or assist the Cavalry in capturing those portions of the BLUE DOTTED LINE within their own Boundaries. The Task of the Fourth Canadian Division was to advance at Zero, following the First and Third Canadian Divisions, pass through them on the RED LINE, and relieve the Cavalry in or assist them in capturing the BLUE DOTTED LINE, from the AMIENS-ROYE Road to CAIX.

The Task of the Third Cavalry Division, with Whippet Tanks, was to follow up the Advance of the First and Second Canadian Divisions to the RED LINE, to pass through the Infantry here, and proceed to capture and hold the BLUE DOTTED LINE, Northwards from the AMIENS-ROYE Road. They were to exploit their success E. of the BLUE DOTTED LINE.

The Canadian Independent Force was given the Task of co-operating with the Third Cavalry Division along the AMIENS-ROYE Road, passing through the Third Canadian Division and making good the line of the AMIENS-ROYE Road between the RED LINE and the BLUE DOTTED LINE, thereby forming a Flank to the Third Canadian Division. The Independent Force was to exploit success down the AMIENS-ROYE Road.

1 Battalion of Fighting tanks was allotted to each Division to go forward with the Infantry. Fighting Tanks were to go through to the Final Objective, assisting the Infantry at each stage. It was arranged that the Tanks operating with the Fourth Division should precede the Infantry to the BLUE DOTTED LINE where they were to assist the Cavalry until the Infantry came up. Each of these Tanks was to carry 1 Vickers and 2 Lewis Gun Detachments, complete with Crews and Ammunition.



A dense Artillery Barrage was provided as far as the GREEN LINE, where all Barrages ceased. Heavy Artillery were employed to support the Attack as long as possible beyond the GREEN LINE by engaging special Strong Points of Localities. Field and Heavy Artillery Detachments were detailed to advance in close support of the Attacking Infantry.

No co-ordinated Machine Gun Barrage was provided for the whole Corps Frontage of Attack. It was left to Divisions to arrange any M.G. Barrages required within their own Boundaries. 2 Batteries, 16 Guns, of the Second Battalion, and 1 Company, 32 Guns, of the Third battalion were employed for Barrage on their own Divisional Frontages, at the commencement of the Attack.

34 Guns and Crews of the Fourth Battalion were sent forward in mark V Tanks, in advance of the Infantry, to assist the Cavalry on the BLUE DOTTED LINE.

The remaining Machine Guns in each Division co-operated, in the usual way, with the Infantry. Generally speaking, a Machine Gun Company operated with an Infantry Brigade, each battery of 8 Machine Guns fighting, in close Liaison, with a Battalion of Infantry. A portion of the Machine Guns of each M.G. Battalion were held in Divisional reserve to meet eventualities.

Officers commanding M.G. Battalions were instructed to make the fullest possible use of their 1st Line Transport, particularly in the case of Batteries accompanying Infantry detailed to go beyond the GREEN LINE. Hand-carrying of Guns and Ammunition was reduced to a minimum.

#### **Assembly of Infantry.**

Upon arrival in FOURTH ARMY Concentration Area, Units began to move forward to the Battle Area S. and S.-E. of AMIENS. By the night of August 6th/7th, the Canadian Corps was concentrated in the Area between BOVES WOOD, (immediately W. of the junction of the AVRE and NOYE Rivers) and AMIENS. During the night August 7th/8th, our Troops moved to their Assembly Positions. The G.O.C. Canadian Corps had taken over command of the Battle Front from the 4th Australian Division at 10.00 A.M. August 5th, and the Australia troops in the Rear portions of the Area were relieved during hours of darkness on the 4th, 5th and 6th. In order to prevent the enemy from obtaining possible identifications, the relief of the Front Line by our Troops did not take place until the night August 7th/8th prior to the Attack.

#### **Green Line Assaulting Troops.**

When the relief was completed the Battle Order of Divisions and Brigades from Right to Left of the Corps Frontage was as follows:-

Third Cdn. Division	9th C.I.B.	43rd C.I.Bn.
		116th C.I.Bn.
		58th C.I.Bn.
First Cdn. Division	8th C.I.B.	1st C.M.R.
	3rd C.I.B.	16th C.I.Bn.
		13th C.I.Bn.
Second Cdn. Division	4th C.I.B.	14th C.I.Bn.
		18th C.I.Bn.
		19th C.I.Bn.

The Objective of these Troops, was the Capture of the GREEN LINE, with the help, if necessary, of Support and Reserve Battalions.

Brigades in Support were to move up and leap-frog the Attacking Brigades and pass on to the Capture of the RED LINE. If Brigades, in Reserve at Zero Hour, were still unengaged at the RED LINE, they were to pass through to the BLUE DOTTED LINE. The Fourth Division, in Corps Reserve at the outset, was to move up in Rear of the Third Division, pass through the 7th C.I.B. on the RED LINE, and on to the BLUE DOTTED LINE, timing the Advance from the Assembly Area, N. and W. of GENTELLES WOOD to conform with the progress of the leading Divisions.



### **Assembly and Tasks of M.G. Battalions.**

Machine Guns Units assembled night August 7th/8th according to the Tasks to which individual Companies or Batteries had been assigned. Batteries and Companies operating closely with Infantry Brigades assembled with those Brigades; Units assigned to Barrage work took up their Positions prior to Zero; Guns co-operating with tanks moved up to their Jumping-off places each Gun and Crew with its own Tank.

1 Batteries of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. (Lt.-Col. MOORHOUSE), were allotted to the GREEN LINE attacking Brigade, viz. "G" Battery, to the 9th C.I.B. on the Right and "C" Battery, to the 8th C.I.B. on the Left. 4 Batteries, viz., "A", "B", "E" and "F", joined the 7th C.I.B. for the Attack on the RED LINE, 2 Batteries, viz., "D" and "H" were held in Divisional Reserve. The remaining 4 Batteries of the Battalion, comprising No. 3 Company (Major Galt, M.C.), were detailed to fire a primary Barrage in support of the 9th C.I.B. from Zero to Zero plus 60 minutes, after which they were to come into Divisional Reserve.

Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Companies of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C. (Lt.-Col. WATSON, D.S.O.), co-operated with the 1st, 2nd and 3rd C.I.B.s, respectively. One Battery from each Company ("C", "F" and "J") was held in Divisional Reserve. Under this arrangement, No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM, M.C.), less one Battery, was to support the GREEN LINE Attack, No. 1 Company (Major E.R. MORRIS), less one Battery, the RED LINE Attack, and No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM, D.C.M.), less one Battery, the BLUE DOTTED LINE Attack. When the GREEN LINE had been established, No. 3 Company was to reassemble and come into Divisional Reserve.

The 3 Companies of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., were detailed to operate with the 3 Infantry Brigades of the Second Division, No. 3 Company (Major McCAMUS), with the 4th C.I.B., for the GREEN LINE Attack, No. 1 Company (Major BASEVI), with the 5th C.I.B., for the RED LINE Attack, and No. 2 Company (Major McCORKELL), with the 6th C.I.B., for the Advance to the BLUE DOTTED LINE. "J" & "K" Batteries (No. 3 Company) were detailed to bring indirect Fire to bear upon enemy Strong Points during the initial Attack, and on completion of their Barrage Task, were to be prepared to move forward as the Tactical Situation might require.

The Machine Guns of the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., had a varied role. 2 Batteries of No. 2 Company were assigned to Infantry Brigades attacking the BLUE DOTTED LINE, viz., "F" Battery to the 11th C.I.B. (Right) and "H" Battery to the 12th C.I.B. (Left). No. 1 Battery (Major Britton), with 2 Batteries less 2 Guns of No. 2 Company, was in Divisional Reserve under Major BRITTON. These Reserve Guns were to move forward in Rear of the 10th C.I.B. and occupy Defensive Positions, by Batteries, between CAIX and the AMIENS-ROYE Road about 2,500 yds. behind the BLUE DOTTED LINE.

### **Tank Guns, Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.**

No. 3 Company (a/O.C., Capt. W.G. WILLIAMS), Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C., with 2 Guns from No. 2 Company (Major L.F. PEARCE, M.C.), co-operated with Tanks. The Guns joined the 1st Battalion Tank Corps on August 5th at HEBECOURT, 5 miles S. of AMIENS, and were distributed one to each of 34 Tanks. On August 6th and 7th, the Personnel was given instructions in the Operation of Tanks and had some experience of travelling inside them. In addition to Tank Personnel, each Tank carried 1 Vickers Gun, with a Crew of 1 N.C.O. and 4 Men; 2 Lewis Guns with a Crew of 3 Men each; one Officer (Infantry or Machine Gun), one Runner and one Scout; the Scout to be under Orders of the Tank Officer. Besides its own necessary Stores, each Tank carried 16 M.G. Belts, 88 Lewis Gun Pans, and 9,000 Rounds S.A.A. in bulk. 8 Runners and all Vickers Gun Crews were supplied by the Fourth battalion, C.M.G.C.

The Tanks were to proceed to the BLUE DOTTED LINE, where the Guns were to be deposited with a view to cutting off the Enemy from the Rear and consolidating on this Line. Upon the arrival of our Infantry on the BLUE DOTTED LINE the Guns were to come under the command of the Brigade Commander in whose Area they were situated. Sign-boards were made, consisting of a yellow Maple Leaf on a white back-ground, to denote the Gun Positions to our advancing Infantry. These Boards were to be placed so as to be visible from the Rear only. When the BLUE DOTTED LINE had been consolidated, these "Tank" Guns were to be withdrawn from the Final Objective and disposed, by Batteries, for the Defence in Depth of the captured ground.



**Location of Divl. and M.G. BNs. Hdqrs.**

Divisional H.Q. were established as follows on August 7th:-

- Third Division - QUARRY, DOMART, on the W. edge of the Village.
- First Division - GENTELLES WOOD, at the W. end of the Wood, beside the ROYE Road.
- Second Division - 1,000 yds. W. of BOIS de BLANCY.
- Fourth Division - Dugouts, just E. of GENTELLES WOOD.

The Officers Commanding Machine Gun Battalions had their Headquarters at the H.Q. of their Respective Divisions. As the Attack progressed Divisional Headquarters moved forward to enable Communication to be maintained with the leading Brigades.



**OPERATIONS, AUGUST 8th, 1918.****Weather.**

The weather was fine and warm. Prior to Zero Hour a thick mist developed which continued for some hours. Although this condition made it difficult for our Troops to maintain Direction and Liaison, the advantages out-weighed these disadvantages. The mist deprived the enemy of observation over the ground to be captured, and so greatly reduced the effectiveness of his Machine Gun Defences sited on commanding Positions of the RIVER LUCE.

**Progress of Attack.**

The Attack was delivered at 4.20 A.M., August 8th, and proceeded satisfactorily from the outset. The Germans were taken completely by surprise. By the afternoon all Canadian Corps Objectives had been taken with the exception of a few hundred yds. of the BLUE DOTTED LINE, on the Right, in the vicinity of LE QUESNEL. This was made good early the following morning. The Canadian Corps penetrated to a maximum depth of over 8 miles, capturing 12 Villages. By 6.00 P.M., 60 Officers and 3,725 Other Ranks, Prisoners, had passed through the Corps Cage.

**Third "Battalion" C.M.G.C., Green Line.**

The First Objective or GREEN Line, was captured in good time. The 9th C.I.B. (Third Cdn. Div.) attacked on the Corps Right in Liaison with the French. The German Barrage came down about 5 minutes after Zero Hour, but was rather scattered and not extraordinarily heavy. The Bridge over the LUCE at DOMART received a good deal of attention. The most difficult Task of the 9th C.I.B. was the taking of the DODO WOOD, situated on high ground S. of the AMIENS-ROYE Road and strongly defended by Machine Guns. This formidable Feature was taken by a Flanking Movement, from the N., carried out by the 43rd C.I.Bn. Heavy Fighting took place in the Wood, and it was not until 7.30 A.M. that it was completely cleared of enemy Machine Gun Nests. By 8.30 A.M., the 9th C.I.B. was passing through to the RED LINE.

"G" Battery, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., assembled with the 43rd C.I.Bn. S. of the River LUCE in the vicinity of HOURGES. The Guns were taken forward at Zero Hour and little opposition was encountered in reaching their Positions. Guns were sited for Defence in Depth, 6 Guns were placed E. of the DEMUIN-MOREUIL Road, 4 Guns, S. of the AMIENS-ROYE Road, and 2, N. of it, close to the DEMUIN-MOREUIL Cross-Roads. The remaining 2 Guns of the Battery were placed on the Eastern edge of DODO WOOD.

No. 3 Company, Third Bn., C.M.G.C., supported the 9th C.I.B. Attack, firing an intense Creeping Barrage on DODO WOOD from Zero to Zero plus 60 minutes. The Company suffered 7 Casualties, 1 Other Rank, killed, and 6 Other Ranks, wounded. All 32 Guns of the Company were used for the Barrage, and, on completion of their Task, came into Divisional Reserve.

The Centre and Left Battalions of the 9th C.I.B. had a less difficult Task. At 6.00 A.M., the enemy made a stand along the Road between DODO WOOD and HANGARD, but the 116th C.I.Bn turned the Position and continued the advance to the GREEN LINE. DEMUIN fell to the 58th C.I.Bn. on the Left, at 6.10 A.M.

Meantime the 8th C.I.B. (Third Division) had been advancing N. of the LUCE with the 1st C.M.R. Bn. And moved off at Zero Hour. A Gap between the 1st C.M.R. Bn. And the 16th C.I.Bn. on the Left was filled by this Battery, which moved forward in line with the First Wave. At the German Front Line, 65 Prisoners, were captured together with 3 Heavy and 2 Light Machine Guns. The Prisoners were handed over to the 16th C.I.Bn. The Battery advanced 2,000 yds. E. of the old German Front Line, eventually coming into Action in commanding Positions 1,500 yds. N. of DEMUIN. During the Advance, enemy opposition, encountered in WREN COPSE, 500 yds. N. of HANGARD, was successfully overcome. Owing to the thick ground mist which prevented observation, it was found impossible for the Battery to carry out its Task of giving Covering Fire for the 9th C.I.B. Attack on DEMUIN. When DEMUIN had been taken, "C" Battery Guns were moved across the LUCE to GREEN LINE Consolidation Positions S. of DEMUIN.



### **First Battalion C.M.G.C. GREEN LINE.**

The 3rd C.I.B. (First Cdn. Div.), in the Centre of the Corps Attack, made rapid progress. No. 3 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported the Attack. "K", "L" and "M" Batteries advanced with the Infantry; "J" Battery was in Divisional Reserve. The 16th C.I.Bn., on the Brigade Right, arrived at the GREEN LINE on time. The first strong Resistance was encountered at the Road Junction 500 yds. N. of DEMUIN. This was overcome and the enemy were gradually pushed back along the Ridge, laying many Machine Guns and dead behind. In a Quarry close to the GREEN LINE, 500 yds. N.-W. of HAPPAGLENE, a German Regimental Commander was captured with his entire Staff.

"K" Battery, First Bn., C.M.G.C., supporting the 16th C.I.Bn., moved off at 4.25 A.M. Capt. SKINNER, in command of the Battery, had his Guns go forward in pairs, in Diamond Formation, about 200 yds. behind the Infantry. The Battery moved steadily forward encountering little Opposition and Suffering few Casualties. Positions previously selected were reached and occupied at 7.15 A.M. There Positions were located on the high ground to the W. of the MARCELCAVE-DEMUIN Road, 700 yds. N.-W. of AUBERCOURT. All Guns were mounted to cover Infantry Consolidation of the GREEN LINE.

The 13th C.I.Bn. in the Centre of the 3rd C.I.B., met with considerable Resistance in HANGARD WOOD WEST. HANGARD WOOD EAST was encircled by the leading Companies, and mopped up by the rear Company and Tanks. The stoutest Fighting took place at CROATES TRENCH which protected several German Batteries in Action in PANTALOOON RAVINE, 500 yds. N.-W. of AUBERCOURT. The German Defences were over-run and the Batteries Captured with their Crews. The GREEN LINE was reached on time.

"M" Battery, First Bn., C.M.G.C. commanded by Capt. BOWLES, supported the 13th C.I.Bn. The O.C., Battery, who was accompanying the O.C. 13th Bn., was wounded within a few minutes after jumping off, and Lieut. MARTIN assumed command. The Battery encircled HANGARD WOOD EAST, one Section (4 Guns) skirting the Northern, and one Section the Southern Limit of the Wood. Some Opposition was encountered from M.G. Nests which had been overlooked by the Infantry in the Fog. These were disposed of at close quarters, 15 Prisoners being captured by one Section and sent to the Rear. A Pocket of Germans was dealt with by the Left Section in the Sunken Road between the E. and W. portions of HANGARD WOOD. It was found necessary to bring one Gun into Action against this Strong Point.

### **Direct Overhead Fire.**

After encircling HANGARD WOOD EAST, the Sections advanced, at an Interval of 800 yds., to commanding Positions 300 yds. W. of the DEMUIN-VILLERS-BRETONNEUX Road. The 13th and 14th C.I.Bns. were at this time climbing the Spur, 1,000 yds. away, S.-E. of MORGEMONT WOOD, in their Attack on CROATES TRENCH, sited near the Crest of this Spur. Both Sections of "M" Battery came into Action immediately with Direct Overhead Fire, and materially assisted the Infantry Advance. On completing this Task, the Sections moved to Positions 2,500 yds. to the E. 4 Guns were mounted at the Head of PANTALOOON RAVINE, and 4 Guns on the SPUR to the E. of it. Here the Guns remained in Action, firing on parties of retreating Germans, till their Fire was masked by our Infantry. Positions were eventually occupied for Defence in Depth of the GREEN LINE.

The 14th C.I.Bn., on the 3rd Brigade Left, pushed forward rapidly after crossing the German Front Line. In MORGEMONT WOOD, a Nest of Machine Guns gave trouble. This Strong Point was encircled and left to be dealt with by Supporting Troops. Heavy Fighting occurred at CROATES TRENCH, but, from this point on, the Advance to the GREEN LINE met with very little Resistance.

"L" Battery, First Bn., C.M.G.C., under Capt. PARKER, operated with the 14th C.I.Bn., moving forward in diamond Formation about 300 yds. in Rear of the Battalion. Machine Gun Nests, passed over in the mist, by the Infantry, were encountered. One of these, containing 5 M.G.s, was successfully assaulted. One Section (4 Guns) fired on the Strong Point, while the other Section, with Bombs, attacked from a Flank, killing all the occupants. 1,000 yds. E of MORGEMONT WOOD, another Strong Point, containing a number of enemy Machine Guns, was engaged by the Right Section at a Range of 200 yds. Finding the enemy still continued firing from this Strong Point, the Section moved to a Flank; 2 Guns gave Enfilade Fire while the Crews of the other 2 Guns bombed out the Germans. GREEN LINE Defence Positions were eventually occupied by "L" Battery.

Thus, when the leading Infantry of the 1st C.I.B. were passing forward to the Capture of the RED LINE, the 32 Machine Guns of No. 3 Company, First Bn., C.M.G.C., were disposed in Depth on the high ground N. of the LUCE, for the Defence of the Area already captured. When the RED LINE was made good the entire Company, with "A" echelon transport assembled in Divisional Reserve in PANTALOOON RAVINE W. of



AUBERCOURT. The Assembly was complete at 3.30 P.M. with guns cleaned, Belts filled and Limbers packed, in readiness for a move, should the Tactical Situation require it.

### **Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.; GREEN LINE.**

The 4th C.I.B. (Second Cdn. Division), carried the GREEN LINE on the Left of the Corps Frontage in Liaison with the Australians attacking N. of the AMIENS-NESLE Railway. The Germans put down a heavy Barrage on the Assembly Area for 1 hour before Zero, causing numerous Casualties to our Troops. Both Attacking Infantry Battalions reached the GREEN LINE on time. No. 3 Company (Major McCAMUS), Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., Co-operated with the 4th C.I.B.

The 18th C.I.Bn., on the Brigade Right, advanced rapidly, moving off at Zero Hour. The first serious trouble came from the Right from German Machine Guns in MORGEMONT WOOD. After assisting the 14th C.I.Bn. (3rd C.I.B.) in overcoming these Guns, the Battalion proceeded steadily forward to the GREEN LINE. No. of CANCELETTE WOOD, 2 Batteries of German Guns were captured, in Action, and, under covering Fire from Infantry Lewis Guns and Vickers Guns brought p by No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C, the CANCELETTE WOOD Ravine was taken by Assault.

"J" Battery, No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., Co-operated with the 18th C.I.Bn. This Battery moved off at Zero Hour, keeping in touch with the Infantry. During the Advance, Capt. SALISBURY, in command of the Battery, assisted by his Headquarters Personnel, captured 2 German Machine Guns, and took Prisoners 1 Officer and 10 Other Ranks. Two of his Battery Signallers were wounded while closing in on the enemy. The 2 captured Guns were immediately turned on a M.G. Strong Point which was holding up some of our Infantry to a Flank. The German Gunners at once ceased Fire and surrendered to our Infantry. The Battery Guns were mounted in their GREEN LINE DEFENCE POSITIONS, 100 yds. S. of MARCELCAVE, in time to obtain good Targets of retreating Germans. 2 Guns were placed well forward for the purpose of engaging these Targets of Opportunity. Severe Casualties were received in the Advance. 3 Guns were destroyed by enemy Fire. Lieut. BUSH suffered a sprained ankle, but continued to the Objective and remained with his Crews until evening when he had to be evacuated. 1 Other Rank was killed and 11 Other Ranks, Wounded.

The 19th C.I.Bn., attacking on the 4th Brigade Left, was delayed by a strongly-wired German Position in JAFFA TRENCH, on the Battalion Left, 500 yds. E. of the Jumping-off Line. This Strong Point was to have been dealt with by the 14th Tank Battalion, but, owing to the mist, the Tanks were not up with the Infantry. The Position was taken about 6.00 A.M. and the advance continued. At 6.30 MARCELCAVE was captured, with a large number of Prisoners, by the 19th and 21st C.I.Bns. By 7.00 A.M., the 19th C.I.Bn. was consolidating on the GREEN LINE.

"M" Battery supported the Advance of the 19th C.I.Bn. This Battery suffered the loss of Lieut. ROUGHTON, who was wounded during the enemy Shelling before Zero Hour. At 4.20 A.M., the Battery moved forward quickly and escaped the hostile Barrage. Several German Machine Gun Nests were rushed and captured by this Battery. Lieut. MacLAREN, in command of the Left Section, after leaving the Jumping-off Line, followed the AMIENS-NESLE Railway. A number of enemy Machine Guns were taken by his Gunners. One M.G. observed to be holding up a party of Infantry was rushed, single-handed, by Corporal C.J. DUFFY who attacked the Gun from the Rear, killing the 2 Germans who were firing it.

Capt. McCULLOUGH, O.C., "M" Battery, assisted by 3 Gunners, rushed 3 German M.G.s successively, during the move forward, killing the Crews. While taking the third Gun, Capt. McCULLOUGH was wounded in the arm, but carried on. A little later he was again wounded and Lieut. MacLAREN took command of the Battery. The Guns were mounted in GREEN LINE Defence Positions E. of the Northern portion of MARCELCAVE, and came into Action against retreating Germans. Casualties to "M" Battery during the Attack were, 2 Other ranks, killed, 2 Officers and 11 Other Ranks, wounded.

"K" and "L" Batteries were detailed to Fire Barrage in support of the 4th Brigade Attack. Positions were occupied during the night August 7th/8th. "K" Battery had 3 Other Ranks, killed and 1 Other Rank, wounded, prior to Zero Hour. The Targets of these Batteries were known enemy Strong Points. "K" Battery was forced to cease Fire at Zero plus 6 minutes, and "L" Battery, at Zero plus 8 minutes by our Infantry moving in the thick mist in front of the Guns. Both Batteries were fired upon while in Action by parties of our Infantry, who mistook them for German Machine Gunners. 28,500 Rounds, S.A.A. were fired by the 16 Guns.

When the 5th C.I.B. had gone forward and made good the RED LINE, Major McCAMUS assembled No. 3 Company, with "A" Echelon Transport, in CAVE COPSE 1,000 yds. W. of MARCELCAVE, where the



Company remained in Divisional Reserve. The Total Casualties of this Company during the day were 3 Officers and 43 Other Ranks, of whom 11 Other Ranks were missing.

### **Corps Advance Continued to the RED LINE.**

The Infantry Brigades and Auxiliary Units, detailed for the RED LINE Attack, had followed up close behind the GREEN LINE Assaulting Troops. At 8.20 A.M., our Protective Artillery Barrage in Front of the GREEN LINE ceased, and the Infantry and Auxiliary Services moved forward without further Barrage, to the RED LINE. The German Gun Line had been taken in the first stage so that our Men had now to contend chiefly with Rifle and Machine Gun Fire, and the Advance was more rapid on the whole Front. Owing to the speed of our Advance, Machine Guns had, in most cases, little opportunity of taking part. The Infantry overcame enemy Opposition before Machine Guns could be brought into Action.

The Assaulting RED LINE Infantry Brigades and Battalions from Right to Left were as follows:-

Third Cdn. Division -	7th C.I.B.	42nd C.I.Bn. 49th C.I.Bn.
First Cdn. Division -	1st C.I.B.	2nd C.I.Bn. 4th C.I.Bn. 3rd C.I.Bn.
Second Cdn. Division	5th C.I.B.	26th C.I.Bn. 24th C.I.Bn.

### **Third Bn., C.M.G.C. RED LINE.**

The 7th C.I.B. (Third Cdn. Division) carried the RED LINE on the Corps Right, passing through the 9th C.I.B., with the 42nd C.I.Bn. (Right) and 49th C.I.Bn. (Left). "A", "B", "E" and "F" Batteries, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported the 7th C.I.B., "B", "E" and "F" Batteries moving forward with the Infantry, and "A" Battery advancing in Rear in Brigade Reserve. Th1 42nd and 49th C.I.Bns. were on their Objective at 10.20 A.M.

"E" and "F" Batteries, on the Right, crossed the DOMART Bridge at 5.50 A.M., with Guns and Equipment on Pack Mules. Slight Shelling was experienced here, and a certain amount of Machine Gun Fire was encountered as the Batteries proceeded up the rising Ground toward DODO WOOD.

"F" Battery skirted the Left edge of DODO WOOD, and passing it on their Right, moved forward on a Line parallel with the AMIENS-ROYE Road and about 200 yds. to the Left of it, to Consolidation Positions. 4 Guns were sited immediately S. of the AMIENS-ROYE Road, 1,500 yds. N. of VILLERS-aux-ERABLES, to protect the Right Flank. The remaining 4 Guns were placed on commanding ground E. of HAMON WOOD, firing in an Easterly direction. The Battery was in Position by 9.30 A.M.

"E" Battery, after crossing the DOMART Bridge, bore to the Left, crossed the DEMUIN-MOREUIL Road, 500 yds. S. of DEMUIN, and, following the Valley S. of DEMUIN, moved back to the Right, eventually taking up Defensive Positions on the forward Slope of Hill 102, 500 yds. in Rear of the RED LINE, and 1,500 yds. N. of MAISON BLANCHE. These Guns had an excellent Field of Fire, from CLAUDE WOOD to BEAUCOURT and the Right Corps Boundary.

"B" Battery, with Guns and Equipment on Pack Mules, moved from the Assembly Area, 800 yds. E. of DOMART at 5.15 A.M., proceeding through HANGARD Village. The crossing over the LUCE at HANGARD was reached at 5.50 A.M. but was found to be impassable. The Bridge was down and had not yet been repaired. A foot-bridge was constructed. Capt. MOTHERSILL, O.C., Battery, had his Guns, S.A.A. and Gun Equipment unloaded from the Pack Animals, and carried across. The Animals were then backed up to the steep Bank of the River, pushed in and swam across. Although the passage of the River was made under considerable Shell Fire, only 2 Casualties to the Personnel and 2 to the Pack Animals were sustained. The Animals were repacked, on the S. Bank of the LUCE, and the Advance continued. While crossing the Valley S. of DEMUIN, the Battery was fired upon by an enemy Machine Gun, losing 2 Other Ranks, wounded, and one Pack Animal, killed. This Machine Gun was engaged and the Crew killed. The Battery advanced, without further incident, to Consolidation Positions on the 7th C.I.B. Left, N. of CLAUDE WOOD, 500 yds. in Rear of the RED LINE.

"A" Battery, in Brigade Reserve, with Guns on pack Animals, crossed the DOMART Bridge in Rear of the Infantry, but, owing to the success of the Operation, this Battery did not come into Action.



With the Capture of the RED LINE, the Third Cdn. Division's Task for August 8th was accomplished. "D" and "H" Batteries, in Divisional Reserve, were not required in the Operation. "B", "C", "E", "F" and "G" Batteries remained in GREEN and RED LINE Defensive Positions throughout the remainder of the Day. No. 3 Company which had fired Barrage was now in Divisional Reserve.

#### **First Bn., C.M.G.C., RED LINE.**

The assaulting Battalions of the 1st C.I.B. (First Cdn. Division) in the Corps Centre, attacked between COURCELLES and the N. of CANCELETTE WOOD, passing through the 3rd C.I.B. on the GREEN LINE. The Objective was reached along the whole Front by 11.30 A.M. The captured ground included the village of INGNAUCOURT, taken by the 2nd C.I.Bn., and the Village of CAYEUX, taken by the 4th C.I.Bn. Considerable Machine Gun Fire was met with at LEMAIRE WOOD, at RUISSEAU WOOD, in the LUCE Valley, and on the Spur N. of CAYEUX. This Opposition was overcome by Infantry Manoeuvre, with Tank Co-operation.

No. 1 Company, First Bn., C.M.G.C. less "C" Battery in Divisional Reserve, supported the 1st C.I.B. "D" Battery supported the Attack on the Right and "A" Battery, on the Left; "B" Battery was in Brigade Reserve. During the advance of the 3rd C.I.B. to the GREEN LINE, "A" and "D" Batteries moved up from Assembly Positions to PANTALOON RAVINE, W. of AUBERCOURT. The Guns and Equipment were brought to this point by G.S. Limber. Here the Guns were off-loaded and carried forward: the Limbered Wagons were instructed to follow on.

"A" and "D" Batteries followed the advancing Infantry in Diamond Formation, prepared at all times to assist the Infantry with Direct Overhead Fire; but, owing to the speed of Advance, and to the fact that the Infantry quickly overcame all Resistance, no opportunities presented themselves for either Battery to be of assistance in Fire Fights.

"D" Battery, under Capt. McDERMOTT, advanced along the Valley Road, N. of the LUCE. 2 Guns came into Action 800 yds. E. of AUBERCOURT, firing on enemy movement on the Spur, E. of IGNAUCOURT, during the advance of our Infantry through the Village. Crossing the LUCE at HAPPEGLENE, the Battery passed through IGNAUCOURT, and was disposed in RED LINE Defensive Positions on the Spur S. and E. of the Village.

"A" Battery, on the Left, after off-loading the Guns in PANTALOON RAVINE, proceeded on its Task, issuing from the Head of the RAVINE and advancing due E. Capt. FERRIE, O.C. the Battery, had his Guns mounted for Action on the high ground near CANCELETTE WOOD, 1,200 yds. N. of IGNAUCOURT, and again near STOVE WOOD, to the Left of the Draw, 1,500 yds. N. of CAMPVERMONT FARM. In each case the Situation was cleared up before the Guns could do any Firing.

All Guns of "A" and "D" Batteries were in their final Positions soon after 12.00 Noon.

"B" Battery did not come into Action, but kept in touch with the O.C., Company (Major E.R. MORRIS) during the Advance, moving in accordance with the moves of the 1st C.I.B. Headquarters. On the Capture of the RED Line, this Battery was disposed as follows: 4 Guns, with Transport in the Draw, N. of IGNAUCOURT: 4 Guns with Transport and Battery H.Q. at HAPPEGLENE.



**Second Bn., C.M.G.C.; RED LINE.**

On the Corps Left the 5th C.I.B. (Second Cdn. Division), attacked the RED LINE through the 4th C.I.B. Positions on the GREEN LINE from the N. end of CANCELETTE WOOD to the AMIENS-NESLE Railway. No. 1 Company (Major BASEVI), 2nd Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported the 5th C.I.B. The Company moved up to the 5th C.I.B. Assembly Area, between CACHY and BOIS d'AQUENNE, night of August 7th/8th, with the following Transport and Equipment:-

- 3 Limbers (4 horses up) per Battery.
- 8 Guns (With Equipment including Tripods, Field Mounts, First Aid Cases) per Battery.
- 20 Filled Belts and Belt-Boxes per Gun.
- 3 Boxes Bulk S.A.A. per Guns.
- 4 Tins of Water per Gun.
- 48 Hours Rations.

In the Assembly Area the Gun Crews were accommodated in Trenches and the Limbers parked in available clear ground close by. Horses and mules were unhitched from the Limbers and hobbled. No Casualties were suffered in the Assembly Area.

At 5.20 A.M., August 8th, the 5th C.I.B. moved forward from the Assembly Area, with the 26th C.I.Bn. on the Right and the 24th C.I.Bn. on the Left. At 8.20, the leading Battalions advanced through the 4th C.I.B. The weight of enemy Opposition was encountered in BOIS de PIERRET, where a number of Guns and about 150 Prisoners were taken. SNIPE COPSE, to the S. of BOIS de PIERRET, was also the scene of hard Fighting. After these 2 Points of Resistance had been captured the German Opposition became weaker. WIENCOURT-l'EQUIPPE was taken at 9.20 A.M. and GUILLAUCOURT at 9.50, with about 100 Prisoners in each. The Assaulting Battalions pushed on and reached the RED LINE on time. The Tanks were of the greatest assistance to the Infantry in dealing with Machine Gun Nests.

In accordance with Orders issued by G.O.C. 5th C.I.B. and Major BASEVI, No. 1 Company moved off behind the Reserve Battalion of the 5th C.I.B. at 5.20 A.M. The Guns and Equipment remained on the Limbers. Batteries moved steadily ahead, disposed as follows:-

- "B" Battery on the Right (26th C.I.Bn.)
- "C" Battery on the Left (24th C.I.Bn.)
- "D" Battery in Support.
- "A" Battery in Reserve.

The leading Batteries moved up to within 600 yds. of the Assaulting Battalions.

Lieut. SAMPSON and 3 Other Ranks of "D" Battery were wounded by Machine Gun Fire during the Advance from WIENCOURT. On arrival of the leading Battalions at the RED LINE, Batteries unloaded Guns, deployed in pairs, and took up Positions for Defence in Depth of the RED LINE. The 2 forward Batteries were sited on the Spur E. of GUILLAUCOURT, in Positions close up to the RED LINE, between the point of the Spur, overlooking the LUCE, and the AMIENS-NESLE Railway. The other 2 Batteries, in Support and Reserve, respectively, were sited in Echelon of the forward Batteries, 1,000 to 1,500 yds. to the Rear.

After the Guns were off-loaded, the Limbers all returned to a pre-arranged rendezvous on the Northern edge of MORGEMONT WOOD where they were joined by the remainder of the Company's "A" Echelon Transport, left behind at BLANGY WOOD prior to the Assembly. The whole of "A" Echelon Transport moved, on the night August 8th/9th, to the Draw, 100 yds. S.-W. of WIENCOURT-l'EQUIPEE, in order to be conveniently near Company H.Q. and the Gun Positions. During the day Company H.Q. moved forward, by bounds, with Brigade H.Q. eventually being located for the night 8th/9th S. of BOIS de PIERRET, not far from the Company Transport.

The Total Casualties of No. 1 Company, for the day's Fighting were, 1 Other Rank, killed, 1 Officer and 4 Other ranks, wounded; 2 saddle horses were killed, 1 mule slightly wounded.



### Corps Advance Continued to the BLUE DOTTED LINE.

The entire RED LINE was in our hands by Noon, August 8, and the BLUE DOTTED LINE Troops at once began moving through the RED LINE Positions.

The BLUE DOTTED LINE was attacked by the Fourth Cdn. Division on the Right, the First Cdn. Division in the Centre and the Second Cdn. Division on the Left. The Advance of the French was to continue on the Right of the Canadian Corps and that of the Australians on the Left. The Frontage of the Right Division was greatly increased for the BLUE DOTTED LINE Attack, the Fourth Division being made responsible for roughly 2/3 of the BLUE DOTTED LINE, from a point of the AMIENS-ROYE Road, 200 yds. E. of LE QUESNEL, to the Valley 1,500 yds. S.-E. of CAIX. The First Division attacked astride the RIVER LUCE from CAYEUX, through the Village of CAIX to the headwaters of the LUCE. The Second Division carried their Advance on, N. of the LUCE Valley with their Right in touch with the First Division and their Left along the AMIENS-NESLE Railway. The Depth of Attack, from the RED to the BLUE DOTTED LINE was 7,500 yds. on the Right and 2,000 yds. on the Left.

The entire BLUE DOTTED LINE was captured by 6.00 P.M. August 8th, with the exception of a few 100 yds. on the Right and a triangle of ground surrounding LE QUESNEL. This Area was made good the following morning.

### Battle Order and Assembly.

Attacking Brigades and Battalions from Right to Left were as follows:-

Fourth Cdn. Division -	11th C.I.B.	54th C.I.Bn.; 75th C.I.Bn. (Support) 102nd C.I.Bn.; 87th C.I.Bn. (Reserve)
	12th C.I.B.	78th C.I.Bn.; 72nd C.I.Bn. (R. Support) 38th C.I.Bn.; 85th C.I.Bn. (L. Support)
First Cdn. Division -	2nd C.I.B.	7th C.I.Bn. 10th C.I.Bn.
Second Cdn. Division -	6th C.I.B.	28th C.I.Bn. 29th C.I.Bn.

The Third Cavalry Division and Tanks assisted in the capture of the BLUE DOTTED LINE. The 1st Tank Battalion with 34 Tanks supported the Fourth Cdn. Division. Each of these Tanks carried 2 Lewis Guns and 1 Vickers Machine Gun, with Gun Crews. The Cdn. Independent Force continued to operate along the AMIENS-ROYE Road.

At Zero Hour the Fourth Cdn. Division, in Corps Reserve was assembled in the dead ground N. and E. of GENTELLES WOOD, between the AMIENS-ROYE Road and the AMIENS-VILLERS-BRETONNEUX Road. The 1st Tank Battalion was assembled in Column along the N. Side of the AMIENS-ROYE Road, with its head just W. of GENTELLES WOOD. At 5.20 A.M. the leading Brigades, viz. The 11th and 12th, moved forward and began to cross the LUCE at 7.20 A.M. The crossing of the River was effected by the Infantry over several foot-bridges at DOMART and DEMUIN, and the 11th and 12th Brigades proceeded to the Jumping-off line along the Line of the MOREUIL-DEMUIN-COURCELLES Road, the 10th C.I.B. following in Rear.

Meantime the 1st Battalion Tank Corps had moved forward at Zero Hour as far as DOMART, where they at once began to dribble across the LUCE as breaks in Traffic occurred. By 8.00 A.M. all Tanks were over the River and in their Assembly Positions along the MOREUIL-DEMUIN Road.

Machine Guns assembled and moved forward with the Units or Formations with which they were co-operating "F" Battery, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., moved with the 11th C.I.B. Group, "H" Battery, with the 12th C.I.B. Group. All Machine Guns of No. 3 Company (a/O.C. Capt. W.G. WILLIAMS) and 2 Guns of "G" Battery, No. 2 Company (Major L.F. PEARCE, M.C.), moved forward with the 1st Battalion, Tank Corps, "E" battery, the remaining Guns of "G" Battery and the whole of No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON) moved with the 10th C.I.B. Group in Divisional Reserve.



#### **Fourth Cdn. Div. Attack on BLUE DOTTED LINE.**

At 12.10 P.M. the Advance of the Fourth Division commenced. At this Hour the 11th C.I.B., on the Right, and the 12th C.I.B., on the Left, moved forward from the Jumping-off Line and passed through the 7th C.I.B. (Third Cdn. Division) on the RED LINE. They were preceded by Mounted Troops of the Third Cavalry Division, and by Tanks.

The 11th C.I.B. advanced about 200 yds. in Rear of the Tanks allotted to their Brigade Frontage. The 54th C.I.Bn., on the Right had the Task of taking BEAUCOURT. The 102nd C.I.Bn. was to capture the SUNKEN Roads, to the Left of BEAUCOURT, and BEAUCOURT WOOD. The 75th C.I.Bn. was responsible for taking LE QUESNEL and the BLUE DOTTED LINE. The 87 C.I.Bn. was in Reserve.

The leading Battalions came under Machine Gun Fire from the Left Brigade Area, but advanced into BEAUCOURT into which the Cavalry had been seen to go a short time before the Arrival of the Infantry. Here they found the Cdn. Cavalry Brigade dismounted held up in Positions in the Sunken Roads E. and N.-E. of BEAUCOURT. The advance was checked here by Machine Gun Fire from the Western edge of BEAUCOURT WOOD.

The German Positions were rushed in a brilliantly daring Attack, led personally by the Officer Commanding the 54th C.I.Bn. The 102nd C.I.Bn. on the Left advanced at the same time, and, after a very stiff fight, succeeded in taking the main BEAUCOURT WOOD, capturing 159 Prisoners, numbers of Machine Guns and a quantity of Booty. By 4.30 P.M., the 102nd C.I.Bn. Line was established along the Eastern Edge of BEAUCOURT WOOD, and was endeavouring to join up with the 12th C.I.B. on the Left.

In the meantime the Brigade Right was suffering severely from enemy Machine Gun Fire from FRESNOY-en-CHAUSSEE, in the French Area. The 54th C.I.Bn. was heavily fired upon in an attempt to get forward over the open ground towards LE QUESNEL. The Line actually reached by the 12th C.I.B. on August 8th extended from the AMIENS-ROYE Road, 1,500 yds. N.-W. and N. of LE QUESNEL, to the inter-Brigade Boundary.

LE QUESNEL and the BLUE DOTTED LINE to the E. of it were taken on August 9th by the 75th C.I.Bn. on the Right and the 87th C.I.Bn. on the Left. The O.C., 75th C.I.Bn. personally led an Assault against a Nest of Machine Guns in Front of LE QUESNEL, thereby enabling the Advance into the Village to be effected. The whole of the Final Objective was taken soon after Noon on August 9th.

#### **Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C. Co-operation with 11th C.I.B.; BLUE DOTTED LINE.**

"F" Battery, 4th Battalion, C.M.G.C., commanded by Lieut. PEVERLEY, M.C., co-operated with the 11th C.I.B. Major L.F. PEARCE, M.C., was Machine Gun Liaison Officer at 11th C.I.B. Headquarters. The Guns of the Battery were not operated as a Unit, but were allotted to the Assaulting Infantry Battalions as follows:-

5th C.I.Bn.	2 Guns
102nd C.I.Bn.	2 Guns
75th C.I.Bn.	4 Guns

The Brigade Commander did not therefore retain a central control over the Vickers Guns, through the M.G. Liaison Officer, but placed them at the disposal of his Battalion Commanders.

As a result of the special nature of the Engagement, the Officers Commanding the 3 Infantry Battalions, to which the Guns of the "F" Battery were attached, were themselves closely involved in the actual Fight and at times were leading. In consequence of this the Vickers guns were overlooked and were not used to cover the Infantry Advance. At no time was the Situation sufficiently clear to the M.G. Personnel in charge of the Guns, to enable them to employ covering Fire for the Infantry. Guns were placed by the O.C., Battery in Defensive Positions conforming with the Advance of the Infantry. Lieut. PEVERLEY, Officer Commanding the Battery, was wounded early in the day and evacuated.

In the early Morning of August 9th, "F" Battery Guns occupied Positions along the Sunken Road to the E. of BEAUCOURT. Later on in the day 4 Guns were moved up to the Brigade Left and placed in Position along the LE QUESNEL-CAIX Road, 100 yds. N. of LE QUESNEL. The other 4 Guns were placed along the LE QUESNEL-FRESNOY-en CHAUSSEE Road, between LE QUESNEL and the AMIENS-ROYE Road, for the Defence of the Right Flank. At the same time "E" and "G" Batteries, from Divisional Reserve, were placed in Defensive Positions between BEAUCOURT WOOD and the AMIENS-ROYE Road.



The 12th C.I.B., to the Left of the 11th C.I.B., encountered less Resistance and rapidly progresses to the Final Objective. On emerging from the PERONNE and ST. QUENTIN WOODS the leading Battalions came under heavy Fire from enemy Machine Gun Defences, on the high ground N. of BEAUCOURT WOOD, - Positions which entirely commanded the Line of Advance until the Valley S. of CAYEUX had been crossed. The O.C., 78th Bn., advancing on the Right, quickly organised an attacking Force consisting of a Company of Infantry, an 18 Pounder Battery, 4 or 5 Tanks and 6" Newton, and by the combined action of these Elements the German Defences were over-run.

The 78th C.I.Bn. continued to its Objective without further Opposition. The 72nd C.I.Bn. passed through the 78th on the Line of the LE QUESNEL-CAIX Road, and went on to the BLUE DOTTED LINE. A Defensive Flank was thrown back on the Right, to the S.-E. and S. to conform with the Line reached by the 11th C.I.B. The 38th and 85th C.I.Bns. on the Brigade Left, advanced without incident to the Final Objective, the 85th C.I.Bn. establishing touch with the First Cdn. Division on the Left at the BLUE DOTTED LINE.

#### **M.G. Co-operation with 12th C.I.B.**

"H" Battery, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., commanded by Capt. HALL, M.C., moved forward with the 12th C.I.B. The Advance was made by bounds. At each bound, Guns were sited to ensure the Defence of ground won. Capt. HALL finally placed his Guns between the Small Wood, 1,500 yds. S.-W. of CAIX, and the Southern edge of CAYEUX WOOD.

#### **Guns in Reserve; Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.**

No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON), Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., with "E" and "G" Batteries, in Divisional Reserve, moved forward in Rear of the 11th and 12th Brigades, with guns and Equipment in Limbers. Owing to the somewhat uncertain Situation, particularly on the Right Flank, all Batteries were mounted in Defensive Positions in the evening across the Fourth Division Front. Guns were sited about 2,500 yds. in Rear of the Final Objective, W. of a line extending from the AMIENS-ROYE Road, through BEAUCOURT to a small Wood 1,000 yds. S.-W. of CAIX, corresponding, roughly, with the Line of the MEZIERES-BEAUCOURT-CAIX Road. Batteries were in Position by 6.00 P.M. August 8th, from Right to Left as follows:-

"G" Battery	
"E" Battery	Covering 11th C.I.B.
"A" Battery	
"B" Battery	
"D" Battery	Covering 12th C.I.B.
"C" Battery	

#### **Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C., Co-operation with Tanks; BLUE DOTTED LINE.**

The 34 Guns allotted to tanks assembled under Capt. W.G. WILLIAMS, a/O.C. No. 3 Company, Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C., on night August 7th/8th, with the 1st Battalion, Tank Corps, just W. of GENTELLES WOOD. The Tank Battalion was divided into 3 Companies, "A", "B" and "C" of 11, 11 and 12 Tanks, respectively. At 12.30 A.M. August 8th, the Tanks moved forward to the Ridge S.-E. of DOMART WOOD, and commenced the Advance from here at Zero Hour. The passage of the LUCE was effected by 8.00 A.M., Capt. WILLIAMS had all Machine Gun Crews enter the Tanks before crossing the River and no Casualties occurred. On arrival at HOURGES, 4 Tanks were immediately requisitioned to assist the Third Cdn. Division. The Vickers and Lewis Gun Crews were unloaded from these Tanks. The Gun Equipment was kept on board and was not recovered.

The Tanks co-operating with the 11th C.I.B., composing "A" Company, 1st Battalion, Tank Corps, went well as far as BEAUCOURT. On debouching from the low ground between BEAUCOURT and BEAUCOURT WOOD, however, they came under fire from an enemy Battery, sited W. of LE QUESNEL, and all but one of the Tanks were put out of Action. One Tank assisted the 54th C.I.Bn. Attack on the W. portion of BEAUCOURT WOOD by moving along in front of the Wood, firing into it, then returning to the dead ground to the N.-W. Another Tank, with Lieut. GARDNER, Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C., got forward to the vicinity of LE QUESNEL, where its Crews were deposited. The Tank was immediately surrounded and the surviving members of the Lewis and Machine Gun Crews, including Lieut. GARDNER and 2 Other Ranks of the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., were made Prisoners. A Number of Tanks were set on fire by hostile Artillery and Machine Gun Fire, and their Crews either burned to death in the Tank or shot by the enemy in trying to escape from the burning Tanks. Of the Crews in Tanks put out of Action, those who survived were



collected by Major PEARCE, Machine Gun Liaison Officer with the 11th C.I.B., and sent up to occupy Defensive Positions.

Regarding these Tank Vickers Guns and Crews, Major PEARCE reported as follows:-

*"At 1.15 P.M., the 11th C.I.B. Headquarters moved forward with the intention of making its Headquarters in BEAUCOURT CHATEAU, but found that the CATEAU had not yet been completely mopped up. A Report Centre was then established in a small wood west of BEAUCOURT.*

*"I went on a Reconnaissance of the Guns and found the 11th C.I.B., via "F" Battery, in the positions previously selected, that is, in front and to the flanks of BEAUCOURT. I continued my reconnaissance of the Tank Guns and found many of the Guns and Crews had become casualties, the Tanks being knocked out by anti-Tank Guns as they came over the rise in front of BEAUCOURT.*

*"I gathered the remnants of the Crews together, and had Lieuts. HENDERSON and EATON move them forward to the final objective. The spirit displayed by the remnants of these tank crews was splendid and there are many instances of the reckless daring with which they carried on after the remainder had been knocked out. I regret that it was impossible for me at the time to make notes of the individual cases which came to my notice.*

*"In all, I found 5 Guns and Crews in the 11th C.I.B. Area."*

Of the 12 Tanks, of "C" Company, 1st Battalion, Tank Corps, advancing in the Centre, 6 managed to reach the BLUE DOTTED LINE, but, owing to the Right being held up, these were obliged to withdraw their detachments 1,500 yds. Not all the Vickers Gun Crews got forward with these Tanks. Some had been unable to stand the heat and fumes inside the Tanks, and were unloaded with their Guns and followed on with the nearest Infantry. On the way up 4 of these Tanks assisted in clearing up Machine Gun Nests for the advance of the 78th C.I.Bn. One Tank of this Company, with its Vickers and Lewis Gun Crews, under Lieut. F.M. MACDONALD, reached the BLUE LINE ahead of the Infantry, on the Right of the 12th C.I.B. Frontage. The surviving members of the Crews got their Guns into Action and held the Position until Troops of the 72nd C.I.Bn. came up.

#### **Action of Vickers Gun Crew with a "C" Company Tank.**

Lieut. MACDONALD described the Action of this Tank as follows:-

*"Our crew continued to go forward with the tank and about two hours afterwards we passed through the 58th Battalion after they had captured the Second Objective. From here we pushed forward to the Final Objective or Blue Line, with the Cavalry and ahead of the Infantry, on the Frontage of the 12th Inf. Bde. Continued machine gun fire and burst of shell fire were encountered during the remainder of the Advance. For this reason we had to travel inside the tanks almost all the way. Several of the men became weak and sickened by the gas fumes inside the tank. By using anti-gas tablets and also a solution which we had for this purpose, most of them recovered. Two, however, had to be left behind to be evacuated. The cavalry were moving forward either with us, or a little in front of us at first; but on many occasions they met with hostile machine gun fire and sustained very heavy losses.*

*"We also met with fire from anti-tank rifles, and a few bullets from these penetrated our tank. Slight casualties were also caused from splinters from the inside of the tank. By continued concentrated fire on the revolver loop-holes in the tank, the enemy succeeded in bursting the loop-hole frames and thereby produced casualties on my men in the tank. My tank officer was fatally wounded in the head. His N.C.O. was killed and two of the tank men were mortally wounded. One of my Lewis gun men and the scout were killed. After a direct hit on our tank, it stalled a couple of times; and on one of these occasions, which was about 2.00 P.M. when we were just to the right of the woods in ".21.d. (1,000 yds. in Rear of the BLUE LINE, and 500 yds. N. of the 12th C.I.B. Right Boundary), the enemy began to rush us from the woods near by. Machine gun and rifle bullets were rapping on our tank from all sides, and our only hope was to keep our guns firing and get our tank started if possible. After a great deal of difficulty in cranking the engine, we succeeded in starting the tank again, and with our machine guns we wiped out groups of the retreating enemy. We pushed forward about 1,000 yds. farther till we reached our Final Objective, where we unloaded our guns and took up positions in some unlevel*



ground. Our tank was hit and destroyed by a shell before we got all our ammunition or any rations out of it.

*"We remained there and held our position against enemy machine gun and rifle fire until some troops of the 72nd Inf. Bn. reached us about 6.30 P.M. By this time I had only my sergeant and three men left. Shortly afterwards Brig.-Gen. McBrien, G.O.C. of the 12th Bde. came up and ordered me to move back and take defensive positions about 800 yds. in rear of where I was. I moved to this position in front of the Wood at approximately E.21.d.40.80. Towards morning, upon being relieved, we moved back to positions on the southern side of Caix Wood, at approximately E.7.c.60.15."*

On the Left, 4 Tanks of "B" Company succeeded in reaching the BLUE DOTTED LINE, S. of CAIX at 3.30 P.M. Capt. WILLIAMS' Report on the Action of Machine Guns operating with this Company of Tanks is in part as follows:-

*"I accompanied "B" Company with the remaining 7 Tanks (4 had been detailed to the Third Cdn. Division at HOURGES) which eventually went forward to CAYEUX WOOD, where we were informed by the Cavalry that they were suffering heavy casualties from Machine Guns in a small Wood at E.12.b. We therefore proceeded to the wood and engaged the enemy. Our casualties in this encounter were heavy, caused from splinters from inside of the Tanks.*

*"Shortly after this my tank developed engine trouble so I returned and reported to the G.O.C. 12th C.I.B. who requested one Tank to remain on the western side of CAIX Wood. I also, at his request, placed 2 Vickers and 2 Lewis Guns on the same side, at approximately E.7.c.60.15 and D.12.d.3.4.*

*"The balance of the Tanks proceeded to the final objective."*

#### **Action of Vickers Gun Crews with a "B" Company Tank.**

Lieut. MCGILLIVRAY, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., who went forward with a "B" Company Tank, gives the following account of the Operation:-

*"At Zero on the morning of the 8th of August our tank was well in front of GENTELLES WOOD and to the left of the ROYE ROAD. Close to us were the rest of the tanks which were to take part in the operation. Shortly after Zero, we moved forward in a long column. All machine gunners and most of the tank crews followed behind their respective tanks. We proceeded in this manner till close to the Village of DONART where we encountered some enemy shelling. This grew worse as we approached the bridge across the LUCE and all personnel were ordered into the tanks. We crossed the River in this manner without any casualties. In the Village itself, there was some delay, and, the shelling having increased, we moved off the road into an orchard, remaining here for about an hour with all personnel in tanks.*

*"We proceeded forward and, after clearing the Village, the personnel again followed the tank until level ground was reached when, owing to the increased speed of the tank, all the men had to ride inside or on top. About this time we came under long range M.G. fire which did no harm, but served to speed up our tank. Shortly after this, on coming over a ridge, we were fired on by a small field gun at very long range. This gun was evidently put out of action for after firing a few rounds it ceased all together.*

*"After passing through the Third Cdn. Division we came into our first real action. Our Troops were held up by M.G. Fire from -- Wood. We at once proceeded to the Wood and went into action. The fire from the enemy M.G. nest here was very heavy and came from every direction. It was aimed mainly against the doors and gun turrets of the tank. This engagement lasted 20 minutes to half an hour. We succeeded in knocking out several of the German Machine Guns but, in doing so, bout our Six-Pounders and four of our Hotchkiss guns were put out of action. In the case of the Six-Pounders the telescopic sights were blown off; the Hotchkiss Guns had the Gas chambers riddled with bullets. We had done a great deal of turning and manoeuvring in a small area and, owing to the tank being new, the huge treads began to lose and pound very badly. The tank officer thought it best to withdraw to dead ground, fix our sights for the Six Pounders and the chambers on the Machine Guns, and see what could be done to the treads.*



*The repairs were effected and we were about to go into action again, when I received orders to hold CAIX Wood against a counter attack which was expected. I withdrew all the Machine Guns from the tanks and took up defensive conditions on one edge of the WOOD; the tank remained with us and formed the pivot of our defence. About dark I received orders to move forward and take up other positions as an attack was threatened at daylight or during the night. Our casualties were many but very slight, all being caused by the Metal splash from the inside of the tank while making small cuts about the face and hands."*

#### **Summary: Tank Guns and Crews.**

Of the 34 Vickers Guns and Crews which went forward in the Tanks on August 8th, 4 actually reached the BLUE DOTTED LINE and came into Action against the Germans in accordance with the Plans for the Operation. 8 Tanks were set on Fire and Guns and Equipment were burned. 2 Crews were completely missing. 16 Crews were unloaded from Tanks, overcome by the unaccustomed heat and gas and cramped conditions inside the Tanks. These Crews went on with the nearest Infantry, taking what Equipment and S.A.A. they were able to carry. 4 Crews were unloaded by tanks, which went to the assistance of the Third Cdn. Division. 13 Machine Guns were destroyed or lost.

The following officers of the Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C. were in charge of Tank Vickers Gun Crews:-

Lieut. EATON	Lieut. MACDONALD (F.M.)
Lieut. GARDNER	Lieut. MCGILLIVRAY
Lieut. HAMILTON	Lieut. PATTERSON
Lieut. LORIMER	Lieut. RIDDELL (W.)

Of these Officers, Lieut. LORIMER and Lieut. HAMILTON were killed; Lieut. GARDNER was made a Prisoner.

The failure of the Tanks to get the Machine guns forward to the BLUE DOTTED LINE was ascribed to various causes.

Perhaps the chief of these was that Tanks carrying Machine Gun Crews and Guns were diverted from their main purpose. Four Tanks were taken at the outset by the Third Cdn. Division. Other 4 Tanks were employed to assist the 78th C.I.Bn. in clearing up Machine Gun Nests, 4,000 yds. in Rear of the Blue Dotted Line. Much valuable time was occupied in this way and the enemy was able to bring up Anti-Tank Crews and Machine Guns to strengthen his Defences. Also by being used for these subsidiary Tasks, Tanks became separated and were unable to render one another mutual assistance. German Gunners were able to deal with them individually.

The Plans for the Operation were made hurriedly and this fact, as much as any other, accounts for the failure of the Tank Machine Guns. In the brief period of Preparations it was not sufficiently impressed upon the minds of all concerned that the chief purpose of the Tanks bearing Machine Gun Crews was to make their way through to the BLUE DOTTED LINE to deposit Machine Guns there.

Capt. WILLIAMS pays a glowing tribute to the Tank Corps Personnel in charge of Machine Gun Tanks. At the conclusion of his Report he writes:-

*"I should like to add an appreciation of the work done by the Tank Officers and Crews. They showed great courage and coolness, and it was through no fault of theirs that every Machine Gun was not dumped in its place."*



**First Bn., C.M.G.C., BLUE DOTTED LINE.**

On the Centre of the Corps Attack, the 2nd C.I.B. (First Cdn. Division) advanced rapidly through the 1st C.I.B. on the RED LINE to the Final Objective. The 7th C.I.Bn. on the Right, S. of the LUCE, jumping-off at 11.00 A.M., had to contend with isolated Machine Gun Nests, Rifle Fire and Sniping. All oppositions was overcome, the Southern portion of CAIX was captured and the Battalion reached the Final Objective at about 2.35 P.M. The entire Advance of the 7th C.I.Bn. from the Concentration Area to the Final Objective was carried out without a Casualty. The 10th C.I.Bn. advanced N. of the LUCE, meeting with Opposition from Machine Gun Nests located in Woods, Hedges and Sunken Road. All Resistance was broken down, the Northern part of the Village of CAIX was taken and the BLUE DOTTED LINE reached about 1.15 P.M.

No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM, D.C.M.), First Battalion, C.M.G.C. less "F" battery, in Divisional Reserve, supported the 2nd C.I.B. At Zero Hour the 3 Batteries were disposed in the Brigade Assembly Area, near GENTELLES Village. At Zero plus 2 hours, the Batteries moved forward with Guns, Gun Limbers and one S.A.A. Limber each; "E" Battery (Capt. MILNER) supported the 7th C.I.Bn. on the Right; "H" Battery (Capt. MATTHEWS) supported the 10th C.I.Bn. on the Left; "G" Battery (Capt. BANKIER) operated with the 8th C.I.Bn. in Brigade Support.

Capt. MILNER's Battery did not come into Action during the Advance. From GENTELLES, the Battery moved direct to the LUCE Valley N. of DEMUIN: following the Valley Road through AUBERCOURT, it crossed the LUCE at HAPPEGLENE, and carried right on to CAIX by way of IGNAUCOURT and CAYEUX. Guns were unloaded from Limbers at 2.15 P.M. at the S.-E. edge of CAIX Village, and sited, for Defence of the final Objective, on the Brigade Right.

"H" Battery advanced from the Assembly Area, E. of GENTELLES Village, skirting the Northern edge of HANGARD WOPOD and MORGEMONT WOOD; E. of the latter, the Battery turned sharply to the S. following the Road to the Southern end of PANTALOOON RAVINE. From here it Proceeded E. along the Slope N. of the LUCE. At 10.45 A.M., Capt. MATTEWS, ordered his 2 Sections forward at the gallop under cover in RUISSEAU WOOD, 700 yds. N. of CAMPVERMONT FARM. Here the Limbers were unpacked, and one Section brought into Action in Positions on the high Ground N. of the LUCE. Effective Fire was brought to bear on enemy Machine Gun Nests in the LUCE Valley, E. of CAYEUX. 5,000 Rounds S.A.A. were expended. This operation was carried out under heavy Machine Gun and Rifle Fire. Lieut. ESSEX, who controlled the Fire of the Section, was wounded, together with 3 Other Ranks. At 11.30, the other Section pushed forward 1,000 yds. and hotly engaged parties of the enemy retreating up the LUCE Valley, expending 1,000 Rounds. Another bound of 1,000 yds. was made to Positions from which Fire was effectively delivered on small parties of the enemy, retiring in the direction of CAIX. All Guns were eventually off-loaded from the Limbers on the North-eastern outskirts of CAIX at 2.30 P.M. and placed in BLUE DOTTED LINE Defence Positions on the Brigade Left.

"G" Battery followed the same Route as "H" Battery from the Assembly Area as far as the entrance to the Draw, N. of the LUCE, mid-way between CAYEUX and CAIX. Here the Guns were off-loaded and sited in Positions astride the River, covering the Valley W. of CAIX.

**Guns in Reserve, First Bn., C.M.G.C.**

"C", "F" and "J" Batteries, in First Divisional Reserve, were not used in the Operations on August 8th. At 8.30 A.M., they moved to a point beside the DOMART-VILLERS-BRETONNEUX Road, 1,500 yds. N. of DOMART. Here they remained throughout the day and until 6.00 A.M. on the 9th, when they were ordered forward to MON IDEE, N. of IGNAUCOURT.



**Second Bn., C.M.G.C.; BLUE DOTTED LINE.**

The 6th C.I.B. advanced through the 5th C.I.B. at 4.30 P.M. The BLUE LINE was occupied without Opposition. The 9th HUSSARS had taken up a Position on the Line of a Light Railway 500 yds. in Rear of the Final Objective. This Unit was relieved as the 6th C.I.B. went through.

No. 2 Company (Major McCORKELL), Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported the 6th C.I.B. At 5.30 A.M., all Batteries began to move forward from their Assembly Area W. of CACHY; advancing slowly behind the Infantry, one Battery on each Flank, one in Support and one in Reserve. Each Battery took forward 4 Limbers, carrying Gun Equipment, 20 loaded Belts per Gun, Water, Oil, Spare Parts, Rations and 4 Boxes S.A.A. per Gun.

At 6.00 P.M., the forward Batteries began taking over Dispositions from the Cavalry. By 9.00 P.M., all Guns were in BLUE LINE Defensive Positions, "E" Battery on the Right, "F" Battery on the Left, "G" and "H" Batteries in Support. Casualties of No. 2 Company were 2 Other Ranks, wounded.



**OPERATIONS, August 9th, 1918.****Battle Order.**

The Canadian Corps, continued the Advance from the BLUE DOTTED LINE on August 9th, about mid-day. Attacking Units moved forward at slightly varying Times, between 11.00 A.M. and 2.00 P.M. The Third Cdn. Division attacked on the Right, the First Cdn. Division in the Centre, the Second Cdn. Division on the Left. The Attack was assisted by Tanks and Cavalry. The Battle Order of Attacking Infantry Brigades and Battalions from Right to Left was as follows:-

Third Cdn. Division:	8th C.I.B.	5th C.M.R. Bn. 4th C.M.R. Bn.
First Cdn. Division:	1st C.I.B.	1st C.I.Bn. 2nd C.I.Bn.
	2nd C.I.B.	5th C.I.Bn. 8th C.I.Bn.
Second Cdn. Division:	5th C.I.B.	25th C.I.Bn. 22nd C.I.Bn.
	6th C.I.B.	31st C.I.Bn. 29th C.I.Bn.

**Boundaries.**

Canadian Corps Boundaries remained unchanged, viz., the AMIENS-ROYE Road on the Right, adjoining the French, and the AMIENS-NESLE Railway on the Left, in touch with the Australians. The inter-Divisional Boundaries for the BLUE DOTTED LINE of the August 8th Attack were readjusted to conform with the Frontages allotted to Divisions for the Advance on August 9th. The Third and First Cdn. Divisions attacked through the Fourth Cdn. Division. The Second Cdn. Division extended its Frontage to the Right to include the Line held by the First Cdn. Division on the evening of August 8th, and the extreme Left of the Fourth Cdn. Division.

**Objectives.**

The Corps Objective was the Line of the Road from BOUCHOIR, through ROUVROY and MEHERICOURT to LINONS. The following Villages were included in the Objectives of the 3 Attacking Divisions:-

Left.	Centre.	Right.
Second Cdn. Division.	First Cdn. Division.	Third Cdn. Division.
VRELY ROSIERES MEHARICOURT	BEAUFORT WARVILLERS ROUVROY	FOLIES BOUCHOIR



### **Progress of Attack.**

The Attack was made without Artillery Barrage. The average depth of our Advance during August 9th was 4½ miles, with a maximum penetration of 6½ miles. Enemy Resistance stiffened considerably and gains were made only as a result of heavy Fighting along the whole Corps Front.

### **Preparations of M.G. Battalions.**

During the night August 8th/9th and the morning of August 9th, Officers Commanding Machine Gun Battalions made the necessary M.G. Preparations for the Advance on the 9th. The Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. (Lt.-Col. MOORHOUSE), having finished its Task at the Red Line, on August 8th, remained in the Positions occupied until the evening. During the night August 8th/9th and early morning of the 9th, Companies were assembled prepared to move at half an hour's notice after 10.00 A.M. No. 3 Company (Major GALT, M.C.) was ordered to co-operate in the Attack and assembled at 10.00 A.M. N. of the AMIENS-ROYE Road near MAISON BLANCHE, with the 8th C.I.B., ready for the Advance. Nos. 1 and 2 Companies remained in Divisional Reserve. At 9.30 A.M., Advanced Battalion H.Q. moved to VALLEY WOOD and later with the Third Cdn. Divisional H.Q. to BEAUCOURT.

The First Battalion, C.M.G.C. (Lt.-Col. WATSON, D.S.O.) supported the First Cdn. Division Attack with 2 Companies, less 2 Batteries. No. 1 Company (Major E.R. MORRIS), less "C" Battery, co-operated with the 1st C.I.B., No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM, M.C.), less "F" Battery, co-operated with the 2nd C.I.B., No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM, M.C.), less "J" Battery, remained with the 3rd C.I.B. in Divisional Reserve. "C", "F" and "J" Batteries, as on the previous day, were kept as a Mobile Reserve in the hands of the G.O.C., First Cdn. Division.

Attacking Companies of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C., moved to their Assembly Areas during the morning of the 9th. - No. 1 Company (less "C" Battery) to the ground on the S.-E. edge of the BEAUCOURT WOOD, No. 2 Company (less "F" Battery) to the line of the LE QUESNEL-CAIX Road, about mid-way between the 2 Villages. "G" Battery had some difficulty into its Assembly Positions on the 2nd C.I.B. Left, owing to enemy M.G. Fire from a small Wood 1,500 yds. in Front, and from BEAUFORT WOOD. The Battery did not reach Positions until 5 minutes after Zero.

The Task of No. 3 Company, less "J" Battery, operating with the 3rd C.I.B., was to be prepared, in case of Attack, to defend the RED LINE of August 8th. At 9.15 A.M. on the 9th, the Company moved from AUBERCOURT to CERFS WOOD 1,000 yds. S. of HAPPALENE, and was held in readiness here throughout the day. A reconnaissance was made of the Area between the BLUE DOTTED LINE and RED LINE, for suitable Machine Gun Positions to be manned in case of Attack. First Battalion, C.M.G.C., Headquarters opened at IGNAUCOURT, at 10.00 A.M. August 9th.

Companies of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. (Lt.-Col. WEIR, M.C.), continued to operate with the Brigades to which they were attached on August 9th, and moved under their orders: No.1 Company assembled with the 5th C.I.B. on the Second Cdn. Division Right, and No. 2 Company, with the 6th C.I.B. on the Divisional Left. No. 3 Company, with the 4th C.I.B. in Divisional Reserve moved to the Area S. of WIENCOURT-LEQUIPEE. Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., Headquarters had moved to PIERRET WOOD on August 8th and remained there throughout the 9th.

Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. (Lt.-Col. M.A. SCOTT, D.S.O.), was in Corps Reserve during the August 9th Advance. All Guns of the Battalion remained in Defensive Positions occupied at the end of the First day's Operations until the 11th C.I.B. had completed the Capture of the BLUE DOTTED LINE on August 9th. When the Third and First Cdn. Divisions had passed through the Fourth Cdn. Division, in the early afternoon of August 9th, the 10th C.I.B. relieved the 11th and 12th C.I.Bs. on the BLUE DOTTED LINE. Batteries of No. 1 Company remained in Defensive Positions with the 10th C.I.B.: Nos. 2 and 3 Companies were withdrawn and spent the remainder of the day in reorganising. The 13 Guns of No. 3 Company, destroyed on the 8th, were replaced in the early morning of the 10th. Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., Headquarters moved to DEMUIN at 1.00 P.M. August 8th, and remained there throughout the 9th.



**Action of Third Bn., C.M.G.C.**

The 8th C.I.B. (Third Cdn. Division) on the Corps Right advanced from its Assembly Area at Noon, the 5th C.M.R. Bn. on the Right, the 4th C.M.R. Bn. on the Left. At 2.00 P.M., the Battalions passed through the 11th C.I.B. (Fourth Cdn. Division) on the BLUE DOTTED LINE. Enemy Machine Gun Resistance was overcome with the assistance of Tanks. The stiffest Fight took place for possession of the BEETROOT FACTORY, near the Crossroads, 1,000 yds. N.-W. of BOUCHOIR. This was eventually taken at 6.00 P.M. by which time the entire Objective was in our hands on the Third Division Front. The French kept well up, with our Advance on the Right Flank. Some assistance was given them by the 5th C.M.R. Bn. in the Capture of ARVILLERS.

No. 3 Company, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., advanced under Orders of the 8th C.I.B. As soon as BOUCHOIR was captured, "K", "L" and "M" Batteries were rushed forward to assist in consolidating the Fronts and Flanks, particular attention being paid to the Right Flank where our Troops were slightly in Advance of the French. During the move forward the 3 Batteries suffered 5 Casualties from Shelling and Machine Gun Fire. "J" Battery was held in Brigade Reserve. While making a reconnaissance in the evening along with the Officer Commanding the 2nd C.M.R. Bn. and an Officer of the 5th Tank battalion, Major GALT, M.C., commanding No. 3 Company, was wounded in the hand by enemy Machine Gun Fire. On returning to Brigade H.Q. Major Galt refused to be evacuated until he had issued Orders to his Battery Commanders for a further Advance. Capt. J.H. McLEAN took over command of No. 3 Company.

Changes in machine Gun Dispositions of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., were made during the evening of August 9th, conforming with Infantry movements. At 7.30 P.M., No. 1 Company moved forward and took up Positions with the 7th C.I.B.; No. 2 Company remained at MAISON BLANCHE. At 10.00 P.M., the general Machine Gun Dispositions were as follows:-

No. 3 Company was with the 8th C.I.B. in Forward Positions, "J" and "K" Batteries, in front and on the Flanks of BOUCHOIR, "L" and "M" Batteries, with the 2nd C.M.R. Bn., 100 yds. in Rear of BOUCHOIR. No. 1 Company was with the 7th C.I.B. in Support Positions, "A" Battery, with the P.P.C.L.I. South of FOLIES, "E" Battery, with the 42nd C.I.Bn., N. of FOLIES, "C" and "D" Batteries, 100 yds. in Rear. No. 2 Company was with Battalion Details, at Rear Battalion headquarters, MAISON BLANCHE. Advanced Battalion H.Q. was with Third Cdn. Division H.Q. at BEAUCOURT.

**Action of No. 1 Company, First Bn. C.M.G.C.**

The 1st C.I.B. (First Cdn. Division) attacked at 1.15 P.M., with the 1st and 2nd Cdn. Inf. BNs. As the Attack proceeded in Advance of the 8th C.I.B. on the Right, part of the 1st C.I.Bn. turned out of its own Area and cleared the Village of FOLIES, handing it over to Third Cdn. Division Troops on their arrival. The Left of the 1st C.I.Bn. in conjunction with the 2nd C.I.Bn. cleared BEAUFORT, and the Line pressed on to the FOLIES-WARVILLERS Road. The 1st C.I.Bn. captured 50 Prisoners in a Trench 200 yds. E. of the FOLIES-WARVILLERS Road, and consolidated on this Line; the 4th C.I.Bn. passed through the 1st C.I.Bn. to continue the Attack. On emerging from BEAUFORT, the 2nd C.I.Bn. to Brigade Left, engaged a German Force forming up for a Counter-Attack along the FOLIES-WARVILLERS Road and routed it, causing severe Casualties. The 2nd C.I.Bn. pressed on, by short rushes, past MARMITES FARM, 500 yds. S. of WARVILLERS, and, assisted by 2 Tanks and a Detachment of the 11th HUSSARS, cleared the Northern part of ROUVROY. The Battalion suffered heavy Casualties from M.G. Fire in the Advance E. of MARMITES FAR. The 3rd C.I.Bn. went through the 2nd C.I.Bn. and in conjunction with the 4th C.I.Bn. captured the remainder of ROUVROY. The whole of this Village was in our hands by 9.20 P.M., and First Cdn. Division Troops were on their Final Objective all along the Line, the C.I.Bn. on the Right, the 3rd C.I.Bn. on the Left.

The Batteries of No. 1 Company (Major E.R. MORRIS) First Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported the 1st C.I.B. Attack, "A" Battery in Brigade Reserve. Company H.Q. moved forward with Brigade H.Q., being finally established in BEAUFORT at 8.30 P.M.

"B" Battery kept in close touch with the 1st C.I.Bn. during the Advance, following the Infantry with Guns in pairs, disposed in Diamond Formation. The Battery came into Action several times, firing on Enemy Points of Resistance. The first Target engaged consisted of parties of the enemy along a Line of Light Railway, 100 yds. E. of the Jumping-off Line, and to the Left of the LE QUESNEL-BEAUFORT Road. When the Right Company of the 1st C.I.Bn. moved to the Right to attack FLOIES, the O.C., "B" Battery placed Guns particularly to defend this Flank until the Situation was well in hand. Covering Fire was Given to the Infantry in their advance through the Right portion of BEAUFORT, special attention being paid to the treed Area W. of the Village. From the vicinity of the FOLIES-WARVILLERS Road, Fire was brought to bear



on enemy Artillery observed withdrawing S. of ROUVROY, causing Casualties to Men and horses. Final Dispositions of "B" Battery were made 200 to 500 yds. E. of the FOLIES-WARVILLERS Road.

The 8 Guns of "D" Battery supported the 2nd C.I.Bn. on the 1st C.I.B. Left. Capt. MACDERMOTT, O.C., Battery, collected his Guns on the LE QUESNEL-CAIX Road and fired a Creeping Barrage of 3 Lifts to cover the Advance of the Infantry and Cavalry against BEAUFORT WOOD. Lieut. DILLON, M.C., organised the Barrage. After firing this Barrage the Guns moved forward in pairs and were eventually disposed in Defensive Positions on the 1st C.I.B. Left.

At 10.00 P.M. August 9th, "A" Battery, First Battalion, C.M.G.C., in Brigade Reserve, was moved up to strengthen the Brigade Right Flank, Guns being sited S.-E. and S. of BEAUFORT.

#### **Action of No. 2 Company, First Bn., C.M.G.C.**

The 2nd C.I.B. attacked at 1.00 P.M. with the 5th C.I.Bn. on the Right, and the 8th C.I.Bn. on the Left. The most determined Resistance was met with from HATCHET WOOD, in the centre of the 8th C.I.Bn. Frontage. The Position was captured by a brilliantly daring Assault in which a large number of Machine Guns and 500 Prisoners were taken. In the Assault, the O.C., 6th C.I.Bn., Major RADDALL, D.S.O., was killed. This gallant Officer was formerly Divisional Machine Gun Commander, First Cdn. Division, and had commanded the 2nd C.M.G. Company on its formation on January 1st, 1916. The enemy resisted our Advance all along the 2nd C.I.B. Frontage, in determined Groups, centred around Machine Gun Nests. With the assistance of Tanks, all Oppositions was overcome and our Line pushed through WARVILLERS to the ROUVROY-VRELY Road.

No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM, D.C.M.), First Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported the 2nd C.I.B. with 3 Batteries, "E" Battery on the Right, "G" Battery on the Left, "H" Battery in Brigade Reserve.

"E" Battery had many Targets during its Advance. After advancing 1,500 yds., No. 2 Section (4 Guns) fire 150 Rounds with good effect on a party of 50 Germans emerging from the Northern extremity of BEAUFORT WOOD. 500 Rounds were fired on retreating Germans 500 yds. W. of WARVILLERS and heavy Casualties were inflicted. Enemy Artillery Wagons on the ROUVROY-VRELY Road were engaged with good results from Position just N. of WARVILLERS. No. 1 Section (4 Guns) came into action against enemy Machine Guns in BEAUFORT WOOD. At one stage of the Attack Lieut. MACINTOSH took charge of elements of the 5th C.I.Bn. who had lost their Officers and, leading them forward by sectional rushes, succeeded in capturing several Prisoners. "E" Battery Guns were eventually sited for Defence along the 2nd C.I.B. Frontage, on either side of the ROUVROY-VRELY Road, 800 to 1,000 yds. behind the Final Objective. Both Sections of "E" Battery had Guns mounted against enemy Air-craft when Final Dispositions had been made. Private McLEOD, of No. 2 Section, firing No. 6 Gun, brought down an enemy Aeroplane in flames, just E. of the ROUVROY-VRELY Road.

"H" Battery, in Brigade Reserve, moved forward, in Diamond Formation, with 200 yds. Interval and 600 yds. Distance between pairs, following the Reserve Infantry Battalions. Limbers accompanied the Battery, in Rear of the last pair of Guns. Previously selected Positions were occupied, 2,000 to 3,000 yds. in Rear of the Final Objective.

#### **Guns in Reserve; First Bn., C.M.G.C.**

No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM), First Battalion, C.M.G.C., did not come into Action on August 9th. The 3 Batteries attached to the 3rd C.I.B., in Divisional Reserve, remained in CERES WOOD until 7.15 P.M., when they moved to the 3rd C.I.B. Assembly Area in the low ground N. of BEAUCOURT. Here Batteries "Stood To" until 11.30 P.M. when Orders were received from 3rd C.I.B. to "Stand Down" and remain where they were for the night.

"C", "F" and "J" Batteries in Divisional Reserve were moved at Noon, August 9th, from MON IDEE to CAYEUX. At 4.30 P.M., they moved again to the Valley S. of CAYEUX, to a point mid-way between CAYEUX and BEAUCOURT.



**Action of No. 1 Company, Second Bn., C.M.G.C.**

The 5th C.I.B., on the Right of the Second Cdn. Division Front, attacked through a portion of the BLUE DOTTED LINE held by the 2nd C.I.B. (First Cdn. Division). The 25th C.I.Bn. was on the Right, the 22nd C.I.Bn., on the Left. As already stated, the First Cdn. Division jumped off at 1.00 P.M. The 6th C.I.B. on the Left of the 5th C.I.B. attacked at 11.00 A.M. In view of this situation and in order to give the greatest possible assistance to the flanking Brigades, the 5th C.I.B. Units launched their Assault at time which would enable their Battalions to keep pace with the Advance of Troops on their Flanks. The Left Company of the 22nd C.I.Bn. left the Jumping-off Line at 11.45 A.M., the remainder of the 22nd C.I.Bn. and the 25th C.I.Bn. attacked at 12.30 P.M.

Severe enemy Machine gun Fire was encountered as soon as Battalions left the Jumping-off Line. Enemy Nests were dealt with by Tanks and Infantry Manoeuvre. Small Parties of Scouts, followed by Lewis Guns worked up Ditches, Sunken Roads and other Dead Ground, until enemy Machine Guns were put out of Action or forced to retire by Enfilade Fire from a Flank; when this had been accomplished, for each successive M.G. Nest, a signal was given to the Infantry that they could now advance. The leading Battalions, making their way forward in this way, were E. of VRELY by 3.25 P.M., and by 5.30 P.M. had taken MEHARICOURT and were consolidating on the Final Objective, in old Trenches, about 500 yds. E. of the latter Village. At this time, the 5th C.I.B. was out of touch with Units on both Flanks; by 7.30 P.M. touch was established with the 2nd C.I.B. on the Right and the 6th C.I.B. on the Left.

No. 1 Company (Major BASEVI), Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported the 5th C.I.B. Attack. "A" Battery, under Capt. L.F. WHITE, M.C., operated with the 25th C.I.Bn. on the Right, "C" Battery, under Capt. HOBSON, M.C., M.M., with the 22nd C.I.Bn. on the Left. "B" and "D" Batteries moved forward in the Right and Left Rear, respectively. Company H.Q. was with Brigade H.Q. in the Orchard, S.-W. of CAIX.

Guns and Equipment were taken forward on Limbers until the Infantry had reached the Final Objective. The leading Battery Commanders at once got into touch with the Officers Commanding the respective Infantry Battalions they were supporting and Guns were placed in Position. Capt. WHITE, O.C., "A" Battery placed 4 of his Guns in Position 1,000 yds. S. of MEHARICOURT to cover a Gap on the Right of the Brigade, and defend the 25th C.I.Bn. Right. The Other 4 Guns of "A" Battery were placed on commanding ground in Rear of the ROUVROY-MEHARICOURT Road, 500 yds. W. of its junction with the VRELY-MEHARICOURT Road. "C" Battery Guns were sited N. of MEHARICOURT, near the Cemetery and outskirts of the Village. "B" and "D" Battery Guns, in Support, were placed in Defensive Positions across the 5th C.I.B. Area, 1,000 to 2,000 yds. in Rear of MEHARICOURT. All Guns remained in Position throughout the night August 9th/10th.

No. 1 Company H.Q. moved with Brigade Headquarters to the BLUE DOTTED LINE at 2.30 P.M. and at 5.00 P.M. were established at VRELY. At about 3.00 P.M. a shell killed the Brigade Major, 5th C.I.B. and wounded the G.O.C., Brigade, and Staff Captain Intelligence. Major BASEVI, commanding No. 1 Company, being the senior Officer left, was temporarily in command at Brigade H.Q., and assisted what remained of the Brigade Staff until the Casualties were replaced. Casualties to No. 1 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., during the day's Operations, were, 2 Other Ranks, wounded.

**Action of No. 2 Company, Second Bn., C.M.G.C.**

The 6th C.I.B. attacked on the Corps Left, at 11.00 A.M., in conjunction with the 15th Australian Inf. Bde., Fifth Australia Division, N. of the AMIENS-NESLE Railway. Great assistance was given to the 6th C.I.B. by the 9th Cavalry Brigade in reconnaissance and supporting the Line. Considerable help was rendered also by 5 Tanks, of the 14th Tank Battalion. The Brigade attacked with the 31st C.I.Bn. on the Right and the 29th C.I.Bn. on the Left. The 28th C.I.Bn. in Support at the outset, became involved as the Attack progresses, and eventually captured the centre portion of the 6th C.I.B. Final Objective.

The 6th C.I.B. jumped-off from the portion of the BLUE DOTTED LINE which they had captured on the previous day. The Village of ROSIERES lay in the centre of the Brigade Objective. The Attack was launched 45 minutes in advance of our Troops on the Right. As with the other Brigades the main enemy Opposition came from well-placed Machine Gun Nests. The 29th C.I.Bn. on the Left was continuously exposed to Machine Gun Fire from Positions N. of the Railway. The Infantry pressed on and by 1.30 P.M. ROSIERES was in our hands. Just after our Line had been advanced through the Village the enemy counter-attacked the Right Flank with Troops brought up in Motor Lorries, but was driven off by our Lewis Gun and Rifle Fire.



At this stage the Germans were making every effort to delay the Advance of the Australians against LIHONS, and had succeeded in temporarily checking their progress. The 6th C.I.B. Left was therefore exposed, and our Troops waited until the Australians came up. The Attack was then resumed. The SUGAR FACTORY, on the MEHARICOURT-ROSIERES Road, was captured by the 29th C.I.Bn. at 4.00 P.M.: the 28th C.I.Bn., in the Brigade centre, continued the Advance capturing 150 Prisoners. A Line was eventually consolidated, 500 to 800 yds. E. of the MEHARICOURT-ROSIERES Road, with the Right in touch with the 5th C.I.B. and the Left on the AMIENS-NESLE Railway.

The 4 Batteries of No. 2 Company (Major McCORKELL), Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., attacked with the 6th C.I.B. "H" Battery, under Capt. TUCKER, M.C., M.M., was on the Right, "F" Battery, under Capt. J.A. RAMSAY, on the Left. When the Advance was held up E. of ROSIERES, the Guns of "F" Battery and 4 Guns of "H" Battery under Lieut. BLAIR were placed to cover the Gap between the 6th C.I.B. Left Flank and the Australians. When the Germans retired before the Australians, Lieut. BLAIR's Guns, which enfiladed a Sunken Road crossed by the Germans in their retirement, had excellent Targets and inflicted numerous Casualties. Great assistance was given the Australians by the Flanking Fire of these Guns. Capt. TUCKER moved the remaining 4 Guns of his Battery to the Right Flank. No. 2 Company guns were placed in Defensive Positions on the Eastern outskirts of ROSIERES when the 6th C.I.B. Line was consolidated for the day, and remained there throughout the night 9th/10th August.

Casualties suffered by No. 2 Company Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., during August 9th were, 4 Gunners, killed, and 20 Gunners, wounded.

### **No.3 Company, Second Bn., C.M.G.C.**

No. 3 Company (Major McCAMUS, M.C.), Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., which had borne the brunt of the fighting on the previous day, did not come into Action on August 9th, but remained in Support with the 4th C.I.B., S. of WIENCOURT-LE'EQUIPEE.



**OPERATIONS, RELIEFS, MOVES: AUGUST 10th TO 25th, 1918.****General Situation August 10th.**

The Advance of the Third, First and Second Cdn. Divisions on August 9th brought the Canadian Corps to the Eastern edge of the SOMME Trench System. The Line at this point had formed the Right Flank of the Allied Offensive in 1916. The Germans had withdrawn from it in their Strategic Retreat in the Spring of 1917, and had recovered this ground in their March Offensive, 1918.

The Resistance which the enemy offered to our Advance on August 9th made it apparent that he was reinforcing his Line, and suggested he would make a stand in his old strongly-entrenched and well-wired Positions of 1916. Our Attack of August 10th confirmed this view, and pointed to the resumption of Trench warfare. Rather than sacrifice lives needlessly the Corps Commander decided not to push the Attack further until a set piece Attack could be arranged with adequate Artillery support. This set-piece Attack never actually took place for, while plans for it were being prepared, the Canadian Corps was withdrawn from the FOURTH ARMY to take part in Offensive Operations E. of ARRAS.

The Total Advance made by the Canadian Corps on the AMIENS Front, subsequent to August 9th exceeded 4,000 yds. Far the greater part of this advance took place on August 10th. The Attack on this date was carried out by the Third Cdn. Division and Thirty-second Division (British) on the Right, and the Fourth Cdn. Division on the Left.

**Action of Third Bn., C.M.G.C.; August 10th.**

The Third Cdn. Division attacked with the 8th C.I.B. which had been in the Front Line the previous day. The 2nd C.M.R. Bn. was on the Right, the 1st C.M.R. Bn. on the Left. When the leading troops had captured le QUESNOY and advanced our Line on the Divisional Left, the Thirty second Division (British) passed through the Third Cdn. Division at 9.45 A.M. and continued the Attack.

The Dispositions of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., remained unchanged during the Advance of the 8th C.I.B. No. 3 Company Guns were in Position in the vicinity of BOUCHOIR, with the 8th C.I.B.; No. 1 Company Guns were in Support with the 7th C.I.B. near FOLIES; No. 2 Company was at MAISON BLANCHE in Divisional Reserve. Battalion H.Q. remained at BEAUCOURT.

**Operations of Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.; August 10th.**

The Fourth Cdn. Division attacked on a 2-Brigade Front from ROUVROY to the AMIENS-NESLE Railway. The Battle Order of Assaulting Brigades and Battalions from Right to Left was as follows:-

Brigade	Front Line.	Support.
10th C.I.B.	44th C.I.Bn.	47th C.I.Bn.
	46th C.I.Bn.	50th C.I.Bn.
12th C.I.B.	72nd C.I.Bn.	76th C.I.Bn.
	85th C.I.Bn.	38th C.I.Bn.

The General Objective was the Line HATTENCOURT-HALLU to the Left Corps Boundary. The Division was assisted by 19 Tanks. The Australians attacked on the Left to capture LIHONS.

At 10.15 A.M., Fourth Division Assaulting Troops passed through the Second Cdn. Division. Stiff Fighting took place all along the Line. The Operations of Tanks were greatly handicapped by the Trenches. The Infantry had recourse to Trench Warfare Tactics and succeeded in reaching their Objectives. The Villages of FOUQUESCOURT, MAUCOURT, CHILLY and HALLU were taken in the day's Operations. Heavy Fighting took place for the Capture of FOUQUESCOURT and CHILLY. The Thirty-second Division on the Right was unable to get forward. 2 Enemy Counter-attacks, delivered in the evening on the 12th C.I.B. Front, were successfully driven off, and in the Line, FOUQUESCOURT-CHILLY-LIHONS Road to the Railway, was consolidated. Posts were retained in HALLU throughout the night August 10th/11th.

In the early morning of the 10th, the entire Personnel of the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., assembled in the small Wood, S.-W. of CAIX. From here "A", "C" and "D" Batteries moved off to their respective Tasks, in support of the Fourth Division Attack. Major BRITTON, O.C., No. 1 Company, proceeded to 10th C.I.B. Headquarters, and Capt. WEAVER, to 12th C.I.B. Headquarters as M.G. Liaison Officers, "B" Battery, and Nos. 2 and 3 Companies were in Divisional Reserve under Major L.F. PEARCE, M.C., commanding No. 2 Company.



"D" Battery, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported the 10th C.I.B., "A" and "C" Batteries the 12th C.I.B. "A" and "D" Batteries were used in a Defensive role and took up Defensive Positions to assist in Consolidation.

"C" Battery, under Capt. RAINBOTH, M.C., moved forward, with Guns on Pack Animals, in Rear of the 85th C.I.Bn. on the 12th C.I.Bn. Left. Severe enemy Machine Gun Fire was experienced, from Positions N. of the Railway, soon after jumping off. At 1.45 P.M., 4 Guns of "C" battery came into Action 500 yds. W. of the CHILLY-LIHONS Road against enemy S. and E. of LIHONS. Captured German Guns were used also by this Battery. Positions were eventually occupied in the old Trench System W. of the CHILLY-LIHONS Road.

#### **Final Dispositions Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.; August 10th.**

Subsequent to this Attack, Fourth Battalion Dispositions were re-arranged. At 3.00 P.M., under Orders from the Battalion Commander, Lt.-Col. M.. SCOTT, D.S.C., "B" Battery and No. 2 Company were placed in Defensive Positions as follows:-

"B" Battery	Eastern Outskirts of ROSIERES.
"E" Battery	1500 yds. W. of VRELY.
"F" Battery	Eastern outskirts of ROSIERES.
"G" Battery )	1500 yds. S.-W. of VRELY, immediately N. of WARVILLERS.
"H" Battery )	

No. 3 Company spent the morning of the 10th in reorganising and re-equipping its Gun Crews and at 3.00 P.M. proceeded to HATCHET WOOD, 2,500 yds. W. of VRELY. Advanced Battalion H.Q. moved from DEMUIN at 6.30 A.M. to the Wood 1,500 yds. S.-E. of CAIX, and at 11.3 A.M. to the Mill, 1,000 yds. S.-W. of VRELY, Rear Battalion H.Q. moved to CAYEUX Wood.

#### **Dispositions of First Bn., C.M.G.C.; August 10th.**

The First and Second Battalions, C.M.G.C., remained in Reserve with their Divisions during August 10th. The First Battalion was disposed as follows:-

No. 1 Company, less "C" Battery, and No. 2 Company less "F" Battery, remained throughout the day in Defensive Positions occupied on August 9th. At 7.00 P.M. "A", "B" and "D" Batteries assembled, with "A" Echelon Transport, in the vicinity of BEAUFORT. "E" and "H" Batteries with "F" Battery from Divisional Reserve assembled with "A" Echelon Transport in ROUVROY. "G" Battery joined "C" and "J" Batteries in Divisional Reserve at BEAUFORT.

At 8.00 P.M., the 3rd C.I.B. took over the 1st C.I.B. Defensive Front, on either Flank of ROUVROY and No. 3 Company Guns less "J" Battery were moved up to Defensive Positions along this Front. "K" Battery was on the Right, supporting the 16th C.I.Bn. "L" Battery, on the Left Supporting the 14th C.I.Bn.: 4 Guns, "M" Battery, were in Rear of the Brigade Centre, and 4, in Reserve at WARVILLERS. No. 3 Company H.Q. were with the 3rd C.I.B. in WARVILLERS Chateau. No. 1 Company moved back to the vicinity of BEAUFORT. These Dispositions were completed at 10.00 P.M. Battalion H.Q. opened at Billet 58, BEAUFORT at 5.00 P.M.

#### **Dispositions of Second Bn., C.M.G.C.; August 10th.**

The Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., was disposed as follows:-

No. 1 Company Guns remained in Defensive Positions N. and S. of MEHARICOURT. No. 2 Company moved forward to Defensive Positions in the vicinity of the SUGAR FACTORY E. of ROSIERES. No. 3 Company remained in Divisional Reserve in WIENCOURT-I'EQUIPEE Area. Advanced Battalion H.Q. remained with Second Cdn. Division H.Q. at BOIS PIERRET. Rear Battalion H.Q. with "B" Echelon Transport, moved from CACHY to the Draw S. and W. of WIENCOURT-I'EQUIPEE.



**OPERATIONS AUGUST 11TH.**

From August 10th until the Canadian Corps was withdrawn from the AMIENS Front, no combined effort was made to break down German Resistance along the Corps Front. Local Attacks were made and our Line advanced from Trench to Trench.

On August 11th, the Corps Line was held by the Thirty-second Division (British) on the Right and the Fourth Cdn. Division on the Left. The First, Second and Third Cdn. Divisions were in Corps Reserve. The Thirty-second Division attacked DAMERY on the morning of the 11th but was unable to make progress against the strongly-entrenched German Positions W. of the Village. On the same day, the Fourth Cdn. Division was subjected to vigorous enemy Counter-attacks. All of these attacks were repulsed, with great loss to the Germans but, in view of the Salient produced by retaining our hold on HALLE, the Posts in this Village were withdrawn, and our Line established 500 yds. E. of CHILLY. Heavy enemy Shelling persisted throughout the day.

**Dispositions of Third Bn., C.M.G.C.; August 11th.**

The Third Cdn. Division relieved the Thirty-second Division (British) on the night 11th/12th August, the 9th C.I.B. on the Right, the 7th C.I.B. on the Left, the 8th C.I.B. in Reserve. Machine Guns of the Third Battalion remained throughout the 11th in Positions occupied on the previous day. In the evening of August 11th Guns of Nos. 1 and 2 Companies were moved up with the relieving Infantry Brigades.

No. 2 Company, with the 9th C.I.B. on the Right, occupied Positions as follows:-

"F" Battery )	1,000 yds. E. of LE QUESNOY on a Line BOIS CARRE-101 SUD
"H" Battery )	
"E" Battery )	In 9th C.I.B. Support at BOUCHOIR.
"G" Battery )	

No. 1 Company, with the 7th C.I.B. on the left, was disposed as follows:-

"A" Battery )	1,000 yds. W. of a Line, PARVILLERS-FOUQUESCOURT.
"B" Battery )	
"D" Battery )	Mid-way between LE QUESNOY and ROUVROY.
"C" Battery )	1,000 yds. S.-W. of ROUVROY in 7th C.I.B. Reserve.

No. 3 Company remained in Divisional Reserve with the 8th C.I.B., in the vicinity of BEETROOT FACTORY, W. of BOUCHOIR.

Battalion Advanced H.Q. moved, with Third Cdn. Division H.Q., to LE QUESNEL CHATEAU.

**Dispositions of Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.; August 11th.**

To conform with the Tactical Situation, certain changes were made in the Dispositions of Fourth Battalion Machine Guns on August 11th.

Orders were received during the night August 10th/11th for a continuation of the Advance on the 12th by the 10th and 12th C.I.B.s. Lt.-Col. SCOTT detailed No. 2 Company to give covering Fire to the 12th C.I.B. on the Left, for this Attack. When Major PEARCE, O.C., No. 2 Company, had already moved his Batteries into Position, orders were received cancelling the Operation. No. 2 Company Guns were then placed in Support Positions, behind the 12th C.I.B., between MEHARICOURT and the AMIENS-NESLE Railway.

"B" Battery reported to major BRITTON at 10th C.I.B. Headquarters and was placed in Position in close Support of the 10th C.I.B. The 4 Batteries of No. 1 Company were now disposed in Forward Positions as follows:-

"B" Battery )	On a Line, FOUQUESCOURT-MAUCOURT.
"D" Battery )	
"A" Battery )	On a Line, MAUCOURT-N. to the Railway, near Junction with
"C" Battery )	CHILLY-LINONS Road.

No. 3 Company Guns were placed in Support Positions on the Right, between ROUVROY and MEHARICOURT. All Guns of the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., were in Defensive Positions. Battalion Advanced H.Q. remained at the Mill, S.-W. of VRELY; Rear H.Q. moved from CAYEUX WOOD to HATCHET WOOD.



**First and Second BNs., C.M.G.C.; August 11th.**

The First and Second Battalions, C.M.G.C., were in Reserve, with their respective Divisions, on August 11th, the First Battalion, on the Corps Right behind the Third Cdn. Division, the Second Battalion, on the Corps Left behind the Fourth Cdn. Division.

No change took place in First Battalion, C.M.G.C., Dispositions on August 11th. The day was spent by Batteries in cleaning Guns and Equipment.

The Guns of No. 1 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., were rearranged, 2 Batteries placed E. of MEHARICOURT, 1 Battery W. of MEHARICOURT, and one Battery held in Reserve, 200 yds. W. of the Village, close to VRELY. No change occurred in the Dispositions of No. 2 Company. No. 3 Company moved to CAIX where it remained, prepared to man the AMIENS Defence Line, with the 6th C.I.B., at 30 minutes' notice. Second Battalion Advanced H.Q. moved with Divisional H.Q. to VRELY.

**Third Bn., C.M.G.C.; Operations, August 12th to 16th.**

The 9th and 7th C.I.B.s, Third Cdn. Division, brought continuous pressure to bear on the enemy Line, during the 4 days following their Relief of the Thirty-second Division, and on August 15th succeeded in capturing the villages of DAMERY and FARVILLERS. In this period a strong Trench System 4,000 yds. in Length and 200 yds. wide was cleared of the enemy. By the Operations on August 15th, the French were enabled to enter Bois-en-Z. from the Rear, and so passed through the German Main Resistance Line on the way to HOYE, 2½ miles distant. In the same period 350 to 450 Prisoners were taken with 160 Machine Guns and numerous Trench Mortars. Approximately 800 German dead were counted in the captured Area.

Forward Guns of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported Infantry Attacks with Overhead Covering Fire. On August 12th and 13th, Guns remained in Positions occupied on taking over the Line, night 11th/12th. On August 14th, Batteries of No. 1 Company supporting the 7th C.I.B. were re-adjusted to conform to the Infantry Advance. "B" Battery moved forward 1,000 yds. to Positions S. and E. of BOIS NOIR (S. of FOUQUESCOURT). "C" Battery, from Brigade Reserve, moved forward 2,000 yds. to Positions mid-way between PARVILLERS and ROUVROY. Slight changes were made in the Dispositions of "A" and "D" Batteries, No. 1 Company, and of "F" and "H" Batteries, No. 2 Company, but the Guns of these Batteries remained on the same general Line of Defence. No. 3 Company remained in Divisional Reserve in the same Location.

**Third Bn., C.M.G.C., Relieved; August 15th/16th and 16th/17th.**

On nights August 15th/16th and 16th/17th, the Third Cdn. Division was relieved by the First Cdn. Division and passed into Corps Reserve, with 1 Brigade ready to move at 30 minutes' notice, the remaining 2, at 24 hours' notice.

The Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., was relieved by the First Battalion, C.M.G.C., nights August 15th/16th and 16th/17th. No. 2 Company was relieved by No. 2 Company of the First Battalion, night 15th/16th, and proceeded to Battalion Rear H.Q., 1,500 yds. W. of FOLIES. No. 1 Company was relieved by No. 3 Company, First Battalion, night 16th/17th, and proceeded to Battalion Rear H.Q. On August 16th, No. 2 Company and Battalion H.Q. moved to CLAUDE WOOD, 1,500 yds. N.W. of BEAUCOURT, where they were joined by No. 1 Company on August 17th. No. 3 Company remained in the vicinity of the BEETROOT FACTORY, W. of BOUCHOIR, ready to move with the 8th C.I.B. at 30 minutes' notice.

**Fourth and Second Cdn. Divisions; Operations, August 12th to 17th.**

While the Third Cdn. Division were advancing our Line on the Corps Right Front, the Fourth and Second Cdn. Divisions improved and slightly advanced our Line on the Left. During the fighting on August 12th, the 44th C.I.Bn., Fourth Cdn. Division, maintained touch with the 42nd C.I.Bn., Third Cdn. Division, on their immediate Right, and materially assisted their Advance. No change occurred in the Machine Gun Dispositions of the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., on August 12th. Battalion Rear H.Q. moved on this day from HATCHET WOOD to the Small WOOD S.-W. of CAIX. The Fourth Cdn. Division was relieved by the Second Cdn. Division, nights 12th/13th and 14th/15th, and passed into Corps Reserve.

The Second Cdn. Division took over the Line with the 4th C.I.B. on the Right and the 5th C.I.B. on the Left. Plans for a further Attack were issued on August 14th, but these Operations were later indefinitely postponed. On August 15th, the 19th C.I.Bn., 4th C.I.B., attacked and captured the Village of FRANSART, capturing 39 Prisoners. The Line was strengthened and improved on the remainder of the Second Division Front.



**Second Bn., C.M.G.C.; Operations, August 12th to 17th.**

On August 12th, No. 3 Company Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., relieved No. 2 Company in Reserve Positions on the Division Left, and No. 2 Company moved, on Relief, to CAIX. Otherwise Dispositions remained unchanged throughout the day. Nos. 1 and 3 Companies, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., were allotted to the 4th C.I.B. for their Relief of the Fourth Cdn. Division Right, night 12th/13th. "A", "C" and "D" Batteries relieved 24 Guns, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., on the Right of the Divisional Frontage. "B" Battery was held in Reserve, N. of WARVILLERS. "J", "K" and "L" Batteries relieved 24 Guns, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., on the Left of the Divisional Frontage. "M" Battery was held in Reserve, S.-W. of ROSIERES. No. 2 Company remained at CAIX.

According to the original plans for the Relief of the Fourth Division, the Left portion of the Front was to be taken over by Australian Troops. On August 14th, word was received that this Relief could not be effected and on the night August 15th/16th Lt.-Col. WEIR, M.C., commanding the Second Battalion, was instructed to take over the Machine Gun Defence of the 5th C.I.B. on the Divisional Left. "H" and "F" Batteries, No. 2 Company, relieved Fourth Battalion Guns in Forward and Support Positions, respectively, "H" Battery taking over Positions 500 to 1,000 yds. W. of the CHILLY-LIHONS Road, "F" Battery relieving Guns E. and N. of MEHARICOURT. "E" and "G" batteries remained in Divisional Reserve at CAIX.

Guns of Nos. 2 and 3 Companies remained in Positions occupied on Relief for the rest of the Tour. On August 15th after the Capture of FRANSART by the 4th C.I.B., Major BASEVI moved forward No. 1 Company Guns to defend the new Line. "D" Battery on the Right and "E" Battery, from Brigade Reserve, on the Left, were moved up to Positions between FOUQUES COURT and FRANSART. This move was completed by 10.00 P.M. "A" and "C" Batteries were sited on a line E. of FOUQUES COURT, to strengthen the Defence of the 4th C.I.B. Right Flank.

On nights August 16/17th and 17/18th the Second Cdn. Division was relieved by the Fourth Cdn. Division, and placed in Corps Reserve. Command passed to G.O.C. Fourth Division at 12 Noon, August 17th.

Machine Gun Reliefs took place at the same time as Infantry Reliefs. On the night August 16th/17th, No. 1 Company and "J" and "K" Batteries, No. 3 Company, were relieved by Guns of the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. On Night August 17th/18th, "F" and "H" Batteries, No. 2 Company, and "L" and "M" Batteries, No. 3 Company, were relieved by Fourth Battalion Guns. Battalion H.Q. with "E" and "G" Batteries, in Divisional Reserve, moved, on August 17th, to the WOOD, 1,000 yds. S.-E. of CAIX, where they were joined by all batteries on completion of Reliefs.

**Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.; August 13th to 17th.**

The Relief of the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., carried out by the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., on night 12th/13th left "C" Battery, No. 1 Company, and "E", "F" and "H" Batteries, No. 2 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., still in the Line on the Divisional Left Front. On August 13th, Battalion Advanced H.Q. and the relieved Batteries joined Battalion Rear H.Q. in the Small Wood, S.-W. of CAIX. "C", "E" "F" and "H" Batteries were relieved by the Second Battalion, or withdrawn, night 15th/16th, and joined the remainder of the Battalion in CAIX WOOD.

Batteries out of the Line, August 13th to 17th, spent the interval in gaining rest and refreshment. Bath Parades were held to the Baths near CAIX. Gun Equipment was cleaned and put in order. The prevailing fine weather added greatly to the comfort and enjoyment of all Ranks.

The Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., relieved the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., nights August 16th/17th and 17th/18th, as follows:- No. 3 Company took over Second Battalion Positions on the Divisional Right, in Support of the 10th C.I.B., night August 16th/17th. On the same night, No. 2 Company, in Divisional Reserve, occupied Defensive Positions, and No. 1 Company moved from CAIX WOOD to the Valley 1,500 yds. N.-W. of VRELY. No. 1 Company relieved Second Battalion Guns on the Divisional Left, supporting the 11th C.I.B., night August 17th/18th. Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., Advanced H.Q. took over from the Second Battalion at VRELY on the 17th.



**Divisions and Brigades Holding the Line; August 17th.**

At 12.00 Noon, August 17th, when command of the Left Divisional Sector passed to the G.O.C. Fourth Cdn. Division, the Canadian Corps Frontage was held by the First Cdn. Division on the Right and the Fourth Cdn. Division on the Left. The First Cdn. Division had relieved the Third Cdn. Division on nights August 15th/16th and 16th/17th. The Battle Order of Brigades, from Right to Left, was as follows:-

First Cdn. Division	2nd C.I.B.	1st C.I.B. (Reserve).
	3rd C.I.B.	
Fourth Cdn. Division	10th C.I.B.	12th C.I.B. (Reserve).
	11th C.I.B.	

Second and Third Canadian Divisions were in Corps Reserve.

**First Bn., C.M.G.C.; Dispositions, August 17th.**

The First Battalion, C.M.G.C., completed the Relief of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., on the Right of the Corps Frontage, night August 16th/17th. Positions taken over were the same as those occupied by Third Battalion Guns. "C", "G" and "J" Batteries, from divisional Reserve, rejoined their Companies, prior to this Relief. No. 2 Company supported the 2nd C.I.B. on the Right, No. 3 Company, the 3rd C.I.B. on the Left. No. 1 Company Guns, in Divisional Reserve with the 1st C.I.B. were in Defence Positions on the outskirts of BEAUFORT. Battalion advanced H.Q. was at LE QUESNEL CHATEAU, Battalion Rear H.Q., at BEAUFORT.

**Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.; Dispositions, August 18th.**

Dispositions of the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., on August 18th, the day following completion of Relief of the Second Battalion, were as follows:-

No. 3 Company, on the Fourth Cdn. Division Right, supporting the 10th C.I.B.:

- "J" Battery - On a Line 500 yds. W. of FRANSART.
- "K" Battery - On a Line 1,000 yds. W. of the FOUQUES-COURT-MAUCOURT Road.
- "L" Battery - Echeloned to the Front, 500 yds. S. of MEHARICOURT.
- "M" Battery - Echeloned to the Front, 1,500 yds. N.-E. of ROUVROY.
- Company H.Q. - 1,500 yds. S.-E. of VRELY, 300 yds. E. of VRELY-ROUVROY Road.

No. 1 Company, on the Fourth Cdn. Division Left, supporting the 11th C.I.B.:

- "A" Battery - Left Forward Positions ) On a line 500 yds. W. of the
- "B" Battery - Centre Forward Positions ) CHILLY-LIHONS Road.
- "C" Battery - Right Forward Positions )
- "D" Battery - In Support between MAUCOURT and MEHARICOURT.
- Company H.Q. - 300 yds. S. of ROSIERES SUGAR FACTORY.

No. 2 Company, in Divisional Reserve:

- "E" Battery - Near ROSIERES SUGAR FACTORY.
- "F" Battery - S.-E. outskirts of ROSIERES.
- "G" Battery - 500 yds. S.-E. of VRELY.
- "H" Battery - 300 yds. N.-E. of WARVILLERS.
- Company H.Q. - VRELY.

Battalion Advanced H.Q. - VRELY.

Battalion Rear H.Q. - S.-W. of CAIX.



**First Cdn. Division Relieved by French.**

The First Canadian Division was relieved by the 55th, 173rd, and 112th Infantry Regiments, XXXVI Corps (French), on the nights August 19th/20th, 20th/21st, 21st/22nd. On the night August 21st/22nd, the Fourth Cdn. Division extended its Front to the S. the 10th C.I.B. taking over a Frontage of 1,000 yds. from the 3rd C.I.B. On completion of Relief by the French, the First Cdn. Division was placed in Corps Reserve.

The Tour of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C., from August 17th to August 19th was uneventful. Some harassing Fire was carried out during each night. Otherwise there were no Machine Gun activities. The Relief of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C., by the French corresponded with the Reliefs of Infantry Brigades. No.1 Company was relieved by Machine Guns of the 55th Infantry Regiment, night August 19th/20th, No. 2 Company, by Guns of the 173rd Infantry Regiment night 20th/21st, No. 3 Company, by Guns of the 112th Infantry Regiment, night 21st/22nd. On Relief, all Companies assembled with battalion H.Q. in CAYEUX WOOD.

**G.O.C. Cdn. Corps hands over Command of Front.**

On August 22nd, the G.O.C. Canadian Corps handed over to the G.O.C. Australian Corps command at the Front, and of the First and Fourth Cdn. Divisions, the 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigade, the 8th Army Brigade, C.F.A. and the C.C.H.A.

**Fourth Bn. C.M.G.C., Aug. 18th to 23rd.**

Minor Changes in Fourth Battalion Machine Gun Dispositions were effected during this Period. On night August 21st/22nd, when the 10th C.I.B. extended its Front to the Right, "F" Battery from Divisional Reserve took over Machine Gun Positions 1,000 yds. S. of FOUQUESCOURT, defending the new 10th C.I.B. Front. On the following night these Guns were moved forward, 2 Guns to Positions S. of FRANSART, 6 Guns to Positions S. and S.-W. of FOUQUESCOURT, and "E" Battery moved to Support Positions, 1,000 yds. W. and S.-W. of FOUQUESCOURT.

"D" and "E" Batteries of the 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigade, which had been attached to the Fourth Cdn. Division, took the place of "E" and "F" Batteries, No. 2 Company, in Divisional Reserve Positions E. of ROSIERES.

Only one Operation took place during this Tour of the Fourth Cdn. Division. On August 19th, the 87th C.I.Bn., 11th C.I.B., advanced the Line 500 yds. on a Front of 1,200 yds. "A" Battery No. 1 Company, fired an effective M.G. Barrage for this Attack. 4 Enemy Counter-attacks were beaten off during the Afternoon.

**Fourth Cdn. Division Relieved by French.**

The Fourth Cdn. Division was relieved by the Thirty-fifth and Thirty-fourth Divisions, XXXVI Corps (French), on the nights August 23rd/24th and 24th/25th. Machine Gun Reliefs took place at the same time. On night 23rd/24th, "D" Battery, No. 1 Company, and "K" Battery, No. 3 Company, were relieved. The remaining Reliefs were carried out night 24th/25th. "A" Battery was not relieved until the early A.M. of the 25th, and, during the night, suffered 13 Casualties including Lieut. WOOLWARD, from enemy Gas Shelling. On Relief all Batteries marched to the Orchard, on the S. Bank of the LUCE, 1,000 yds. E. of HORGES. Battalion Rear H.Q. had preceded the Batteries to this Location on August 24th.

**Moves of Infantry to ARRAS Front.**

The Transfer of the Canadian Corps from the FOURTH ARMY to the FIRST ARMY began on night August 19th/20th. On this and the following night, the Second and Third Cdn. Divisions, respectively, entrained and embussed in the Area of S. of AMIENS. They detrained and debussed on the 20th and 21st in the BOUQUEMAISON Area, and proceeded by Route March, the Second Cdn. Division, to the ETRUN Area, the Third Cdn. Division, to the HERMAVILLE Area.

At 10.00 A.M., August 22nd, the day on which the G.O.C. handed over command of the AMIENS Front to the Australian Corps, Canadian Corps H.Q. opened at HAUTECLOQUE, 3 miles S. of ST. POL.

On the night August 24th/25th, the First Cdn. Division entrained S. of MIENS and detrained on the 25th at TINQUES, SAVY and AUBIGNY. The Division concentrated on this date in the ARRAS Area.

The Fourth Cdn. Division entrained S. of AMIENS on night August 27th/28th, detraining the following day at AUBIGNY, ACQ and MAROEUIL. The Fourth Cdn. Division concentrated in the ARRAS Area. The ARRAS-CAMBRAI Operations began on August 26th so that, when the Fourth Division rejoined the Canadian Corps, the other 3 Canadian Divisions were already heavily engaged.



**Moves of M.G. Units to ARRAS Front.**

The Machine Gun Battalions moved North with their respective Divisions.

The Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., was the first of the M.G. Battalions to reach the ARRAS Area. On August 17th, the Battalion was disposed as follows:-

Nos. 1 and 2 Companies and Battalion H.Q., in CLAUDE WOOD.

No. 3 Company, in the vicinity of BEETROOT FACTORY W. of BOUCHOIR. The Battalion remained in these Positions on the 18th. On the 19th, the Unit entrained and embussed for the N.

The Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., was in CAYEUX WOOD on August 18th, following its Relief by the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. On the 19th, the whole Unit marched to GENTELLES WOOD, and on the 20th, entrained for the ARRAS Front.

The First Battalion, C.M.G.C., on completion of Relief by the French, night 21st/22nd was concentrated in CAYEUX WOOD. On the 22nd, all Companies marched to GENTELLES WOOD: Battalion H.Q. moved to BOVES. On the 23rd, Battalion H.Q. and Companies moved to BOUTILLERIE where they remained until the 25th when the Battalion entrained for the N.

The Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., concentrated in the ORCHARD, E. of BOURGES, on the morning of August 25th, following the Relief by the French. The same evening, Battalion H.Q. moved to SAINS-en-AMIENOIS and Companies joined their Brigade Groups in GENTELLES WOOD, where they remained throughout the 26th. The Fourth Battalion entrained for the ARRAS Area on August 27th.

The 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigade assembled in BEAUFORT WOOD on August 24th and proceeded N. on the 25th.



The following Table shows that the MOVES of Canadian Machine Gun Battalions from the FOURTH to the FIRST ARMY Area:-

Table of Moves: Canadian M.G. Battalions,  
AMIENS Area to ARRAS Area,  
August, 1918.

	Unit	Entrained at.	Date Aug.	Detrained at.	Date Aug.	Billeted at.
First Bn., C.M.G.C.	Battalion H.Q. <sup>(x)</sup> No. 1 Company No. 2 Company No. 3 Company	BACQUEL BACQUEL SALEUX	25th 25th 25th	SAVY SAVY AUBIGNY	25th 26th 26th 26th	HERMAVILLE ARRAS ARRAS ARRAS
Second Bn., C.M.G.C.	Battalion H.Q. No. 1 Company No. 2 Company No. 3 Company	LONGEAU LONGEAU LONGEAU LONGEAU	20th 20th 20th 20th	FREVENT FREVENT FREVENT FREVENT	21st 21st 21st 21st	MONCHEAUX HOUVIN- HOUVIGNEUIL MONTS-en- TERNOIS MONCHEAUX
Third Bn., C.M.G.C. (y)	Battalion H.Q. No. 1 Company No. 2 Company <sup>(z)</sup> No. 3 Company	BOVES MAISON BLANCHE BOVES	19th 19th 19th	BOUQUEMAISON GROUCHES BOUQUEMAISON	20th 20th 20th 20th	SUS-ST. LEGER SUS-ST. LEGER SUS-ST. LEGER SUS-ST. LEGER
Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.	Battalion H.Q. <sup>(x)</sup> No. 1 Company No. 2 Company No. 3 Company	LONGEAU LONGEAU LONGEAU	27th 27th 27th	ACQ ACQ ACQ	27th 28th 28th 28th	HERMAVILLE ARRAS WARLUS ST. NICHOLAS

<sup>(x)</sup> By Battalion Motor Transport <sup>(y)</sup> Transport moved by Road <sup>(z)</sup> By Motor Lorry.



## **CONCLUSION.**

### **Transport and Supplies.**

The Plans for the AMIENS Operation presupposed that the first day's Attack would create a condition of semi-open Warfare. Arrangements were therefore made for the fullest possible use to be made of Machine Gun Transport. Only those Guns detailed for the Attack on the First Objective were man-handled. Batteries going forward to the RED and BLUE DOTTED LINES moved off from the Assembly Area with Guns in Limbers or on Pack Animals. The Limbers or Pack Animals carried Guns and Equipment as far as it was advisable to do so, when the Guns were off-loaded, and the Transport used for establishing S.A.A. Dumps near the Gun Positions.

Provision was made by Officers Commanding M.G. Battalions for early establishing, on August 8th of a Water and S.A.A. Supply forward of the Old Front Line. The First and Third Battalions were each allotted a Supply Tank. These Tanks were loaded with S.A.A. and Water and were detailed to establish Dumps at previously arranged Positions. Lieut.-Col. WATSON also made First Battalion Companies responsible for getting their own S.A.A. forward, 4 G.S. Limbers per Company, under an Officer, being detailed for this purpose. This turned out to be a very wise provision, as the First Battalion Supply Tank broke down before reaching our old Front Line. In the Second and Fourth M.G. Battalions, "B" Echelon Transport was employed on August 8th for getting forward Ammunition and other supplies by Lorries and Limbered Wagons. As the Attack progressed, S.A.A. Dumps were moved forward under Battalion arrangements.

All Battalion Dumps were established centrally to their respective Divisional frontages. On August 8th, the Third Battalion Supply Tank, under Major WHITAKER, crossed the DOMART Bridge at 7.15 A.M. and proceeded at once to a point immediately W. of DEMUIN where a Dump was located, consisting of 170,000 Rounds S.A.A., 50 Gallons Drinking Water and Spare Rations.

### **Advanced Armourer's Depot.**

As in previous Operations, Advanced Armourer's Depots were sent forward by each M.G. Battalion. Their Location was selected beforehand. Armourers were stationed here, ready to effect immediate repairs, and the Depots were stored, as usual, with Supplies of Spare Guns, Spare Parts, Lubricating Oil, Flannelette, etc. These Depots were located on August 8th, well within the old German Lines. In the First Battalion the Armourer's Depot was despatched in a Lorry which left, at Zero Hour, to follow up the Attack, over a previously selected Route. Special Runners were detailed by the Officer in Charge to advise Company and Battery Commanders of the Lorry's position, from time to time. The Supply Tank of the Third Battalion, under Major WHITAKER, carried forward the Advanced Armourer's Depot.

### **Communications.**

On account of the Depth of our Objectives on August 8th, Machine Gun Battalions did not attempt to lay their own Wires forward to Companies from Battalion Headquarters. Shortage of Personnel, and the inadequacy of Telephone Wire made this inadvisable. Also Companies operated closely with Brigades, and it was arranged that Machine Gun Units should use Wires from Brigade H.Q. to Divisional H.Q. and vice versa. To supplement this Service Mounted Orderlies and Runners were used, between Companies and Battalion H.Q. Various means of Communication were used between Batteries and Companies. Batteries in close Liaison with Infantry Battalions were often able to use an Inf. Battalion Wire to Brigade H.Q. and so to Company H.Q. Visual Signalling, with Lucas Lamps was used also, with varying success. Some Batteries laid wires to Company H.Q. Runners were employed where other means of Communication were lacking.

Attempts were made to carry forward, by Visual Signalling, a series of Relay Posts or Battalion Report Centres. This System was used very considerably in subsequent Operations but, on August 8th, it was found unsatisfactory, owing to dust, which obscured observations, and to the difficulty of informing Batteries and Companies where the Relay Posts were located. On August 10th, when the Line became more or less stationary, Wire Communications were established down to Batteries, and Visual Signalling by Lucas Lamps was used quite generally to supplement Wire Communications.



**Casualties, Battle of AMIENS.**

The following Table shows Casualties suffered by the 4 Battalions of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps during the Battle of AMIENS:-

Unit	Killed		Wounded		Missing		TOTAL		
	Off.	O.R.s	Off.	O.R.s	Off.	O.R.s	Off.	O.R.s	TOTAL
First Battalion, C.M.G.C.		22	5	82		3	5	107	112
		13	4	83		5	4	101	105
		10	2	38		5	2	53	55
Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.	2	16	2	60	1 <sup>(x)</sup>	12 <sup>(y)</sup>	5	88	93
Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.									
Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.									
TOTAL	2	61	13	263	1	25	16	349	365

<sup>(x)</sup> Prisoner of War. <sup>(y)</sup> 2, Prisoners of War.



**Casualties, August 8th and 9th.**

The following Table shows the Casualties for the first 2 days of Operations. It will be seen that 75% of the TOTAL Casualties suffered by the 4 Canadian M.G. Battalions on the AMIENS Front were incurred on August 8th and 9th.

Unit	Date (Aug.)	Killed		Wounded		Missing		TOTAL		
		Off.	O.R.s	Off.	O.R.s	Off.	O.R.s	Off.	O.R.s	TOTAL
First Battalion, C.M.G.C.	8		9	3	33		2	3	44	47
	9		10	2	28		2	2	40	42
Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.	8		8	3	43		3	3	54	57
	9		4		20		2		26	26
Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.	8		3	1	16		1	1	20	21
	9			1	15			1	15	16
Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.	8	2	12	1	34	1 <sup>(x)</sup>	11 <sup>(y)</sup>	4	57	61
	9		2		1				3	3
TOTAL		2	48	11	190	1	21	14	259	273

<sup>(x)</sup> Prisoner of War. <sup>(y)</sup> 2, Prisoners of War.

**Reinforcements.**

As for the Operation at PASSCENDAELE, Canadian Machine Gun Corps Reinforcements were supplied from the C.M.G.C.R.D. at AUBIN-ST. VAAST, through the medium of an Advanced Reinforcement Depot, close to the Battle Line. This advanced Machine Gun Reinforcement Depot was placed for Organisation and administrative purposes under the Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp advanced Depot and for the opening Phase of the Battle of AMIENS, was located in the BOIS de NEUILLY, S.-W. of PICQUIGNY. The Machine Gun Personnel was grouped into a Machine Gun Wing, commanded by a Machine Gun Officer detailed for the purpose, Machine Gun Instructors and Equipment were supplied to the Wing from the C.M.G.C.R.D.

The procedure for the actual supply of Reinforcements to Units was as follows:- Estimated Casualties were wired daily to H.Q., C.M.G.C. by Machine Gun Battalions and Motor Machine Gun brigades. Upon receipt of these Wires, Despatch Wires, giving Officers by name and numbers of Other ranks, by their specialities, were at once submitted by H.Q., C.M.G.C., to Canadian Corps "A: for sanction, and despatched to the O.C., Advanced C.C.R.C. for Action. This latter Officer then issued Orders to the O.C., Machine Gun Wing, who detailed the required Reinforcing Personnel and supervised their despatch to Units. Nominal Rolls were made out, one copy going to each Unit reinforced, and other copies to Advanced C.C.R.C. for transmission to C.C.R.C. and C.M.G.C.R.D. All Despatch Wires sent to Advanced C.C.R.C. were repeated to the O.C., C.M.G.C.R.D., who immediately warned a corresponding number of Reinforcements to proceed to the Advanced C.C.R.D. In the way the supply of Reinforcing Personnel in the Battle Area was kept constant.

As our line was carried forward, the distance between Advanced C.C.R.C. at PICQUIGNY and the Unit in the Line became so great that it was difficult to get Reinforcements up with sufficient rapidity. Arrangements were made for the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades Motor Transport to convey Personnel forward and, eventually, Advanced C.C.R.C. was moved to BOVES and a staging camp opened at BEAUCOURT. This arrangement continued until the Canadian Corps was withdrawn from the AMIENS FRONT.



### **Tactical Lessons.**

In the Battle of AMIENS, Battalions of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps experienced for the first time, conditions of Open Warfare. Training during the Summer of 1918, when the Canadian Corps was in Rest, had included many Exercises, in Open Warfare Tactics. All Ranks had an opportunity, in the AMIENS Fighting of putting into practice the Lessons learned in these Field Exercises. The experience derived from the Operations themselves proved of incalculable value during the succeeding months of the War. The following extracts from Machine Gun Battalion Reports illustrate observations made by Machine Gun Battalion Commanders and the chief Lessons learned in the Course of the Battle.

*"Batteries, whether in reserve or advancing in rear of Infantry, must use limbers or pack animals, or both, and must not be divided into Sections while there is a probability of continued Advance. To properly support the Infantry advance, Batteries need not follow closer than 1,000 yds. in rear of the first wave. Their moves should be by bounds, and detailed by the Battery Commander, who will advance with the Infantry. When the Infantry are held up by a centre of resistance, they do not require Machine Gun Support if the resistance point can be overcome in a short time. From half an hour to an hour is required to determine the situation, by which time Batteries can easily come into action at any suitable spot, in order to develop superiority of fire."*

*"Great difficulty was experienced by some Batteries who tried to keep pace, on foot, with the rapidly advancing Infantry, preventing participation in fire-fights, unless hold-ups were of lengthy duration."*

*"The diamond formation of guns in pairs, with 200 or 300 yds. intervals and approximately 600 yds. distances, was adopted by all Batteries in this advance. Gun and S.A.A. Limbers moved with, or close up to the Batteries at all times, thereby eliminating all unnecessary fatigue, and ensuring mobility at all times."*

### **Liaison With Infantry.**

*"Battery Commanders cannot fight their Batteries and personally be Liaison Officers to Infantry Battalion Commanders, in rapid open warfare. A Battery must be allotted a certain area to advance over cover the consolidation of their objective, and eventually defend the area in depth. Also Battery Commanders should be allowed to use their own initiative in giving supporting fire on targets coming within range, irrespective of the particular unit which they are following. This method was successfully tried out, and proved entirely satisfactory."*

*"It was demonstrated, during the advance on BEAUFORT, that batteries, well under control, can fire a supporting indirect fire barrage at short notice."*

### **Divisional M.G. Reserve.**

*"As many Batteries as possible should remain in Divisional Reserve, under orders of the D.M.G.C. These can then be despatched, on short notice to any part of the Divisional Front, either to assist in overcoming strong points, or leap-frogging forward batteries, or to take up defensive Positions."*

### **Lessons In Use Of Transport.**

*"Use of limbers in the semi-open warfare which followed the initial Attack proved very satisfactory in this area where there were not many trenches to cross and no Wire."*

*"Pack Animals are more suitable than limbers:-*

*(a) Over rough ground with obstacles.*

*(b) If Roads and limber tracks are scarce.*

*(c) If, on account of hostile fire, it is necessary to choose covered approaches and keep away from roads."*

*"Limbers should be used with four up, in case of casualties among animals. Pack saddlery should be carried even when using limbers for moving forward." "Each Battery operated its own limbers ('A' Echelon) during an actual advance but limbers parked at night in pre-arranged rendez-vous, the 4 Batteries of each company being together. The Q.M.S. and Storemen of each Company (1 Storeman per Battery) remaining with 'B' Echelon and delivered rations to 'A' Echelon, who, in turn, supplied the Gun Crews."*



**Suggested Distribution of Battery Transport and Personnel.**

The following distribution of Machine Gun battery Transport and Personnel was suggested by the Officer Commanding the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.:-

**Transport.**

With the Guns -	4 Gun Limbers 1 Limber for Rations, etc.
With 'B' Echelon -	2 S.A.A. Limbers loaded, prepared to move forward at any time.
Riding Horses -	1 Horse for Battery Commander. 1 Horse for Battery Transport N.C.O. 1 Horse for Orderly.

**Personnel.**

With Battery Commander -	4 Runners (including 1 Batman).
With each Section -	2 Runners (with Brigades).
With Battery -	1 Mounted Orderly. 1 Officer per Section. 1 N.C.O. and 2 Men per Gun. 2 Batmen (Brakemen). 17 Drivers.
At Company H.Q. -	Company Commander. 1 Officer (a/Adjutant). 2 Batmen. 2 Runners per Battery. 2 Mounted Orderlies.

**Communications.**

All Machine Gun Battalion Commanders emphasised the need for Motor-Cyclist Despatch Riders. Mounted Orderlies, when used, proved invaluable. It was found unsatisfactory to rely upon Brigade and Divisional Report Centres for Communications between M.G. Company and Battalion Headquarters, and it was suggested that Motor-Cyclists be provided to ensure rapid and constant Communication.

**Successes of M.G. Organisation.**

The Organisation of Machine Guns of each Division into Machine Gun Battalions, with the Battery as a Tactical Unit, was severely tested for the first time, in these Operations. The Battery of 8 Guns, with its Transport complete, was found to be a most satisfactory Unit under Open Warfare conditions. Quite generally, the Principles of Employment of Machine Guns, outlined by Brig.-Gen. BRUTINEL, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C., Canadian Machine Gun Corps, and published by Canadian Corps on April 30th, 1918, were applied and fully substantiated in the Battle of AMIENS.



**CAMBRAI.****PHASE I : AUGUST 26TH to 28TH, 1918.****INTRODUCTORY.****General Plan of Operations.**

In spite of reverse suffered on the MARNE and at the Battle of AMIENS, the Germans still had hopes of being able to reorganise and stem the Allies' on-rush behind the HINDENBURG LINE, which was still intact. The Allies laid plans to extinguish those hopes by erecting a breach in the BROUCOURT-QUEANT Line and by the Capture of CAMBRAI. The Canadian Corps was to be used in this Attempt.

The Second Canadian Division arrived in the ARRAS Area from AMIENS on August 20th. This Division relieved a part of the Fifteenth Division (British) during the nights August 22nd/23rd and 23rd/24th, in the NEUVILLE VITASSE-TELEGRAPH HILL Sector, S.-E. of ARRAS, coming under Orders of the XVII CORPS. The G.O.C., Second Canadian Division assumed command of the Line at 9.00 A.M. August 23rd.

The G.O.C., Canadian Corps moved his Headquarters from HAUTE-CLOQUE to NOYELLE-VION on August 23rd and at noon on that day assumed command of the XVII Corps Front from NEUVILLE VITASSE to GAVRELLE, the Fifteenth and Fifty-first Division (British) coming under his command.

On the night August 23rd/24th, the Third Cdn. Division which had arrived on the ARRAS Front from AMIENS on August 21st, relieved the balance of the Fifteenth Division (British) from the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road to the SCARPE RIVER, immediately on the Left of the Second Cdn. Division. The G.O.C., Third Cdn. Division assumed command of this Sector at 10.00 A.M. August 24th.

The First and Fourth Cdn. Divisions were not used in Phase I of this Battle, the former returning to the Canadian Corps on August 25th and the latter not until August 28th.

The General Plan of the Operation was defined by the B.G., G.S. Canadian Corps, in a letter dated August 25th, 1918, and sent to General Officers Commanding Formations in the Corps. It is quoted in full:-

*"The Commander in Chief yesterday indicated to the Corps Commander the outline of Operations to be undertaken by the Corps, which were as follows:-*

*"The Corps, reinforced by other British Divisions, has the task of driving in S. of the SCARPE to break the QUEANT-DROCOURT Line and reach the Line of the CANAL du NORD. When this has been accomplished the Corps is to swing Southward and sweep down behind the HINDENBURG LINE.*

*"In view of the above it is essential to push the Operations to-morrow with the utmost vigour, and as much ground as possible must be gained. Leading Brigades must continue pushing on as long as possible and Reserves must be closed up, ready to push through as soon as the leading Troops are expended.*

*"As far as possible Boundaries will be adjusted so that the Battle can be carried out with 2 Divisions in the Front Line, each on a Brigade Front thus enabling Divisions to keep fighting 3 days continuously.*

*"We have approximately three main Systems of Defence, in addition to the system E. of MONCHY, to penetrate - i.e. the old German Front Line E. of MONCHY, the FRESNES-ROUVROY Line and the DROCOURT-QUEANT Line.*

*"These Systems will mark definite stages in the Advance as it will probably be necessary to pause for 24 hours in front of each, while fresh Brigades and Tanks are brought up and Artillery moved Forward."*



The Canadian Corps, on the Right Wing of the FIRST ARMY Front, was to attack Eastwards on both sides of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road. The enemy had 4 main Lines of Defence which would have to be broken down before CAMBRAI could be captured:-

- (a) Old German Front Line System, E. of MONCHY-le-PREUX.
- (b) FRESNES-ROUVROY Line.
- (c) DROCOURT-QUEANT Switch.
- (d) CANAL du NORD Line.

This Chapter deals with the Attack on the 1st Line of Defence.

#### **Boundaries.**

The THIRD ARMY was operating on the Right of the Canadian Corps and Liaison was established with the Troops on their Left Flank - the XVII Corps. The Attack on the Canadian Corps Front was to be carried out by the Second Division on the Right and the Third, on the Left, the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road forming the Boundary between these Divisions.

The Fifty-first (Highland) Division, N. of the SCARPE RIVER, was on the Left of the Canadian Corps. It was not participating in the Attack proper, but was to cover the Left Flank of the Third Cdn. Division by advancing towards MOUNT PLEASANT and ROEUX.

The Boundaries of the Canadian Corps Area were the RIVER SCARPE on the N. and a line parallel thereto, and distant approximately 3,500 yds. on the S.

On the Second Divisional Front the 6th C.I.B. was entrusted with the Attack on the Right and the 4th C.I.B. with the Attack on the Left. The 5th C.I.B. was held in Reserve in readiness to pass through the Attacking Brigades, on capture by the latter of their Second Objectives. The 8th C.I.B. was attacking on the Third Division Front, with the 7th C.I.B. in close Support ready to push through the 8th C.I.B. and exploit its success. The 9th C.I.B. was in Reserve.



**Canadian Corps Order of Battle, August 26th.**

The Battle Order of Units, from Right to Left of Corps Front, is shown in the following Table:-

Infantry Unit.	Disposition.	Machine Gun Unit.
Second Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Right.	Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.
6th C.I.B. Second Cdn. Div. Right	No. 2 Company	
28th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"E" Battery
27th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"F" Battery
29th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"G" and "H" Batteries
31st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	
4th C.I.B. Second Cdn. Div. Left	No. 3 Company	
21st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"J" Battery
20th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"M" Battery
18th C.I.Bn.	Bde. Support, Right	"L" Battery
19th C.I.Bn.	Bde. Reserve, Left	"K" Battery
5th C.I.B. Second Cdn. Div. Reserve	No. 1 Company	
Third Cdn. Division. Canadian Corps Left. Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.		
8th C.I.B. Third Cdn. Div. Front	No. 1 Company	
5th C.M.R.	Brigade Right	"B" Battery
2nd C.M.R.	Brigade Centre	"A" Battery
4th C.M.R.	Brigade Left	"C" Battery
1st C.M.R.	Brigade Support	"D" Battery
7th C.I.B. Third Cdn. Div. Close Support	No. 2 Company	
R.C.R.	Brigade Right	"F" Battery
P.P.C.L.I.	Brigade Centre	"H" Battery
49th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"H" Battery
42nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	"G" Battery
9th C.I.B. Third Cdn. Div. Reserve	No. 3	

**Tasks and Objectives of Corps.**

The First Objective of the Canadian Corps was the GREEN LINE running from Right to Left almost due N. from WANCOURT, along MINORCA and CORSICA TRENCHES, N. of CHAPEL HILL and ORANGE HILL and due N. to the RIVER SCARPE. The First Objective proper did not extend so far S. because at the point where the GREEN LINE crossed the junction of ROSE and MINORCA TRENCHES the Flank of the Second Division was thrown back due W. along EDINBURGH and HUMBER TRENCHES. When the N. part of this Line was taken, the Second Cdn. Division was to work down MINORCA TRENCH (i.e the GREEN LINE) to join the Fifty-second Division (British) at the Northern end of WANCOURT SPUR. In this way the enemy would be pocketed in NEUVILLE VITASSE and in the Valley leading to WANCOURT. At the same time, the Battalions holding the Flank along ENINBURGH and HUMBER TRENCHES would turn sharp to the Right and, working from N. to S., with their Right Flank on the original Jumping-off Line and their Left on the GREEN LINE, would mop up the enemy Positions between EDINBURGH TRENCH and the Corps Southern Boundary.

The Second Objective of the Canadian Corps, termed the RED LINE, was at an average distance of 1,000 yds. E. of the First Objective, just W. of GUEMAPPE on the Second Divisional Front and on the Western outskirts of MONCHY-le-PREUX on the Third Divisional Front. As soon as the Second Objective was taken, Divisions were to exploit as far E. as possible. Along the Crest of the Ridge E. from MONCHY the Third Cdn. Division would refuse its Left Flank in order to avoid enemy Fire from the high ground N. of the RIVER SCARPE. On the Right the Second Cdn. Division would maintain touch with the flanking Division of the XVII Corps. The Fifty-first (Highland) Division on the Left had no definite Objective. It was to push Outposts and Patrols along the N. Flank of the SCARPE, exploiting gains on the S. Bank, and endeavour to gain MOUNT PLEASANT.



### **Tasks of Divisions.**

The Second Cdn. Division had two very definite Tasks to perform in the first Stage of the Battle. The Left or Northern Brigade (the 4th C.I.B.) was to capture CHAPEL HILL and consolidate the First Objective, i.e., the GREEN LINE. The Right or Southern Brigade (the 6th C.I.B.) was to advance along the inter-Brigade Boundary due E., following HUMBER TRENCH and EDINBURGH TRENCH to its junction on the GREEN LINE with HOSE TRENCH. This formed a defensive Flank and was the S. Boundary of the Corps Advance up to that time. This Flank was formed by 2 Battalions of the 6th C.I.B. The moment that it was definitely established that the 4th C.I.B. had consolidated the GREEN LINE, these 2 Battalions turning to the Right, i.e. changing direction from N. to S., would advance and mop up enemy Defences down as far as the Southern Boundary. They would meet the Troops of the XVII Corps just N. of WANCOURT on the high ground commanding this Village.

After the First Objective was taken the 6th C.I.B. was to push forward and take VANCOURT and MARLIERE. The 4th C.I.B. would advance and make good the Second Objective N. of the COJEUL RIVER, keeping in close touch with the Third Division. If the latter were successful in their Attack on MONCHY, the 4th C.I.B. would then push on to GUEMAPPE and capture that Village if the number of Troops available were sufficient for this Task. The 6th C.I.B. was not to attempt to deal with enemy S. of the Defensive Flank until the 4th C.I.B. were established on the Second Objective.

The Second Objective taken, the attacking Divisions would exploit as far E. as possible. The Second Division was to maintain touch on the Right with the Flanking Division of the XVII Corps. The Third Division was to advance, refusing the Left Flank along the Crest of the Ridge running E. from MONCHY for the reason already stated.

The 5th C.I.B. was to be prepared either to pass through the 4th C.I.B. and exploit their success or to advance on the S. side of the COJEUL RIVER. To be in readiness for either of these Tasks the Units of this Brigade were to take up Positions of Deployment on the Western slopes of CHAPEL HILL with Left Flank on the CAMBRAI Road, when the first Objective had been gained.

On the Third Division Front the 8th C.I.B. was to attack the enemy Positions from the ARRAS-AMBRAI Road N. to the SCARPE RIVER. The dominating feature was MONCHY-le-PREUX, just W. of which was the formidable ORANGE HILL RIDGE, running N. and S. from the SCARPE to the COJEUL RIVER. The ground to the W. consisted of glacial Slopes and provided an ideal Field of Fire, for enemy Machine Guns. Hence a Frontal Attack was out of the question. To avoid this the 8th C.I.B. would direct its main Attack along the S. Bank of the SCARPE RIVER. A subsidiary Attack would be made along the N. side of the CAMBRAI Road. The enemy's Defences were then to be rolled up from the N. The Task of the 8th C.I.B. was to gain the First and Second Objectives and to exploit Eastwards and capture MONCHY-le-PREUX. The 7th C.I.B. was then to leap-frog the 8th and exploit Eastwards to BOIRY-notre-DAME refusing its Left Flank whilst so doing for reasons already explained. The 9th C.I.B., in Divisional Reserve, was to be ready to push through in Support of the 7th C.I.B. or to exploit its success.

### **Machine Gun Battalions Move to the Line.**

The Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., had arrived in the MONCHEAUX-HOUVIN-HOUVIGNEUL Area from the AMIENS Front on August 21st. The following day, August 22nd, No. 2 Company embussed at MONTS-en-TERNOIS, debussing at DAINVILLE and le BAC du NORD. The night of August 23rd this Company relieved the Fifteenth Battalion, M.G.C., in the Line on the ARRAS Front, with Horse Lines and Rear Details in WAILLY. The rest of the Battalion moved by train on August 23rd to MAROEUIL. No. 1 Company proceeded to WANQUENTIN and No. 3 Company, to DAINVILLE. On August 24th and 25th, No. 3 Company relieved the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. in the Line. No. 1 Company remained in Billets until the 25th when it took up its Position for firing the Barrage which preceded the Attack on the 26th.

On August 21st, the Companies of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., were assembled at SUS-ST. LEGER having arrived from the AMIENS FRONT on the previous day, and on the following day moved to LIENCOURT. No. 3 Company relieved a Company of the Fifteenth Battalion, M.G.C., and 16 guns of the 1st Life Guards M.G. Battalion on the night August 23rd/24th. The same night, Nos. 1 and 2 Companies moved to Billets S.-E. of AGNY. These 2 Companies carried out a Reconnaissance of the Sector S. of the RIVER SCARPE on the 24th. Sir DOUGLAS HAIG paid an informal visit to the Transport Lines on the evening of the 24th. During the night of August 24th/25th 150,000 rounds of S.A.A. were moved to forward Dumps in readiness for the coming Attack, on August 25th. Nos. 1 and 2 Companies took up their Positions in the Line.



**Jumping-off Line Secured.**

The Fifty-second Division, on the Left of the THIRD ARMY, and on the immediate Right of the Second Cdn. Division had attacked on the morning of August 24th, with the NEUVILLE VITASSE-ST. MARTIN-sur-COJEUL Road as their First Objective, and the HINDENBURG LINE N. of ST. MARTIN-sur-COJEUL and S. of HENINEL as the Second Objective. The 6th C.I.B. kept in close touch with the enemy during these Operations by means of Scouts and Observers. As the enemy showed signs of weakening, strong Patrols were pushed forward in Support of the Scouts. One Section of No. 2 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., was moved forward under the orders of the 6th C.I.B. to engage enemy movement that might develop between NEUVILLE VITASSE and the WANCOURT SPUR. In the evening of the 24th, strong Patrols of the 29th and 31st C.I.Bns. reported that NEUVILLE VITASSE was almost entirely in our hands. They secured some prisoners in THE MAZE, just S. of the Village. On the night of the 25th, Outposts were in the Southern outskirts of the Village, the Sugar Refinery being captured. In this way, a favourable Jumping-off Line was obtained for the Attack on the 26th.

**Artillery.**

Ample Artillery was available for Barrage purposes - 17 Brigades of Field, 9 Brigades of Heavy Artillery and the Long Range Guns of the Heavies.

**Machine Gun Barrage.**

The Arrangements for the Machine Gun Barrage were as follows:-

One Machine Gun was allotted to every 35 yds. on the Front of the Initial Assault. The Initial Barrage was to be fired by 16 Batteries of 8 Guns each from selected Positions on a Line stretching in a North-Easterly direction. The extreme right Battery Position was on the S.-E. Slope of TELEGRAPH HILL and the Left Position in FRUCHY COPSE. The Front Line was at an angle to the main direction of the Advance. Our Troops on the Right would therefore have to advance to a greater depth than those on the Left. This necessitated a deeper Machine Gun Barrage on the Right of the Line. Consequently secondary forward Positions had to be occupied after Zero by 6 Barrage Batteries on this Flank. The Crews to fire from the second Positions did not participate in the early stage of the Barrage, but followed the attacking Infantry to these Positions and by settled Programme carried on the Barrage. At the same time, the Batteries on the six original right Positions ceased to fire and the Guns withdrew to Reserve to await further Orders. The rate of Fire for all Guns of these Batteries was 5,000 Rounds per hour, the Barrage lifting 100 yds. every 4 minutes.

In addition to these Guns, 32 Machine Guns of the 1st Life Guards M.G. Battalion were placed in Positions N. of the SCARPE and N.-W. of FAMPOUX in the Area occupied by the Fifty-first (Highland) Division to support the Left Flank of the Canadian Corps (Third Division) by directing Fire on the Northern Slopes of ORANGE HILL and by supplying Neutralising Fire on MOUNT PLEASANT.

After firing their Barrage Programmes the Guns of the Second and Third Battalions, C.M.G.C. were to report to the Brigade to which their Company was allotted ; the Guns of the 1st C.M.M.G. Bde. and the 4 Batteries of the 1st Life Guards M.G. Battalion were to withdraw to Corps Reserve.



**Allotment of Tasks, Second Bn., C.M.G.C.**

On August 25th, Lieut.-Col. J.G. WEIR, M.C., in command of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., established his Headquarters at WARLUS. The Companies of his Battalion were allotted to Brigades as follows:- No. 2 Company to the 6th C.I.B. attacking on the Right, No. 3 Company to the 4th C.I.B., attacking on the Left and No. 1 Company to the 5th C.I.B. in Reserve.

Capt. RAMSAY, acting Officer Commanding, No. 2 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., moved "E" and "F" Batteries up to Positions on TELEGRAPH HILL on night August 25th/26th. "G" and "H" Batteries, after firing their programme in the Initial Barrage, would come under his command. All 4 Batteries were to assist the 6th C.I.B. in their Attack and exploit the successes of the 4th C.I.B. on the Left.

Two Batteries of No. 3 Company (Major McCAMUS, M.C.), Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., were to take up Positions on the high ground just S. of the CAMBRAI Road, to take on opportunity Targets and, with Direct Overhead Fire, to assist the progress of the 4th C.I.B. The other two Batteries were, if possible, to move forward to Positions N. of WANCOURT, covering the ground to the S., S.-E. and N. of GUEMAPPE firing from E. to S.-W.

Until the Capture of the Second Objective the Batteries of No. 1 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., were engaged on Barrage work under Major BASEVI, Officer Commanding, No. 1 Company. After this, they were to report to Capt. HOBSON, M.C., M.M., with "A" Echelon Limbers packed and ready to move forward with the 5th C.I.B.

**Allotment of Tasks, Third Bn., C.M.G.C.**

Lieut.-Col. MOORHOUSE, Officer Commanding, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., established his Headquarters with Advanced Third Division at LONDON CAVE on August 25th. The Companies of his Battalion were allotted to Brigades as follows:- No. 1 Company to the 8th C.I.B., attacking, No. 2 Company to the 7th C.I.B., in close Support and No. 3 Company to the 9th C.I.B., in Reserve.

No. 1 Company (Major HARTLEY, M.C., M.M.), Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., was given the Task of assisting the Infantry to consolidate both Flanks on GRANGE HILL; 2 Batteries to take up Positions commanding the Right and 2 on the Left Flank – subsequently two of these Batteries were to advance Right and Left, respectively, of MONCHY-le-PREUX to assist the Infantry in consolidating Positions won there.

As the 7th C.I.B.'s Task was to support or exploit the success of the 8th C.I.B.'s attack, the exact Positions to be occupied by No. 2 Company (Capt. DRINKWATER), Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., could not be definitely arranged until the result of the initial Attack was known. The general plan was that 2 Batteries would be held in Reserve in Rear of ORANGE HILL. A third Battery was to advance in Support of the Attack from the Right of MONCHY and the fourth, with 2 Companies of Infantry, was to form a Left Defensive Flank to the 7th C.I.B.

The 9th C.I.B. was in Support, ready to pass through the other 2 Brigades when all Objectives had been captured. One Battery of No. 3 Company (Capt. J.R. McLEAN), Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., operating with this Brigade was to advance to a Position due N. of BOIS-du-SART, one Battery to a point N.-W. of BOIS-du-VERT, supporting the Advance of the Infantry in the latter stages of the Attack. The remaining 2 Batteries were to endeavour to secure advantageous Positions E. of BOIS-du-SART and E. of BOIS-du-VERT.

Care was taken in choosing Machine Gun Positions so that the Guns were placed most advantageously to support the various Attacks and at the same time a formidable Machine Gun Defence in Dept was automatically formed.



**OPERATIONS. AUGUST 26th, 1918.****6th C.I.B.**

At Zero Hour August 26th, the 6th C.I.B. had 2 Battalions in the Front Line, the 31st on the Right and the 29th on the Left. The 27th and 28th C.I.Bns. assembled in Rear of the 29th C.I.Bn. The 27th C.I.Bn. attacked at Zero with 2 Companies in Front and 2 in close Support, under a Creeping Barrage, on the Left Flank of the 5th C.I.B, and in touch with the 4th C.I.B. in their Left. The whole of the 27th C.I.Bn., as it moved forward, formed a Defensive Flank, facing Southwards, along HUMBER and EDINBURGH TRENCHES and GORDON AVENUE. The Reserve Company of the 29th C.I.Bn. moved in Rear of the 27th C.I.Bn., joining up with the latter Battalion in HUMBER TRENCH, and continuing the Defensive Flank Westwards to the old Front Line. The Defensive Flank had a total length of 5,000 yds., 3,500 yds. of which was occupied by the 27th C.I.Bn. and 1,500 yds. by the 29th C.I.Bn.

The 28th C.I.Bn., moving at Zero, followed the 27th C.I.Bn. and at Zero plus 3 hours formed up facing S. in Rear of one Company of the 27th C.I.Bn. and one Company of the 29th C.I.Bn. The Brigade was then disposed with the 31st C.I.Bn. holding original Right Flank Position, the 29th holding original Left and one Reserve Company of the 29th facing at right angles due S. in prolongation of the Defensive Flank formed by the 27th Battalion. The 27th C.I.Bn. was along EDINBURGH TRENCH-GORDON AVENUE, facing S. and the 28th C.I.Bn. in Rear of the 29th C.I.Bn. At Zero plus 2 hours approximately, after the Capture of the RED LINE (Second Objective) the 29th and 28th Battalions advanced due S. to mop up the Area. This was successfully done and all Objectives were gained.

In the afternoon Orders were received for the 6th C.I.B. to attack S.-E. and capture the WANCOURT RIDGE. This necessitated a complete change of direction and reorganisation of the 27th and 28th C.I.Bns.

This Attack took place at 4.30 P.M. and the Ridge was successfully captured.



## CAMBRAI

### PHASE II : AUGUST 28th to SEPTEMBER 5th, 1918.

#### Introductory.

#### General.

In the First Phase of the Battle of CAMBRAI, Fighting continued right up to the hour when the Second and Third Cdn. Divisions were relieved.

Both Divisions had attacked vigorously on August 28th, and had encountered fierce opposition. During the evening of August 28th the enemy counterattacked on both Divisional Fronts. This made more difficult the task of the Reliefs, which, however, were carried out successfully during the night August 28th/29th.

The Second Cdn. Division, on the right of the Corps Front, was relieved by the First Cdn. Division. On the extreme right the 5th C.I.B. was relieved by the 3rd C.I.B. with 3 Battalions in the Front Line and 1 in Reserve. From right to left this Brigade Front was taken over by the 15th, 13th, and 14th C.I.Bns., the 16th Battalion being in reserve. The 4th C.I.B. was relieved by the 2nd C.I.B., and the 8th C.I.Bn. holding the Outpost Line, the 5th C.I.Bn. in close support, the 10th C.I.Bn. in support and the 7th C.I.Bn. in reserve. Machine Gun Reliefs were carried out the same night, the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. being relieved by the First Battalion, C.M.G.C.

#### First Battalion, C.M.G.C., Aug. 26th to 28th.

On August 26th, all 3 Companies of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C. were in Billets in ARRAS; Battalion H.Q. was in HERMAVILLE. 3 Batteries, one from each Company, ("C" "E" and "M" ) were sent to ST. NICHOLAS where they were held in Divisional Reserve. The following day No.1 Company (Major E. R. Morris), First Battalion C.M.G.C., moved forward and went into Bivouacs for the night, just N. of TELEGRAPH HILL. No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM, D.C.M.) remained in Billets in ARRAS, and No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM, M.C.) proceeded via the CAMBRAI Road to a point half-way between NEUVILLE VITASSE and HAUCOURT where they arrived at 9 P.M. A warning order was sent to the Batteries in Divisional Reserve at ST. NICHOLAS to be ready to move at half an hour's notice. At 10 A.M. August 28th these Batteries were ordered to move forward to positions close to No. 3 Company. They reached there destination at 3:30 P.M. At 6:00 P.M. August 28th the disposition of the Battalions were as follows :-

Battalion H.Q.	In ARRAS.
No. 1 Company	300 yards S. of TILLOY-les-MAFFLAINES.
No. 2 Company	In ABERDEEN TRENCH 2,000 yards S.-E. of TILLOY-les-MAFFLAINES.
No. 3 Company	In BEUVILLE VITASSE SWITCH. LINE, 1,600 yards E. of NEUVILLE VITASSE.
"C" "E" and "H"	Close to No. 3 Company Batteries.

The First Battalion, C.M.G.C., (Lieut.-Col. WATSON, D.S.O.) moved into the Line and Batteries took up positions in support of their respective Brigades. The Second Battalion C.M.G.C., was not relieved in the actual sense of the word, but the Batteries remained in position until midnight until August 28th/29th, and then withdrew. In this way, the incoming Batteries were well established in their new positions before the Second Battalion withdrew. No. 1 Company (Major E. R. Morris) was attached to the 1st C.I.B. in Divisional Reserve, in the HENINEL LINE, 400 yards S.-W. of WANCOURT. No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM, D.C.M.) was attached to the 2nd C.I.B. and took up positions for the defense of the right of the Divisional Area. The Guns of "F" Battery were disposed along a line from just W. of CHERISY to just W. of VIS-en-ARTOIS. "G" Battery Guns were distributed in the area N.-W. of CHERISY, S. E. of GURMAPPE, in the vicinity of SHIKAR AVENUE. The Guns Of "H" Battery were all located within 1,000 yards of TRIANGLE WOOD, and N.-W. of this WOOD. "E" Battery was in Divisional Reserve. No.3 Company (Major GRANTHAM, M.C.) took up positions for defense of the 3rd C.I.B., on the left of the Divisional Front. The Guns were all disposed within 500 yards N. and S.-E. of SUN QUARRY. (SUN QUARRY is 1,000 yards S. E. of CHERISY). 2 Guns of "J" Battery were in SUN QUARRY and the other Guns were disposed within 1,000 yards N. and S.-E. of CHERISY. "L" Battery Guns were located on a Line 1,000 yards W. of CHERISY. "M" Battery was in Divisional Reserve.



**General Situation, Night August 28th/29th.**

On the left of the Corps Front, the Third Cdn. Division was relieved by the Fourth Division (British) and BRUTINEL'S Brigade. The 8th C.I.B. on the right of the Divisional Front, was relieved by 10th Brigade (British). The 9th C.I.B. in the centre was relieved by the 11th Brigade (British). The extreme left, running from a point W. of JIGSAW WOOD in a North-Westerly direction to the RIVER SCARPE, 700 yards N. of PELVES, was taken over from the 7th C.I.B. by BRUTINEL'S Brigade. Machine Gun Reliefs were carried out early in the morning of August 29th, the Third Battalion C.M.G.C. being relieved by the Fourth Battalion, M.G. Corps (British).

At Relief, the General Line extended from a point on the Southern Boundary, midway between FONTAINE-les-CHOISILLES and HENDECOURT, thence in a direction almost N.-E. along UNION and ULSTER TRENCHES, through REMY WOOD, W. of ST. SERVINS FARM, N. of BOIHY-notre-DAME, E. of HATCHET and JIGSAW WOODS, W. of VICTORIA COPSE, to the RIVER SCARPE, about 1,000 yards N. of PELVES. Ever since the capture of MONCHY-le-PHEUX, the enemy resistance had steadily increased and indications were plain that he would defend the DROCOURT LINE very stubbornly. On August 28th instructions were received that this Line would be assaulted, on or about September 1st, in conjunction with the XVII Corps. It was necessary before that date to secure a jump-off Line, parallel to, and at a distance of 500 yards or 600 yards. W. of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE.

This entailed the capture of the FRESNERS-ROUVROY LINE, the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH and a number of defended localities of very great strength, notably the CROWS NEST, UPTON WOOD and ST. SERVINS FARM. From August 29th to September 1st a series of minor operations were carried out with these ends in view. During the same period the Artillery concentrated on the task of cutting the Wire in front of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. On the First Cdn. Divisional Front, the Wire was very strong in front of ULSTER, UNION and UNICORN TRENCHES. The Infantry were holding positions very close to these trenches and, to enable the Artillery to cut this Wire the Battalions holding the Front Line were withdrawn 800 yards to a general Line UNA LANE, SAND ROAD and OBUS TRENCH.

**Line Improved and Redistributed; August 29th.**

The Fourth Division (British) improved their positions in the vicinity of REMY and HAUCOURT, establishing Posts in both Villages. BRUTINEL'S Brigade advanced their Line and occupied BENCH FARM and VICTORIA COPSE. (X) N. of the SCARPE, the Fifty-first (Highland) Division gained ground, capturing GREENLAND HILL and the high ground in the vicinity, from which the advance of our Divisions had been harassed by enemy fire during Phase I.

Preparatory also to the attack, the Canadian Corps Frontage was considerably reduced. At 12:00 noon on August 29th, the Fifty-first (Highland) Division left the Canadian Corps, command of it's Front passing to the XXII Corps. At the same time the Eleventh Division (British) was attached to the Canadian Corps from the I Corps, and relieved BRUTINEL'S Brigade, holding the Left Flank S. of the SCARPE. On the night of August 29th/30th, the XXII Corps extended it's Front S. of the SCARPE to include the Eleventh Division (British). The Left Flank of the Canadian Corps now rested on the COJEUL RIVER, 1,500 yards N.-W. of ETERPIGNY, The total Corps Frontage was 6,000 yards.

(X) For the Operations of BRUTINEL'S Brigade during Phase II, *vid.*



### **Minor Operations, August 30th to September 1st.**

#### **First Canadian Division Attack on August 30th.**

From August 30th to the morning of September 2nd, a series of Minor Operations took place which were preliminary to the attack on September 2nd. The Division on the right of the First Cdn. Division, in the XVII Corps Area was slightly ahead, having captured HENDECOURT. Hence plans were laid to advance the Line to conform with the XVII Corps Frontage, by an attack on UPTON WOOD and the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH. On the right, the 1st C.I.Bn. was to assemble just N. of HENDECOURT CEMETERY and attack ORIX TRENCH, with Right Boundary, CEMETERY AVENUE – UNICORN AVENUE and Left Boundary, UNICORN TRENCH (exclusive) UPTON QUARRY (inclusive) to ORIX TRENCH. The 2nd C.I.Bn. echeloned on the Left Rear, was to attack ULSTER and UNICORN TRENCHES with 2 Companies until a junction with the 3rd C.I.Bn. was affected. The 3rd C.I.B. was to deliver a frontal Attack on UNION TRENCH and ORIENT TRENCH with 2 Companies combining an overland attack with an advance along the Communication Trenches, S. of VIS-en-ARTOIS. It's objective was to form junctions with the 2nd C.I.Bn. in UNION and UNICORN TRENCHES and with the 1st C.I.Bn. in ORIX and OPAL.

3 Batteries of Machine Guns were detailed to take part in the Operation, 2 assisting in the attack from the S. and 1 in reserve with the 4th C.I.Bn.

The Barrage planned by the Artillery would box in the whole area attacked, and at the same time would move in from of each Attacking Battalion.

During the night August 29th/30th, the 10th C.I.Bn. attacked on the Left of the Divisional Front and as a result the Jumping-off Line for the Operation on the 30th was established in front of HAUCOURT.

At 4:40 A.M. August 30th the 1st C.I.B. attacked. The enemy had delivered very powerful Counter-attacks against the XVII Corps on the right and had succeeded in regaining HENDECOURT. Owing to this feat, our Troops were subjected to heavy fire from the Right Flank, as well as from the strongly garrisoned Trenches in Front. Stiff resistance was encountered, the 3rd C.I.Bn. in particular having to contest every foot of ground, in their Frontal Attack, with Bomb and Bayonet. By 7 o'clock in the morning Battalions, had connected up as planned, the 3rd effecting junction with the 2nd in UNION and UNICORN TRENCHES and with the 1st C.I.Bn. in ORIX and OPAL. In the early part of the battle elements of the 2nd C.I.Bn. became deflected and swept through the W. corner of UPTON WOOD. The enemy's Barrage in reply to ours was fairly heavy but, as it came down on the W. side of ULSTER and UNION TRENCHES, it was behind our Attacking Troops who were not seriously affected.

Owing to the strength of enemy resistance, the flanking Battalions via., the 1st and 2nd, were reinforced by the 4th C.I.Bn. from Brigade reserve, 2 Companies going to each. One of the Companies sent to the 2nd C.I.Bn. was detailed to clean up UPTON WOOD from which heavy Machine Gun Fire was being brought to bear on the 3rd C.I.Bn. This task was accomplished and at 10:00 P.M. the Line was everywhere held. During this Operation the 3rd C.I.B. was in reserve to the 1st C.I.B., the 16th C.I.Bn. forming a defensive flank at OUSE TRENCH, and the other Battalions moving up behind the Brigade at Zero Hour and occupying ULSTER and UNION TRENCHES.

#### **Machine Gun Participation, August 30th, No. 1 Company, 1st Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

3 Batteries of No. 1 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. were attached to the 1st C.I.B. for this operation. "A" Battery supporting the right of the Attack, and "B" Battery the left, "D" Battery was in Brigade Reserve, "C" Battery was in Divisional Reserve. The supporting Batteries did not follow Infantry Battalions directly along their Lines of Advance, but closely supported them, as for a direct Frontal Attack. They were able to get occasional targets of small Infantry Parties, over the heads of our Advancing Troops at long range, and enfiladed the Front of their advance at fairly close range. 2 captured German Guns were brought into action by "A" Battery and 2 by "E" Battery, several thousand rounds of enemy Ammunition being fired. The advance was continuous, although slow, and consisted mainly of Bombing the enemy Trenches. No Guns were in action for any protracted period at any one point, but frequently targets of opportunity were momentarily engaged. The Guns were man-handled forward, Limbers being left in assembly positions. Objectives in ORIX and OX TRENCHES were reached by 8 A.M., although fighting was still in progress in the forward elements and the situation not clear. All Guns including those captured by both Batteries, were disposed for defence in case of Counter-attack.



At noon, the enemy counter-attacked between UPTON WOOD and HENDECOURT, and 5 Guns of "A" Battery were in action with good targets. Our Infantry were obliged to temporarily withdraw, and "B" Battery covered their withdrawal to UPTON and UNICORN TRENCHES. The Guns of "A" Battery were sited on UPTON TRENCH S.-W. of UPTON WOOD, on completion of the movement. An hour later the 2nd C.I.B. regained the lost ground and recaptured their original positions. During this operation the Guns of "A" Battery fired heavily at points E. of UPTON WOOD and CROW'S NEST, where considerable enemy movement was observed. The left Guns of "B" Battery got small opportunity targets in the vicinity of OCEAN WORKS. On the development of the enemy Counter-attack at noon the G.O.C. Brigade ordered "D" Battery forward from Reserve, to protect the right flank. The Guns of this Battery took up positions just to the rear of "A" Battery. "C" Battery from Divisional Reserve replaced "D" Battery in Brigade Reserve.

Visual Communications between Company H.Q. and Batteries were not maintained during the actual fighting but was established as soon as Batteries were disposed for defence. Runners were used, 4 being employed by Company H.Q. and 2 with each Battery.

### **Nos. 2 and 3 Companies, First Battalion, C.M.G.C., August 29th to 30th.**

Throughout the morning and afternoon of August 29th, Batteries of No.2 Company, First Battalion C.M.G.C. remained in positions occupied after taking over the Line, night August 28th/29th. (X) Late in the day however when the First Division (British) on the Canadian Corps left, attacked and advanced their Line E. of HAUCOURT, the Guns of No. 2 Company were moved forward to improve our defences. On August 30th, as soon as the success of the 1st C.I.B. was reported, one section, each, of "F", "G" and "H" Batteries was moved a little S. to protect the right flank of the 2nd C.I.B. At night CABLE and OSTRICH TRENCHES were searched with Machine Gun Harassing Fire, preparatory to an attack of the 2nd C.I.B. planned for the next day.

Guns of No.3 Company, C.M.G.C., remained, during August 29th in defensive positions occupied on relief of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., night August 28th/29th. Batteries were not actually engaged in the fighting of August 30th, but after the successful attack on UPTON WOOD, they moved up to positions in support of No.1 Company.

### **2nd C.I.B. Minor Operations, August 31st.**

On the left flank of the 1st C.I.B. attack the enemy fought strenuously on August 30th, and not much ground was made. OCEAN WORK and OLIVE TRENCH, in particular, were holding out, and heavy Machine Gun Fire was coming from these localities. Consequently the 2nd C.I.B. received orders to prepare to attack on the morning of the 31st.

At the end of the fighting on August 30th, the Line was held as follows :

1st C.I.B.	ORIX TRENCH
2nd C.I.B.	OX TRENCH
10th Inf. Brigade (British)	N. side of CAMBRAI ROAD.

The 2nd C.I.B. attacked from OX and ORIX TRENCHES with the 8th C.I.Bn. on a 2-Company Frontage to take OLIVE and OSTRICH TRENCHES, and to establish Outposts E. of OSTRICH. The Barrage opened at 3:00 A.M. August 31st, and by 5 A.M. OCEAN WORK was in our hands, all of the enemy Garrisons there being dead or wounded. The attack extended as far N. as the Inter-Divisional Boundary and was quite successful. The 2nd C.I.B. Right Flank was secured and our Troops strongly established in ORIX and OPAL TRENCHES.

No. 2 Company, 1st Battalion C.M.G.C., was detailed to assist the 8th C.I.Bn. and the Guns of this Company, particularly of "H" Battery, fired with excellent results, the Infantry stating that a great number of casualties were inflicted on the enemy by Machine Gun Fire.

The Artillery was instructed to search the ground between OSTRICH TRENCH and the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE during the night following this attack, as a preliminary to further Operations.



At the same time as the 2nd C.I.B. attack on August 31st the 10th Infantry Brigade (British) on the left of the First Canadian Division attacked ST. SERVINS FARM, with the objective of advancing their Outpost Line to the WOOD, N. of the Farm. All objectives were taken.

#### **Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., August 28th to 31st.**

So far only the First, Second and Third Cdn. Divisions had been involved in the Battle of CAMBRAI. The Fourth Cdn. Division did not rejoin the Canadian Corps from the AMIENS FRONT until August 28th. (X) On this date it was placed in Corps Reserve, and prepared to take part in our continuing attacks. On August 28th the Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C. (Lieut.-Col. M. A. Scott, D.S.O.) was disposed as follows :-

Battalion H.Q. HERMAVILLE  
 No. 1 Company ARRAS  
 No. 2 Company WALRUS  
 No. 3 Company ST. NICHOLAS

On August 29th Companies moved with their respective Brigade Groups to the Concentration Area E. of ARRAS. No. 2 Company, about 3,000 yards N.-E. of NEUVILLE VITASSE, No. 3 Company, 2,000 yards N. of TILLOY-MAFFLAINES. Battalion H.Q. August 30th to AGNY and No. 1 Company moved to the W. side of the ARRAS-BAPAURNE ROAD. due W. of NEUVILLE VITASSE. On August 31st Battalion H.Q. moved to Fourth Cdn. Division H.Q., about 2,000 yards W. of WANCOURT.

#### **Reliefs and Redistribution of Frontage; Night August 31st/Sept.1st.**

On the night August 31st/Sept.1st, various moves and reliefs took place in the Line. The 5th C.I.Bn. was in close support to the 8th C.I.Bn. following the attack by the latter on August 31st, and was prepared to move forward next morning through the 8th C.I.Bn. This arrangement was however, altered. The 2nd C.I.B. received orders to move out of their area on being relieved by the 12th C.I.B., Fourth Cdn. Division, and take over the Frontage from the 1st C.I.B. The 5th C.I.Bn. moved off at dusk, August 31st, to take over their new positions, leaving just sufficient Personnel to hand over their present Line to the relieving Unit of the 12th C.I.B., at the same time, the 3rd C.I.B. took over the remainder of the 1st C.I.B. Frontage.

The 12th C.I.B. came into the Line, relieving the extreme left of the 1st C.I.B., the whole of the 2nd C.I.B. and the right of the 4th Division (British). During the evening of August 31st, in connection with this relief the Guns of No. 2 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. were relieved by No.3 Company (Major BAILEY, D.S.O., M.C.), Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C., and side-slipped to their new Battle Front on the right, relieving Guns of 1 and 3 Companies, First Battalion C.M.G.C. This movement S. commenced at 11:00 P.M. but was not complete until daylight on Sept.1st owing to a serious traffic blockage in the road.

#### **Operations, September 1st.**

The attack on Sept.1st was launched along the whole Canadian Front, the 3rd C.I.B. attaching on the right, the 2nd C.I.B. in the centre and the 12th C.I.B. on the left. The 3rd C.I.B. moved forward at 4:50 A.M. with the objective of seizing CROWS NEST and the CHATEAU WOOD N.-E. of HENDECOURT. In this they were successful. An advance in all of 1,000 yards was made and the capture of the strong outer Defences of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE provided a good starting point for the main attack which was planned for Sept. 2nd.

HENDECOURT was captured at the same time by XVII CORPS on the right. In the centre, the 2nd C.I.B. met with very strong opposition. The 5th C.I.Bn. bombed its way up the VIN-en-ARTOIS SWITCH, and established a Line of Outposts from which good observation of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE was obtained. The enemy repeatedly counter attacked and on one occasion drove the 5th C.I.Bn. back to its starting point. The ground lost in this counter-attack was regained but the enemy maintained his resistance and constant hand-to-hand fighting took place right up to Zero Hour on Sept. 2nd. On the left, the 12th C.I.B. pushed Outposts beyond the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH and secured a good Jumping-off Line for the Major Operation.



2 Batteries of No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM, M.C.), First Battalion C.M.G.C. fired on barrage, assisting the 15th and 14th C.I.Bns. to capture the CROW'S NEST, CRATEAU WOOD, the CHATEAU at N.-E. end of HENDECOURT and HANS TREE. As soon as the objective had been gained, Guns were immediately disposed in previously selected positions prepared to ward off a Counter-attack which was considered imminent. Owing to the Brigade on the left (2nd C.I.B.) not having pushed so far ahead, a Defensive Flank was thrown out, and as the Machine Guns were situated on high ground, many targets of opportunity were engaged during the day, particularly small enemy groups, dribbling forward to reinforce the DROCOURT QUEANT LINE. At 6:00 P.M. the enemy were observed massing for a Counter-attack on the Right Front. The right forward section (4 Guns) immediately came into action with concentrated fire, having excellent results, causing a general dispersal of the Party who were evidently none too eager to carry on. The other 2 Batteries of the First Battalion C.M.G.C., spent the day resting and getting Guns and Equipment ready for the Operation the following day.

No. 3 Company (Major BAILEY, D.S.O., M.C.) Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C. was in support to the 12th C.I.B. in the Minor Operation but was not called upon to any great extent. During a Counter-attack against the 72nd C.I.Bn. the Guns of "M" Battery in forward positions fired 10 belts with good effect on the advancing enemy and helped break up the attack.



**Capture of DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE, September 2nd, 1918.****Tasks and Objectives.**

The series of Minor Operations already described had resulted in a favorable Jumping-off Line being obtained, and the Attack was arranged along the whole Corps Front to take place at 5:00 A.M. September 2nd. The First Cdn. Division attacked on the Right on a 2-Brigade Front, the Fourth Cdn. Division, in the centre on a 2-Brigade Front, and the Fourth Division (British) on the left on a 1-Brigade Front. The general idea was to break through the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE on a narrow Front and roll up the flanks, N. and S. The point chosen to make the breach was the junction of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. This achieved, the main attack was to push through, seize the high ground overlooking the CANAL du NORD and, if possible, cross the CANAL and secure the high ground on the E. Bank. The Objectives allotted to the Corps were the RED, GREEN and BLUE LINES as follows from right to left :-

The First Objective, or RED LINE, extended from a point S. of CAGNICOURT where the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE cut the Corps Southern Boundary W. of CAGNICOURT and VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT, thence N. Across the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, E. of MONT DURY, E. of DURY. Here the Fourth Cdn. Division Frontage ended. The Line then continued due N. for 1,500 yards on Frontage occupied by the Fourth Division (British), thence due W. to a point N. of RIMY and including the Village of ETERPIGNY.

The Second Objective, or GREEN LINE, from the point where the BUISSY SWITCH cut the Corps Southern Boundary in a N.-E. direction along high ground for 1,000 yards to the MOULIN de BUISSY, thence N.E. of BUISSY and W. of BAPALLE, thence N.E. about 5,500 yards along the Spur almost parallel to the SENSEE RIVER, running N. of RECOURT and the BOIS de RECOURT, thence following high ground still and joining the RED LINE at its N.E. corner.

The Third Objective, or BLUE LINE, ran almost parallel to the Green Line, an average distance there from of 3,000 yards, including the CANAL du NORD, SAINS-les-MARQUION, SAUCHY-1'ESTREE, SAUCHY-CAUCHY, OISY-le-VERGER, BOIS de QUESNOY, and PALLUME, thence westwards, along the S. edge of the SENSEE MARSHES, including LECLUSE and ETAING, cutting the Corps Northern Boundary immediately N. of the latter Village.



**Order of Battle, September 2nd.**

The Order of Battle of Assaulting Infantry Battalions from right to left of the Corps Frontage is shown in the following Table, together with the Machine Gun Batteries with which they were affiliated :-

**Order of Battle - September 2nd, 1918****For Attack on RED LINE.**

Division	Brigade	Battalion	Affiliated Machine Gun Battery
First Cdn. Division	3rd C.I.B.	(16th C.I.Bn. (13th C.I.Bn. (7th C.I.Bn.	"K" Battery, First Bn., C.M.G.C. "J" Battery, First Bn., C.M.G.C. "G" Battery, First Bn., C.M.G.C.
Fourth Cdn. Division	12th C.I.B.	(72nd C.I.Bn. (38th C.I.Bn. (85th C.I.Bn. (47th C.I.Bn.(X)	"M" Battery, Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C. "L" Battery, Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C. "C" Battery, Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.
	10th C.I.B.	(50th C.I.Bn.(Z) (46th C.I.Bn.(Y)	"A" Battery, Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.

**Resuming Attack from RED LINE.**

Division	Brigade	Battalion	Affiliated Machine Gun Battery
First Cdn. Division	3rd C.I.B.	(15th C.I.Bn. (14th C.I.Bn. (10th C.I.Bn.	"L" Battery, First Bn., C.M.G.C. "F" Battery, First Bn., C.M.G.C.
Fourth Cdn. Division	12th C.I.B.	(78th C.I.Bn. (54th C.I.Bn.)	"K" Battery, Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.
	11th C.I.B.	(75th C.I.Bn.) (87th C.I.Bn.	"H" Battery, Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.(Z) "G" Battery, Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.
	10th C.I.B.	(44th C.I.Bn.	"B" Battery, Fourth Bn., C.M.G.C.

(X) Objective, DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE

(Y) To leapfrog 47th and 50th C.I.Bns. in DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE

(Z) Replaced by "F" Battery from Brigade Reserve.



### **Task of Infantry, First Canadian Division.**

The 3rd C.I.B. attacked on the right on a frontage of 1,600 yards .

The objectives of this Brigade were the S.-E. portion of the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH, the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE within the Brigade boundaries, CAGNICOURT, BOIS de BOUCHW and BOIS de LOISON. The 2nd C.I.B. attacked on the left. It was to assault and capture the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH and the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE within its boundaries, and also to capture the Village of VILLERS-lez-CAGNICOURT. The 1st C.I.B. held in reserve, was to leapfrog the 3rd and 2nd Brigades immediately E. of BUISY SWITCH and to capture the Villages of BUISSY and BARALLE. Its task also was to garrison the GREEN LINE and put it in a state of Defence, then push out Patrols to the Third Objective E. of the CANAL du NORD.

### **Role of Machine Guns, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The Batteries of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C., were allotted to Brigades, 3 Batteries to each Brigade, and the remaining 3 Batteries, 1 from each Machine Gun Company, were held in Divisional Reserve. No.3 Company (less "M" Battery) was to attack with the 3rd C.I.B., on the right. No.2 Company (less "E" Battery) with the 2nd C.I.B. on the left, and No.1 Company (less "C" Battery) with the First C.I.B. "C", "E" and "M" Batteries formed the Divisional Reserve under orders of the G.O.C., First Cdn. Division. They were prepared to move to any part of the Front as soon as the Second Objective was taken. They would probably be ordered to take up positions on the high ground about 1,000 yards N.-W. of HENDECOURT and were to be prepared to deal with counter-attacks from the S. and E.

The Artillery Barrage would cease on the RED LINE which was from 2,500 yards to 3,000 yards E. of the Jumping-off Line. From that point onwards, the principal support for the advancing Infantry would come from the Machine Gunners, who would supply Neutralizing and Covering Fire. Sections would advance by bounds and be allotted definite halting places where they could come into action with the greatest possible speed. In view of this fact, several vantage spots were selected and suggested to the Battery Commanders, in the Machine Gun Battalion Operation Order for the Attack. S.A.A. Limbers were to follow the Batteries as closely as possible, taking advantage of all covered Routes of Approach.

### **Task of Infantry, Fourth Canadian Division.**

On the left of the First Cdn. Division, was the Fourth Cdn. Division. The original plans called for the 12th C.I.B. on a Frontage of 1,500 yards launching the initial attack against the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. The fighting on September 1st had all been in preparation of this one-Brigade Assault, the 10th and 11th C.I.Bs. having been detailed to support positions from which they would advance through the 12th Bde. and continue the attack.

However late in the evening of August 31st orders were received from Canadian Corps that the Fourth Division was to extend its Front 1,000 yards further N. thus increasing our Battlefront to 2,500 yards. This necessitated a considerable alteration to the Plan of the Operations and accordingly the 10th C.I.B. was ordered to relieve the Fourth Division (British) to the new Battle Boundary on the night September 1st/2nd. Credit is due to the 10th C.I.B. for the skilful manner in which they executed, at such short notice, this Order, which changed their whole role in the Operations.

This Brigade was obliged to march 10 miles, effect a Relief, and then immediately take up Assembly Positions for the Assault.

There had been no time for proper reconnaissance and the situation in the Assembly Area was obscure, as the enemy had made every effort to gain ground, and yet the assembly was effected so successfully that a Post of the enemy actually within our Jumping-off Line was entirely ignorant of our presence until Zero next morning. (X) Thus before Zero on the morning of September 2nd the Fourth Cdn. Division was holding its Battlefront with the 12th C.I.B. on the right, on a 1,500 yards Frontage, and the 10th C.I.B. on the left with a Frontage of 1,000 yards; the 11th C.I.B. was in Reserve.

The 12th C.I.B. was to attack as far as the RED LINE, with 3 Battalions in the Line, the 72nd, 38th, and 85th, and 1 (the 87th) in Reserve. The 10th C.I.B. was to attack on the RED LINE with 2 Battalions in the



Line (the 47th and 50th), 1 in support, (the 46th), allotted the special task of capturing DURY, and 1 (the 44th) in Reserve. The 11th C.I.B. was to leapfrog the Battalions of the 12th C.I.B., on the RED LINE and proceed to the capture of the GREEN and BLUE LINES with the 54th C.I.Bn. on the right, the 75th in the centre, the 87th on the right and the 102nd in close Support.

(X) Fourth Cdn. Division Report on Operations, SCARPE, Art. 2.

#### **Tasks of Machine Guns : Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

An intense Artillery Shrapnel Barrage was to carry the Attack to the RED LINE, but beyond this Line the advance would be made without Artillery Support other than that furnished by the Field Artillery allotted to each Brigade. Consequently, the importance of Machine Gun work was increased, it being necessary that supporting Batteries should get forward quickly, following the advance of the Infantry, to positions with good Field of Fire, to provide as effective Overhead Fire as possible and to neutralize enemy Machine Guns. The O.C. Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., Lieut.-Col. M. A. SCOTT, D.S.O. allotted 9 Batteries to accompany the Infantry in the Attack. "K", "L" and "M" Batteries going forward with the 12th C.I.B., "A", "B" and "C" Batteries with the 10th C.I.B., while "F", "G" and "H" Batteries were attached to the 11th C.I.B. and would go forward in the Second Stage of the Attack.

Of the Batteries attached to Brigade, 2 were to advance with each Brigade to assist the Advance when necessary, by Covering Fire on enemy points of resistance, to engage any Targets of Opportunity and to assist the Infantry in consolidating the ground won. The third Battery with each Brigade advanced under orders of the Company Commander in rear of the Brigade with a view to supplementing the Covering Fire of the Forward Batteries, consolidating in depth the ground won and reinforcing the Forward Batteries. In this way, the Mobile Batteries of the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., were allotted duties as follows :-

"M" Battery, went forward with the 72nd C.I.Bn., "L" Battery with the 85th C.I.Bn. on the on the right and left, respectively, of the 12th C.I.B. advance : "K" Battery was in Brigade Reserve with the 78th C.I.Bn. on the 12th C.I.B. Front. "C" and "A" Batteries were to go forward on the right and left, respectively with the 47th and 50th C.I.Bns. "B" Battery was allotted to the 44th C.I.Bn. in Brigade Reserve. "H" Battery, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. was to move forward with the 54th and 75th C.I.Bns., "G" Battery with the 87th and 102nd C.I.Bns., while "F" Battery would be in Brigade Reserve.

"D", "E" and "J" Batteries (1 Battery from each Company), under Capt. A.G. SCOTT, M.C. were detailed to carry out Barrage Fire during early Operations, firing a Rolling Barrage on the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE, where it crosses the CAMBRAI ROAD. On completion of this, they were to advance to the junction of the CAMBRAI ROAD and the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE, at which point they were to come into Divisional Reserve under Orders of the C.M.G.C. From here they were to follow in rear of the attacking Brigades, with a view to reinforcing the Brigades and of assisting the Infantry to consolidate in depth the ground won.

In addition, 8 Guns of the 4th Battalion M.G.C. (British) were to place a Rolling Barrage on the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE in front of the 10th C.I.B. advance.

#### **Canadian Independent Force.**

The Canadian Independent Force, consisting of Cavalry, Motor Machine Guns, Artillery and Trench Mortars was to be held in reserve. These Troops were ordered to follow closely the advance down the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. As soon as the Line had been broken, they were to make for the crossings over the CANAL du NORD. If the Cavalry and Motor Machine Guns were successful the Infantry were to push forward and follow them as quickly as possible . (X)

The Fifty-seventh Division (British) was on the Right Flank of the Canadian Corps and would conform to its movements. The First Division (British) was in Corps Reserve and was to move in Support of Operations.



### **3rd C.I.B., Attack.**

Zero Hour was set for 5:00 A.M. September 2nd, 1918. During the whole of the night September 1st/2nd, the enemy harassed the forward area consistently with H.E., Gas and Shrapnel. He made many local Counter-attacks to regain the Jump-off Line, which had been captured on September 1st. The Assembly under these circumstances was very difficult, but was completed well on time.

The Barrage came down promptly on time at 5:00 A.M. and the Assaulting Troops went forward to the Attack. The Barrage was excellent. The enemy immediately threw up many coloured Signals and his Barrage opened up shortly afterwards. This did not fall on our Assembly Area but was directed, chiefly, against the Trenches of the FRESNES-ROUVROY System, behind.

The 16th C.I.Bn. on the right got away well, its left reaching the RED LINE on time. Its right however, was badly held up near the DROCOURT-QUEANT support Line, S.-W. of CAGNICOURT, by direct Artillery Fire and Machine Gun Fire from high ground on Ridges N. of the Corps Boundary and E. of RIENCOURT, localities strongly held by the enemy. The 15th C.I.Bn. leapfrogged the 16th according to plan and pushed forward on the right in spite of the very heavy Fire from the high ground on the right. This Battalion captured the BOIS de BOUCHE after heavy fighting. This advanced the right of the Line to a point about 1,000 yards, E. of the RED LINE. The 16th C.I.Bn. having reorganized, pushed on in rear of the 15th C.I.Bn. and took up positions W. of the BOIS de BOUCHE. Many prisoners were taken.

The 13th C.I.Bn. on the left reached the RED LINE with comparatively light losses. This Battalion found the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE strongly held, numerically, but the enemy put up very little fight. A large number of prisoners were taken.

The 14th C.I.Bn. leapfrogged the 13th and, pushing forward rapidly, captured the Village of CAGNICOURT. Here a complete Battalion was surprised and captured, and an enemy Staff Officer. Enemy Machine Gun Nests in this vicinity put up hard fights, but were eventually overcome and captured. On emerging from the Village of CAGNICOURT, the 14th C.I.Bn. came under heavy Direct Fire from enemy Machine Guns and Artillery from the vicinity of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. This Battalion pushed on, however, and captured the BOIS de LOISON, suffering heavy Casualties.

Following the 14th C.I.Bn. closely the 13th C.I.Bn. also came under heavy Fire from the left and threw out a Defensive Flank facing the BUISSY SWITCH. Pushing through the BOIS de LOISON, the 14th C.I.Bn. made a quick dash for the BUISSY SWITCH, which was reached on the Brigade left boundary at 11:15 A.M. A determined attempt to follow the 14th C.I.Bn. to the BUISSY SWITCH was made by Troops of the 13th C.I.Bn. This was found impossible owing to heavy enemy Fire from the left. The main part of the 13th C.I.Bn. was at that time employed forming a defensive flank facing N. where the 2nd C.I.B. was held up.

Dispositions of the 3rd C.I.B. night September 2nd/3rd, were as follows :- the 15th C.I.Bn., on the right held a Sunken Road S.-E. of the BOIS de BOUCHE, the 16th C.I.Bn. was in QUEER STREET, just behind them. The 14th C.I.Bn. was in the BUISSY SWITCH, with the 13th close behind them, on the Brigade Left Front. In close support was the 1st C.I.B., in readiness to go through to attack on the following morning.

### **Action of No. 3 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

No. 3 Company, First Battalion C.M.G.C. attacked with the 3rd C.I.B. "K" and "J" Batteries attacked on the right and left with the 16th and 13th C.I.Bns., respectively. "L" Battery followed with the 13th and 14th C.I.Bns. in close support.

"K" Battery jumped off at Zero in support of the 16th C.I.Bn. on the 3rd C.I.B. right. Very little resistance was encountered until the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE was reached. Here heavy Fire from enemy Machine Guns about 1,500 yards E. of CAGNICOURT checked the advance. "K" Battery endeavoured to neutralize this Fire, 2 Guns being pushed forward to a position N.-W. of le BRULLE, at the N. end of RIENCOURT, and securing good Targets. In a short time the Infantry were able to continue their advance and capture the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. During the heavy fighting between this Line and the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE, "K" Battery moved closer to CAGNICOURT and opened fire on enemy Machine Gun Nests, S.-W. of the Village. This enabled the Infantry to continue their advance and capture the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE.



During this time, the Brigade on the right (XVII Corps) had been unable to move up, and a wide gap was left on our Right Flank. In pushing forward the Guns to cover this Flank, "K" Battery suffered heavy casualties inflicted by Machine Gun Fire on the high ground on our right, but in spite of losses, the Guns got into positions S. of CAGNICOURT, and maintained a heavy Fire on the enemy Machine Gun positions, until the Brigade on our right caught up. At this stage the strength of the Crews had been so reduced that only 5 Guns could be sent forward with the next advance of the Infantry to the BUISSY SWITCH and the QURANT-MARQUION RAILWAY. These 5 Guns took up defensive positions in depth to consolidate our Line. On the arrival of reinforcements, later in the day, the remainder of the Guns were sent into forward positions.

On the left, "J" Battery jumped-off from their Assembly positions, N. of HENDRCOURT, followed closely behind the 13th C.I.Bn. Very little resistance was encountered until the last TRENCH of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE was reached, when the advance was held up by heavy Machine Gun Fire from the Support Line and by enemy Field Batteries firing at point-blank range from CAGNICOURT WOOD. The Battery was called upon for support by both the 13th and 16th C.I.Bns. and advanced to positions about 1,000 yards W. of CAGNICOURT WOOD, from where direct Fire was obtained on enemy Batteries and Machine Gun Nests. While supervising this movement, the Battery Commander, R.H. MORRIS, was severely wounded, which left "J" Battery without an Officer. Sgt. E. C. MORBY immediately took charge and fired on numerous targets with good effect.

In order to engage the enemy more closely some of the Guns were moved slightly forward of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE and it was at this point that the Crews became involved in a hand-to-hand fight with the Personnel of the enemy Machine Gun Nest, which was eventually silenced. From these new positions the Guns were able to engage numerous hostile Machine Gun Posts. Our casualties from Snipers were very heavy at that time, but superiority of Fire was obtained and, under cover of Fire from the Battery, the Infantry continued their advance. When high ground in the BOIS de LOISON was reached the advance was again halted by heavy Machine Gun Fire from both Flanks. The 3rd C.I.B. Infantry had been more successful than the Units on their right and left, and both Flanks were in the Air. The assistance of the Machine Guns was again called for by the Infantry. No.1 Section, reinforced by men from the rear, was sent forward to establish a defensive and supporting Diamond S. of the BOIS de LOISON. From these positions, Fire was brought to bear on the enemy in BUISSY SWITCH. At this time the Battery replenished its supply of S.A.A. from the Limbers, which had been brought forward to just W. of CAGNICOURT.

Several times during the day our Infantry advanced on the enemy positions in BUISSY SWITCH, but, in spite of covering Fire from our Machine Guns, they were repeatedly driven back. However in the late afternoon a foothold was established, which was eventually made good. The situation was obscure until BUISSY SWITCH had fallen, and the Machine Guns were ahead of the Infantry on several occasions during the attack on BUISSY SWITCH LINE, thus being able to cover their withdrawal until our Line was eventually established. During the night, "J" Battery disposed their Guns for defense in depth on the high ground E. and S.-E. of CAGNICOURT.

45 minutes after Zero, "L" Battery moved up behind the supporting Battalion. Defensive positions in depth were taken up on reaching the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. When the right attacking Battalion advanced, the position of the Guns was so altered as to cover the right flank in case of a hostile counter-attack.

## **2nd C.I.B., Attack.**

The 2nd C.I.B. attacked on the First Cdn. Division Left. The 7th C.I.Bn. was to attack and take the RED LINE. Here the 10th C.I.Bn. was to leap-frog the 7th, and carry through the attack on the GREEN LINE. The 8th C.I.Bn. was to support the attack of the 10th C.I.Bn. and on arrival at the Objective was to take up a Position of Support. The 5th C.I.Bn. was in Brigade Reserve. As we have already seen, the latter Battalion was continuously fighting during the night September 1st/2nd. The enemy was trying hard to regain the ground lost on the day previous. At Zero Hour the Battalion was still engaged in hand-to-hand fighting, on the Jumping-off Line, just E. of the HENDECOURT-DURY ROAD. The 7th C.I.Bn. passing through the 5th C.I.Bn., took over the fight and, aided by the Shrapnel Barrage and Tanks, advanced rapidly and captured all Objectives. The attack was hard before the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE was reached, but, on arrival there, the Tanks came up and made the task of the Infantry infinitely easier. The 10th C.I.Bn.



leapfrogging the 7th according to Program, attacked shortly after 8:00 A.M., one Company working to the right down the BUISSY SWITCH and one Company on the left astride the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

At 8:45 A.M. the attack was held up a short distance beyond the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE. All Tanks were knocked out. Enemy Machine Guns were thick. Artillery and Light Trench Mortars were firing over open sights. Troops on the left flank had not come up. The enemy was bombing the BUISSY SWITCH very heavily. For these reasons a frontal attack was out of the question. Instructions were accordingly received that the Companies should move forward slowly, taking advantage of all cover and flanking their Objectives. The area attacked was very formidable. VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT was strongly defended, as was the BUISSY SWITCH. Strong opposition was encountered in the Factory N. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. The attack moved forward slowly, our Infantry gradually gaining ground. When a General Line passing through the Eastern end of the Village had been established about 4:00 P.M., a halt was called in order to reorganize and arrange Artillery Support for the continuation of the Attack.

A Barrage was arranged and under cover of this, the attack was renewed at 6:00 P.M. In spite of strenuous resistance the attack was entirely successful. The BUISSY SWITCH and the Sunken Road E. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT were cleared of the enemy and at 11:00 P.M. a Line of Outposts was established. Touch was effected with the 3rd C.I.B. on the right. On the left, the 8th C.I.Bn. threw out a screen of Posts well in advance of the BUISSY SWITCH and swung back a defensive flank to the W. along the line of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

#### **Action of No. 2 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

3 Batteries of No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM, D.M.C.) First Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported the advance of the 2nd C.I.B. "E" Battery was in Divisional Reserve. "G" Battery assembled N.-E. and S. of UPTON WOOD and at 5:15 A.M. moved forward in Diamond formation in support of the attack of the 7th C.I.Bn. This Battery had frequent opportunities of Direct Fire, and on numerous occasions were able to engage enemy Strong Points that were holding up the advance of the Infantry. At 5:45 A.M. Sgt. BILLINGTON rushed 2 Guns ahead of the Infantry and engaged a hostile Field Battery with direct Fire at a range of 800 yards. The enemy Crew retired in disorder.

At 6:00 A.M. our Line ran from 500 yards S. of the junction of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI and HENDICOURT-DURY ROADS, to the outskirts of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. On this Line 4 Guns opened fire on retiring enemy Infantry, with good observed results at ranges from 800 to 1,000 yards.

Lieut. HARRIS brought his Guns into action against the enemy Field Battery which was holding up our left flank. He silenced the Battery, inflicting heavy casualties on the Gunners. At about the same time, the enemy endeavored to remove a Field Battery from the high ground E. of CAGNICOURT by means of horse transport. This provided an opportunity of direct Fire at 1,000 yards. All the horses were killed or wounded. A Mounted Sgt.-Major endeavored then to take charge of the retirement. He was shot down and the German Gunners retired in disorder, leaving the Guns in our hands. At this point 6 enemy Machine Guns and about 10,000 Rounds of S.A.A. were captured. These were turned against the enemy and used with great effect on enemy Positions E. of CAGNICOURT. On Reaching the Objective (RED LINE) the Guns were mounted in Defensive Positions for Defense in Depth on the high ground W. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT, where they remained for 2 days. During the day (September 3rd) the Guns had many opportunities of engaging low-flying enemy Planes and succeeded several times in turning them back.

The 10th C.I.Bn. whose task was to leapfrog the 7th C.I.Bn. on the RED LINE, advanced from UNION TRENCH at 6:00 A.M.; "F" Battery kept in close touch with them. The Guns worked their way up the VILLERS ROAD to the left of the Ridge N. W. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. At about 9:00 A.M. the O.C., 10th C.I.Bn. informed the Battery Commander that he could not advance, his left Flank being subjected to heavy Fire as the Battalion on his left had not come up. The Guns of "F" Battery were brought into action against the enemy Batteries firing from N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. Our Guns were only carrying 2,000 rounds per Gun and could not afford to use more than 1,000 rounds apiece against this target, but at this point some enemy Machine Guns were salvaged and were used to good effect, about 5,000 rounds being fired. At noon touch was established with the S.A.A. Limbers and a further supply of 3,000 rounds per Gun was brought forward at 6:00 P.M.

The 10th C.I.Bn, supported by an Artillery Barrage, participated in the attack on the BUISSY SWITCH. One section of "F" Battery assisted by engaging selected targets, consisting of suspected enemy Machine



Gun Positions, N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. The other section supported the Infantry, with Indirect Fire when they jumped off. By midnight the 10th C.I.Bn. had cleared the BUISSY SWITCH as far as their Objective, but could not advance on the left beyond the SUNKEN ROAD N. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. The Guns of "F" Battery were placed in Positions of Defense slightly to the N.-W. of the Village. "H" Battery, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. was in 2nd C.I.B. Reserve and moved in close support of the 5th C.I.Bn. On the 10th C.I.Bn. being held up, these Guns were brought forward to positions just E. of the HENDECOURT-DURY ROAD and 1,500 yards S. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. They were not brought into action. At night the Guns were disposed for Defense in these positions with a view to cover the left flank in case of a hostile counter-attack. These positions were in Shell-holes and very good Fields of Fire were obtained, The Battery remained here throughout the night September 2nd/3rd.

### **1st C.I.B. Operations.**

The 1st C.I.B. in Reserve, was in readiness at Zero on September 2nd to move forward and leapfrog the 3rd and 2nd C.I.B.s At 8:00 A.M. the 1st C.I.B. moved forward from its Assembly area. Owing to the heavy fighting encountered by the leading Brigades, E. of the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPOT LINE Troops of the 1st C.I.B. became merged with Troops of the 2nd and 3rd C.I.B.s and continued to the attack on CAGNICOURT and the BOIS de BOUCHE. These were withdrawn as soon as possible with the exception of the Troops of the 3rd C.I.Bn. which had advanced too rapidly and, at the end of the days fighting, held the Line of the QUEANT-MARQUION RAILWAY, from the right Divisional Boundary to the BUISSY SWITCH, nearly 1,000 yards. The 3 remaining Battalions of the 1st C.I.B. (1st, 2nd and 4th) were meantime held in hand, ready to leapfrog the 2nd and 3rd C.I.B.s immediately the BUISSY SWITCH was captured. The BUISSY SWITCH was not taken until 11:00 P.M. and this exploitation could then not be carried out.

Orders were then issued that the 1st C.I.B. was to relieve the 3rd C.I.B. in the area adjoining the Corps S. Boundary. The 4th C.I.B. was ordered to relieve elements of the 3rd C.I.B. and the 3rd C.I.Bn. in the Line going in on a 3-Company Front with 1 Company in support. This was done and the 1st C.I.B. was then disposed in Depth with the 4th C.I.Bn. in the Line, 2nd C.I.Bn. in support, and the 1st and 3rd C.I.Bns. in Reserve.

### **Action of No. 1 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

No. 1 Company (Major E. R. MORRIS) First Battalion C.M.G.C. advanced with the 1st C.I.B. rear of the assaulting Brigades. "A" Battery supported the 3rd C.I.Bn. on the right, and "B" Battery the 4th, on the left. "D" Battery was in Brigade Reserve, "C" Battery in Divisional Reserve.

"A" Battery in passing through CAGNICOURT came under intense Shell and Machine Gun Fire. The Officers, Capt. FERRIE and Lieut. HANCOCK, soon became casualties and Sgt.-Major WALKER took command. His work was excellent and it was largely due to him that the Battery suffered so few casualties. He had the Limbers unloaded immediately, and the Guns mounted, bringing Fire to bear on the enemy Machine Gun Nest, which was firing on the Battery at point blank range. After some Minutes of grueling fire, the enemy fire from this Nest was beaten down and the transport enabled to retire with the loss of only 3 horses and 1 Limber. The remainder of the Guns of the Battery were then mounted in commanding Positions and Fire was brought to bear on targets of enemy Infantry, on the slopes in front of BUISSY. At 1 P.M. reinforcing Officers arrived and Lieut. DILLON, M.C. acting O.C. went forward to reconnoitre, as the situation was obscure. He found the 3rd C.I.Bn. advancing and occupying a position of the Railway Line about 1,700 yards S.-E. of BOIS de BOUCHE. This Battalion had suffered heavily in the advance and was holding this Line with both flanks in the air. "A" Battery Guns were disposed for Defense of the high ground about 1,700 yards S.-E. of BOIS de BOUCHE.

"B" Battery with the 4th C.I.Bn. came under heavy Shell and Machine Gun Fire about 10:30 A.M., N. W. of CAGNICOURT WOOD. At this point the Guns and Equipment were unloaded and the Limbers sent back a few hundred yards. The Guns were immediately mounted in Defensive positions on high ground in and behind the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE, 1,500 yards W. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. Enemy Machine Guns were firing heavily from VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT, and Lieut. DAVIES massed his Guns, together with 2 captured German Guns near the left, in commanding positions among the advanced Infantry, to deal with the situation. A heavy concentration of Fire was put down on an enemy



Machine Gun Nest, silencing their Fire and enabling the Infantry to advance with only slight casualties. The Guns were then withdrawn to their former locations.

At 7:00 P.M. the G.O.C., 1st C.I.B. issued instructions that the Guns of "D" Battery, in Brigade Reserve, be disposed to defend a section of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE, W. of CAGNICOURT. These Guns were in positions W. of CAGNICOURT and CAGNICOURT WOOD by 7:45 P.M.

### **First Battalion, C.M.G.C., Guns In Divisional Reserve.**

On September 1st the Guns of "C", "E" and "M" Batteries were assembled together under orders of the First Cdn. Division at a point in Reserve almost 1,000 yards W. of CHERISY. From this point a reconnaissance was made of Roads to the Forward Area, in order to be ready to go ahead quickly in case of enemy counter-attacks. At 8:10 A.M. when the attacking Battalions were on the RED LINE, orders were received to move to CROWS NEST and establish communications through the 1st Cdn. Divisional O. P. At that place, the Batteries moved at 8:25 A.M. travelling Eastwards to CHERISY thence S.-E. to SUN QUARRY, thence down the CHERISY-HENDECOURT ROAD to a point about 800 yards N.-W. of HENDECOURT, and thence due E. by overland route to the CROWS NEST. Reconnecting parties immediately proceeded to select defensive positions on the high ground E. and S.-E. of CROWS NEST. Communication was here established with Battalion Headquarters through the 1st C.I.B. During the evening of September 2nd, a Reconnoitering Party went to the forward area in the vicinity of CAGNICOURT and positions were selected to which the Reserve Batteries could move their Guns in case of sudden need.

### **12th C.I.B. Attack.**

In the face of many difficulties, the Brigades of the Fourth Cdn. Division were in position before 4:00 A.M. September 2nd to attack on the left of the First Cdn. Division. On the right, the 12th C.I.B. attacked with 3 Battalions in the Line, the 72nd C.I.Bn. on the right, the 38th in the centre and the 85th on the left. The 78th C.I.Bn. was in support and detailed to attack beyond the RED LINE, leapfrogging the other Battalions when that Objective was gained. Initial fighting of a hand-to-hand nature took place as enemy Machine Gunners had established themselves strongly in various pockets on the CAMBRAI ROAD and near our Outpost Line. They were inside the area on which our Barrage fell, and had to be dealt with by the Infantry. The 85th C.I.Bn. in particular suffered heavy casualties in this task.

The DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE itself did not resist quite as strongly as was anticipated. It was heavily garrisoned, but at the approach of our Infantry with fixed Bayonets, masses of Germans surrendered. The DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE formed a very formidable obstacle. It was defended by a great number of Machine Gunners and frequently enemy Field Batteries, firing at point blank range over open sights contested our advance. On topping the ridge between the SUPPORT LINE and the RED LINE, too, our Infantry suffered heavy casualties. Enemy Machine Guns, at close, medium and long range swept across the DURY RIDGE with direct and indirect fire. It was the most severe Machine Gun Opposition that the Division had ever experienced. The 72nd C.I.Bn. suffered severely from Machine Gun Fire from the direction of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT : the 38th C.I.Bn. engaged by Machine Gun Fire as it stormed MONT DURY, and the 85th C.I.Bn. suffered from enemy Machine Gun Fire from MONT DURY.

By 7:30 A.M. the RED LINE was taken and the First Stage of the battle was successfully completed. At 8:00 A.M. the Second Stage opened with the advance toward the GREEN LINE. The 78th C.I.Bn. pushed forward on the right of the Divisional Front. They encountered terrific Machine Gun Fire from VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT on the right, and from the FACTORY on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, where the right flank was resting. The Canadian Independent Force operating down the road, made several unsuccessful attempts to expel the enemy from the FACTORY, and all attempts to advance further were unavailing. The Artillery Barrage had ceased at the RED LINE and it was realized it was quite impossible to make any further headway until the Artillery could be brought up and adequate support given the Infantry. At the close of the days fighting, our Line ran at the average distance of 500 yards E. of the RED LINE.



**Action of No. 3 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

"M" Battery, Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C., was detailed to advance with the 72nd C.I.Bn. on the right of the Fourth Cdn. Division Frontage. During the night September 1st/2nd, the enemy made an attack against our positions. As the Germans came forward they afforded excellent targets to the Guns of "M" Battery mounted in Shell-holes, and 10 belts were got off with good effect. Our positions were subjected to heavy Artillery Fire during the night. The arrangements made for the attack on September 2nd were that the Left Half-Battery would come along the CAMBRAI ROAD, with Transport, and join up with the Right Half-Battery on the way. Owing to heavy Shelling of all roads, this could not be done and the Left Half-Battery did not reach the RED LINE until 11:00 A.M. The Right Half-Battery went forward, carrying all their equipment and arrived at the RED LINE at 9:30 A.M. where they took up positions. During the advance Lieut. EATON, acting O.C., "M" Battery was wounded and evacuated. Lieut. PATTERSON took command of the Battery.

"L" Battery was attached to the 85th C.I.Bn. attacking on the left of the 12th C.I.B. Frontage. At 10:00 P.M. September 1st the H.Q. of the 85th C.I.Bn. was in the QUARRY by TRIANGLE WOOD and the O.C., "L" Battery Capt. W.G. WILLIAMS, reported personally to the O.C. 85th C.I.Bn. that "L" Battery was located near MARK ROAD, N.-E. of CHERISY. The O.C. 85th C.I.Bn. gave instructions that the Battery would not advance with the Infantry but would follow behind in time to establish Positions on MONT DURY, or in the vicinity, from which the Infantry, as it reached the RED LINE, could be assisted in consolidating the First Objective. These instructions were followed. To avoid casualties, Sections were moved off, independently, at 5:15 and 5:30 A.M. respectively. Limbers were taken right forward to just behind the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE, without any casualties. At 6:45 A.M. "B" Section had established 2 Guns in MONT DURY ready to fire on DURY, if required, and the other 2 Guns in the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. All Guns of "A" Section were established in the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. At 9:00 A.M. all Guns were in direct communications with the O.C., 85th C.I.Bn. and, at his suggestion, the 2 Guns from MONT DURY were withdrawn and all 8 Guns mounted on the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE, in readiness to repel any organized counter-attack.

"K" Battery, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. was holding defensive positions in TRIANGLE WOOD. On September 1st Orders were received for the Operation to commence on the morning of September 2nd. The Battery was attached to the 78th C.I.Bn. At 2:00 A.M. on the 2nd, the Battery moved off to join this Battalion, between the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. Acting in accordance with instructions from the O.C., 78th C.I.Bn. the Battery was held back for an hour and brought up to the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. It then passed over to the left of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and took up positions immediately S. of MONT DURY and very close to it, with the object of supporting the advance of the Infantry with Indirect Fire from there.

At this place, touch was lost with the Infantry. A reconnaissance by Lieut. CARPENTER, O.C. Battery, discovered that the Infantry were being badly cut up by Machine Gun Fire. The Guns were rushed forward to the right to a point S. of MONT DURY and 400 yards N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. Here 2 Guns got into action against moving targets from positions in a Communication Trench on the right slop of MONT DURY, about 500 yards N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. One of the Guns fired on an enemy Trench Mortar Battery in action on the right at a distance of about 1,000 yards and this Unit was eventually silenced. From this point the Battery Commander pushed forward to the RED LINE and, observing 2 German Field Guns, operating within 1,500 yards, to the left, he sent back for 2 Guns to be brought up immediately by way of the Communication Trench. These Guns were unable to get through, owing to intense Machine Gun Fire from both flanks. The Communication Trench, also, was crowded with our Infantry. On touch again being established with the O.C., Battalion, the Battery was ordered to take up defensive positions in the rear, to repulse any Counter-attack, as the Infantry were being withdrawn to the Trench System to reorganize. The Guns remained in these positions for the night.



**Operations of the 10th and 11th C.I.B.s.**

On the Fourth Cdn. Division Left, the 10th C.I.B., attacked with the 47th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 50th C.I.Bn. on the left. The 46th C.I.Bn. was in support and detailed to attack DURY; the 44th C.I.Bn. in reserve, was to exploit successes and to advance to the GREEN and BLUE LINES. The leading Battalions were well up at Zero Hour and escaped the enemy Barrage.

Considerable opposition was encountered. One enemy Patrol was found inside our Barrage Line, but owing to the darkness, was surprised before it could do any damage. Wire was in many places uncut and the Infantry had to wait until paths were cut to enable them to proceed. Their steadiness in face of this delay was admirable. The enemy put up a stubborn resistance, many detached bodies fighting to the last man. The leading Battalions reached their Objective and were leapfrogged by the 46th C.I.Bn. which advanced to the capture of the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE and the Town of DURY.

On reaching the SUPPORT LINE, the Troops were held up by intense Machine Gun Fire from the SUNKEN ROAD, S. of DURY and immediately N. of MONT DURY. This opposition was also holding up the left Battalion of the 12th C.I.B. on the right. By an outflanking movement, skillfully executed, the enemy position was captured and over 120 Prisoners taken, together with 2 Heavy and 7 Light Machine Guns. With the fall of this position, the defense of DURY collapsed and our Troops were able to enter the Villages, capturing the Area Commandant, his Assistant and 100 Prisoners. The advance was continued to the RED LINE, which was occupied at 7:30 A.M.

At 8:00 A.M. the Second Stage of the attack opened and the 78th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 11th C.I.B. on the left passed through the 12th C.I.B. Front whilst the 44th C.I.Bn. leapfrogged the 46th C.I.Bn. on the 10th C.I.B. Front. The Order of Battle of the Fourth Division was now : 78th C.I.Bn. on the right (their Operations have already been described), the 11th C.I.B. in the centre, and the 44th C.I.Bn. on the left. In the centre the 11th C.I.B. attacked with the 54th C.I.Bn. on the right, the 75th in the centre and the 87th C.I.Bn. on the left, the 102nd C.I.Bn. was in support.

These Battalions met with the same difficulty which rendered impossible the advance of the 3rd and 2nd C.I.B.s on the right. Battalions on the right were held up within a few hundred yards of the RED LINE. Intense Machine Gun Fire swept the top of DURY RIDGE and no Battalions were able to advance without excessive casualties. Along the whole Front it was obvious that no further advance could be made, until Artillery and Tanks could be brought up to support the Infantry. The 44th C.I.Bn. on the left met with the same resistance and were unable to advance past the RED LINE. Consequently along the whole Fourth Divisional Front, the positions gained were consolidated prior to the continuation of the attack in the morning towards the GREEN LINE.



**Action of No. 1 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

No. 1 Company, (Major BRITTON) Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., was operating with the 10th C.I.B.

"C" Battery moved forward in support of the 47th C.I.Bn., attacking on the right. Shortly before moving forward, the area in which the Battery was assembled was subjected to heavy Bombardment, Capt. RAINBOTH, M.C., and 5 Other Ranks being wounded. Lieut. ALLAN took command of the Battery. The Battery moved along the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and then along the Road to DURY, through ST. SERVINS FARM. Touch was established in the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE, W. of DURY, with the O.C., 44th C.I.Bn. who stated that his Battalion had taken and passed DURY and was going after RECOURT. It was accordingly arranged that the Battery should move up to positions immediately E. of DURY, to deal with any possible counter-attack. On investigation, however, the report proved inaccurate as the 44th C.I.Bn. were only advancing from the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE. The Battery was thereupon established in positions around the CHALK PIT on the DURY-ETERPIGNY ROAD, about 1,000 yards N.-W. of DURY. The Guns stayed in these positions until the afternoon of September 3rd.

"A" Battery was detailed to support the advance of the 50th C.I.Bn. on the left of the 10th C.I.B. Front. During September 1st the Battery was ordered to move up to the VIS-en-ARTOIS RIDGE. Then on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD about 100 yards in front of SR ROHART'S FACTORY, near CRATER BRIDGE over the COJHUL RIVER, heavy Shelling was encountered, causing temporary disorganization. The Battery was reorganized and located for the night about 200 yards W. of the FACTORY. Early in the morning of September 2nd, the Battery moved with Limbers to the SUNKEN ROAD running W. from STRIPECORPS, ST. SERVINS FARM, and on receipt of further Orders, continued the advance still further to the Valley in rear of DURY, where positions were taken up for the night in an old Trench in rear of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE.

"B" Battery was to move at 8:30 A.M. September 2nd, from the Assembly Area beside the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, W. of HAUCOURT. At 8:00 A.M. on that morning, the enemy bombarded this area with Heavies. A number of casualties were inflicted and Lieut. GILL was killed. The wounded were evacuated, the Gun Crews organized and the Guns moved forward on Pack Mules. On reaching DURY it was found that the advance had been held up. The 44th C.I.Bn. had gone through the other Battalions, but the Line actually held was still the First Objective. It was found impossible to get in touch with the 44th C.I.Bn. and the Guns were unloaded from Pack Animals and sited, 4 in the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE, among the Troops of the 46th and 87th C.I.Bns. and the other 4 echeloned in rear about 500 yards behind. The guns remained in these positions during the night September 2nd/3rd.

**Action of No. 2 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

No. 2 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. was attached to the 11th C.I.B., "H" Battery on the right, with the 75th and 54th C.I.Bns., "G" Battery on the left with the 87th and 102nd C.I.Bns. "F" Battery was in Brigade Reserve. The 3 forward Batteries were to be in position at 2:00 A.M. September 2nd.

Late in the night September 1st/2nd, while the Batteries were moving to assembly positions 3 Bombs were dropped by enemy Aeroplanes in the midst of "H" Battery Transport, 1 Driver was killed and 6 Men wounded. 16 out of 20 animals were killed or wounded. 3 Limbers were destroyed and 4 Guns and considerable Gun Equipment lost. This necessitated "F" Battery being detailed to act with the 75th and 54th C.I.Bns. "H" Battery proceeded to reorganize as quickly as possible in readiness to follow the attack in Brigade Reserve.

Battery Commanders of "F" and "G" Batteries kept in touch with the Infantry Battalions and had their Batteries and Transports moved up some distance in rear of the Infantry Battalions. Batteries were able to get Guns in position and engage live targets. 16000 rounds in all were expended during the first few hours of the attack and the support furnished to the Infantry was greatly appreciated by the Battalion Commanders. Lieut. LEACH, M.C. in charge of "G" Battery was killed by Shell Fire. The Battery was taken over by Lieut. FAIR. "F" Battery and Transport were in position soon after 8:30 A.M. E. of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE, immediately W. of DURY. The 75th C.I.Bn. was experiencing difficulty from MONT DURY RIDGE. Fighting was very severe, many enemy Machine Guns being encountered. Fire was coming on the right from the FACTORY on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and from the WOOD on the northern outskirts of VILLER-les-CAGNICOURT. All Guns of the Battery got into action, firing 8,000 rounds on the FACTORY. The O.C. 75th C.I.Bn. expressed his satisfaction at the results obtained.



Later, this Officer stated that his Battalion was pushing forward towards RUMAUCOURT and was urgently in need of Machine Gun assistance. He asked that the Battery be pushed forward to fire on RUMAUCOURT. Orders were given that the Battery, with Transport, would advance if possible to a point 1,000 yards S.-W. of SAUDEMONT, from where fire could be directed on RUMAUCOURT. In moving forward from the DROCOURT LINE, with the end in view, "F" Battery Transport came under direct Artillery and Machine Gun fire, which resulted in 6 Animals being killed and 2 Limbers being destroyed, 4 Guns being temporarily out of action.

Defensive positions were taken up by "F" and "G" Batteries and the remnants of "H" Battery which suffered by Bombing the previous night. Then the 4 Guns of "F" Battery were damaged, the 4 remaining "H" Battery Guns, from Brigade Reserve were moved forward and placed in defensive positions under "F" Battery on the right flank. These Guns were all in position by 3:30 P.M. September 2nd., disposed as follows:- 4 Guns of "F" Battery were just in rear of the 75th C.I.Bn. covering the Slopes of MONT DURY. At dusk 2 "F" Battery Guns were recovered from the Transport Wreck. These Guns together with the 4 Guns of "H" Battery were placed in position on the forward Slopes of MONT DURY, on the right of the 54th C.I.Bn. protecting their right flank and guarding against possible counter-attack.

#### **Barrage and Reserve Guns, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

"D", "E", and "J" Batteries, Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C. reported to O.C. No. 3 Company (Major BAILEY, D.S.O., M.C.) to receive orders for a Barrage to be laid down by Guns of these Batteries in support of the advance of the 72nd C.I.Bn. on the right of the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Frontage. These Batteries took up positions, "J" on the right, "D" in the centre and "E" on the left, in ORIX TRENCH about 1,000 yards N. of UPTON WOOD. The main waves of the 72nd C.I.Bn. were jumping off from the VIS-en-ARTOIS SWITCH and consequently "E" and "D" Batteries could not fire on the Barrage as the Infantry advancing were masking their Fire. "J" Batteries position was in ORIX TRENCH well to the right of the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Boundary and just in rear of the 5th C.I.Bn. On the way in, the enemy's Shelling was very heavy and considerable Gas was mixed with the H.E. "J" Battery fired 22,000 rounds S.A.A. on this Barrage.

At 8:00 A.M. the 3 Batteries moved up to the DROCOURT LINE just N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and came into Divisional Reserve. At 10:00 A.M. "E" Battery was sent forward to join No. 2 Company. At the same time owing to very heavy shelling, "D" and "J" Batteries were withdrawn to a point S. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and behind the Jumping-off Line. In the evening, the Guns were moved forward to defensive positions, in the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE defending positions in the DROCOURT-LINE, defending that LINE along with the Guns of "F", "G" and "H" Batteries.

#### **Operations, September 3rd to September 5th, 1918.**

##### **General.**

On the night September 2nd/3rd our Line was a little E. of the RED LINE, at places, the Infantry had penetrated 1,000 yards, and even 1,500 yards beyond this Line, but a Line parallel to the RED LINE, at a distance of 500 yards N. of it, would give the approximate Jumping-off Line for actions which took place on September 3rd. The Order of Battle of Infantry Battalions on September 3rd from right to left of the Canadian Corps Front, was as follows :-

First Cdn. Division -	1st C.I.B.	4th C.I.Bn.
	2nd C.I.B.	(10th C.I.Bn. (8th C.I.Bn.
Fourth Cdn. Division -	11th C.I.B.	(102nd C.I.Bn. (54th C.I.Bn. (87th C.I.Bn.
	10th C.I.B.	(46th C.I.Bn. (44th C.I.Bn.



The Operation carried out on September 3rd was more in the nature of an Advance than an Attack. At the end of the previous day, Infantry Units had been ordered to keep close watch of, and in constant touch with the enemy in front of them so as to be able to follow him up closely the moment he commenced to retire.

During the early morning of September 3rd, Aeroplanes reported that no enemy Troops were to be seen between our Line and the CANAL du NORD and it was suspected that he had withdrawn most of his Forces over the CANAL. Consequently, in place of an organized attack with Artillery preparation, the Battalions in the Front Line were ordered to push forward.

#### **First Canadian Division.**

On the right in front of the First C.I.B. the enemy was found to be holding on to the BUISSY SWITCH. The 4th C.I.Bn. was therefore ordered to attack his Line on the whole Brigade Front. The enemy offered very little resistance in the BUISSY SWITCH, but on topping the Ridge and going down the Forward Slope, severe Artillery and Machine Gun Fire was encountered. At the same time, British Troops attacked INCHY, on the right. About 3:30 P.M. it became apparent that the 4th C.I.Bn. had become deflected toward the left and the 2nd C.I.Bn. was accordingly ordered up from Support to establish touch between the 4th C.I.Bn. and Troops on the right. About 6:50 P.M., the 2nd and 4th C.I.Bns. had reached the W. Bank of the CANAL and were everywhere held up by heavy Machine Gun Fire from the E. Bank.

Meanwhile, on the 2nd C.I.B. Front, considerable resistance was met from enemy Machine Guns and close-range Artillery Fire, but despite this fact, the advance was pushed slowly forward and the Line of the W. Bank of the CANAL du NORD was established about 5:00 P.M. Patrols sent forward, covering the whole Brigade Front, ascertained there were no enemy Troops W. of the CANAL. Companies were then rearranged in Defensive Positions and touch finally established with flanking Units. Immediately after dark, the 7th C.I.Bn., having reorganized, relieved the 8th and 10th C.I.Bns. in the Front Line and the 5th C.I.Bn. came into Support. The 8th and 10th C.I.Bns., on Relief came into Brigade Reserve.

From the high ground on the right, S. of BUISSY, evidence of great confusion on the part of the enemy E. of the CANAL was observed. Gun, Lorries and Transport could be seen moving Eastward along the roads and Parties of enemy Infantry retiring, towards BOURLON WOOD. Mounted Officers could be seen endeavouring, without success to rally their Men. But in distinct contrast to this, Parties of enemy Machine Gunners could be seen moving Westward to the CANAL Bank apparently oblivious of the retirement going on about them. Plans were laid that the Brigades should assault the CANAL under cover of a heavy Artillery Barrage and attempt to cross over the remaining Bridges. During the night however, the enemy blew up 2 of the 3 Bridges on the right Brigade Front and all of these remaining on the left. More information brought in from Troops on both flanks proved that the attempt was not likely to succeed and orders came from Corps that the Division should stand fast.

The relief of the Troops in the Line was carried out, during the night September 3rd/4th, by the Second Cdn. Division, the 6th C.I.B. taking over from the 2nd C.I.B. Hardly had the relief commenced, when word was received that the enemy had regained possession of INCHY on the right. The relief was therefore checked and a defensive flank formed by the 1st C.I.Bn. The Sixty-third (Naval) Division afterwards succeeded in retaking INCHY.

During the days September 3rd and 4th, the 3rd C.I.B. was in Reserve with the 16th and 13th C.I.Bns., right and left, respectively, in the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE, and the 15th and 14th C.I.Bns., in the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. The Brigade withdrew to DAINVILLE on the evening of September 4th. Command of the First Cdn. Division Sector passed to the G.O.C. Second Cdn. Division at 5:00 P.M. September 4th.

#### **Fourth Canadian Division.**

On the Fourth Cdn. Division Front the day's fighting during September 2nd convinced all Commanding Officers along the Line that any further advance would be impractical without adequate preparations and ample Artillery arrangements. Plans were made to attack on September 3rd with the 11th C.I.B. on the right and the 10th C.I.B. on the left, these 2 Brigades to advance to capture the GREEN LINE. The Scheme of Operations included an attack by the 12th C.I.B., Northwards, from the BUISSY SWITCH. Accordingly, the 12th C.I.B. was withdrawn from the Line and placed in Reserve in the Trenches of the DROCOURT-



QUEANT SYSTEM. The 11th C.I.B. took over the Line to the Southern Divisional Boundary. Orders were issued to all Brigades that the attack would commence at 5:00 A.M. September 3rd, but these Orders were subsequently cancelled.

Patrols sent out early in the morning failed to get in touch with the enemy and, later in the day, low-flying Aeroplanes reported the enemy clear of the area W. of the CANAL. A general advance then commenced along the whole Divisional Front and no opposition was met with. The Villages of RUMAUCOURT, ECOURT-ST-QUENTIN, SAUDEMONT and RECOURT were occupied unopposed. By 3:00 P.M. all ground W. of the CANAL, except a small WOOD immediately N. of the CAMBRAI ROAD had been vacated by the enemy.

Our Patrols were sent to Bridgeheads. All Bridges had been destroyed and the enemy held the Bridgeheads on the Eastern side. During our advance to the GREEN LINE throughout the afternoon of September 3rd our Troops were subjected to heavy Artillery Fire, particularly from the vicinity of OISY-le-VERGER, from which place the enemy had very good Observation. Our Artillery was brought up and to some degree neutralized the enemy Fire.

During the night September 3rd/4th our Post were established all along the W. Bank of the CANAL. The 102nd C.I.Bn. surrounded the small WOOD N. of the CAMBRAI ROAD and dealt with its German occupants. On September 4th, reports from the First Cdn. Division on the right indicated that a crossing might be forced by them. Orders were received to be ready to cross the CANAL as soon as the XVII Corps and the First Cdn. Division on our right had effected a crossing. There had been nothing on the Fourth Division Front to indicate that the enemy would not fight the CANAL LINE. Late in the day the idea of crossing was abandoned by the First Cdn. Division.

During the night September 4th/5th, the 6th C.I.B. took over part of the Fourth Divisional Southern Front from the 11th C.I.B. and the 9th C.I.B., Third Cdn. Division, relieved the 10th C.I.B. on the left. Command of the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Front did not pass at this time. On the morning September 5th, following a report that a Patrol had succeeded in effecting a crossing of the CANAL on the left, several daring Reconnaissance's of the CANAL were made. One of these resulted in the wounding of the G.O.C., 11th C.I.B. All Reconnaissance's established the fact that the enemy was still holding the Eastern Bank of the CANAL in force with Snipers and Machine Gunners. As orders were not to commit Troops to a fight, the idea of crossing was again abandoned. During the days September 3rd, 4th and 5th, the 12th C.I.B. remained in Reserve in positions just E. of the RED LINE, with the right flank on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

At 6:00 P.M. September 5th, the G.O.C., Third Cdn. Division took over command of the Line from the G.O.C., Fourth Cdn. Division.

### **Operations of First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

At 10:30 P.M., night September 2nd/3rd, instructions were received at H.Q. First Battalion, C.M.G.C., that the 1st C.I.B. was to attack on the morning of September 3rd on the right of the First Cdn. Divisional Front. "A" and "B" Batteries of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C. were detailed to go forward with the 4th C.I.Bn. which was attacking on the Brigade Frontage. "D" Battery was moved to the rear and established in defensive positions W. of CAGNICOURT to operate with the 3rd C.I.Bn. in Brigade Reserve and ready to defend the BUISSY SWITCH in case of Counter-attack. "A" and "B" Batteries were withdrawn with their Transport to a Line just E. of CAGNICOURT and were in position behind the Infantry at 3:15 A.M. September 3rd.

About 2:00 P.M. September 3rd, the 4th C.I.Bn. moved to the attack from their assembly positions near the BOIS de LOISON. The Guns of "A" and "B" Batteries followed close behind, but no supporting Fire was given as the Infantry met with little resistance. On advancing down the Slope severe Artillery and Machine Gun Fire was encountered from the enemy who was holding the E. Bank of the CANAL in force. The Batteries were disposed for defense between the BUISSY SWITCH and the CANAL du NORD, and kept up heavy Fire on the E. Bank of the CANAL. The Infantry made many attempts to gain the Bridgeheads but these were not successful.

Meanwhile "D" Battery, First Battalion, C.M.G.C., in accordance with instructions from the G.O.C., was moved to defensive positions in the BUISSY SWITCH. During the day, hostile low-flying Planes were



extremely active and a great deal of Firing was carried out at these Machines many of which were driven back over their own Lines.

“C” Battery was in Divisional Reserve. No. 2 Company supported the 2nd C.I.B.

“F” Battery moved forward at 2:00 P.M. behind the 10th C.I.Bn., on the right of the 2nd C.I.B. Frontage.

The enemy had retired on this Front during the night and little resistance was encountered. The Guns kept in close touch with the Infantry. No targets were observed and the Guns finally took up positions in the SUNKEN ROAD S.-E. of BUISSY, between the Eastern edge of the Village and the QUEANT-MARQUION RAILWAY. This Battery was withdrawn at 10:00 P.M. under instructions from the O.C., 10th C.I.Bn., and went into Bivouacs for the night in the vicinity of SUN QUARRY, 1,000 yards S.-E. of CHERISY and the CHERISY-HENDECOURT ROAD.

“G” Battery remained in positions on the high ground W. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT where the Guns were established on the previous day.

“H” Battery supporting the 5th C.I.Bn., had remained throughout the morning of September 3rd in positions near the HENDECOURT-DURY ROAD, occupied the previous night. Numerous targets of enemy Aeroplanes were engaged by this Battery. At 2:00 P.M. orders were received from the O.C., 5th C.I.Bn. to “Stand To” as our Troops had reached the W. Bank of the CANAL. At 5:00 P.M. this Battalion moved forward and “H” Battery followed close behind. Limbers accompanied the Battery along the VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT ROAD, until the SUNKEN ROAD on the Western outskirts of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT was reached. At this place the Battery was halted and relief by the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., took place. On completion of the relief, the Battery bivouacked for the night and prepared to move out in the morning.

“E” Battery was in Divisional Reserve during this period.

#### **Guns in Reserve, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

No. 5 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. was held in Reserve during September 3rd, with the 3rd C.I.B. The Men made the most of their opportunity and spent the day resting. “M” Battery of this Company was in Divisional Reserve.

The Guns of “C”, “E” and “M” Batteries in Divisional Reserve remained in their positions in the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE just E. of TRIGGER COPSE and about 1,500 yards W. of CAGNICOURT. At 11:30 A.M., September 4th, the Batteries were moved to a point across the SENSEE RIVER just W. of CHERISY-HENINEL ROAD, and at 2:00 P.M. they proceeded to WALRUS, arriving there at 10:00 P.M. September 4th.

On relief by the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., the whole of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C. assembled at WALRUS in Corps Reserve. No. 1 Company was relieved night September 4th/5th and reached WALRUS at 3:30 P.M., September 5th.

#### **Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., General.**

The Guns of the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., advanced with the 11th and 10th C.I.B.s on the right and left of the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Frontage, respectively.

“E”, “F” and “G” Batteries of No. 2 Company (a/O.C., Capt. HALL, M.C.) and “K”, “L” and “M” Batteries of No. 3 Company (Major Bailey, D.S.O., M.C.) advanced with the 11th C.I.B., “E” Battery utilizing Limbers and the remainder carrying Guns and Equipment. “A”, “B” and “C” Batteries of No.1 Company (Major BRITTON) advanced with the 10th C.I.B. carrying Guns and Equipment. No opportunities for supporting fire were offered. Some casualties were suffered from the heavy Artillery Fire encountered during the advance. These Batteries took up defensive positions in depth with “E”, “G” and “F” Batteries covering the CANAL from PALLUEL to SAUCHY-CAUCHY. Owing to Machine Gun and Artillery Fire, it was found impossible to push “K”, “L” and “M” Batteries over the Ridge on the extreme right of the GREEN LINE; these Batteries, therefore, occupied positions on the W. side of the Ridge. During the



afternoon of September 3rd and the night September 3rd/4th, the ground gained was occupied in depth as far back as the DROCOURT-QUEANT SUPPORT LINE, these positions being maintained until the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. was relieved by the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.

### **Action of No. 3 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

On the night September 2nd/3rd, it had been seen that the Mobile Batteries of No. 3 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. had established themselves in rear of the RED LINE in defensive positions. At 9:00 A.M. on September 3rd, instructions were given to "L" Battery to proceed with the 102nd C.I.Bn. This Battalion was pushing out strong Patrols and the task of "L" Battery was to follow this Battalion in close support and engage any enemy that appeared. This was done and 4 Guns went forward to the point where the Infantry dug in. This was on the extreme right of the GREEN LINE on the W. side of the Ridge, below the Crest. No Machine Gun targets were observed during the advance. From the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE to the Final Line, Guns, Tripods and 8 Belt-boxes of Ammunition were carried by the Crews, Limbers being left in the hollow behind the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. 3 mules were killed here by Shell Fire and the Transport was moved 600 yards further back and to the left of the Road.

On the morning of September 4th, the 27th C.I.Bn., 6th C.I.B., side-slipped and took over the extreme right of the 11th C.I.B. Line reliving one Company of the 102nd C.I.Bn. Relief of "L" Battery by "F" Battery of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., took place at the same time and "L" Battery was withdrawn to the SUNKEN ROAD 1,000 yards behind the GREEN LINE on the extreme right, 500 yards N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, where it remained until withdrawn the night September 5th/6th.

"M" Battery advanced from their defensive positions in the RED LINE at 11:00 A.M. September 3rd. The Guns were pushed forward in rear of "L" Battery, ready to support that Battery if necessary. Positions were eventually established in the SUNKEN ROAD referred to above. No targets presented themselves. The Battery remained in this position until relieved by "H" Battery of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., at 9:00 P.M. September 5th.

At 9:00 A.M. September 3rd, "K" Battery was ordered by the O.C., No. 3 Company, to move from their defensive positions in the RED LINE and to get in touch with him along the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

In the evening this Battery was moved to the Crest of the Ridge on the 11th C.I.B. right overlooking the CANAL, in readiness to support an attack planned by the 102nd C.I.Bn. for the morning of September 4th. This was cancelled and the Battery was sent across to the left where it took up positions near the CHALK PIT, 1,000 yards S.-E. of RUMAUCOURT, supporting the 102nd C.I.Bn. on the new Frontage taken over by that Battalion on relief of the right Company by the 27th C.I.Bn. On September 5th, "K" Battery vacated its positions and was withdrawn to the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE, 500 yards N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. Here, the Battery bivouacked for the night, moving back to AGNY on the morning of September 6th.

"J" Battery of this Company was in Divisional Reserve during these operations and did not come into action.

In the evening of September 3rd, Major BAILEY, O.C., No 3 Company while reconnoitering a position for a Sniping Gun with Lieut. PERKINS was severely wounded by enemy Machine Gun Fire. Lieut. PERKINS went back to the 102nd C.I.Bn. and obtained a Stretcher Party and some Riflemen for covering fire and, at great personal risk managed to bring Major BAILEY back. Capt. W.G. WILLAMS took command of the Company.



**Action of No. 2 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

No. 2 Company (a/O.C., Capt. HALL, M.C.) continued in support of the 11th C.I.B.

“F” Battery supported the 54th C.I.Bn. in the centre of the 11th C.I.B. Frontage. At 10:00 A.M. on September 3rd, the O.C. 54th C.I.Bn. sent back word that the enemy was retiring on this Front. Guns were moved forward up to the Infantry, each Crew carrying Gun, Tripod, First Aid Kits, 1 can for Gun-water and 8 Belts of S.A.A. The O.C., Battery, reconnoitred and found that the CANAL was being rapidly cleared. Scouts were being sent back and the Battery guided to OSVILLERS FARM, E. of RUMAUCOURT. The 54th C.I.Bn. was holding the Ridge overlooking the CANAL and at the request of the O.C., this Battalion, the Guns were located on the forward Slope overlooking the CANAL and facing the VILLAGE of SAUCHY-CAUCHY. The Battery thus placed commanded the main Bridges in this area and filled in the Gap between the 54th C.I.Bn. and the 87th C.I.Bn. on the left. 4 Guns were actually mounted in this position, the other 4 being in close support 500 yards in the rear and just E. of OSVILLERS FARM. “F” Battery was relieved on the night September 5th/6th.

“E” Battery was moved forward to ECOURT ST. QUENTIN on September 3rd, supporting the 87th C.I.Bn. and protecting its left flank. In moving forward, this Battery suffered very heavy casualties, its effective strength being reduced to 2 Officers, 5 N.C.O.s (including B.S.M. White who was wounded but remained on duty) and 17 Other Ranks. Forward positions were reconnoitred and the Guns moved at dusk to positions N. of the GREEN LINE and on the extreme left of the 11th C.I.B. Front.

These two Batteries (“E” and “F”) from their positions controlled the CANAL on the Brigade Frontage. “G” Battery, in Brigade Reserve, formed the rear defensive Line. “H” Battery was in Divisional Reserve and did not come into action.



**Action of No. 1 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The Batteries of No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON), Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., were in support of the 10th C.I.B. on the left of the Divisional Front.

"B" Battery acted in co-operation with the right attacking Battalions, the 46th C.I.Bn. in front and the 47th C.I.Bn. in support. This Battery moved forward about 12:00 noon. Severe Shelling was encountered and great difficulty was experienced in bringing mules forward with Guns and Ammunition. 2 mules actually got away and returned to the Transport Lines. The remainder were unloaded and the equipment, etc., carried to the Gun positions. These were established half-way between RE COURT and ECOURT ST. QUENTIN. No digging in was done on account of enemy Observation from OISY-le-VERGER. The Crews carried Gun Equipment to the positions and lay quietly until dusk, when Gun positions and individual "Funk Holes" were made. Guns were sited to command the ground down to the CANAL du NORD in the direction of PALLUSL and to protect the 10th C.I.B. right flank S. of the SENSEE RIVER.

"A" Battery supported the advance on the left of the 44th C.I.Bn. During the afternoon of September 3rd, positions were established midway between RE COURT and SAUDEMONT, guarding the left flank of the 10th C.I.B. Limbers were taken forward as far as DURY, where Shell Fire made use of Transport inadvisable. Equipment was carried from there to the Gun positions. In these positions "A" Battery was relieved on the night September 4th/5th by "J" Battery of the Third Battalion C.M.G.C.

"C" Battery had established positions in the CHALK PIT about 1,000 yards N.-W. of DURY on September 2nd. At 1:00 P.M. September 3rd, the Battery was moved forward in support of the 50th C.I.Bn. which was in support to the 44th C.I.Bn. on the left. Guns were located in positions immediately W. of RE COURT and remained there until relieved by the 3rd Battalion, C.M.G.C., at 9:15 P.M. September 4th.

**Guns in Reserve; Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

"D", "H" and "J" Batteries of the Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C., in Divisional Reserve were moved on the morning of September 3rd to positions on the forward slope of the DURY RIDGE between the WINDMILL and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

At 4:00 P.M. September 5th, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., Advanced H.Q. joined Battalion Rear H.Q. at AGNY CHATEAU, and by noon, September 6th all 3 Companies of the Battalion were in Rest Billets in the vicinity of AGNY.

**Redistribution of Frontage.**

Coinciding with the end of Phase II of the Battle of CAMBRAI, the Canadian Corps Frontage was shortened on the left. The Inter-Divisional Boundary was changed at the same time. These changes were effected during the Inter-Divisional Reliefs which took place at the end of the Phase. On the extreme left, the 1st Black Watch, of the First Brigade, 1st Division (British) took over the River Frontage to the N. from the 44th C.I.Bn. The adjustment of the Inter-Divisional Boundary was made on September 4th, when the 27th C.I.Bn. on the left of the Second Cdn. Division Front, on relieving the left Battalion on the First Cdn. Division Front, took over also from 1 Company of the 102nd C.I.Bn. on the extreme right of the Fourth Cdn. Division. On completion of this Relief the Inter-Divisional Boundary on the CANAL du NORD was a point 300 yards S. of the SAUCHY-CAUCHY CEMETERY. The Corps Southern Boundary was unchanged. The Northern Boundary was a Line running from the intersection of the HENDECOURT-DURY and ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROADS, N. of MONT DURY, S. of DURY, through RE COURT and thence (approximately) straight to the CANAL at PALLUEL.



## **CAMBRAI,**

### **PHASE III : SEPTEMBER 5th to OCTOBER 1st, 1918.**

#### **Preliminary Period, September 5th to 26th, 1918.**

##### **General Situation; Canadian Corps Policy.**

The end of the Second Phase of the Battle of CAMBRAI found the Canadian Corps established firmly on positions commanding the CANAL du NORD, Outpost Lines being from 500 to 1,000 yards W. of the CANAL. The General Situation and Policy of the Corps is clearly defined in the following Letter addressed to Divisions by the Bgde .Gen. , Gen Staff. Canadian Corps and dated September 5th 1918 :-

*"The present intention is that the Corps should mark time in its present position while operations are developed further South with a view to maneuvering the enemy out of his positions behind the Canal. Advantage must therefore be taken of this lull to reorganize, refit and rest the men as far as circumstances permit in order that the Corps may be ready to join the hunt as soon as operations elsewhere make the Corps fluid again.*

*"Our present Front is very strong defensively. On the North and East the enemy, by flooding the SENSEE marshes and destroying the bridges over the CANAL du NORD, had rendered it impossible for him to take any offensive action so long as we guard the possible crossings.*

*"Our extreme Right Flank is at present the only possible point at which the enemy can undertake offensive action.*

*"In view of the above, the Corps Commander wishes the Line to be held with the minimum number of men. The principals of outposts should be supplied in their entirety, i.e. a line of observation posts on the high ground by day with standing patrols pushed forward at night to watch crossings and reconnoitering patrols .*

*"Close watch over, and touch with, the enemy must be maintained so that any further retirements may be detected and followed up immediately.*

*"Movement in the forward area, which is very exposed, must be reduced to a minimum in order to save unnecessary casualties from shell fire.*

*"Divisions in the front line should be disposed in great depth so that the Reserve Brigades at least can carry on training in their own areas without risk of drawing shell fire.*

*"Every effort should be made to improve the accommodation in the forward area East of ARRAS : it will not be possible to provide tents or huts in any numbers, but much can be done to increase men's comfort by covering in old trenches with corrugated iron and trench shelters.*

*"Special attention should be paid to securing protection for horses from weather and bombing : the fullest use should be made of sunken roads and old trenches for the latter purposes.*

*"G.O.C., R.A. will arrange to withdraw a proportion of Artillery units in order that the men and horses may be given a certain amount of rest.*

*"O.C. will continue to push on work on light railways, roads and water supply, special attention to be paid to dry weather tracks for Infantry and horse transport in order to relieve the congestion on the main roads.*

*"He will also arrange for thorough reconnaissance of all bridge sited over the CANAL du NORD and storage of the necessary material in order that no time will be lost in opening up roads across the CANAL as soon as the advance is resumed. (X)*



The Period September 5th to 26th can be discounted so far as active Operations are concerned. After the Mobile Actions of August 8th, S. of AMIENS, and of August 26th and September 2nd on this Front, it was as though conditions had suddenly reverted to the period of Trench Fighting, and yet, for the Machine Gun Units, this period represented very hard work, with very definite tasks to perform. Once again, Batteries had set up positions to occupy and set programs of night harassing Fire to carry out.

(X) Canadian Corps G. 79/2526-4, dated September 5th, 1918.

#### **Dispositions, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

On the night September 3rd/4th No. 2 Company (Major Mc CORKELL), Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. relieved No. 2 Company of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C., in the Line. On relief, the Guns were distributed along the area taken over by the 6th C.I.B. during the same night from the 2nd C.I.B., i.e., the left Sector of the First Cdn. Divisional Front. On relief, the Batteries were disposed as follows : "H" Battery, on the right, "G" Battery in the centre and "F" Battery on the left, these Batteries being in positions 1,000 yards to 1,500 yards W. of the CANAL du NORD between the HOULIN de BUISSY on the right and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD on the left. "E" Battery was in support with all 8 Guns 500 yards W. of MOULIN d'en HAUT.

During the night September 4th/5th, the 6th C.I.B. relieved the 1st C.I.B. in the Right Section of the Divisional Front. At the same time in the same area, No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., relieved No 1 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C., in the Line, and No 1 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., relieved No 3 Company, First Battalion C.M.G.C., in Reserve. The Guns of No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., on completion of Relief were on the right of the Divisional Front. "K" and "L" Batteries being in forward positions around the MOULIN de BUISSY. "J" Battery in support, S. of BUISSY, and "M" Battery, in Reserve.

The Situation on the Second Cdn. Divisional Front on the morning of September 5th was as follows :-

Front Lines -	6th C.I.B. on Divisional Front. "K" and "L" Batteries, Second Bn., C.M.G.C. on Right. "H", "G", "F" Batteries, Second Bn., C.M.G.C., on Left.
Support Area -	4th C.I.B. "J" Battery, Second Bn., C.M.G.C., on Right. "E" Battery, Second Bn., C.M.G.C., in Centre.
In Reserve -	5th C.I.B. No. 1 Company, Second Bn., C.M.G.C. "M" Battery, Second Bn., C.M.G.C.



### **Second Canadian Division Boundaries Adjusted.**

On September 6th, the Divisional Boundaries were adjusted, the areas occupied by Brigades in Support and Reserve being clearly defined. The Second Cdn. Division was on the right of the Canadian Corps Front. On the right was the 57th Division (British) and on its left the Third Cdn. Division. Division were as follows :-

Right Boundary – Ran from a point just W. of CROISILLES, passing S. of RIENCOURT and continuing on this Line for 2,000 yards past RIENCOURT, then turning E. to a point 200 yards S. of SAINS-les-MARQUION.

Left Boundary – From a point half-way between CHERISY and FONTAINE to just N. of CAGNICOURT WOOD, Thence due N. to a point 500 yards N. of BARALLE QUARRY, thence N- E. to a point half-way between RUMAUCOURT and BARALLE, thence due E. to the CANAL du NORD.

The Western Boundary was a Line running just W. of FONTAINE-les-CROISILLES and CHERISY. The Reserve Brigade occupied this area between this Line and a Line drawn N. and S. between CAGNICOURT and VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT. The Troops on Support occupied the area of the latter Line and W. of a Line drawn N. from CAGNICOURT. E. of this was the Forward Area.

Following this adjustment of Boundaries, the Guns of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. were redistributed. No. 2 Company took up positions in the Forward Area in Support of the 6th C.I.B., its Guns being distributed in Depth along the whole Divisional Front. No. 3 Company moved back to the Support Area occupied by the 4th C.I.B., and No. 1 Company remained in Reserve S.-E. of CHERISY with the 3rd C.I.B.

### **Conditions in the Line; General Arrangements, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

Practically all the country E. of HENDECOURT was under observation from BOURLON WOOD, except the area between RIENCOURT and BOIS de BOUCHE, close to the Southern Divisional Boundary. From the Ridge just E. of the BOIS de BOUCHE, the ground sloped down to the CANAL. The Railway from QUEANT to MARQUION passed through a deep Cutting up to within 500 yards of the CANAL, and was constantly Shelled. The Village of BUISSY lay in a pocket which was kept under Gas Shelling by the enemy. These circumstances made the work of digging Emplacements difficult and hazardous and intensified the need for efficient use of Camouflage.

On the other hand, the Swamps along the CANAL Bank restricted the points at which the enemy could make an attack so that these points could be covered with comparatively few Guns, enabling one Company to hold the Line whilst the others got as much rest as conditions permitted. A certain number of “*Bivvies*” were issued to the Support Company and a few old Dugouts were available. Other shelters were constructed out of remains of old German Huts found in TRIGGER COPSE.

While the Infantry were digging Trenches, the Machine Gunners constructed positions sited under the personal supervision of Lieut.-Col. WEIR, M.C. Commanding the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. These positions generally consisted of carefully camouflaged Pits, with a shelter covered by a rubber sheet close by.

A complete System of Communication was established stretching from FONTAINE to CHERISY, thence to Battalion Headquarters at SUN QUARRY, 1,000 yards S.-E. of CHERISY, thence to CAGNICOURT, where Report Centre was established with a Line running to the H.Q. of the Forward Company in VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT and to the 4 Battery H.Q. in MONT d'en HAUT, BARALLE, the crossroads one mile S. of BOIS de BOUCHE, and the Railway Cutting S. of BUISSY. Lines were duplicated, so that in spite of heavy Shelling in the forward area, Communications was maintained without interruption. As usual all Stations were connected with the Infantry Division, Brigade and Battalion H.Q. and the Formations were frequently able to use Machine Gun Lines when their own were down.



**Activities of Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., September 5th to 13th.**

During this period, Indirect Harassing Fire was maintained by the Company in the Line, an average of 25,000 Rounds per night being fired. The enemy Artillery was very active. The forward area where the night-firing Guns were sited, was continually subjected to heavy H.E. and Gas Shelling and was constantly swept by enemy Machine Gun Fire. The Guns of No. 2 Company Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., in forward positions, carried out this night-firing.

The Batteries of this Company covered the whole Divisional Front. On the right, "H" Battery had 2 Guns within 200 yards of the MOULIN de BUISSY, 2 Guns 500 yards S. of these on the high ground overlooking SAINS-les-MARQUION and 1,700 yards due W. of this Village, 2 Guns 700 yards W. and a little S. of the MOULIN de BUISSY, 200 yards S. of the QUEANT-MARQUION RAILWAY, and the remaining 2 Guns 500 yards N.-W. of the MOULIN de BUISSY, midway between the MILL and BUISSY.

"F" Battery was in forward positions on the left, with 2 Guns at a point 200 yards N. of the Eastern outskirts of BARALLE and mid-way between BARALLE and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, 2 Guns were mounted 1,000 yards due W. of these, 2 Guns were on the left boundary, 1,500 yards W. of the CANAL, immediately opposite SAUCHY l' METREE, the remaining 2 Guns were about 200 yards N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, just E. of its junction with the RUMAUCOURT ROAD.

"G" Battery was on the southern boundary from 2,500 to 3,000 yards W. of "H" Battery, the Guns being disposed for defence on the right flank on the high ground between the QUEANT-MARQUION RAILWAY and the QUEANT-BUISSY ROAD.

"E" Battery had its Guns disposed for defence in depth in the centre of the forward area. 4 Guns were in positions in the BUISSY SWITCH, 500 yards N.-W. of BUISSY and 4 Guns at a point 700 yards N. of BOIS de BOUCHE. These Guns had excellent fields of fire. Their targets for the night-firing carried on during this period were, the Village of SAINS-les-MARQUION, MAQUION SAUCHY l' ESTREE, SAUCHY-CAUCHY and all roads leading up to these Villages and forward to the E. Bank of the CANAL du NORD.

No. 3 Company Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. was in the Support Area, the Guns of "J", "K" and "L" Batteries being disposed from right to left across the Divisional Support Area on a General Line about 1,000 yards W. of CAGNICOURT. "M" Battery was in Brigade Reserve with Company Headquarters in TRIGGER COPSE. No. 1 Company Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., was in Divisional Reserve 500 yards S.-E. of CHERISY.

On September 11th, the Fifty-seventh Division (British) attacked MORUVRES. The Guns of No. 2 Company, C.M.G.C. co-operated with the Artillery in support of this attack. The 28th C.I.Bn., holding the extreme right of the Line, was to establish a Post 500 yards S. of SAINS-les-MARQUION and get into touch there with the 171st Brigade (British) on their right, in this way protecting the left flank of the Fifty-seventh Division (British).

The Line on the right held by our Troops was from 500 to 1,000 yards W. of the CANAL du NORD and this Post to be established was about half-way between our Line and the CANAL. The enemy retaliated on the right and also on the Second Cdn. Division Front with very heavy Shelling for 2 hours. The task of the 28th C.I.Bn. was carried out successfully. The attempt of the Fifty-seventh Division (British) to reach the W. Bank of the CANAL was, however, not successful and the Outpost Line established by the 28th C.I.Bn. was withdrawn to the original Front Line. The area was Shelled at night very heavily with Gas. This was a nightly occurrence and many casualties were caused. Hostile Aerial activity at night was considerable and some casualties occurred from enemy Bombs.

On the night September 12th/13th the 6th C.I.B. was relieved in the Line by the 4th C.I.B. The Infantry Battalions took up positions as shown on the Table below. The 172nd Infantry Brigade (British) was on the right and the 8th C.I.B. on the left.

No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., relieved No. 2 Company in forward positions on the night September 13th/14th. At the conclusion of the relief No. 3 Company occupied positions almost identical to those held by No. 2 Company (detailed above) when this Company was in the Line. No. 1 Company in Support had its Guns along the whole Divisional Front in the area between BUISSY and CAGNICOURT. No. 2 Company was now placed in Divisional Reserve.



**Disposition and Activities of Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., September 5th to 13th.**

The Machine Gun Operations during this period closely corresponded with those of the Spring and Summer of 1917, Indirect Firing by night being the chief Task. On the Third Cdn. Division Front this was particularly noticeable. The report of the O.C. Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., covering this period reads in full :- *"On the 5th (i.e. of September) No. 2 Company relieved No. 2 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., in the Line. There were no active Operations during this Tour which lasted until the 19th when we were relieved by the 56th M.G. Battalion."*

The Third Cdn. Division took over the Line on the left of the Second Division at 6:00 P.M. September 5th. Its northern boundary ran from la CHAUSSEE, 700 yards N. of PALLUEL, in a S.-W. direction straight through RECOURT and DURY to the Crossroads on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD at l' ESPERANCE FARM.

The 7th C.I.B. Front, on the right of the Third Cdn. Division, was held by the 49th C.I.Bn. This Battalion had an Outpost Line about 700 yards W. of the CANAL du NORD and parallel to it, and a Support Line about 1,000 yards W. of the Outpost Line and just E. of OSVILLERS FARM. From 1200 to 1,500 yards W. of this again, the Line of Resistance was held by the R.C.R. The 42nd C.I.Bn. was in Support in an area immediately N. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT and the P.P.C.L.I. in Reserve about 2,000 yards W. of the 42nd C.I.Bn.

On the left of the Third Cdn. Division Front, the 9th C.I.B. were in the Line. The 116th C.I.Bn. occupied an Outpost Line N. of ECOURT ST. QUENTIN. The 58th C.I.Bn. was in Support N. of SAUDEMONT, the 52nd C.I.Bn. in Reserve, around the MOULIN DAMIERS between DURY and the ARRAS- CAMBRAI ROAD, and the 43rd C.I.Bn. also in Reserve, in the area around l' ESPERANCE FARM.

No. 2 Company, Third Battalion C.M.G.C., held the Line along the 7th C.I.B. Front. "F" Battery covered the whole of the Brigade Frontage. "H" Battery, in Support covered the Brigade Frontage from a point N. of BUISSY on the S. Boundary to a point 700 yards S. of RUMAUCOURT. "G" Battery was in Support to "H" Battery and its Guns were placed in the Line of Resistance occupied by the R.C.R. "E" Battery in Reserve was located in the vicinity of la BRIOCHE FARM, immediately E. of VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT and on both sides of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

No. 3 Company, on the 9th C.I.B. Frontage, had its Batteries disposed in depth along the N. Boundary from E. to W. "K" Battery was in positions N. of ECOURT ST. QUENTIN with the 116th C.I.Bn. "J" Battery was in Support of "K" Battery with the 58th C.I.Bn. The Guns of "L" Battery were disposed along the N. Boundary between DURY and RECOURT, whilst "M" Battery was astride the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD in the area occupied by the 52nd C.I.Bn., S. of DURY.

No. 1 Company was in Divisional Reserve, in ORIENT LARE, about 1,000 yards S.-E. of CHERISY. Battalion H.Q. was at a point 500 yards N. of CHERISY.

During this period these positions remained more or less fixed. The 49th C.I.Bn. holding the Front, was relieved by the 42nd C.I.Bn. on the night September 9th/10th but the Machine Gun Dispositions were unaltered.

On the 9th C.I.B. Frontage No. 3 Company, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., was relieved by No. 1 Company of the same Battalion, "B" Battery taking over the forward positions from "K" Battery and "A" Battery, the support positions from "J" Battery. "C" Battery, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., relieved "L" Battery and "D" Battery took over the positions in rear from "M" Battery.

Consequently on the night September 11th/12th when the 8th C.I.B. relieved the 7th and 9th C.I.B.s, No. 2 Company, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. covered the right Frontage and No. 1 Company the left. No. 3 Company was in Divisional Reserve 1,000 yards S.-E. of CHERISY.



**Canadian Corps Units Holding the Line, September 14th.**

The following table shows the Infantry and Machine Gun Disposition of Divisions holding the Line on September 14th :-

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Second Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Right	Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.
4th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Div. Front	No. 3 Company; Forward Positions
19th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	No. 1 Company; Support Positions
18th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	No. 2 Company; Divisional Reserve
20th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
21st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	
Third Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Left	Third Battalion C.M.G.C.
8th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Div. Front	No. 2 Company; Division Right
1st C.M.R.	Brigade Right	No. 1 Company; Division Left
2nd C.M.R.	Brigade Left	No. 3 Company; Divisional Reserve
5th C.M.R.	Brigade Right Support	
4th C.M.R.	Brigade Left Support	

**Canadian Corps Activities; September 14th to 19th.**

From September 14th to September 19th, no event of particular moment took place. The enemy continued to bombard the area very heavily. A large proportion of his Shelling was with Gas and the whole Corps area was impregnated with Mustard Gas. Frequently during a cold night he would shell the area with Gas which would not be detected until towards noon on the next day when the Gas would commence to evaporate. This made it difficult to guard against.

On September 17th, Orders were received by the G.O.C., Second Cdn. Division to readjust the Front. 600 yards on the N. was to be handed over to the Third Cdn. Division and 2,700 yards to the S. was to be taken over from the Fifty-second Division (British) which had relieved the Fifty-seventh Division. This was a preliminary to the advance on CAMBRAI; the new Frontage coming under the command of the G.O.C., Second Cdn. Division was the Front on which the main attack of the Canadian Corps was to be made.

On September 18th, the 5th C.M.R. took over 800 yards on their right from 2 Companies of the 21st C.I.Bn. on the left of the Second Cdn. Division Front. On the same day the 5th C.I.B. relieved the 6th C.I.B. in the Reserve Area, the latter Brigade going back to HAUTE AVESHES. The 5th C.I.B. went forward on the night September 19th/20th and relieved the 157th Brigade, Fifty-second Division (British) in the Line immediately N. of MOEUVERS. On September 19th the 10th C.I.B. moved up in support of the 5th C.I.B., coming under Orders of the Second Cdn. Division.



**Changes in Dispositions and Boundaries; September 20th to 22nd.**

On the night September 19th/20th the Fifty-sixth Division (British) relieved the Third Cdn. Division in the Line. The 157th and 168th Infantry Brigades (British) took over from the 8th C.I.B. and the Fifty-sixth Battalion, M.G.C. relieved the Guns of No. 2 Company, Third Battalion C.M.G.C., on the right and of No. 1 Company on the left.

On September 20th, the Second Cdn. Division held the Canadian Corps Frontage, disposed as follows :- the 5th C.I.B. was in the Line on the right with the 10th C.I.B., Fourth Cdn. Division, in support; the 4th C.I.B. was in the Line on the left with the 1st C.I.B., First Cdn. Division in support, both the 1st and 10th C.I.B.s being under Orders of the G.O.C., Second Canadian Division.

The Corps Southern Boundary (i.e., Right Boundary of the 5th C.I.B.) cut the CANAL at a point from 400 to 500 yards N. of MOEUVRES and ran W. from there towards QUEANT. The Boundary between Brigades cut the CANAL at a point 700 yards S. of SAINS-les-MARQUION, about half-way between that Village and INCHY. The N. Boundary of the Second Cdn. Division cut the CANAL at its intersection with the QUEANT-MARQUION RAILWAY (i.e., about 1,800 yards N. of MARQUION) and ran thence between VILLERS-les-CAGNICOURT and CAVNICOURT. The Fifty-sixth Division (British) was occupying the former Third Cdn. Division Front with the 167th and 168th Inf. Brigades in the Line.

On the night September 18th/19th No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., was relieved in the Line by No. 1 Company. No. 2 Company took up the positions vacated in the Support Area by No. 2 Company and No. 3 Company went into Divisional Reserve.

The following night, No. 3 Company took over from No. 2 Company the positions in Support of the 4th C.I.B. and on completion of this relief, No. 2 Company moved to the right and relieved the Guns of the Fifty-second Battalion, M.G.C. which were holding the Front taken over by the 5th C.I.B.

**Canadian Corps Units Holding the Line, September 22nd.**

The Table below gives Disposition of Infantry and Machine Gun Units on September 22nd :-

<b>Infantry Units.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Second Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Front.	Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.
5th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Right	No. 2 Company
25th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"E" Battery
26th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"G" Battery
24th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"F" Battery
22nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	"H" Battery (at Company H.Q.)
4th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Left	Nos. 1 and 3 Companies
20th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"C" Battery
21st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"A" Battery
19th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"D" Battery (on Right)
18th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	"B" Battery (Support on Left)
		"L" Battery (Reserve on Right)
		"M" Battery (Reserve on Left)
		"J" and "K" Batteries, Reserve at 3 Company H.Q.
10th C.I.B. (X)	Second Cdn. Div. Right Support	(att'd. from Fourth Cdn. Div.)
1st C.I.B. (Y)	Second Cdn. Div. Left Support	(att'd. from First Cdn. Div.)

(X) Machine Guns came into Line night 25th/26th.

(Y) Machine Guns came into Line night 26th/27th.



### **Preparations for Attack, September 23rd to 25th.**

In the Assault that was to be launched in a very few days, the 10th and 1st C.I.B.s were to be the leading Brigades. From their positions in Support to the 5th and 4th C.I.B.s respectively, they were now able to arrange with these Brigades any preliminary work they wished carried out. The G.O.C., 1st C.I.B. considered the Position on the 4th C.I.B. Front quite satisfactory and requested that the Troops in the Line should remain as quiet as possible.

The G.O.C., 10th C.I.B. wished the enemy driven back slightly on the 5th C.I.B. front so as to give the 10th C.I.B. a good Line on which to form up and in order that his assembly for the attack might not be greatly interfered with. Accordingly, the 5th C.I.B. started a series of small Patrol Operations and Minor Attacks. This work was well organized and cleverly executed. A comparatively large number of the enemy were killed and wounded while our losses were slight. The 5th C.I.Bn. was fighting continuously for five days and nights in these Minor Operations.

The Machine Gun Batteries prepared for the coming attack. Large Dumps of Ammunition were established. One of 500,000 Rounds was established at a point 100 yards N. of the crossing of the BARALLE-INCHY ROAD and the QUEANT-MARQUION RAILWAY; another 500,000 Rounds, in INCHY and a third, of 300,000 Rounds on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, 1,500 yards N. of the CANAL du NORD. All available Limbers were used in this work. At the same time all Batteries in forward positions were engaged in harassing the enemy and night firing was carried out systematically.

The minor operations of the 5th C.I.B. were carried out chiefly by the 25th C.I.Bn. and "E" Battery, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. was frequently called upon to support the attacks made by this Battalion. On the night September 23rd/24th Lieut. HOWARD took 2 Guns forward near ROLAND'S POST, 800 yards S.-E. of INCHY supporting one of these attacks. The Infantry reported that the Indirect Fire supplied by these Guns was very effective.

The following day, September 24th, movement was observed on the Bridge on the MARQUION-INCHY ROAD E. of INCHY and 2 Guns of No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., opened on this target at 4:30 P.M. At the same time, the 25th C.I.Bn. made another daylight attack supported by the Guns of "E" Battery. One of the targets engaged by this Battery was the WOOD just S.-E. of INCHY and when the Infantry advanced to this place they found over 50 dead Germans who had been killed, chiefly by Machine Gun Bullets. "E" Battery was firing from ROLAND'S POST at point-blank range : one of the Guns was knocked out after 5 minutes rapid fire.

Barrage Practices were carried out daily by Batteries who were to be engaged in Overhead Fire in support of Major Operations. Harassing fire was increased. The Artillery had cut Gaps in the Wire and the Machine Guns had kept these Gaps open with their Fire, preventing enemy Working Parties from repairing them. A great deal of movement was also seen on the Bridge described above and this was covered night and day by Machine Guns. During the 3 days, September 23rd to 25th, 250,000 Rounds of S.A.A. were expended on Harassing Fire.

On the night September 25th/26th, the Second Cdn. Division was relieved in the Line by the Divisions who were to carry out the Major Operations. On the Infantry being relieved, the Second Battalion Machine Gunners remained in the Line and carried out Indirect Fire with a view to keep the Gunners of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C., as fresh as possible and to keep from the enemy the fact that a Relief was taking place. 2 Batteries of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. remained in the Line and took part in the initial Machine Gun Barrage for the Operation on September 27th.



## **Capture of CANAL du NORD LINE and BOURLON WOOD, September 27th, 1918.**

### **Second Canadian Division Takes Over Line, September 26th.**

The Reliefs referred to above were completed during September 26th, the Second Cdn. Division being relieved in the Line by the Fourth and First Cdn. Divisions. The Line has already been described and had not materially changed during the fighting from September 5th to 26th. But although the Line remained fixed, our Troops were not inactive. Patrols had been busy all the time and skirmishes were frequent with hostile Patrols, more particularly on the extreme right where the 25th C.I.Bn. was endeavoring constantly to improve its position and to provide a satisfactory Jumping-off Line for the 10th C.I.B. attack.

On the extreme right the 5th C.I.B. was relieved by the 10th C.I.B., the 25th C.I.Bn. on Brigade Right, being relieved by elements of the 44th, 46th and 47th C.I.Bns. and the 24th C.I.Bn. in Support, by the 50th C.I.Bn. The remainder of the 5th C.I.B. was relieved by the 1st C.I.B., the 26th C.I.Bn. in the Front Line being relieved by the 4th C.I.Bn.

On the left the 4th C.I.B. was relieved by partly by the 3rd C.I.B. and partly by Regiments of the Fifty-sixth Division (British). The 20th C.I.Bn. (less 1 Company) was relieved in the Line by the 16th C.I.Bn. the remaining Company being relieved by a British Regiment. The 18th C.I.Bn., in the BUISSY SWITCH, was relieved by the 14th, 13th and 15th C.I.Bns. from right to left. On completion of these Reliefs the 4th and 5th C.I.B.s went into Corps Reserve.

### **General Plans of Operations : Corps Boundaries and Objectives.**

In the Operations about to follow, the Canadian Corps was to advance in such a way as to protect the left flank of the Third Army. These Operations were to take place in 2 Phases. The First Phase comprised the seizing of BOURLON WOOD and the high ground about PILGRIMS REST and la MAISON NEUVE with the left flank thrown back across the Plateau via SAUCHICOURT FARM to the CANAL du NORD. The Second Phase comprised the seizing of the Bridges over the CANAL de l' ESCAUT, N.-E. of CAMBRAI, and establishing the necessary Bridgeheads and at the same time capturing the high ground overlooking the SENSEE VALLY between the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and the CANAL du NORD.

The right of the Canadian Corps Frontage was a Line crossing the CANAL du NORD, 300 yards N. of MOEUVRES then in a S.-E. direction to the BAPAUME-CAMBRAI ROAD at ANUEUX CHAPEL (500 yards N. of ANUEUX) – thence along the BAPAUME ROAD to CAMBRAI but not including FONTAINE-notre-DAME. The left or N. Corps Boundary for the First Phase coincided with the YELLOW LINE. For the Second Phase it side-slipped to the right, the general Line being from SAINS-les-MARQUION to the S.-E. corner of EPINOY.

The Corps Objectives for the Operation were as follows ;-

**RED LINE** – From the CANAL du NORD N. of SAIN-les-MARQUION southwards along the MARQUION LINE to the southern boundary ; - cutting that at a point 1,500 yards S.-W. of BOURLON.

**GREEN LINE** – From the CANAL du NORD, 500 yards W. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, parallel to the ROAD for nearly 2,000 yards, then southwards almost parallel to the RED LINE about 1,000 yards E. of it, Bulging out a little to include BOURLON VILLAGE then curving in again on W. outskirts of BOURLON WOOD (i.e. the GREEN LINE included BOURLON VILLAGE but not BOURLON WOOD).

**BLUE LINE** – A Line drawn from FONTAINE-notre-DAME to SAUCHY l' ESTREE will coincide with the BLUE LINE except that from a point 1,000 yards W. of SAUCHY l' ESTREE the BLUE LINE swept around westwards to the CANAL du NORD.

**YELLOW LINE** – 2 Lines drawn, one from FONTAINE-notre-DAME to HAYNECOURT, the second from HAYNECOURT to SAUCHY l' ESTREE will give the approximate YELLOW LINE. The actual Line is a wide curve drawn with these Lines as tangents, and curving about 500 yards W. of HAYNECOURT.



**Tasks of Divisions.**

At Zero the Corps Front was held by the Fourth Cdn. Division on the right, the First Cdn. Division in the centre and the Eleventh Division (British) on the left. The Third Cdn. Division was in the rear of the First and Fourth Cdn. Divisions, and the Second Canadian Division was in Reserve, in the rear of the Third Division.

In the First Phase, the Fourth Cdn. Division on the right and the First Cdn. Division on the left were responsible for capturing the BLUE LINE and for establishing Patrols on the YELLOW LINE, which include the bulk of the enemy Battery positions.

The Third Cdn. Division and the Eleventh Division (British) would advance in the First Phase in rear of the Fourth and First Cdn. Divisions respectively. This supporting advance had to be very carefully regulated in order to avoid congestion of the Troops should the attacking Divisions receive a check. In this way, definite boundaries were allotted and, until the various Objectives were taken, these supporting Divisions were to remain W. of given Lines. For this reason, the Third Cdn. Division was not to cross the CANAL Bank until the GREEN LINE had been captured.

In the Second Phase the Third Cdn. Division were to attack on the right, the Fourth Cdn. Division in the right centre, the First Cdn. Division in the left centre and the Eleventh Division (British) on the left. The Second Cdn. Division was in Corps Reserve.

The Operation presented many difficulties, notwithstanding that the enemy was not holding the Front in any great strength. The advance was to be made to the greatest possible depth, yet care was to be taken to form a defensive flank to the N. for protection against enemy Troops holding the refused flank.

The first serious obstacle was the CANAL du NORD and great difficulty was contemplated in forcing a crossing. On the Fourth Divisional Front 3 crossings appeared in evidence as used by the enemy, but did not appear fit for traffic, Craters having been blown by the enemy. On the First Divisional Front a great part of the CANAL contained water, in places 4 feet deep. Consequently, on the Canadian Corps Front the CANAL could only be crossed on a Frontage of approximately 2,600 yards whereas the Frontage of the Third Objective (BLUE LINE) was approximately 10,000 yards. The passage of the whole First Cdn. Division through a narrow "*defile*" was the chief anxiety to the Divisional Commander, as it was realized that a heavy enemy concentration of Artillery and Gas in the congested forward Assembly Area, prior to Zero, would seriously affect the whole Operation.

Moreover the ground sloped on both sides of the CANAL du NORD, more steeply on the W. slopes. Consequently the preparations and assembly were under constant observation from the enemy. Numerous ditches on both sides of the CANAL, strong Nests of Machine Gunners on the E. bank of the CANAL and the Belts of Wire immediately E. of it, all made the initial Operation one of great difficulty.



**Canadian Corps Order of Battle and Machine Gun Tasks; September 27th.**

The following Table shows the Infantry Order of Battle, from right to left of the Canadian Corps Front, and Tasks of the Machine Gun Units in the Operations of September 27th :-

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Fourth Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Right.	Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C.
10th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Div. Front to RED LINE	No. 1 Company
47th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	Barrage to GREEN LINE :
50th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	then in Defensive Positions
44th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	on RED LINE
46th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left Support	No. 2 Company
11th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Div. Right from RED LINE	“E”, “F” and “G” Batteries
102 C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	supported 11th C.I.B. ;
87th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	“H” Battery Barrage to
75th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	GREEN LINE.
54th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left Support	No. 3 Company
12th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Div. Left from RED LINE	“J”, “K” and “M” Batteries
85th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	supported 12th C.I.B.
38th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	“L” Battery; Barrage to
78th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	GREEN LINE
72nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left Support	
First Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Left.	First Battalion, C.M.G.C.
1st C.I.B.	First Cdn. Div. Right to BLUE LINE	No. 1 Company (less “B” Bty.)
4th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front	supported 1st C.I.B.
1st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	No. 2 Company (less “H” Bty.)
2nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve Right	supported 2nd C.I.B.
3rd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve Left	No. 3 Company (less “K” Bty.)
3rd C.I.B.	First Cdn. Div. Left to BLUE LINE	“L” and “M” Batteries
14th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front to RED LINE	Barrage to GREEN LINE
13th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front from RED LINE	“J” Battery; Brigade Reserve.
15th C.I.Bn.	to leapfrog 13th C.I.Bn.	“B”, “H” and “K” Batteries
16th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	Divisional Reserve.
2nd C.I.B.	First Cdn. Div. Support	
Third Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Right Support	Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. (X)
11th Division (British)	Canadian Corps Left Support	

(X) No. 1 Company, Third Bn., C.M.G.C. fired Barrage for Fourth Cdn. Division to the GREEN LINE.



**Tasks and Assembly : Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

Machine Gun Tasks on the Fourth Cdn. Division Front were allotted as follows :-

No. 1 Company, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., was attached to the Fourth Cdn. Division for the purpose of firing a Rolling Barrage in support of the advance of the 10th C.I.B.

No. 2 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., less "H" Battery, and No. 3 Company less "L" Battery, were detailed to advance with the 11th and 12th C.I.B.s respectively, with the purpose of overcoming enemy strong points when necessary by Direct Fire and of assisting the Infantry to consolidate the ground won.

No. 1 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., plus "H" and "L" batteries were to advance with the 10th C.I.B. to the GREEN LINE at which point they were to come into action and engage any targets of opportunity offered by the enemy and to supply Direct Overhead Covering Fire for the advance of the 11th and 12th C.I.B.s on BOURLON WOOD and VILLAGE. These 6 Batteries, in order to centralize control were divided into 2 Groups. "A" Group consisted of "A", "B" and "H" Batteries under Captain K. WEAVER. "B" Group consisting of "C", "D" and "L" Batteries under Captain A. G. SCOTT, M.C. On completion of this Task "H" and "L" Batteries were to join their respective Companies, coming into Reserve to the 11th and 12th C.I.B.s.

Nos. 2 and 3 Companies (less "H" and "L" Batteries) had joined their respective Brigades (11th and 12th C.I.B.s) on September 19th in order to train with the Battalions which they were affiliated. These Companies moved to the Assembly Area with their respective Brigades. No. 1 Company plus "H" and "L" Batteries assembled behind the 10th C.I.B. on the night September 25th/26th.

No. 1 Company, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., moved into Barrage Positions on night September 26th/27th. "A" Echelon Transport for each Battery was under the direct control of the Battery Commander concerned throughout the Operation.

A sufficient number of expendable Belts had been received to permit of 150,000 Rounds S.A.A. to be loaded before Zero Day. This was held at Rear Battalion Headquarters for the purpose of forming advanced Dumps as soon as the situation would permit.

Reinforcements and Rations were collected by the Battery Transport ("A" Echelon) and taken forward daily.

**Action of Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., RED LINE.**

The 10th C.I.B. attacked on the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Frontage and captured the RED LINE. This involved the taking of the CANAL du NORD, the CANAL du NORD LINE and the MARQUION LINE. On the RED LINE, the 11th C.I.B. on the right and the 12th C.I.B. on the left leapfrogged the 10th C.I.B. to capture the GREEN and BLUE LINES.

The attack was launched at 5:20 A.M., supported by a very thick Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage. There was no previous Bombardment, but considerable Wire-cutting was carried out prior to the assault. A percentage of our Artillery Barrage was composed of Smoke and screened the advance from the high ground which dominated the front and left flank.

During the night rain had fallen and the ground was very slippery. Although fine, the morning was dark and it was difficult to see the progress of the Troops.

The 10th C.I.B. attacked on a 2-Battalion Front, the 47th C.I.Bn. being on the right and the 50th C.I.Bn. on the left. The 44th C.I.Bn. supported the 47th and the 46 C.I.Bn. supported the 50th. The Barrage was effective and the leading Troops advanced across the CANAL with few or no casualties. On approaching the CANAL du NORD LINE considerable Machine Gun Fire was encountered and a party of the enemy, about 50 strong, made a stand, causing considerable casualties. This Line however, was captured and the Troops were able to keep up with the Barrage. The MARQUION LINE, through the Wire of which gaps had been cut by the Artillery, was captured and at 7:15 A.M. our Troops were reported digging in on the RED LINE.



No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON), Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., (plus "H" and "L" Batteries) moved forward in rear of the 10th C.I.B., carrying Guns and Ammunition. 6-Men Crews were used. 4,000 Rounds S.A.A. per Gun were carried.

On crossing the CANAL, Batteries were rested and reorganized. Small Battery-Dumps of Ammunition were formed in order to lighten the loads, Men being sent back afterwards from the RED LINE to bring this forward.

During the advance to the RED LINE, the Fifty-second Division (British) on our right experienced trouble with enemy Machine Gun Nests. "H" Battery (Lieut. RYLEY) came into action and did most efficient work expending 7,500 Rounds on these targets. This Battery when on the RED LINE, secured several good targets of enemy Artillery and Infantry in the ANNEUX VALLEY. It then moved forward and sited Guns to prevent the enemy concentrating in the Sunken Roads and in the Valley in the vicinity of ANNEUX. These positions were retained during the night.

The remaining Batteries came into action in the RED LINE, arriving at their positions with the leading Infantry. These Batteries secured good targets as far E. as BOURLON VILLAGE and WOOD.

Direct Covering Fire was employed with good results during the advance of the 11th and 12th C.I.B.s. On conclusion of this Task, "H" and "L" Batteries reported to their respective Companies and No. 1 Company occupied defensive positions on the RED LINE which they maintained during the night September 27th/28th.

#### **Action of Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., GREEN and BLUE LINES.**

The 11th and 12th C.I.B.s leapfrogged the 10th C.I.B. on the RED LINE according to schedule.

The 11th C.I.B. attacked with the 102nd C.I.Bn. on the right and the 87th C.I.Bn. on the left. The 54th C.I.Bn. was to skirt the WOOD to the N. passing through the 87th C.I.Bn. The 102nd C.I.Bn. was to keep pace with the attack of the British Battalions, protecting their left, and endeavor to work through the S. portion of the WOOD and join hands with the 54th C.I.Bn. on the BLUE LINE, E. of the WOOD. The 75th C.I.Bn. in Brigade Reserve, was placed behind the 102nd C.I.Bn. on the right.

Owing to the fact that the Sixty-third (R.N.) Division was encountering difficulty S. of the WOOD, the advance of the 102nd C.I.Bn. was temporarily checked. The 54th and 87th C.I.Bns. however were able to advance along the N. edge of the WOOD and the S. edge of BOURLON VILLAGE. The 54th C.I.Bn. met considerable opposition and suffered many casualties in taking the enemy positions.

At 10:45 A.M. the GREEN LINE was captured.

Troops on the right had not come up so that further advance by the 11th C.I.B. was difficult. At 6:50 P.M. enemy Troops were massing in front of the 11th C.I.B. A counter-attack was impending but it was crushed before it could develop. Three enemy Battalions were involved in this counter-attack with severe losses to themselves. The 54th C.I.Bn. then pushed on towards FONTAINE-notre-DAME and occupied Trenches W. of the VILLAGE. This attack was followed shortly afterwards by the advance of the 87th C.I.Bn. to a Sunken Road situated half-way between FONTAINE-notre-DAME and RAILLENCOURT, on a line drawn through these 2 Villages, about 1,000 yards ahead of the YELLOW LINE. Owing to darkness Operations were then suspended for the day.

No. 2 Company (Major L. M. PEARCE, M.C.), Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. followed the 11th C.I.B., jumping off at ZERO plus 2 hours. These Batteries employed Limbers as far forward as the RED LINE. "G" Battery under Capt. S. JOHNSON, worked around the N. side of BOURLON WOOD using Pack Animals for half the distance. From here the Battery worked forward and came into contact with the enemy at the end of a Sunken Road on the E. outskirts of the WOOD. The Guns were brought into action here. Numerous Parties of the enemy retiring over the open were engaged. This Battery also assisted by Flanking and Overhead Fire, the attack of the 75th C.I.Bn. on Trenches E. of FONTAINE-notre-DAME.

"F" Battery (Capt. HOPPER, M.C.) found that the 102nd C.I.Bn. had difficulty working around the S. side of BOURLON WOOD. The Guns of this Battery were brought into action on the Western outskirts of the



WOOD. They were moved during dusk into defensive positions along the Southern end of the WOOD, touch being maintained with "G" Battery.

"E" Battery came into action behind "F" W. of BOURLON WOOD, and took up positions there in defence of the S. flank. On the left the 12th C.I.B. attacked with the 85th C.I.Bn. on the right, the 38th on the left, with the 78th and 72nd C.I.Bns. in the right and left Support.

The intention was that the Battalions in Support would leapfrog the leading Battalions on the GREEN LINE. Their advance met with considerable opposition. The left flank had to be refused along the Railway Running N. from BOURLON VILLAGE owing to the fact that the enemy held a strong position immediately E. of the Railway. Later on however the Brigade captured the BLUE Objective along the entire Divisional Front and the Troops exploited their success towards the YELLOW LINE.

During the evening, Orders were received from CORPS that the attack would be continued the next day by the Third Cdn. Division on the right and the 10th C.I.B. on the left. In order to provide suitable jumping-off positions, the Troops ahead of it were withdrawn to the BLUE LINE.

No. 3 Company (Capt. LOGAN), Fourth Battalion C.M.G.C., moved forward with the 12th C.I.B., several targets presenting themselves during the advance.

2 Guns of "J" Battery (Capt. HENDERSON), from positions just N.-E. of BOURLON WOOD successfully engaged an enemy Field Gun Battery firing over open sights from a point 1,000 yards W. of RAILLENCOURT.

No. 3 Company occupied positions for defence in depth during the night September 27th/28th.

#### **Tasks and Assembly of First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

Owing to the narrow Front available for the 1st C.I.B. to cross the CANAL du NORD, it was decided to attack to the RED LINE with the Battalions whose Task was to effect a crossing of the CANAL. This Task was assigned to the 4th C.I.B. The 1st C.I.Bn. in Brigade Support leapfrogged the leading Battalion on the RED LINE and advanced to the GREEN LINE. At this point the Brigade Frontage was considerably wider and so the 2 Battalions passed through the 1st C.I.Bn. on the GREEN LINE, the 2nd C.I.Bn. on the right and the 3rd C.I.Bn. on the left.

Just before Zero Hour the 1st C.I.B. was disposed as follows :- The 4th C.I.Bn. in the E. limits of INCHY-en-ARTOIS; The 1st C.I.Bn. in support in the lower end of the BUISSY SWITCH; The 2nd C.I.Bn. behind the 1st and the 3rd immediately behind the 2nd C.I.Bn.

The 3 Companies of the First Battalion C.M.G.C. had moved forward with their respective Brigade Groups to the HENDECOURT area on September 25th. During the night September 26th/27th, they moved by road into their Barrage positions and Assembly Area.

3 Batteries (1 from each Company) were retained in Divisional Reserve S.-E. of CAGINCOURT. Battalion H.Q. moved with Divisional Headquarters.

Arrangements for the Machine Gun Barrage were made and coordinated by the Corps Machine Gun Officer. Nos. 1 and 2 Companies (each less 1 Battery) were not firing in the Barrage but were attached to the 1st and 2nd C.I.B.s, respectively, to support them closely throughout. No. 3 Company (less 1 Battery) was to fire in the Machine Gun Barrage and after completion of this Task, come under the Orders of the G.O.C., 3rd C.I.B. to assist as required.



**Action of No. 1 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

At Zero Hour September 27th (5:20 A.M.), it was still dark. It had been raining all night and, although the morning was fine, the ground was wet and slippery and the going very hard. The Troops were thoroughly wet and cold. Hot food and rum was issued just before Zero. The Barrage opened sharp on time and the leading Troops moved forward. The enemy's Barrage fell behind the Assembly Area of the 4th C.I.Bn. and did not cause them any casualties.

The leading Company of the 4th C.I.Bn. attacked the CANAL in 4 places with one Platoon in support, each Party working right and left and mopping up the Garrison. The Company carried the attack to a point 100 yards E. of the CANAL where the 2 succeeding Companies leapfrogged the leading Company and with the Fourth Company in support, advanced to the RED LINE which was captured on time.

The First C.I.Bn. leapfrogged the 4th C.I.Bn. according to plan on the RED LINE. This Battalion pressed forward the attack vigorously, closely following the Barrage. The GREEN LINE was reached and captured on time, except on the right where the attack was held up by heavy fire from the Railway.

The 2nd and 3rd C.I.Bns. leapfrogged the 1st C.I.Bn. on its Objective on time. Their attack however, was held up soon after the jump-off by stiff resistance from the Railway about 2,000 yards N. of BOURLON VILLAGE. To deal with this situation the G.O.C., 1st C.I.B. asked that the Fourth Cdn. Division which could make progress where this Railway bent Eastward on their Front, should direct enfilade Fire on the resisting enemy. In the meantime however the 2 attacking Battalions of the First Division, with great drive and determination, had driven the enemy from the Railway at about noon and pushing forward, captured the BLUE LINE on their respective Fronts. Patrols were pushed out and the Line secured was consolidated. The 2nd and 3rd C.I.Bns. held the Front Line on the right and left respectively. On the right the Fourth Cdn. Division had not been able to take over the Front between the right boundary for the First Phase and the new Right Boundary for the Second Phase. Hence the 2nd C.I.Bn. had to remain in the Line on that Front and was responsible for its Defence until the following morning. On the left, the 2nd C.I.B. had leapfrogged the 3rd C.I.Bn. on the BLUE LINE according to program, and was relieved of the necessity of Front Line Vigilance.

All Batteries of No. 1 Company (Major E. R. MORRIS) First Battalion, C.M.G.C., were in positions of assembly several hours before Zero. "A" Battery organized a covering Barrage in support of the 4th C.I.Bn. At the completion of this task, this Battery was to assist the 3rd C.I.Bn. to the BLUE LINE. "C" Battery was to assist the 4th C.I.Bn. to the RED LINE, the 1st C.I.Bn. to the GREEN LINE and finally to help consolidate the BLUE LINE in support to the 2nd C.I.Bn. "D" Battery was to move forward to the high ground about 1,000 yards W. of BOURLON VILLAGE in support of the 1st C.I.Bn. and to employ Overhead Fire, after which this Battery was to assist in the consolidation of the BLUE LINE. "B" Battery was in Divisional Reserve.

At Zero Hour each Gun of "A" Battery (Lieut. DUDLY) fired approximately 1,500 rounds in Direct Overhead Supporting Fire which was mainly put down on the CANAL du NORD LINE, E. of INCHY and was lifted to the Defence Line, which consisted of a series of connected Shell Holes. This Barrage lasted half an hour.

The enemy Barrage fell close to the Gun positions but the Battery suffered no casualties. At Zero plus 70, "A" Battery moved off behind the 3rd C.I.Bn. and crossed the CANAL du NORD E. of the Village of INCHY in Artillery Formation, making their way rapidly forward with no trouble until they were about 1,000 yards E. of SAIN-les-MARQUION. At this point the Battery came under heavy Machine Gun Fire. The 3rd C.I.Bn. being held up, 6 Guns of the Battery got into action and excellent targets were obtained along the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, where large Parties of the enemy were seen. Fire was carried out for approximately one hour when the enemy were seen to retire and the advance was continued.

This Battery followed the 3rd C.I.Bn. and took up positions from which they could assist in the consolidation of the BLUE LINE. During the "Hold Up" the Battery expended a large amount of S.A.A., but at this juncture the Pack Mules arrived with further supply.

At Zero plus 7 minutes, "C" Battery (Capt. DEWART) moved forward with the 4th C.I.Bn. and crossed the CANAL du NORD with little opposition, entirely escaping the enemy Barrage. The Battery proceeded towards DELIGNY MILL and were met at this point by heavy Artillery and Machine Gun Fire. About 1,000 yards W. of BOURLON VILLAGE 4 Guns of this Battery came into action firing on good targets,



consisting of bodies of enemy Infantry in the direction of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. All Guns of the Battery came into action a little further forward and engaged Parties of the enemy Infantry and Machine Guns S. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. During this action Captain DEWART and Lieut. BRYNE were wounded. The Infantry was held up for a time at this point where the Railroad crosses the Sunken Road N. of BOURLON VILLAGE. As soon as the advance continued "C" Battery took up positions, assisting the Infantry to consolidate the BLUE LINE.

At Zero plus 15 minutes, "D" Battery (Capt. JORDAN) moved forward with the 4th C.I.Bn., crossed the CANAL du NORD at several points and reassembled S.-E. of SAINS les-MARQUION. At this point Lieut. WHITHLAW went forward to reconnoitre and found the Infantry checked at the MARQUION LINE, in front of BOURLON VILLAGE.

No.1 Section of "D" Battery came into action from positions in Shell-holes W. of this LINE and engaged the enemy Infantry and Machine Gun Posts in the Trenches ahead. When No. 2 Section arrived at this point it was noticed that a Field Gun in the vicinity of DELIGNY MILL was holding up the advance. Cpl. BEATIE moved 2 Guns forward and engaged this target while Lieut. Mc MULLEN and Sgt. COOMBE worked around the flank, rushed the Gun and captured it together with its Crew, which consisted of 10 Other Ranks.

No. 2 Section then moved forward to some deserted Gun Pits in the MARQUION LINE in front of BOURLON VILLAGE. From these positions about 3,000 Rounds S.A.A. were fired at enemy Infantry and Machine Guns directly N. of the Village, thus covering the advance of the 1st C.I.Bn.

At this point No. 1 Section salvaged 2 enemy Machine Guns and fired some 3,500 Rounds from them together with about 3,000 Rounds from our own Guns. This fire was laid on targets in BOURLON VILLAGE on our right flank. Just forward of the MARQUION LINE an enemy Machine Gun strongly entrenched, was causing considerable trouble. Pte. HOLLOWAY went forward with a Tank, and bayoneted the Gunner, shot 2 of the Crew and took 6 prisoners.

No. 2 Section moved forward to some Gun Pits E. of the MARQUION LINE and some 2,000 Rounds were expended along the Railway N. of these positions. After the resistance on the Railway had been overcome the Battery moved forward and took up their positions to assist in the consolidation of the GREEN LINE.

### **3rd C.I.B. Attack.**

On the 3rd C.I.B. Front the initial attack was to be made with one Battalion, owing to the narrow Front available. This task was assigned to the 14th C.I.Bn. who were also to capture and mop up the CANAL du NORD LINE, the RED LINE and to attack the Village of SAINS-les-MARQUION from the E. The 13th C.I.Bn. in support was to push forward and capture the GREEN LINE on the Brigade Front; then to attack the CANAL du NORD LINE in enfilade and mop up as far N. as the GREEN LINE; then turn W. and clean up KEITH WOOD and the WOODS E. of the CANAL and to capture the Village of MARQUION. The 15th C.I.Bn. was to leapfrog the 13th C.I.Bn. on the GREEN LINE and attacking N. to capture the BLUE LINE. The 16th C.I.Bn. was in Brigade Reserve.

Prior to Zero Hour September 27th, Units were in their Assembly Area, the 14th C.I.Bn. in PAVILAND WOOD and vicinity, the 13th C.I.Bn. back of the 14th in and in front of the BUISSY SWITCH, the 15th C.I.Bn. in the BUISSY SWITCH, N. of the 13th C.I.Bn. and the 16th C.I.Bn. N. of the 14th C.I.Bn. Assembly Area. The 14th C.I.Bn. attacked the CANAL du NORD with 2 Companies. The capture of the CANAL was in itself an extraordinary achievement. Ditches had to be forded and the W. Bank of the CANAL was cut square and stoutly defended by enemy Machine Guns. In spite of these difficulties, the CANAL was captured and the attacking Battalion moved Eastwards close behind the Barrage. The thick Belts of Wire were found to have been well cut by the Artillery and the RED LINE was captured on time. The Lock just E. of the CANAL caused considerable trouble, as enemy Machine Gunners were in strong positions which could not be attacked as the Barrage was still playing on the Lock. The Guns in these positions were finally silenced, 2 of the Crew being killed by Artillery Fire and the remainder by Snipers.

At 7:20 A.M. the internal Barrage, previously organized opened and the Reserve Company of the 14th C.I.Bn. followed it and attacked SAIN-les-MARQUION from the S.-E. This village was cleared of the enemy at 9:15 A.M. The 14th C.I.Bn. suffered many casualties, including the Commanding Officer, Major PRICE.



The 13th C.I.Bn. following closely behind the 14th C.I.Bn. waded the ditches W. of the CANAL and crossed the latter close to the Brigade Southern Boundary. The leading Company leapfrogged the 14th C.I.Bn. on the right and, attacking due E. kept pace with the Troops of the 1st C.I.B. on the right, capturing the GREEN LINE on time, after hard fighting.

The Companies following, turning N. met heavy opposition. The Wire was heavy and 2 Tanks that had been detailed to cut the Wire had not been able to come up. The WOODS on the E. Bank of the CANAL had not been cleared of the enemy between MARQUION and SAINS-les-MARQUION. The CANAL was impassible opposite these WOODS and this fact enabled the enemy in these positions to direct Machine Gun Fire on the 15th C.I.Bn. and the Eleventh Division (British) which was to cross the CANAL N. of SAINS-les-MARQUION.

Owing to this delay the enemy defence had stiffened considerably after the first onslaught. However the 15th C.I.Bn. and the 13th C.I.Bn. organized a joint attack and, with the assistance of 1 Company of the MANCHESTERS (Eleventh Division), cleared the balance of MARQUION and captured the GREEN LINE N. and E. of it. After this, the enemy resistance weakened considerably.

The 15th C.I.Bn. then leapfrogged the 13th C.I.Bn. on the GREEN LINE and pushing on, captured the BLUE LINE on the whole Brigade Front at 2:00 P.M.

Troops of the Eleventh Division (British) passed through the 15th C.I.Bn. on the BLUE LINE at 2:30 P.M. and advanced successfully. On this being evident, the 3rd C.I.B. was assembled in Bivouacs near SAINS-les-MARQUION ready to occupy and hold the Railway, in case of Counter-attack.

During the initial Phase the First Cdn. Divisional Artillery was employed on a special Barrage. At Zero the Barrage rolled forward to the Wire of the CANAL du NORD where it rested. At Zero plus 128 minutes the Barrage rolled back, the 14th C.I.Bn. followed it Westward as it unrolled. This is probably the first occasion on which an attack was carried out with the Barrage rolling back towards the Guns, and it was a great success.

### **No. 3 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The Guns of No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM, M.C.) First Battalion C.M.G.C., did not come under Orders of the 3rd C.I.B. until the afternoon of September 27th. From Zero Hour "L" and "M" Batteries were employed on Barrage work. (X). "J" Battery was in Brigade Reserve W. of the BUISSY SWITCH. "K" Battery was in Divisional Reserve.



**Task of No. 2 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The task of the 2nd C.I.B. in the First Phase was to be carried out by the 7th C.I.Bn., which would leapfrog the 13th C.I.Bn. on the GREEN LINE N. of the 1st C.I.B. and capture the BLUE LINE between the Brigade Boundaries. Strong Patrols would then be pushed out to the Line of Exploitation, the YELLOW LINE. The 5th and 10th C.I.Bns. were to cross the CANAL in their own time and assemble in the vicinity of the RED LINE, remaining there until the BLUE LINE was captured. They would not be employed in the First Phase.

Upon the capture of the BLUE LINE the 5th C.I.Bn., followed by the 10th C.I.Bn., would advance from the RED LINE and jump-off from the BLUE LINE through the 3rd and 7th C.I.Bns. in conjunction with the 32nd Infantry Brigade (British) on the left. The 5th C.I.Bn. would capture HAYNECOURT on the high ground immediately in front of it and the 10th C.I.Bn. would then carry the attack forward.

When the Troops of the Eleventh Division (British) passed through the 8th and 7th C.I.Bns. the 8th C.I.Bn. would pass through the 5th C.I.Bn. and come into support of the 10th C.I.Bn. The 7th C.I.Bn. would move an hour and a half after the 8th C.I.Bn. to the vicinity of HAYNECOURT in Reserve. This latter part of the Operation entailed a difficult side-slip on the part of the 2nd C.I.B.

No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM, D.C.M.), First Battalion, C.M.G.C. was attached to the 2nd C.I.B. "E", "F" and "G" Batteries were detailed to support the 5th, 10th and 7th C.I.Bns. respectively. They were to assist the advance by bringing Overhead Fire to bear on points of resistance and to dispose their Guns for Consolidation in Depth of all Objectives gained. "G" Battery was to watch particularly for any massing of the enemy's Troops W. of EPINOY and would remain in position until the Eleventh Division (British) had passed through.

**Attack of 2nd C.I.B. to BLUE LINE.**

The 7th C.I.Bn. started off 2 hours after Zero in order to reach the GREEN LINE at Zero plus 4 hours. No casualties were suffered until close to the CANAL itself. Crossing was affected near the Divisional S. Boundary and the advance was continued astride the Road S.-E. of SAINS-les-MARQUION. Enemy Shelling and Machine Gun Fire was considerable from the Village and all Companies suffered casualties.. At this time the 13th C.I.Bn. was held up in the Valley E. of KEITH WOOD and so the 7th C.I.Bn. could not get into their jump-off positions. The Barrage by this time had moved on and elements of the 13th C.I.Bn. were doggedly trying to work their way forward. The 7th C.I.Bn. attacked, with their left in KEITH WOOD, and passing through the 13th C.I.Bn. on the GREEN LINE, took up the fight.

The fighting at this time had developed into individual Rifle and Machine Gun Struggles against strong Bodies of the enemy along the CAMBRAI ROAD and in the Eastern outskirts of MARQUION. With the aid of a local Barrage, quickly organized, this resistance was beaten down and the advance continued. The ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD was crossed at noon and from here onwards the enemy resistance consisted only of isolated Machine Gun Nests and Trench Mortar Batteries N.E. of the BOIS du COORET.

The BLUE LINE was captured at 2:00 P.M. and Patrols were pushed forward to the YELLOW LINE.

The situation was quiet during the afternoon and at 4:00 P.M. the Eleventh Division (British) passed through the 7th C.I.Bn. attacking towards EPINOY, apparently without much opposition.

The 8th C.I.Bn. followed the 7th in support throughout but was not called upon to assist. 2 Companies were ordered up to reinforce the 7th C.I.Bn. on the BLUE LINE.



**Attack of the 2nd C.I.B. to YELLOW LINE.**

In accordance with previous Instructions, the 5th and 10th C.I.Bns. moved forward in Reserve throughout the First Phase, marching to their Rendezvous on the RED LINE.

In the Second Phase of the attack the 5th C.I.Bn. swept across the BLUE LINE at 3:20 P.M. and advanced rapidly. HAYNECOURT and the high ground E. and N. of this Village were soon in our possession.

This advance met with no opposition frontally. On the left also the 32nd Infantry Brigade of the Eleventh Division (British) advanced quickly towards EPINOY and relieved us of anxiety on that flank. On the right, however, there was no sign of any attacking Troops and the enemy, un-attacked, brought very heavy enfilading Fire to bear on the First Division. As the advance continued this situation became increasingly serious. The fighting which followed was of a very strenuous nature. The 10th C.I.Bn. leapfrogged the 5th C.I.Bn. on the Road E. of HAYNECOURT. Enemy Machine Guns and Field Guns were firing point-blank into the advancing Companies from behind Wire on the high ground E. of HAYNECOURT. Battle Patrols with great dash swept around the fire and cleared the situation. Just W. of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD a strong, thick, continuous Belt of Wire was encountered. This could not be flanked. In the teeth of enemy Machine Gun Fire the Troops commenced cutting this Wire by hand. Passages were eventually cut after severe casualties had been suffered. The enemy Machine Guns were disposed of and the Troops crossed the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. E. of the Road further Belts of Wire were encountered and heavy Machine Gun Fire from well concealed positions contested our advance. Enemy Artillery too was concentrated on our narrow Front.

Both flanks were in the air, particularly the right flank, the Fourth Cdn. Division being still on the BLUE LINE. All the high ground within the Divisional Boundaries had been captured. Consequently it was decided to consolidate the positions gained along the Sunken Road E. of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD.

At dusk the enemy attacked the flank E. of HAYNECOURT, under covering Fire from Artillery and Machine Guns firing direct. The 5th C.I.Bn. gave a little ground but the attack was stopped by Rifle and Machine Gun Fire S. of the Village. The defence of the Line was then strengthened, the 10th C.I.Bn. held the Front Line facing E. the 5th C.I.Bn. held the defensive flank on the S. Boundary of HAYNECOURT and pushed out Battle Patrols in touch with the 10th C.I.Bn. E. of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. The 8th C.I.Bn. had 2 Companies on the defensive flank S. and W. of HAYNECOURT; the other 2 Companies being in close support N.-W. of HAYNECOURT. The 7th C.I.Bn. reorganized and came into Brigade Reserve in the vicinity of the YELLOW LINE.

At 11:00 P.M. an S.O.S. Line had been established around the Brigade Front and Flanks. Touch was established with the Eleventh Division (British) on the left at the S.-E. corner of EPINOY. Machine Guns were redistributed on the whole Brigade Front and everything possible was done to strengthen the positions.

**Action of No. 2 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. to BLUE LINE.**

No. 1 Section of "G" Battery (Capt. MAYNARD), under Lieut. BALFE, M.C., advanced with the leading Company of the 7th C.I.Bn. Passing through PAVILAND WOOD and crossing the CANAL at Lock 3 E. of INCHY, this Section halted on the Railway N. of SAINS-les-MARQUION. From here on the Section came under heavy Rifle and Machine Gun Fire. They pushed on through KEITH WOOD. On the S. outskirts of MARQUION an enemy strong point held up the advance. Corporal WILSON immediately opened Fire at point-blank range. Two other Guns were pushed forward in Shell-holes and opened Fire. Corporal WILSON then rushed his Crew, to the flank and enfiladed the strong points. Severe casualties were inflicted and the Infantry coming up, the strong point was rushed. Over 50 prisoners were taken and 6 Light Machine Guns.

One Company of the 7th C.I.Bn. had pushed well over on the left to help the 3rd C.I.Bn. Lieut. BALFE followed closely behind this Company with his Section and came into action again on the MARQUION LINE, W. of DATFORD WOOD, firing on large bodies of the enemy in the vicinity of SAUCHICOURT FARM. 4,000 Rounds of S.A.A. were expended and heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. The advance then continued in a N.-E. direction and the Guns went forward to positions in the Sunken Road 2,000 yards W. of EPINOY.



No. 2 Section under Lieut. HARRIS, moved to INCHY and crossed the CANAL du NORD E. of this Village. The advanced about 2,000 yards N.-E. and then pushed up the MARQUION LINE, coming into action on this LINE about 1,000 yards S. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, firing at enemy positions Eastward along the Main Road. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy. The Guns then moved forward to their positions for defence S. of the BOIS du COORET.

Capt. MAYNARD, O.C., "G" Battery was wounded in the face by a Shell when moving forward with the 7th C.I.Bn. Headquarters. Lieut. BALFE, M.C., was placed in command of "G" Battery. During the night this Battery side-slipped into positions N. of HAYNECOURT.

#### **Action of No. 2 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. to YELLOW LINE.**

"E" Battery (Lieut. Mac INTOSH, M.C.) moved off with the leading Company of the 5th C.I.Bn. at 5:00 A.M. This Battery crossed the CANAL E. of INCHY, having met their Limbers at the cross-roads between CAGNICOURT and QUEANT. One of the Limbers was destroyed E. of SAINES-les-MARQUION. The Section then moved E. to the MARQUION LINE.

No. 1 Section under Lieut. GILLARD, moved N.-E. and halted just S. of the main ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. At this point the Limbers were unloaded and the advance continued E. until HAYNECOURT was reached. The Section skirted the Village on the S. side and the Guns came into action at this point. All 4 Guns got good targets of retreating Parties of the enemy. The Section then moved N. around the Village of HAYNECOURT and took up positions in the Sunken Road from where they fired on Parties of the enemy crossing the DOUAI ROAD. The Section was then moved back as they were too far ahead of the 5th C.I.Bn. and the left flank was exposed; to protect this flank, the Guns were mounted W. of HAYNECOURT.

No. 2 Section under Lieut. BATTERSHILL, left No. 1 Section about 1,000 yards E. of SAINES-les-MARQUION and moved N.-E. across the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, past the S. edge of LEEK WOOD where the Guns came into action, engaging retreating Parties of the enemy which were moving towards EPINOY. These Parties were thought to be Machine Gun Groups and many casualties were inflicted on them. The Section then continued to move along the Northern Divisional Boundary, 2 Guns firing on an enemy Battery moving behind EPINOY. The Gun under Sgt. KEARSE fired a burst on an enemy Wagon seen moving E. of HAYNECOURT. The Wagon turned and Pte. LUMSDEN and Cpl. ELLIS rushed out and captured the vehicle. The Drivers surrendered and our 2 men mounted the 2 pair of horses and brought the Wagon back to our Lines.

"F" Battery (Lieut. HERRIDGE), moved off at 7:30 A.M. in front of the 10th C.I.Bn. At 10:30 A.M. the Battery crossed the CANAL du NORD and unloaded the Limbers N.-E. of INCHY. From here the Battery moved N.-E. in front of the Village of SAINES-les-MARQUION until the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD was reached. Here the Battery came under Shell and Machine Gun Fire.

Fire was directed against enemy Batteries of Field Guns between the Villages of HAYNECOURT and RAILLENCOURT. Fire was also brought to bear from the outskirts HAYNECOURT on enemy Batteries E. of HAYNECOURT and on Troops on the Road W. of the MARCOING LINE, beyond the Village of RAILLENCOURT. Over 5,000 Rounds were expended and several casualties inflicted. Also a number of the Battery horses were seen to fall.

At 5:30 P.M. the Guns of "F" Battery were brought back N. of HAYNECOURT, as the position of the Front Line was indefinite, and the left flank was exposed. The Guns remained here for the night.

#### **Batteries in Reserve, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

"B" , "H" and "K" Batteries were in Divisional Reserve for the First Phase of the BOULON WOOD Operations commencing September 27th.

These 3 Batteries were assembled in old Trenches, half-way between HENDECOURT and CAGNICOURT and at 6:00 A.M. they moved forward to a position immediately N. of BOIS d' INCHY. Capt. MATTHEWS was in command of the Reserve Batteries.



At 5:45 P.M. Orders were received from the O.C., First Battalion C.M.G.C., (Lt.-Col. WATSON, D.S.O.), to move the Batteries forward to positions E. of SAIN-les-MARQUION. The Batteries were in these positions by 7:30 P.M.

At 8:55 P.M., Orders were received from the First Cdn. Division to send 2 Batteries to defend the right flank of the 2nd C.I.B. which was situated at that time E. and S.-E. of HAYNECOURT. These Batteries were sent forward immediately and were disposed for Defence in Depth on the desired flank at 10: 40 P.M. They remained there during the night.

### **Organization of Machine Gun Barrage Batteries.**

A Machine Gun Barrage coordinated with the Artillery Barrage was organized, in support of the initial attack on September 27th, along the whole Corps Front. 24 Batteries, each of 8 Guns, were detailed to fire on this Barrage, which was extended by the XXII Corps on their Front.

Owing to the depth of the advance contemplated by the Infantry and consequent deep advance of the Machine Guns in support, the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., did not participate in the Corps Barrage. For the same reason the First Battalion, C.M.G.C., supplied only 2 Batteries.

On the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Front, 4 Batteries (No. 1 Company) of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., fired a Barrage in support of the advance of the 10th C.I.B. For this Task, these Batteries came under the command of the Fourth Cdn. Division. From positions immediately S. of INCHY, these 4 Batteries laid a Barrage on a Line N. to S. which rested at Zero on the CANAL Bank on the left flank of the 10th C.I.B. Front, and 300 yards W. of the CANAL on the right flank. From that Line, the Barrage traveled Eastwards in Lifts of 100 yards every 4 minutes as far E. as QUARRY WOOD, roughly 1,000 yards W. of the RED LINE.

This Barrage was the right wing of the Barrage which ran W. to E. extending as far as the RED LINE. It was continued on the left, in the First Cdn. Division Area by all 8 Batteries forming the right sub-groups, under Major TRENCH, and consisting of 4 Batteries of the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades.

The left sub-groups under Major GRANTHAM, M.C., constituted as shown in the Table below, laid down a Barrage which opened at Zero plus 90 minutes on the RED LINE. The left of the Barrage rested on the CANAL du NORD and its average width was 2,000 yards. It traveled almost N. (i.e., in the direction of the CANAL du NORD) in Lifts of 100 yards through MARQUION, until at Zero plus 400, it reached SAUCHY-LESTREE (i.e., N. of the BLUE LINE) where it ended. The rate of progress of this Barrage varied. For 20 minutes from the RED LINE it lifted 100 yards every 4 minutes, then 100 yards every 10 minutes up to Zero plus 180 minutes. From the Southern outskirts of MARQUION to the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, the Barrage only traveled 400 yards in 70 minutes. From there Northwards to SAUCHY-LESTREE, it lifted 100 yards every 5 minutes.



**Organization of Machine Gun Barrage; September 27th.**

The following Table shows the Organization of the Machine Gun Barrage as coordinated by the Corps Machine Gun Officer, Brig.-Gen. BRUTINEL :-

<b>Divisional Front. `</b>	<b>Sub-Group.</b>	<b>Battery No.</b>	<b>Unit.</b>	<b>Barrage Position.</b>
Fourth Canadian	A	1-4	Third Bn., C.M.G.C.	S. of INCHY.
First Canadian	B	5-8	1st C.M.M.G. Bde.	N. of INCHY.
	C	9-12	2nd C.M.M.G.Bde.	S.-W. of SAINS-les-MARQUION.
	D	13-16	2nd Bn., C.M.G.C.	N.-W. of SAINS-les-MARQUION.
First Canadian	E	17-20	2nd Bn., C.M.G.C.	E. of BARALLE.
	F	21-22	11th Bn., M.G.C.	N.-W. of MARQUION
	G	23-24	1st Bn., C.M.G.C.	2,500 yards W. of SAUCHY CAUCHY.

Batteries No. 1 to 12 laid down the Barrage running W. to E. for the capture of the RED LINE; Batteries 13 to 24 laid down the Barrage running S. to N. for the advance from the RED to the BLUE LINE.

The Barrage laid down by the Left Sub-Groups was arranged in such a way as to cover the swampy ground extending from just N. of SAINS-les-MARQUION to the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and N. of this to SAUCHY-LESTREE. This is practically the Basin of the AGACHE RIVER. In depth it extended over the CANAL du NORD and the MARQUION LINE, which was the enemy's main LINE of DEFENCE covering the CANAL du NORD.

The attack was planned with a view to leaving the Swamp as a pocket and the Machine Gun Fire was intended to keep down the Snipers from the trees and disorganize the defence, while the main attack proceeded S. of the Swamp over the dry part of the CANAL.

**Action of Barrage Machine Guns.**

At 5:20 A.M., September 27th, all Guns in the Right Sub-Group opened Fire and followed out the programs as laid down, with the exception of a few short periods which Fire had to ease owing to our Infantry passing forward through the Guns.

Hostile Artillery was active during the first 60 minutes of the Barrage; particularly around the positions occupied by "B" Sub-Group. Hostile Machine Gun Fire was not noticeable to any extent until Zero plus 90, after which several Guns in the WOOD 500 yards N. of SAINS-les-MARQUION on the E. Bank of the CANAL du NORD were active and caused several casualties in "C" Sub-Group.

After the Firing Programs had been completed, Belts were refilled. At Zero plus 6 hours it was found possible to bring up the Transport to the Guns. Previous to that hour, no Transport except Ammunition and R. E. Stores was allowed forward. At Zero plus 7 hours, all Batteries rejoined their respective Brigades.

The total quantity of S.A.A. expended by these Sub-Groups was over 320,000 Rounds.

"D", "E" and "F" Sub-Groups opened Fire on their allotted targets at the times specified, and having completed their various Tasks without difficulty withdrew according to Instructions. The Ammunition expended by these Sub-Groups was as follows :-

"D" Sub-Group	241,000 Rounds.
"E" Sub-Group	146,000 Rounds.
"F" Sub-Group	73,000 Rounds.
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>460,000 Rounds.</b>



“G” Sub-Group advanced with their Limbers at Zero plus 160 minutes and moved forward towards their Barrage positions which were very close to the W. Bank of the CANAL just N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. 3 Guns reached this location but the remainder were laid up 1,000 yards W. by heavy Machine Gun Fire from the vicinity of MARQUION. These 3 Guns fired 2,500 Rounds at Parties of the enemy moving on the other side of the CANAL. Several attempts were made to get more Ammunition to these Guns but every Man who started forward from the Dump, 1,000 yards in rear of the Battery positions, became a casualty. At 1:15 P.M. our Troops had reached their Objective and “G” Sub-Group assembled and withdrew to positions N. of BARALLE.

**Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

Only 1 Company of the Third Bn. C.M.G.C., Lt.-Col. MOORHOUSE was in action on September 27th. No. 3 Company, with the 9th C.I.B., and No. 2 Company, with the 7th C.I.B., crossed the CANAL du NORD in the afternoon and prepared to go forward on the following day.



**Operations, September 28th, 1918.****General.**

During the night September 27th/28th, the Third Cdn. Division relieved a portion of the Fourth Cdn. Division, and the Third, Fourth and First Cdn. Divisions and the Eleventh Division (British) took up their Battle positions from right to left of the Corps Frontage. The Third and Fourth Cdn. Divisions attacked at 6:00 A.M. September 28th. In view of the advanced position reached in the advance of the previous day, the First Cdn. Division did not attack until 9:00 A.M. September 28th. On the Third Cdn. Division Front the 9th C.I.B. attacked on the right, the 7th C.I.B. on the left. The 10th C.I.B. attacked on the Fourth Division Front, in the right centre of the Corps, and the 2nd C.I.B. on the First Division Front, in the Corps left centre.

The Third Cdn. Division succeeded in penetrating the MARCOING LINE and the Fourth Cdn. Division made good progress, our Troops pushing through RAILLENCOURT and SAILLY. Enemy Machine Gun Fire was intense and heavy fighting took place. Our Troops reached the Western outskirts of ST. OLLE on the right and captured RAILLENCOURT in the face of determined enemy opposition. During the evening, another attempt was made to push forward and our troops were reported to have reached the Western outskirts of ST. REMY and to be holding the Line along the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. The Eleventh Division (British) established Posts in AUBENCHEUL-au-BAC and captured BOIS de QUESNOY.

**Canadian Corps Order of Battle; September 28th.**

The Order of Battle of Canadian Corps Infantry and Machine Gun Units attacking on September 28th is shown in the following Table :-

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Third Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Right	Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.
9th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Right	No. 3 Company
43rd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"M" Battery
52nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"L" Battery
58th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	"J" and "K" Batteries
7th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Left	No. 2 Company
R.C.R.	Brigade Right	"F" Battery
P.P.C.L.I.	Brigade Left	"G" Battery
49th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"H" Battery
42nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	"E" Battery
Fourth Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Right Centre	Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.
10th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Division Front	No. 1 Company with
47th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"H" Battery from
50th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	No. 2 Company and "L" Battery
44th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	from No. 3 Company.
46th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left Support	
First Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Left Centre.	First Battalion, C.M.G.C.
2nd C.I.B.	First Cdn. Division Front	No. 2 Company
10th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front	
8th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
5th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
7th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	
Eleventh Division (British)	Canadian Corps Left.	



### **Third Canadian Division, Infantry Action.**

It was intended that the Third Cdn. Infantry Division with 2 Brigades should take over the right Front of the Fourth Cdn. Division from the 11th C.I.B. on the morning of September 28th. This was not possible, however as, during the previous evening's fighting, all attempts of the 11th C.I.B. to reduce FONTAINE-notre-DAME were unsuccessful. It was arranged, therefore, that in place of relieving the 11th C.I.B. the Third Cdn. Division would attack through them.

The Third Cdn. Division attacked the MARCOING LINE and FONTAINE-notre-DAME at 6:00 A.M. September 28th, the 9th C.I.B. on the right and the 7th C.I.B. on the left.

The right flank of the 9th C.I.B. was exposed during the initial stages owing to the Division on their right being held up. The 10th C.I.Bn. (attached from the Fourth Cdn. Division) protected this flank with covering Fire from the Southern edge of BOURLON WOOD. Machine Gun Fire was also kept up on this flank. By 9:00 A.M. the 43rd C.I.Bn. had captured the Village of FONTAINE. The 52nd C.I.Bn. attacked the MARCOING LINE but was held up by Machine Gun Fire before gaining their objective. At this stage, the Line ran from about 800 yards S.-E. of FONTAINE to the Eastern edge of the Village on the BAPAUME-CAMBRAI ROAD, thence across the Front Line of the MARCOING System. Resistance encountered here was so strong that another attack was planned under cover of an Artillery Barrage for 3:00 P.M. Owing to difficulty of coordination and the supply of Ammunition, this was postponed to 7:00 P.M. The First Part of this Operation was successful. The MARCOING LINE as far S. as the CAMBRAI-BAPAUME ROAD was captured. The 116th C.I.Bn went through the MARCOING LINE and one Company reached the Western outskirts of ST. OLLE.

At 11:00 P.M. the 43rd C.I.Bn. were holding the Line facing S.-E. astride the CAMBRAI-BAPAUME ROAD, in touch with a Pocket of the R. I. Fusiliers on the right.

The 58th C.I.Bn. were in the MARCOING LINE, with the 52nd C.I.Bn. in close Support.

The 116th C.I.Bn. had 3 Companies in the MARCOING LINE in touch with the 7th C.I.B. on the left and one Company in the Western outskirts of ST. OLLE. During the day's Operations, very heavy casualties were suffered from Machine Gun Fire from the MARCOING LINE and from the Trench in front of ST. OLLE.

### **Action of 3 Company, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

No. 3 Company (Capt. BURNHAM), Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., was allotted to the 9th C.I.B. for the Operations on September 28th and crossing the CANAL in the afternoon of September 27th, Bivouacked in QUARRY WOOD for the night.

"M" Battery (Lieut. GERMAN) went into action with the 43rd C.I.B. on the right of the 9th C.I.B. Front at 8:00 A.M., September 28th. The Guns were disposed in positions near FONTAINE-notre-DAME to protect the right flank of the attack.

"L" Battery (Lieut. SHEARER) went forward on the left of the 9th C.I.B. with the 52nd C.I.Bn. at 6:30 A.M. September 28th. The Battery advanced in depth until the 52nd C.I.Bn. was held up in the Sunken Road near the MARCOING LINE. The Battery then took up positions commanding this Line with Direct Overhead Fire. From these positions 8,000 rounds were fired. Two enemy Machine Guns were put out of action and numerous casualties were inflicted on the enemy.

"J" and "K" Batteries were in Brigade Reserve.



**Action of No. 2 Company, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The 7th C.I.B. attack on the left of the Third Cdn. Division, progressed favorably and the MARCOING LINE was captured at 8:50 A.M. Strong opposition was encountered in the MARCOING SUPPORT LINE and the attack was held up. At 11:20 A.M., however the R.C.R. on the right of the 7th C.I.B. Front penetrated portions of this Line and worked forward along the Sunken Road on their right Front in order to destroy enemy Machine Guns. The P.P.C.L.I. assisted in this Operation from their positions on the left. Shell Fire and Machine Gun Fire was intense and many casualties were suffered.

At this Stage a second attack was planned under cover of Artillery Fire and this attack was launched at 7:00 P.M. The MARCOING LINE was captured right along the Front and the Light Railway, 1,000 yards N.-E. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, was also reached.

At 11:00 P.M. the 49th C.I.Bn. had crossed the Light Railway just N. of ST. OLLE and the P.P.C.L.I. had 3 Companies on the S. side of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD with Patrols pushed out in front and were in touch with the Fourth Cdn. Division on the left. No. 2 Company (Major FOWLER, M.C.), Third Bn., C.M.G.C. was detailed to cooperate with the 7th C.I.B. in these Operations. During the night September 27th/28th, "E" and "H" Batteries moved up to positions of Support, 500 yards N. of BOURLON VILLAGE. "F" and "G" Batteries moved forward to positions on the BLUE LINE from which the R.C.R. and P.P.C.L.I. were to jump-off in their attack on September 28th.

"F" and "G" Batteries pushed off with the Infantry. On the left, the P.P.C.L.I. were held up and "G" Battery did not get into action until later. "F" Battery, however succeeded in reaching a position just S. of RAILLENCOURT and brought Fire to bear on the MARCOING LINE, just S. of its junction with the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD.

Later on in the morning, the 49th C.I.Bn. attacked, supported by "H" Battery which moved forward with them, and by "F" Battery which took up positions E. of SAILLY. From these positions they supported the attack with good effect, sweeping the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and the VILLAGE of ST.OLLE with their Fire. "H" Battery assisted the Operations on the right by taking up positions in the MARCOING LINE, 1,000 yards S. of SAILLY, and Firing on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD and targets in the vicinity of ST. OLLE. "E" Battery was in Reserve with the 42nd C.I.Bn. during the day and did not participate in these Operations.

**No. 1 Company, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

No. 1 Company (Major HARTLEY M.C., M.M.), Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. was with the 8th C.I.B. in Reserve during the day. Batteries were massed with Battalions behind BOURLON WOOD and were preparing to assist in the attack which was planned for September 29th.

**Action of Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

At 6:00 A.M. September 28th, the 10th C.I.B. Fourth Cdn. Division, attacked with the 47th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 50th C.I.Bn. on the left. Little opposition was encountered up to the MARCOING LINE and the outskirts on RAILLENCOURT where very heavy Machine Gun Fire was encountered. The attack progressed in spite of this opposition and the 47th C.I.Bn. passed around the N. of RAILLENCOURT and the 50th C.I.Bn. reached the MARCOING LINE after severe fighting.

These 2 Battalions were followed closely by the 44th and 46th C.I.Bns. which leapfrogged them on the SAILLY-HAYNECOURT ROAD, N. of SAILLY. 1,000 yards ahead of this, the attack was held up by Fire from the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. The right flank was exposed owing to the fact that the Third Cdn. Division were unable to enter the MARCOING LINE on the immediate right of SAILLY.

Enemy concentration in the area S. of SANCOURT was noticed during the day and seemed to indicate a counter-attack. This developed on the right against the 44th C.I.Bn. and this Battalion was driven back to the Railway Line 700 yards E. of SAILLY. The 47th C.I.Bn. re-established the situation on this Line, but the enemy retained the Trenches in front of the Fourth Cdn. Division right, between 500 and 700 yards W. of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD.



At 7:00 P.M. an organized attack was made in conjunction with that launched on the right by the 7th C.I.B. In spite of considerable opposition the Line was established on the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD and late at night touch was gained with the Third Cdn. Division on the right.

Instructions were issued for the 12th C.I.B. to pass through the 10th C.I.B. on the morning of September 29th, to continue the attack.

For the advance of the 10th C.I.B. it was considered necessary for No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON), Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., to go forward with the Infantry to engage targets of opportunity and to assist in the consolidation of ground won. "H" and "L" Batteries were attached from No. 2 and No. 3 Companies respectively, and were employed as a Brigade Reserve.

When the advance was held up in the vicinity of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD by enemy Machine Gun Nests, heavy casualties were suffered. All Batteries came into action, engaging these strong points.

"B" Battery assisted in breaking up an enemy counter-attack which was developing on the right. When the Infantry were no longer able to progress, the Guns were established in defensive positions and the Crews "dug in", Lieut. FRENCH, M.C., commanding "B" Battery was killed in these Operations.

During the day very heavy casualties amongst the Officers in both the Infantry and Machine Gun Batteries were suffered. In one case an Officer had command of 16 Machine Guns and a number of Infantry who had collected in the vicinity.

No. 3 Company (Capt. LOGAN), Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., was in Divisional Support throughout the day with the 12th C.I.B. "K" Battery during the morning fired 4000 Rounds in Indirect Fire on the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD in support of the 10th C.I.B. Lieut. STONEMAN, "M" Battery was killed by Shell Fire night September 28th/29th.

No. 2 Company (Major L.F. PEARCE, M.C.) was engaged in reorganizing the Batteries.

### **Infantry Action First Canadian Division.**

The attack of the First Cdn. Division on September 27th had progressed so much further than that of the Troops on their right flank that a defensive flank of 4,000 yards had been formed along the S. Boundary. Consequently, when Orders were received that the Canadian Corps would attack along the whole Front and that the 2nd C.I.B. would attack on the First Division Front the G.O.C., 2nd C.I.B. requested that Zero Hour for this attack on this Front should be advanced 3 hours. The Third and Fourth Cdn. Divisions, who were attacking on the right at 6:00 A.M., would then have time to advance their Line and the Troops holding the defensive flank could be relieved of that duty and would be available to support the Troops detailed to carry out the attack. This request was granted.

The Fourth Cdn. Division advanced at 6:00 A.M. and by 8:45 A.M. the 8th C.I.Bn. was relieved in its defensive flank position and moved forward to support the 10th C.I.Bn. which attacked at 9:00 A.M.

When the 10th C.I.Bn. attacked it was met with very heavy Machine Gun and Artillery Fire from the high ground on both flanks. Troops on the right and left had not come up and the enemy on both sides was unmolested. It became apparent immediately that the attack could not succeed. In spite of this, the attacking Troops went bravely forward against the enemy entanglements and calmly commenced cutting passages through by hand. For 2 hours this unusual fight went on, in spite of swiftly diminishing numbers.

The Fourth Cdn. Division was still held up some distance W. of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD and a considerable gap existed between their left and our right. The attempt of the 10 C.I.Bn. to push forward against such heavy odds was finally given up.

During the balance of the day heavy Artillery Bombardments were carried out against the enemy Wire on our Front, to cut it out. The enemy's Machine Gun and Artillery Fire remained strong against our forward positions during the day, but his Fire was kept down considerably by our Artillery, Machine Guns and Snipers. Threatened enemy counter-attacks between 3:00 P.M. and 4:00 P.M. were crushed by Fire and did not develop. During the night September 28th/29th the 8th C.I.Bn. relieved the 10th C.I.Bn. in the Line, preparatory to carrying on the attack on the morning of September 29th.



**Action of First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The attached Machine Gun Batteries of No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM, D.O.M.), First Battalion, C.M.G.C., cooperated in the attack.

No. 2 Section of "E" Battery, under Lieut. NORRIS, moved off in support of the right flank of the 10th C.I.Bn. until they reached the CAMBRAI-DOUAI ROAD, where they rested in a small Trench W. of SANCOURT. They then moved S.-E. towards the Sunken Road in this vicinity. Owing to the heavy Machine Gun Fire it was found impossible to advance and Lieut. NORRIS was killed in a daring attempt to push his Guns forward. The Guns were brought back W. of the CAMBRAI-DOUAI ROAD and mounted in commanding positions, from which Direct Fire was brought to bear on the enemy in the vicinity of SANCOURT.

No. 1 Section of "F" Battery, under Lieut. Mc CLELLAN, moved in support of the left flank of the 10th C.I.Bn. at 9:30 A.M. Heavy Artillery and intense Machine Gun Fire was encountered but the Gun Crews gained their positions in the Trenches, W. of the CAMBRAI-DOUAI ROAD, W. of SANCOURT, without sustaining a casualty. This Section remained here throughout the day and numerous moving targets of the enemy Infantry were engaged with good results. At nightfall, the Infantry again withdrew and this necessitated a redistribution of the Guns. Positions of defence of the left flank were eventually taken up N.-E. of HAYNECOURT.

During the early part of the night September 28th/29th the 8th C.I.Bn. relieved the 10th C.I.Bn. in the Line and "F" Battery was ordered to support the relieving Battalion.

At 5:00 P.M. September 28th, Lieut. BALFE, M.C., in command of "G" Battery, received Orders to push ahead of the 7th C.I.Bn. After reconnaissance, positions were selected N. and E. of HAYNECOURT. "G" Battery remained in these positions until relieved on the night September 30th/October 1st.

"E" Battery (Lieut. Mac INTOSH, M.C.), moved forward behind the 10th C.I.Bn. on its left and took up positions in the Trench System between the Villages of HAYNECOURT and EPINOY, protecting the left flank. The Battery remained in these positions until the morning of September 29th. Lieut. Mac INTOSH was wounded but did not go to the Dressing Station until ordered to do so by the O.C., 8th C.I.Bn. Lieut. BATTERSHILL then took command.

"D" Battery went forward at 1:00 P.M. with the 1st C.I.Bn. to strengthen the Line W. of HAYNECOURT. The Battery took up positions to consolidate the ground held and to watch the flanks against expected counter-attacks. The remaining Batteries stayed in their positions throughout the day in Support with the 1st C.I.Bn. E. of SAINS-lez-MARQUION.

**Guns in Reserve, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The 3 Batteries (i.e., less "K") of No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM, M.C.), First Battalion, C.M.G.C., which were in Divisional Reserve with the 3rd C.I.B. moved from their positions in the vicinity of BUISSY to positions E. of SAINS-lez-MARQUION. The Batteries were ready to move forward in an hour's notice. During the day, Battery Commanders made Reconnaissance of their area so as to be ready to take up defensive positions in case of hostile counter-attack.

"B", "H" and "K" Batteries (i.e., one Battery from each Company) remained during the day at the Divisional Report Centre W. of SAINS-lez-MARQUION.

Battalion Headquarters, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. remained at QUEANT. Orders were received during the evening of September 28th that the advance would be continued on the morning of September 29th. The 2nd C.I.B. would advance with the 1st C.I.B. in Support and the 3rd C.I.B. in Divisional Reserve. The Companies of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C., would remain attached as at present to their respective Brigades.



### **Operations, September 29th, 1918.**

#### **General Progress of Attack.**

September 29th was a day of very severe fighting. At 6:00 A.M. the 32nd Infantry Brigade (British) attacked on the left but encountered stiff opposition and uncut Wire and was forced to give up the attempt to advance. The Cdn. Corps attacked at 8:00 A.M. along the whole Front. The Third Cdn. Division met with heavy resistance but progressed to a point 500 yards E. of the MARCOING LINE, 500 yards N. of the CANAL de l' ESCAUT, then on to the junction of the ARRAS and BAPAUME ROADS, taking the Village of PETIT-FONTAINE. The 7th C.I.B. made a slow progress but managed to reach the Western outskirts of NEUVILLE-ST. REMY and the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. At 9:45 A.M. the 18th C.I.B., Fourth Cdn. Division captured SANCOURT and entered BLECOURT. A heavy counter-attack against this Brigade forced them back later to the Railway 500 yards S.-E. of SANCOURT. The 2nd C.I.B., on the First Cdn. Divisional Front, fought hard but was unable to progress beyond ABANCOURT STATION, nearly 1,000 yards S.-E. of ABANCOURT, as the Ridge attacked in the morning by the 32nd Infantry Brigade (British), on the left was still held in force by the enemy who directed a murderous Fire from there on the advancing Troops of the First Cdn. Division.



**Canadian Corps Order of Battle September 29th.**

The following Table shows the Order in which Troops attacked on the Canadian Corps Front and the disposition of the Machine Guns during the attack on September 29th :-

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Third Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Right.	Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.
9th C.I.B	Third Cdn. Division Right	No. 3 Company (X)
43rd C.I.Bn	Brigade Right	
52nd C.I.Bn	Brigade Left	
58th C.I.Bn	Brigade Right Support	"K" Battery
116th C.I.Bn	Brigade Left Support	"J" Battery
7th C.I.B	Third Cdn. Division Left.	No. 2 Company
49th C.I.Bn	Brigade Right	
42nd C.I.Bn	Brigade Left	"G" and "E" Batteries
P.P.C.L.I	Brigade Support	
R.C.R	Brigade Reserve	
8th C.I.B	Third Cdn. Division Support	No. 1 Company
1st C.M.R	Brigade Right	"A" and "B" Batteries
2nd C.M.R	Brigade Left	
4th C.M.R	Brigade Support	"C" Battery
5th C.M.R	Brigade Reserve	"D" Battery
Fourth Cdn. Division	Cdn. Corps Right Centre.	Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.
12th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Division Front	No. 3 Company
38th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"K" Battery
72nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"M" Battery
78th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	"J" and "L" Batteries
85th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left Support	No. 2 Company, Brigade Support
First Cdn. Division.	Cdn. Corps Left Centre.	First Battalion, C.M.G.C.
2nd C.I.B.	First Cdn. Division Front	No. 2 Company
8th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front	"F" Battery
5th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"E" Battery
Eleventh Division. (British)	Canadian Corps Left	

(X) "L" and "M" Batteries in Brigade Reserve.



### Action of Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.

The Third Cdn. Division attacked with the 9th C.I.B. on the right and the 7th C.I.B. on the left. The 8th C.I.B. came into the Line in the centre, between these 2 Brigades at 6:00 A.M., with 2 Battalions in the Front Line. The 102nd C.I. Bn., Fourth Cdn. Division, remained along the Southern end of BOURLON WOOD to act as a defensive flank in case of strong enemy counter-attacks. This Battalion came under the Orders of the 9th C.I.B.

The 43rd and 52nd C.I.Bns. were holding the Line on the 9th C.I.B. Front. The 58th and 116th C.I.Bns. passed through these Battalions and attacked on the right and left respectively. The 58th C.I.Bn. assaulted the MARCOING LINE as far S. as the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. The 116th C.I.Bn. attacked ST. OLLE and the junction of the ARRAS and BAPAUME ROADS. Both Battalions met with severe Shell and Machine Gun Fire and neither was able to advance quickly. "*Ding-dong*" fighting ensued and at 7:00 P.M. ST. OLLE, PETIT-FONTAINE and the MARCOING LINE were securely in our hands.

On September 29th "K" Battery (Lieut. J. HENRY) moved up into positions in Support of the advance of the 58th C.I.Bn. and Fired 10,000 Rounds Indirect and Direct fire during the attack. The 58th C.I.Bn. was held up in front of the MARCOING LINE between the BAPAUME-CAMBRAI ROAD and the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. 2 Guns were placed in the MARCOING LINE on the BAPAUME ROAD which did great execution and assisted the Infantry very materially. After the attack this Battery took up defensive positions in depth.

"J" Battery went into action with the 116th C.I.Bn. Guns of this Battery fired 10,000 Rounds, Indirect and Direct Fire, on the enemy's Lines and took up frequent targets of opportunity during the attack, inflicting a great number of casualties on the enemy. 2 Guns were put out of action during the day by enemy Shell Fire. "L" and "M" Batteries, in Brigade Reserve did not come into action during the day.

In the early Stages, the 8th C.I.B. was held up by Machine Gun Fire W. of ST. OLLE and held a Line from that point to a point on the DOUAI ROAD just W. of NEUVILLE ST. REMY. They were in touch with the 9th C.I.B. at the junction of the BAPAUME and DOUAI ROADS.

"A" and "B" Batteries, No. 1 Company (Major HARTLEY, M.C., M.M.) Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. were ordered to go forward with the 1st and 2nd C.M.R. Bns. to establish Posts along the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and to capture ST. OLLE and NEUVILLE ST. REMY. Orders were given to the Batteries to push forward 4 Guns with the assaulting Infantry to keep down enemy Machine Gun Fire and to advance 4 Guns about 400 yards in rear to provide a defence in depth if required. The Guns going forward with the assaulting Infantry carried Light Mounts only and did exceedingly good work.

One Gun of "B" Battery, when 500 yards N.-E. of St. OLLE, was met with heavy Machine Gun Fire from ST.OLLE Church and from the high ground in front. The Officer in charge of this Section was killed and all the Crew became casualties except Pte. DICK who pushed forward as far as possible, taking the Gun and 2 Boxes of Ammunition. He got into a commanding position and opened fire on the enemy Machine Guns, putting 2 Guns out of action and killing over 30 enemy Machine Gunners. This achievement was verified by eye-witnesses.

The advanced Sections of "A" and "B" Batteries inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and did good work in very materially neutralizing hostile Machine Gun Fire.

"C" Battery attached to the 4th C.M.R., moved forward to the MARCOING LINE after its capture.

"D" Battery attached to the 5th C.M.R., came into Reserve in the Sunken Road, 500 yards W. of FONTAINE-notre-DAME and were disposed finally for defence in depth.

The 7th C.I.B. attacked with the 49th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 42nd C.I.Bn. on the left. At 11:00 A.M. the 49th C.I.Bn. had reached the Line of the DOUAI ROAD and the 42nd C.I.Bn. was across it. Both Battalions were held up by fire from the Railway cutting. An enemy counter-attack was driven off and the 7th C.I.B. remained in possession of the Line on the DOUAI ROAD.

By midnight September 29th/30th, the Fifty-seventh Division (British) had taken over the Line S. of the BAPAUME ROAD from the 9th C.I.B. The remaining Troops of the 9th C.I.B. were relieved by the 8th C.I.B. and, on relief moved to the BOURLON area in Divisional Reserve.



On the morning of September 29th, "G" and "E" Batteries, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. moved off with the 42nd C.I.Bn. on the left of the 7th C.I.B. attack. This attack did not progress beyond the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD, being held up by Wire and intense hostile Fire. These 2 Batteries reached the Road, but suffered heavy casualties in doing so.

#### **Action of Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

On the Fourth Cdn. Divisional Front, Assembly on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD was not possible owing to Zero Hour being in daylight. The Jumping-off Line was the Road running N.-W. and cutting the MARCOING LINE 800 yards N. of SAILLY.

The 12th C.I.B. attacked with the 38th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 72nd C.I.Bn. on the left. The 78th C.I.Bn. followed the 38th C.I.Bn. and the 85th C.I.Bn. followed the 72nd.

The enemy Barrage opened almost simultaneously with our own and the 38th C.I.Bn. came under heavy Machine Gun Fire after crossing the CAMBRAI-DOUAI ROAD. This Fire came from the Ring Trench 1,000 yards S. of SANCOURT, from the Railway and from the flanks. The Division on the right had not progressed E. of the DOUAI ROAD and this caused our right flank to be exposed.

With the help of an Artillery Bombardment on the Railway opposite their Front, the 78th C.I.Bn. passed through the 38th C.I.Bn. at 1:30 P.M. and established Posts on a Line due S. of SANCOURT and including the right Trench referred to above. The 72nd C.I.Bn. on the left passed through SANCOURT capturing 250 prisoners, and reached BLECOURT but were unable to hold the latter Village which was defended in great strength. The Line was established along the Railway Bank just E. and N.-E. of SANCOURT. The 72nd C.I.Bn. was again forced to withdraw their Line from the Railway on the left of their Line and this necessitated the cancellation of the proposed attack through them of the 85th C.I.Bn. The latter Battalion in defensive positions around SANCOURT, were withdrawn to the CAMBRAI-DOUAI ROAD.

"K" and "M" Batteries of the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. attacked with the 38th and 72nd C.I.Bns. "K" Battery under Lieut. GUDGEON, with the 38th C.I.Bn. on the right, reached the DOUAI ROAD, but fell back when it was seen that the attack could not progress. The Guns were withdrawn to defensive positions in the Trench astride the Light Railway 1,000 yards N.-E. of SAILLY. They remained in these positions until withdrawn from the Line 3 days later. "M" Battery under Lieut. RIDDELL, took up defensive positions behind the 72nd C.I.Bn. immediately W. of SANCOURT.

"L" Battery, under Lieut. KERR, in support, was brought up with the 78th C.I.Bn. at noon and positions were occupied in the MARCOING LINE, 1,000 yards N. of SAILLY for defence in depth.

"J" Battery (Capt. HENDERSON) cooperated with the 85th C.I.Bn. and took up positions in the evening 800 yards W. and S.-W. of SANCOURT.

No. 2 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., during the day, was in support to the 12th C.I.B. and was concentrated N.-W. of BOURLON WOOD.

No. 1 Company as withdrawn to positions N. of BOURLON VILLAGE to reorganize.



### **Action of First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The First Cdn. Division attacked with 8th C.I.Bn. of the 2nd C.I.B. at 8:00 A.M. September 29th. At first the attack progressed well but later the enemy Shell and Machine Gun Fire from the high ground in front and on the left became very intense. The Eleventh Division (British) on the left were obliged to give ground. The enemy made 3 counter-attacks on the 8th C.I.Bn. These were driven off, but the Battalion suffered many casualties.

At night the Battalion was in advance of their Jump-off positions but nothing of moment had been accomplished. The Front held was still practically that gained on September 27th and was still in advance of both flanks. The 2nd C.I.B. withdrew into support positions during the night September 29th/30th, on being relieved in the Line by the 1st C.I.B.

“F” Battery, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. supported the attack of the 8th C.I.Bn. The Guns of No. 1 Section moved into positions S.-E. of EPINOY and came into action there, firing on an enemy Battery in the vicinity of BLECOURT. No. 2 Section, under Sgt. STONE took up positions for defence of the right flank and, finding it impossible to advance, established the Guns in strong defensive positions.

“E” Battery kept in touch with the attacking Battalion and pushed Guns forward to the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD. As little progress had been made and the situation was obscure, the Guns finally took up defensive positions in the neighborhood of EPIOY. Lieut. BATTERSHILL, acting O.C., “E” Battery was wounded during the afternoon and Sgt.-Major HUBBLE assumed command of the Battery until the arrival of Capt. MILNER who took over at 5:30 P.M.

Nos. 1 and 3 Companies, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. and the Batteries in Divisional Reserve remained all day in their defensive positions.



**Operations, September 30th, 1918.****General.**

The Canadian Corps was to resume the Offensive at 6:00 A.M. September 30th. The Operations for the day were planned to be carried out in Two Stages. In the First Stage the Third and Fourth Cdn. Divisions were to capture Bridgeheads on the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. In the Second Stage the First Cdn. Division and the Eleventh Division (British) on the left, were to secure the high ground overlooking the RIVER SENSEE.

The attack commenced favourably, the Third Division taking TILLOY and the Fourth, BLECOURT. Heavy counter-attacks against the Fourth Cdn. Division and the left of the Third Cdn. Division drove the Line back to a general Line TILLOY-SANCOURT.

The First Cdn. Division endeavoured to get in touch with the left of the Fourth Cdn. Division, when it was found that the latter had been forced back. It was decided that the Second Phase as planned could not be successful and the Operation was cancelled.

The following Table gives the Troops holding the Line along the Canadian Corps Front during the day; the actual attack was carried out by the 7th and 11th C.I.B.s.

**Canadian Corps Attacking Units and Units Holding the Line; September 30th.**

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Third Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Right.	Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.
8th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Right	No. 1 Company (did not attack)
7th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Left	No. 2 Company
P.P.C.L.I.	Brigade Right	"G" Battery
R.C.R.	Brigade Left	"F" Battery
42nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
49th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	"H" Battery
9th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Reserve	No. 3 Company
Fourth Cdn. Division	Cdn. Corps Right Centre	Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.
11th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Division Front	No. 2 Company
75th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front	
54th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
87th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
102nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	
12th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Division Support	No. 3 Company
10th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Division Reserve	No. 1 Company
First Cdn. Division	Cdn. Corps Left Centre	First Battalion, C.M.G.C. (did not attack)
Eleventh Division (British)	Cdn. Corps Left	(did not attack)



**Action of Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The Third Cdn. Division had Orders to attack at 6:00 A.M. September 30th on the right of the Canadian Corps Front. The Objectives were the high ground N. of CAMBRAI and the CANAL Crossings at RAMILLIES. To effect this it was necessary for the Barrage to travel E. along the Ridge and then turn sharp to the right and travel down the hill to the CANAL. The 8th C.I.B. were not to attack but were to keep in close touch with the enemy in order to follow him up if he retired.

The 7th C.I.B. attacked with the P.P.C.L.I. on the right and the R.C.R. on the left. Before 7:30 A.M. the P.P.C.L.I. were well through TILLOY and the enemy were seen retiring from this place. A number of Prisoners, a Battery of 77mm. Guns and 60 Machine Guns were captured here. The R.C.R. on the left reached the Chapel on the BELCOURT-TILLOY ROAD but the Fourth Cdn. Division on the left was held up. This position became untenable, the R.C.R. withdrew to the Sunken Road just E. of the DOUAI Railway. The P.P.C.L.I. conformed to this withdrawal as their left flank had in turn become exposed to the intense Machine Gun Fire from the N. Eventually a Line of Posts was established from the junction of the Railway and the TILLOY ROAD due N. about 500 yards along the Road, then extending N.-W. and N. so as to include TILLOY FARM. The R.C.R. on the left were in touch with the Fourth Cdn. Division in the Sunken Road in front of the Railway.

By 5:15 P.M. the 8th C.I.B. had moved forward and in touch with the 7th C.I.B. just N. of NEUVILLE ST. REMY. Their Line ran from this place S.-W. to the Divisional Boundary on the Road S. of REMY, with Posts pushed out toward the CANAL and Patrols out ahead of these again.

The 9th C.I.B. was in Divisional Reserve all day but kept in very close touch with the 7th C.I.B.

At 11:00 P.M. Orders were received that the Corps would attack along their whole Front on the next day, October 1st. On the Third Cdn. Division Front the 8th C.I.B. would once again hold their ground, the 9th C.I.B. attacking through the 7th C.I.B. and the latter Brigade coming into Divisional Reserve.

The Guns of Nos. 1 and 3 Companies, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., remained in their defensive positions during September 30th, and did not participate in the Operation.

No. 2 Company (Major FOWLER, M.C.) Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. attacked the Railway and the Village of TILLOY in support of the 7th C.I.B.

"F" Battery gave covering Fire on NEUVILLE ST. REMY and the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. On one occasion, this Battery under the command of Lieut. ROE pushed 500 yards forward in front of the Infantry, killed an enemy Machine Gun Crew and drove them out of a Pill Box. The Battery then established itself in this Pill Box and Fired from there with Battle Sights at the enemy in front.

"H" Battery brought Indirect Fire to bear on the Road junction just N. of TILLOY with good results.

"G" Battery placed 3 Guns in the Railway E. of the DOUAI ROAD and brought deadly Fire to bear on Parties of the enemy who were making their way into TILLOY.



### **Action of Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The Fourth Cdn. Division attacked at 6:00 A.M. with the 11th C.I.B. in the direction of BLECOURT. The Objective was to gain the high ground S. of this place, then swing S.-E. from CUVILLERS and establish a Bridgehead at ESWARS. The left of this attack was to be supported by a heavy Bombardment and by Smoke in BLECOURT VALLEY.

The 11th C.I.B. attacked with the 75th C.I.Bn., the 54th C.I.Bn. was in close support, ready to leapfrog the 75th. The 87th C.I.Bn. was to swing off S.-E. towards ESWARS. The 102nd C.I.Bn. was held in Reserve. The attack met with resolute Opposition from the outset. The 75th C.I.Bn. suffered heavy casualties. In spite of this, the Railway S. of SANCOURT, which had been the centre of an enemy resistance the preceding day, was captured. The enemy resistance increased with the advent of daylight and after suffering severe losses the attacking Battalions were withdrawn to the Railway Line. The attack was not successful for 3 reasons :-

- (1) The Left Flank was unprotected and heavy Enfilading Fire resulted.
- (2) The Smoke Screen was not sufficiently dense to enable the Infantry to advance against the numerous Machine Gun Nests.
- (3) The enemy threw a tremendous number of Troops into the Battle and clearly demonstrated his intention of holding the Line at any cost.

The 12th C.I.B. was in Support during the days Operations and the 10th C.I.B. was in Divisional Reserve N. of BOURLON.

No. 2 Company (Major L.F. PEARCE, M.C.) Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., advanced with 11th C.I.B. Very severe Machine Gun Fire was encountered from the left.

"F" Battery obtained good targets. On the Railway Cutting being captured, all Batteries moved forward and took up positions, numerous targets of opportunity were engaged with excellent results. A defensive Line was occupied for the night.

No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON), Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., was ordered up to support the 11th C.I.B., they were moved back and resumed the positions vacated.

No. 3 Company remained in positions occupied the previous day.

### **First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

As has already been seen, the proposed attack of the First Cdn. Division and of the Eleventh Division (British) was cancelled owing to the failure of the Divisions to advance on the right. An attack along the whole Corps Front was planned for October 1st and the First Cdn. Division was to attack on the left on a 2-Brigade Front. During the afternoon of September 30th preparations were made for the attack. The 3rd C.I.B. moved forward and relieved the 2nd C.I.B. in Divisional Support, the latter going into Reserve. At dusk, the 3rd C.I.B. moved forward into assembly positions behind the 21st C.I.B., Fourth Cdn. Division, through whom they were to attack in the morning.

On the night September 30th/October 1st, No. 1 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C., relieved No. 2 Company in the Line. The Batteries of No. 1 Company were assembled in the area between SANCOURT, EPINOY and HAYNECOURT in readiness to support the attack of the First C.I.B. on the left of the First Cdn. Division on October 1st.

On completion of this relief, No. 2 Company came into Divisional Reserve.

No. 3 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C., was to attack with the Third C.I.B. on the right of the Corps and Batteries of this Company were moved at 5:00 P.M. to assembly positions ,W. and S.-W. of SANCOURT, in readiness for the attack.



## **Operations, October 1st, 1918.**

### **General Course of the Action.**

Early in the morning of October 1st the Fifty-sixth Division (British) took over the left of the Front held by the Eleventh Division (British) on the Northern portion of the Canadian Corps Front.

The Canadian Corps renewed the attack along the whole Corps Front at 5:00 A.M. under cover of a heavy Artillery Barrage. The attack made excellent progress in the early Stages. At 8:00 A.M. the Line had been advanced to the CANAL Bank on the right, on the Northern outskirts of CAMBRAI, thence along the CANAL to MORENCHIES WOOD (inclusive). The Towns of CUVILLERS, BANTIGNY and ABANCOURT were captured.

Heavy counter-attacks developed at 10:00 A.M. from PAILLENCOURT up to the BANTIGNY Valley. Our Troops were driven back. The flank on the left of the 1st C.I.B. was exposed and this fact made progress difficult. The Third Cdn. Division also was held up definitely by heavy Artillery and Machine Gun Fire as they attempted to push down the Slopes towards the CANAL de l' ESCAUT.

Pockets of the enemy gave trouble in the Villages of BLECOURT, BANTIGNY, CUVILLERS and ABANCOURT as the counter-attack up the BANTIGNY Valley developed. Tremendously superior numbers compelled our Troops to withdraw, the enemy having 10 Divisions, 2 Regiments and a number of Marksmen Companies on this short Front. The enemy suffered very heavily from our Artillery Fire, especially in the BANTIGNY Valley where they were massed in preparation of the counter-attack.

The Second Cdn. Division, which was in close Support during the Operation, relieved all Troops in the Line N. of the DOUAI-CAMBRAI Railway, S. of TILLOY to the Northern outskirts of BLECOURT. The Fourth Cdn. Division, on relief, withdrew to the INCHY-QUEANT area. The 5th and 6th C.I.B.s took over the Line supported by the 4th C.I.B. Relief was complete at 5:00 A.M. October 2nd. The strenuous way in which the enemy fought and the large number of enemy Units identified made it very clear that he had absolutely no intention of withdrawing on this Front, but would resist our advance to the limit.



**Canadian Corps Order of Battle; October 1st.**

The following Table gives the Battle Order from Right to Left, of the Canadian Corps for Operations of October 1st :-

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Third Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Right	Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.
8th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Right	No. 1 Company (did not attack)
9th C.I.B.	Third Cdn. Division Left	No. 3 Company
43rd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"M" Battery
52nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"L" Battery
58th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"K" Battery
116th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"J" Battery
Fourth Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Right Centre	Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.
11th C.I.B.	Fourth Cdn. Division Front	No. 2 Company
102nd C.I.B.	Brigade Front	
87th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
85th C.I.Bn. (X)	Brigade Support	
First Cdn. Division	Cdn. Corps Left Centre	First Battalion, C.M.G.C.
3rd C.I.B.	First Cdn. Division Right	No. 3 Company (less "K" Battery)
13th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Front	"M" Battery
16th C.I.Bn. )	Close Support to pass	"J" Battery
14th C.I.Bn. )	through the 13th C.I.Bn.	"L" Battery
15th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	
1st C.I.B.	First Cdn. Division Left	No. 1 Company (plus "H" and "K")
1st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"H" and "K" Batteries
4th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"A" Battery
3rd C.I.Bn.		"D" Battery
2nd C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	"B" and "C" Batteries
Eleventh Division (British)	Canadian Corps Left	

(X) Attached from 12th C.I.B., Fourth Cdn. Division.



### **Action of Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The Third Cdn. Division advanced on October 1st with 2 objects, firstly to capture the high ground E. of TILLOY, secondly to wheel to the right down the Slope towards the CANAL de l' ESCAUT, and capture the Bridgeheads at PONT d' AIRE and RAMILLIES.

The 8th C.I.B. did not attack but, during the day, established Posts along the CANAL Bank from ST. OLLE to NEUVILLE ST. REMY and on the high Railway embankments E. of NEUVILLE ST. REMY.

The 9th C.I.B. attacked with the 43rd C.I.Bn. on the right, advancing on RAMILLIES, and the 32nd C.I.Bn. on the left. The 58th C.I.Bn. followed the 52nd C.I.Bn., then swung to the right and endeavoured to work down the Slope from the N. to capture the Bridgehead at PONT d' AIRE. The 116th was to follow the 58th C.I.Bn. and capture the RAMILLIES Bridgehead.

The first part of the action was quite successful. The enemy Barrage fell along the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD and was very heavy. The attacking Troops, however did not suffer many casualties until the high ground forming the First Objective was taken.

The 58th and 116th C.I.Bns. passed through according to plan and commenced to work their way down the Slope towards the CANAL. They were held half-way down the hill by intense Machine Gun Fire and by Artillery Fire from the high ground N. of RAMILLIES. The enemy counter-attacked heavily from PONT d' AIRE in the afternoon and drove our Outposts in.

The Line held by the 9th C.I.B., when relieved by the 5th C.I.B., during the night October 1st/2nd was on the CANAL de l' ESCAUT at MORENCHIES. From there it ran along the Ridge overlooking RAMILLIES, thence N.-W. towards the Southern edge of BLECOURT.

The Guns of No. 3 Company (Capt. BURNHAM), Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., operated with the 9th C.I.B. on October 1st.

"M" Battery laid down a Barrage on suspected strong points in the Front of the 43rd C.I.Bn. from Zero to Zero plus 15 minutes, Firing 16,000 Rounds. This Battery then advanced with the 43rd C.I.Bn. and after going through heavy Shelling and Machine Gun Fire, arrived at a point 1,000 yards W. of RAMILLIES at 10:00 A.M. On the Infantry being compelled to withdraw owing to the enemy counter-attack, the Battery withdrew to positions in the Practice Trench, 1,000 yards E. of TILLOY. The Firepower of "M" Battery was augmented by 4 German Machine Guns, with a plentiful supply of Ammunition.

Lieut. W.N. SMITH did splendid work and it was chiefly through his initiative and resource that an enemy counter-attack was beaten off. About 3,000 Rounds (mostly German) were fired during this attack.

On the night October 1st/2nd, the 43rd C.I.Bn. was relieved in forward positions by the 24th C.I.Bn., 5th C.I.B. The Machine Guns remained in their positions and the Officers of this Battery were able to render material assistance to the incoming Battalion through their knowledge of the ground on the Battle Front.

One Section of "L" Battery went forward with the 52nd C.I.Bn., employing Field Mounts, and occupied positions 1,500 yards N.-E. of TILLOY. Their Tripods were brought up later. The other Section remained in Reserve at 52nd C.I.Bn. H.Q. The forward Section under Lieut. Mc CALLUM, was of great assistance when the Troops on the left withdrew. This Section fired 7,500 Rounds at opportunity targets and accounted for a large number of the enemy.

"K" Battery was in support positions close to the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD about 500 yards N.-W. of NEUVILLE-ST.-REMY.

"J" Battery was in Brigade Reserve W. of ST. OLLE.

Nos. 1 and 2 Companies, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., remained in their positions in support of the 8th and 7th C.I.B.s respectively, during the day.



**Action of Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The Fourth Cdn. Division attacked on October 1st with the 11th C.I.B. The 102nd C.I.Bn. led the attack as far as CUVILLERS where it was leapfrogged by the 87th C.I.Bn., which was to push forward to ESWARS. The 34th and 75th C.I.Bns. were in Reserve.

The 102nd C.I.Bn. gained the First Objective which was the Road running S.-E. from BLECOURT and numerous Prisoners began to come in. The First Cdn. Division on the left were seen to have passed beyond BLECOURT and ABANCOURT and at an early hour were moving on BANTIGNY. Indications, however, confirmed the belief that the enemy was still holding BLECOURT. The 87th C.I.Bn. pushed on to the outskirts of ESWARS, but in the face of heavy opposition were forced to withdraw. It became evident that the situation on the left could not be cleared up while the Division on the right was able to secure RAMILLIES and the Line of the CANAL.

The 85th C.I.Bn. was placed at the disposal of the 11th C.I.B. and Instructions were received to hold CUVILLERS Salient.

At night a strong Line was established from a point 500 yards S.-E. of SANCOURT to a point 500 yards S.-E. of BLECOURT thence S.-W. along the BLECOURT-MORENCHIES ROAD. On this Line the 11th C.I.B. was relieved by the 5th C.I.B. during the night October 1st/2nd.

On relief the 11th C.I.B. withdrew to the QUARRY W. of BOURLON Village and the Fourth Cdn. Division came into Corps Reserve.

No. 2 Company (Major PEARCE, M.C.) Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported the attack of the 11th C.I.B. The Batteries of No. 2 Company went forward with the attacking Battalions and secured good targets, but suffered heavy casualties. The left flank was in a critical condition at one time and the O.C. No. 2 Company received Orders to arrange for a disposition of Machine Gunners to conform to the present Line of the Infantry which was facing N. After a Reconnaissance of the area, 10 Guns were placed along the Railway Embankment from 500 to 1,000 yards S. of SANCOURT, 4 Guns, 500 yards E. of SANCOURT and 8 Guns, 1,000 yards S.-E. of SANCOURT. The remaining 10 Guns of No. 2 Company were out of action.

Besides these 32 Guns, there were 36 Guns of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. now in the Line. 8 of these Guns were sited about 500 yards E. of the CHAPEL between BLECOURT and TILLOY; 8 Guns were 500 yards W. of the CHAPEL; the other 20 were placed in the area S. of the CHALEL.

These positions provided a very powerful Machine Gun Defence in Depth and Guns remained here until the night October 2nd/3rd.

Nos. 1 and 3 Companies, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. remained in their former positions during the day. Battalion H.Q. was at a point near INCHY on the W. Bank of the CANAL du NORD.

**Infantry Attack, First Canadian Division.**

The First Cdn. Division attacked with the 3rd C.I.B. on the right and the 1st C.I.B. on the left. On the 3rd C.I.B. Front, the 13th C.I.Bn. attacked. This Battalion, in spite of heavy Fire, forced its way on the right beyond BLECOURT and commenced to dig in. Another Company forced its way through BLECOURT but met very strenuous resistance and was unable completely to clean up the Village on account of very heavy Fire from the direction of ABANCOURT. The Company attacking on the left cleaned up SANCOURT and the Railway Embankment on the N. whilst the Fourth Company took up positions on the Railway S.-E. of SANCOURT.

E. of BLECOURT, the 16th and 14th C.I.Bns. leapfrogged the leading Battalion, on the right and left, respectively. The 16th C.I.Bn. pushed on rapidly towards CUVILLERS and the 14th, towards BANTIGNY. From this point on the enemy resistance increased. Artillery and Machine Gun Fire became intense, enemy Machine Guns being disposed in very great numbers on the high ground on the left beyond CUVILLERS and BANTIGNY. The 16th C.I.Bn. pushed on and captured CUVILLERS and actually worked its way 1,000 yards N.-W. towards PAILLENCOURT. The 14th C.I.Bn. captured BANTIGNY. At this point the left flank was very exposed and was being cut up by Machine Guns and by Artillery firing at point-blank range. 3 enemy counter-attacks were beaten off by the 14th C.I.Bn., by Rifle and Machine Gun



Fire, many casualties being inflicted on the enemy. The position being held by 2 Battalions became untenable and in the face of enemy counter-attacks and under severe Fire from ABANCOURT, the Battalions withdrew until the Eastern outskirts of BLECOURT were reached. Orders were received that the Village of BLECOURT was to be held and a Company of the 15th C.I.Bn. was sent up to assist the 13th C.I.Bn. to do this. The enemy attacked again in force and our Line was forced back just W. of the Village where a strong stand was made. The Line so established was held and handed over, on relief, to the 6th C.I.B.

The 1st C.I.B. attacked on the left with the 1st C.I.Bn. and the 4th C.I.Bn., right and left respectively. The 1st C.I.Bn. was held up on the Railway. The Eleventh Division (British) had been held up from the beginning by the Wire and the left flank of the 1st C.I.B, was absolutely exposed and at the mercy of devastating Machine Gun Fire from the left. It was impossible to attempt to push forward and the Troops dug in. After dark the 1st C.I.B. was withdrawn to a Line 400 yards W. of the Railway where it was relieved by the 2nd C.I.B. during the night October 1st /2nd. The First Cdn. Division continued to hold the Line on a one Brigade Front, the 3rd C.I.B. on the right being relieved by the 6th C.I.B. during the night October 1st/2nd.

### **Action of No. 3 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM, M.C.), First Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported the 3rd C.I.B. in their attack on October 1st and played an important part in the days Operations.

“M” Battery (Capt. DONALD) pushed forward with the 13th C.I.Bn. to positions E. of BLECOURT. When the counter-attacks compelled the Infantry to withdraw, the Guns of “M” Battery protected the endangered left flank and fired 6,000 Rounds covering the withdrawal. The Battery was subjected to very severe Artillery Fire during this action. 2 Guns were put out of action and casualties were heavy. “M” Battery withdrew to positions S. of SANCOURT, secured a fresh supply of Ammunition and disposed the Guns for defence against expected counter-attacks.

“J” Battery, (Lieut. WARNER) moved forward with the 16th C.I.Bn. and encountered heavy Fire E. of BLECOURT, one Gun being put out of action by Shell Fire. The remainder continued to advance to points just S. of CUVILLERS. When the Infantry withdrew, the Guns of this Battery assisted by providing covering Fire. In moving back, one of the Guns was nearly surrounded and after all the S.A.A. was expended, had to be abandoned. The Lock and Feed Block were first removed.

“L” Battery (Capt. PARKER) jumped-off with the 14th C.I.Bn. and advanced on the right of the Brigade area. One Section advanced to a point 500 yards N.-E. of BLECOURT. Low-flying enemy Aeroplanes were engaged with a captured enemy Machine Gun, 1,000 Rounds being fired at these targets.

During the advance one Gun was put out of action, 1,000 yards S. of BLECOURT. Another Gun got as far as 1,000 yards E. of BLECOURT and fired 750 Rounds at Groups of Hostile Infantry assembling near ABANCOURT. This Gun was put out of action by a Shell which wounded the whole Crew, with the exception of one man.

2 Guns pushed forward to the Northern outskirts of CUVILLERS, from which place they engaged Parties of the enemy in BANTIGNY. On the enemy attacking in force, the Guns of “L” Battery continually covered the withdrawal of our Troops. Establishing positions N.-E. of SANCOURT, 4 of the Guns fired 4,000 Rounds in a protective Barrage and enabled the Infantry to withdraw to the W. of BLECOURT. The other 4 Guns assembled just E. of BLECOURT, and finding 7 Officers and 125 O. R.s of the Infantry with 2 Lewis Guns at this point, Capt. PARKER, formed a Strong Point here. 5 enemy Machine Guns were brought in by Sgt. Mc CALL and mounted in defence. This point was strongly attacked by the enemy but held out for 4 hours. Runners were sent back to get assistance, but this was not forthcoming. The Ammunition was all expended and the Troops holding this point withdrew to the Railway Line just E. of SANCOURT.

“L” Battery then took up defensive positions which they held until relieved by Guns of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. on October 3rd.



**Action of Reserve Guns, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

The advance of the 1st C.I.B. on the left of the Canadian Corps Attack was supported by No. 1 Company, C.M.G.C., and by "B", "H" and "K" Batteries from Divisional Reserve.

"H" and "K" Batteries advanced with the 1st C.I.Bn. on the right of Brigade Front. "H" Battery under Lieuts. SHERINGHAM and CARTER encountered an enemy strong point 900 yards N.-E. of SANCOURT and the same distance N.-W. of BLECOURT. It engaged this at close range and expended 1,500 Rounds in silencing its 4 Machine Guns. Two of these captured Guns were manned and fire was opened with 10 Guns on ABANCOURT STATION and Church and on numerous targets in the vicinity of ABANCOURT. Lieut. SHERINGHAM had gone forward to reconnoitre but was not seen again. Lieut. CARTER was wounded. The 2 Sections were now commanded by Sgt. CUTHBERTSON and Sgt. BOULET.

2 enemy Machine Guns firing from a small Trench were rushed and captured by Sgt. BOULET and Cpl. COLLYER who killed the Gunners with their Revolvers. 1,500 Rounds were fired from these 2 captured Guns at enemy Planes which, lying low, had opened fire on our Guns and Crews. At dusk, our attack being held up and the flanks insecure, the Infantry withdrew under cover fire from the Guns of "H" Battery to a Road running N. from SANCOURT. When the Troops had established their Line on this Road, the Guns of "H" Battery were sited in defensive positions. 4500 Rounds were fired on the Railway as far as ABANCOURT STATION. Targets in the vicinity of ABANCOURT were also engaged with good effect.

"K" Battery (Lieut. KNILL) also advanced with the 1st C.I.Bn., and in the face of enemy Machine Gun Fire came into action, expending 3,000 Rounds on Enemy Machine Guns firing from BLECOURT, ABANCOURT and the Railway rear ABANCOURT STATION. 1,500 Rounds were fired at an enemy 7.7 Battery firing from N. of BLECOURT. Lieut. KNILL was wounded here, as was Lieut. TURK, both by Machine Gun Fire. Sgt. FELL took charge of No. 2 Section. 2 Guns of "K" Battery were destroyed by enemy Shell-fire at 6:30 P.M. The others remained in positions until 6:00 P.M. when they withdrew to SANCOURT.

By 7:15 A.M., 4 Guns of "K" Battery had been put out of action by Shell and Machine Gun Fire. The remaining 4 Guns, together with a captured German heavy Machine Gun were reorganized by Lieut. MORE and took up defensive positions in the Road running N. from SANCOURT. From these positions Parties of the enemy advancing from ABANCOURT were engaged and disposed after 500 Rounds had been Fired.

During the time the Battery was being reorganized, Lieut. MORE and Sgt. MANLEY encountered a Party of 40 Germans making their way towards ABANCOURT STATION. With some Men of the 1st C.I.Bn. they engaged this Party with Revolvers and Rifles, killing and wounding about 20, the remainder escaping. A short time afterwards, Lieut. MORE and Sgt. MANLEY charged a small Trench, 1,000 yards N.-E. of SANCOURT, with their Revolvers and captured 1 Officer and 17 men.

"B" Battery was held in Brigade Reserve N. of HAYNECOURT until 8:15 A.M. when 2 Guns were sent up to support the 3rd C.I.Bn. who were advancing to assist the 1st C.I.Bn. These Guns advanced to the N.-W. of SANCOURT and were later taken over by Lieut. FREEMAN to reinforce "H" Battery. At 10:45 P.M. the remaining 6 Guns of "B" Battery were disposed for defence N. and N.-E. of HAYNECOURT.



**Action of No. 1 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

"A" Battery, (Lieut. SHAUGHNESSY) moved forward with the 4th C.I.Bn. Heavy Machine Gun Fire was encountered after crossing the DOUAI-CAMBRAI ROAD. This advance continued for another 400 yards when it was found necessary to form a defensive flank, as the Division on the left was held up. Guns were mounted 1,000 yards E. of EPINOY and 4,000 Rounds were fired at Parties of the enemy on the left Divisional Front. The advance continued to the Sunken Road 1,500 yards E. of EPINOY. At this place Sgt. HOLMES turned a captured Field Gun around and fired 20 Rounds point-blank at Parties of the enemy.

When the Infantry attack was held up the Battery Commander moved his Guns back to a point 500 yards W. of the Road running N. from SANCOURT, about 700 yards N.-W. of the Village. Good Fields of Fire were obtained here and 8,000 Rounds were fired at Parties of the enemy about 1,700 yards S.-W. of FRESSIES. At dusk the Guns took up positions for defence in depth of the high ground gained.

"D" Battery advanced with the Reserve Company of the 4th C.I.Bn., No. 1 Section encountered severe Machine Gun Fire coming from the Railway Embankment W. of ABANCOURT. Guns were mounted and these targets engaged. The advance continued by short rushes from Shell-hole to Shell-hole, covered by the Guns of "A" Battery. 2600 Rounds were fired during this advance. No. 2 Section advanced on the right and, when about 1,000 yards N.-E. of SANCOURT, brought 2 Guns into action against enemy Machine Guns in the Railway Embankment E. of ABANCOURT. This Section also advanced by rushes to the Sunken Road N. of SANCOURT, firing 1,000 Rounds during the advance on the advance being held up the Guns of "D" Battery took up defensive positions N.-E. of SANCOURT, which they held until relieved on October 3rd.

"C" Battery was in Brigade Reserve N. of HAYNECOURT throughout the day and furnished Carrying Parties to supply S.A.A. to "A" and "D" Batteries. At 4:15 P.M., 3 Guns of "C" Battery fired on low-flying enemy Aeroplanes. After these 3 Guns had fired 7 Belts, Pte. J. W. Mc CARTHY, in charge of No. 8 Gun, succeeded in bringing down an enemy Plane flying at about 800 feet. This Plane crashed in flames on the S.-E. outskirts of EPINOY. At night, the Guns of "C" Battery were disposed for the defence of HAYNECOURT.

**No. 2 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

No. 2 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. was in Divisional Reserve. The Guns of this Company were sited in position for defence of the BLUE LINE of the attack on September 27th.

Headquarters, First Battalion, C.M.G.C., (Lieut.-Col. WATSON, D.S.O.) remained in the vicinity of QUEANT during the day.



**General Situation, Night, October 1st/2nd.**

The Operations of October 1st mark the end of Phase III of the Battle of CAMBRAI. At the conclusion of the day's fighting, the 8th C.I.B. were holding the ground in the area between ST. OLLE and NEUVILLE-ST.-REMY to the E. and the MARCOING LINE as far N. as SAILLY to the West.

Guns of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. were disposed for defence in depth of this area.

The 5th and 6th C.I.B.s held the Front Line from the high ground overlooking MORENCHIES on the right, then bulging out into a Salient S. of CUVILLERS, then Northwards along the Road from MORENCHIES to BLECOURT to a point about 700 yards S.-E. of BLECOURT, thence W. of BLECOURT and E. of SANCOURT.

Guns of the Second, Fourth and First Battalions, C.M.G.C. were disposed for defence of this part of the Line.

The 2nd C.I.B. held the left of the Canadian Corps Front Line which ran in a Northerly direction about 400 yards W. of the Railway N. of SANCOURT.

Guns of No. 2 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. were disposed for defence behind the 2nd C.I.B.

The Infantry Reliefs, night October 1st/2nd had thinned out the Infantry strength very considerably and for this reason a very large number of Machine Gun Batteries were placed in the Line in anticipation of possible Counter-attacks. The Machine Guns attached to Units relieved remained in the Line also, practically doubling the normal Fire Power of the Defensive Batteries.



## **CAMBRAI**

### **PHASE IV : OCTOBER 2nd to OCTOBER 12th, 1918.**

#### **Introductory.**

#### **General Outline of Period.**

Phase III of the Battle of CAMBRAI ended with the relief in the Line of the Fourth Canadian Division and parts of the First and Third Canadian Divisions by the Second Canadian Division during the night October 1st/2nd. The remainder of the First Cdn. Division was relieved by the Eleventh Division (British) on the night October 2nd/3rd. The Canadian Corps Front was now held as follows :-

The Third Cdn. Division on the right with 1 Brigade in the Line from the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD to the CAMBRAI-DOUAI RAILWAY S. of TILLOY; the Second Cdn. Division in the centre with 2 Brigades in the Line which extended to the Northern outskirts of BLECOURT; the Eleventh Division (British) on the left continuing the Line to 1,000 yards S. of AUBENCHEUL-au-BAC.

The First and Fourth Cdn. Divisions were in Corps Reserve.

The following few days, nothing occurred of particular moment on the Corps Front. The enemy counter-attacked once or twice but was usually beaten off. Our Machine Gun Batteries kept up Harassing Fire by day and night and close touch was maintained with the enemy by Infantry Outposts and Patrols.

The THIRD ARMY had crossed the CANAL de l' ESCAUT S. of CAMBRAI between CREVECOEUR and PROVILLE. Plans were now made to take CAMBRAI by Envelopment. This would be achieved in 2 Stages. The First Stage, the XVII Corps was to capture AWOIGNT from the S. The Canadian Corps assisted in this Operation by an Artillery Demonstration. In the Second Stage, the Canadian Corps was to cross the CANAL de l' ESCAUT, capture ESCAUDEUVRES, and join hands with the XVII Corps N.-E. of CAMBRAI.

This attack was launched on October 9th and was completely successful. Zero Hour was at 1:30 A.M. in order that the attack should be a complete surprise and at 3:35 A.M. the Third Division was in CAMBRAI. By 8:00 A.M. CAMBRAI was completely cleared of enemy Troops.

On October 10th, the Third Cdn. Division was relieved in the Line and withdrew to the INCHY-QUEANT area to rest and refit. The attack was continued by the Second Cdn. Division and the Eleventh Division (British) also by the Forty-ninth Division and Fifty-first (Highland) Division, which had come under the Canadian Corps. The enemy delivered a very strong counter-attack at 10:30 A.M. October 11th, supported by 7 Tanks. 6 of the Tanks were put out of action and the attack beaten off.

Meanwhile, during the night October 7th/8th, the First Cdn. Division relieved the Fourth Division (British) in the Line between PALLUEL and the RIVER SCARPE, coming under Orders of the XXII Corps. On October 11th, the Canadian Corps Front less the portion held by the Eleventh Division (British), was handed over to the XXII Corps, the Second Cdn. Division, Forty-ninth and Fifty-first Divisions coming under command of the G.O.C., XXXI Corps. At the same time, the G.O.C., Canadian Corps took over the former XXXI Corps Front, the Fifty-sixth Division (British) and the First Cdn. Division coming under Canadian Corps. During the night October 11th/12th, the Second Cdn. Division was relieved E. of the IWUY-DENAIN Railway by the Fifty-first (Highland) Division. This was the situation on October 12th at the completion of the BATTLE of CAMBRAI.



**Preliminary Period, October 2nd to 8th, 1918.**

**Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., October 2nd to 8th.**

On the Canadian Corps Right, the 9th C.I.B., Third Cdn. Division, on completion of relief by the 5th C.I.B. at 8:00 A.M. October 2nd, moved out to the area W. of the MARCOING LINE. At the same time, the 7th C.I.B. moved further W. to the area just W. of BOURLON WOOD.

From this time until the morning of October 9th, the 8th C.I.B. continued to hold the Line on a 2-Battalion Front, practically without change. During this period the Third Cdn. Division was holding, with their Outposts, the CANAL just W. of CAMBRAI while the flank Divisions by a series of Minor Operations, gradually enveloped CAMBRAI from the N. and S.

When the Infantry of the Second Cdn. Division had settled down in their new positions, the Guns of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. relieved the Guns of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. supporting that portion of the Front taken over by the 5th C.I.B. This relief took place during the night October 2nd/3rd. At the conclusion of this relief the Guns of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. were disposed as follows :-

NO. 1 Company (Major HARTLEY, M.C., M.M.) was in Forward Position supporting the 8th C.I.B. Its Guns were disposed as follows :-

“A” Battery – 800 yards W. of the junction of the BAPAUME and ARRAS ROADS, defending the right of the Brigade Front.

“B” Battery – 2 Guns 500 yards N.-E. of NEUVILLE-ST. REMY on the left of Brigade Front, the other 6 Guns being sited for Defence in Depth W. of these, the most Westerly Guns being about 1,500 yards W. of NEUVILLE-ST. REMY.

“C” Battery – Behind “A” Battery, E. of the MARCOING LINE and N. of the BAPAUME-CAMBRAI ROAD.

“D” Battery – from 800 yards to 1,600 yards N.-E. of FONTAINE-notre-DAME, W. of the MARCOING LINE and N. of the BAPAUME ROAD.

No. 3 Company (Capt. BURNHAM) was in the Support Area and was disposed as follows :-

“J” Battery – In rear of “A and “C” Batteries, 4 Guns being 500 yards E. of SAILLY and 4 Guns from 500 to 1,000 yards W. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, just E. of the MARCOING LINE.

“L” Battery – In rear of “B” Battery, just N. of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD, 1,000 yards N.-W. of ST. OLLE.

“M” Battery – In rear of “D” Battery, about 1,700 yards S.-W. of RAILLENCOURT.

“K” Battery – 1,500 yards W. of RAILLENCOURT.

No. 2 Company (Major FOWLER, M.C.) was in Divisional Reserve, W. of BOURLON VILLAGE.

These Dispositions remained until October 8th. During the intervening period, the situation on the Divisional Front was unchanged and the Guns were not actively engaged.



**Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., October 2nd to 6th.**

The Second Cdn. Division relieved a portion of the Third Cdn. Division, the whole of the Fourth Cdn. Division and a portion of the First Cdn. Division in the Line, on the night October 1st/2nd. On the right, the 5th C.I.B. took over the Line from the CAMBRAI-DOUAI Railway, 500 yards S. of TILLOY, to a point about 800 yards S. of CUVILLERS. The 6th C.I.B. took over the Line from this point N. to a Line through BLECOURT and SANCOURT, both inclusive.

The situation on the Second Cdn. Division Front remained unchanged until the evening of October 6th. At 6:00 P.M. October 5th, the enemy delivered an attack in considerable strength against the positions held by the 5th C.I.B., W. of PONT d' AIRE. This attack was repulsed without any of the enemy reaching our Line. A previous counter-attack had been made on October 4th at 10:00 A.M. This was directed against the Front held by the 6th C.I.B. and was delivered down the BANTIGNY RAVINE. This attack was also repulsed with very heavy losses to the enemy.

*"From October 2nd to October 6th the Infantry Troops worked hard in the Line, both in constructing Lines of Defence and in gaining control of No Man's Land and pushing back the enemy's Outposts and Patrols. There is no doubt that the Operations carried out by the Division in the Final Phase of the Battle of CAMBRAI, would have been much more difficult if it had not been for the extremely fine work by the Patrols during these days." (X)*

(X) From the Second Cdn. Division "Report on Operations" carried out during the period 13th March to 11th November, 1918.

No Machine Gun Reliefs took place during the night October 1st/2nd but the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., was required to supply 1 Company to each of the relieved Brigades. During the night October 2nd/3rd, the Guns of the First, Third and Fourth Battalions, C.M.G.C., occupying positions along the Second Cdn. Division Front were all relieved. At the conclusion of the relief, the Batteries of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., were disposed as follows :-

No. 1 Company – With the 5th C.I.B. on Second Cdn. Division Right.

"D" Battery, on right of 5th C.I.B. Front, 1,000 yards E. and S. of TILLOY.

"C" Battery, on left of 5th C.I.B. Front, 1,000 yards N.-E. and N. of TILLOY.

"A" Battery, 2 Guns on extreme left Front; the other Guns in depth W. of these along the Brigade Northern Boundary.

"B" Battery, in rear 1,500 yards E. of SAILLY.

No. 2 Company – With the 6th C.I.B., on Second Cdn. Division Left.

"E" Battery, along the right of 6th C.I.B. Front near CHAPEL, 1,500 yards S. of BLECOURT.

"G" Battery, along the left of the 6th C.I.B. Front from 1,500 yards S.-E. to 500 yards S. of SANCOURT.

"F" Battery, along the Brigade Front, behind "G" Battery.

"H" Battery, in Reserve in the area S. and S.-W. of HAYNECOURT, N. and N.-W. of RALLEN COURT.

No. 3 Company – In Reserve, with the 4th C.I.B.

"J" Battery, between RAILLENCOURT and BOURLON.

"K" Battery, 1,500 yards N.-E. of SAILLY.

"L" Battery, 500 yards N. and N.-E. of SAILLY.

"M" Battery, 2,500 yards S.-W. of SANCOURT.

In addition to these, the Guns of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade were mounted for defence in the Second Cdn. Division area. 3 Batteries held positions immediately S. of SANCOURT, from 500 yards to 1,000 yards from that Village. 8 Guns were mounted just W. of the MARCOING LINE, 1,500 yards S.-W. of SANCOURT, and 4 Guns just W. of these again. One Battery of the 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigade was in Mobile Reserve, 2,000 yards N. of BOURLON WOOD.

These dispositions ensured a very strong Defence in Depth in case of any powerful counter-attack. During the period which elapsed prior to the capture of CAMBRAI, the Batteries were not called on to do much Firing.



Lt.-Col. WEIR, M.C., left the Battalion on October 2nd to proceed to ALDERSHOT to attend the Senior Officers Course. Major BASEVI, was temporarily in command of the Battalion until October 4th, when Major SANSOM, from the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. arrived and assumed command.

Owing to the activity of our Infantry Patrols and owing to the width of No Man's Land, the amount of Harassing Fire carried out by the Batteries was very small. Much work was done in preparing for the attack which was to take place shortly. Large Dumps of Ammunition were established along Roads in the Support Area, in convenient locations in the MARCOING LINE between SAILLY and SANCOURT and W. of RAILLENCOURT. During this period, there were many casualties. Hostile Shelling of the area was very heavy and, in the forward area, low-flying Bombing Planes were active.

#### **First Battalion, C.M.G.C., October 2nd to 4th.**

During the night October 1st/2nd, the 3rd C.I.B. on the right of the First Cdn. Division Front, was relieved by the 6th C.I.B. On the left the 2nd C.I.B. took over the Line from the 1st C.I.B. During the night and the following day, no Machine Guns were withdrawn. On the contrary, the Batteries in Reserve were moved up into the Line and on the one-Brigade Front there were no fewer than 112 Machine Guns disposed in Depth. The Front Line held by the 2nd C.I.B. was from a point 800 yards W. and a little N. of BLECOURT to a point W. and a little N. of ABANCOURT. On October 2nd, Patrols succeeded in pushing forward to the Railway from 500 to 1,000 yards E. of this Line but were held up there by Machine Gun Fire from BLECOURT. During the night October 2nd/3rd, the 2nd C.I.B. was relieved by the 33rd Infantry Brigade of the Eleventh Division (British).

The Guns of No. 1 Company (Major E. R. MORRIS), First Battalion, C.M.G.C. (less "B" Battery) remained in their positions in the vicinity of SANCOURT throughout the day. Several Thousand Rounds were expended in Harassing Fire, directed on enemy movement in the neighborhood of BLECOURT and also on Machine Gun Nests at ABANCOURT STATION and the Village of ABANCOURT. The Guns remained in their positions during the night and until 4:00 P.M. October 4th, when they were relieved by Batteries from the Fourteenth Battalion, M.G.C. On relief, the Company (less "B" Battery) withdrew to the area W. of CAGNICOURT where they went into Bivouacs.

No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM, D.C.M.), (less "H" Battery), took up defensive positions for the protection of the BLUE LINE (Phase III) in case of hostile counter-attacks. At 8:15 A.M. October 3rd, this Company (less "H" Battery) moved off with Transport and proceeded by Route March to the Bivouacking area near CAGNICOURT which they reached at 11:00 A.M.

No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM, M.C.), (less "K" Battery), had been very hotly engaged in the fighting on October 1st. In some cases, whole Gun Crews had become casualties. In other cases the Crews had lost touch with their Batteries during the withdrawal. During the night October 1st/2nd, "L" and "M" Batteries had each recovered one Gun whose Crew had all become casualties. Early in the morning of October 2nd, another Gun and Crew of "L" Battery, which had lost its way during the withdrawal reported to Company Headquarters. Still another Gun of this Battery, with the only remaining Man of its Crew, was recovered during the day.

At 12:30 P.M. October 2nd, a Runner reported from Lieut. PALMER. This Officer had taken up positions with 3 Guns and Crews of "J" Battery W. of SANCOURT, when the withdrawal commenced, and had been trying to get in touch with his Battery H.Q. by means of Runners. He was immediately sent forward to "J" Battery. This gave each of the Batteries 7 Guns which were brought out on completion of the relief.

"J", "L" and "M" Batteries withdrew at 11:00 P.M. and marched to Bivouacs in the area between BUISSY and CAGNICOURT, arriving at 10:00 A.M. October 3rd.

The Guns in Divisional Reserve ("B", "H" and "K" Batteries) remained in positions occupied in the evening of October 1st. During the day Sgt. CUTHBERTSON in charge of No. 1 Section employed a captured Heavy Machine Gun and fired 1,000 Rounds on enemy movement N. of BLECOURT. 2,000 Rounds were fired from a captured Light Machine Gun against low-flying Planes. These Batteries withdrew from their positions at 7:30 P.M. October 3rd on completion of relief by the Fourteenth Battalion M.G.C. They then proceeded by Route March to the Bivouacking Area in the vicinity of CAGNICOURT, where they rejoined their respective Companies.



In the Battle of CAMBRAI the First Battalion, C.M.G.C. took no further part. When the First Cdn. Division came into the Line again, it was further N., off the immediate Front of the CAMBRAI Attack

### **The Capture of CAMBRAI, October 9th, 1918.**

#### **Preparations.**

The part played by the Third Cdn. Division in the actual Capture on CAMBRAI was the protection of the Right Flank of the Second Cdn. Division. Consequently, Zero Hour for the Third Cdn. Division Attack was decided by the G.O.C., Second Cdn. Division. He in turn was guided by the movements of the XVII Corps of the Third Army which was attacking CAMBRAI from the S.

About 4,000 yards S.-E. of CAMBRAI is the NIERGNIES-AWOIGNT SPUR. This was one of the Objectives of the XVII Corps. During the night following the capture of this SPUR, the Second Cdn. Division would attack with the object, first, of crossing the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and then joining up with the XVII Corps E. of CAMBRAI. To achieve this, the 5th C.I.B. would attack through MORENCHIES to the CANAL Crossing at PONT d' AIRE and the 6th C.I.B. would secure the Bridgehead at RAMILLIES.

In support of this attack, the Third Cdn. Division would advance at the same hour as the Second and would capture the Railway Embankment and Slag Heap E. of NEUVILLE ST. REMY and some houses situated W. of MORENCHIES. In this way the right flank of the Second Cdn. Division would be protected. To ensure the complete protection of this flank, the 7th C.I.B. was moved to the area occupied by the Reserve Brigade of the Second Cdn. Division prior to the attack. In case of an enemy counter-attack, the 7th C.I.B. would come under Orders of the G.O.C., Second Cdn. Division. In addition to this, the Third Cdn. Division would establish Bridgeheads over the CANAL wherever possible in order to allow the Engineers to commence working on the repair of the permanent Bridge.

On the morning of October 8th, word was received that the Twenty-fourth Division (British) on our left had commenced their attack on the S. of CAMBRAI. The NIERGNIES-AWOIGNT Bridge was captured by the XVII Corps, although AWOIGNT was not held. It was expected then that the attack on the CANAL would be made soon after dark on October 9th but this was not done.

The enemy maintained very heavy Fire on our forward positions up to Midnight. The W. Bank of the CANAL was subjected to an intense Bombardment by Trench Mortars located in CAMBRAI. After several changes, Zero Hour was finally fixed for 1:30 A.M. October 9th. The heavy Harassing Fire maintained by the enemy on our forward area slackened perceptibly soon after Midnight and by 1:00 A.M. the situation was quiet.



**Third Canadian Division Attack.**

At 1:30 A.M. our Barrage opened and the Troops of the Third and Second Cdn. Divisions attacked. The Order of Battle is shown in the Table which follows :-

**Canadian Corps Order of Battle; October 9th.**

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Third Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Right.	Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.
8th C.I.B. 5th C.M.R. 4th C.M.R.	Third Cdn. Division Front Brigade Right Brigade Left	Nos. 1 and 2 Companies with Indirect Fire.
Second Cdn. Division	Canadian Corps Left.	Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.
5th C.I.B. 26th C.I.Bn. 25th C.I.Bn. 22nd C.I.Bn. 24th C.I.Bn.	Second Cdn. Division Right Brigade Right Brigade Left Brigade Support Brigade Reserve	Nos. 1 and 2 Companies "L" Battery "B" Battery "D" Battery
6th C.I.B. 31st C.I.Bn. 29th C.I.Bn. 27th C.I.Bn. 28th C.I.Bn.	Second Cdn. Division Left Brigade Right Brigade Left Brigade Right Support Brigade Reserve	No. 2 Company "E" Battery

On the Third Cdn. Division Front, the 4th C.M.R. attacked at Zero Hour, 1:30 A.M. October 9th, and by 2:30 A.M. had reached all of its Objectives, via, the Railway Embankment and the Slag Heap, E. of NEUVILLE ST. REMY and the houses W. of MORENCHIES. Immediately after the commencement of the attack it was obvious that the enemy had withdrawn and that no great resistance would be encountered. No Flares were sent up by the enemy and there was practically no retaliation to our Barrage either from his Machine Guns or Artillery. The G.C.O., 8th C.I.B. decided to ignore the Artillery, Machine Gun and Smoke Barrages that had been organized and at 2:30 A.M. ordered the 5th C.M.R. on the left to push forward and cross the CANAL. These Battalions advanced and no opposition was met with. At 5:30 A.M. the leading Troops of the 8th C.I.B. entered CAMBRAI.

At 8:00 A.M. the Third Cdn. Division had gained the Eastern end of CAMBRAI without casualties. Before mid-day, a Line of Posts was established running N. and S. along the Eastern outskirts of CAMBRAI, and during the evening the 8th C.I.B. were notified that they might withdraw. No relief was necessary, and the Plan of Attack had resulted in the Divisions on our right and left coming together E. of CAMBRAI.

On October 10th, the Third Cdn. Division withdrew from the Line, the Fifty-first Division (British) taking over their area. The 7th C.I.B. withdrew to the area just W. of QUEANT, the 9th C.I.B. to the neighborhood of PRONVILLE N. of QUEANT and the 8th C.I.B. to the area W. of INCHY-en-ARTOIS.



### **Action of Third Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

In connection with the attack of the 8th C.I.B. on CAMBRAI, Nos. 1 and 2 Companies, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. were detailed to carry out Indirect Fire on targets in CAMBRAI from Zero Hour to Zero plus 90 minutes. From the statement of Prisoners and from the lack of enemy opposition, it was from the first apparent that the enemy had retired from CAMBRAI. Consequently, this Program was abandoned and the Guns did not shoot.

On October 10th, Battalion H.Q. and all Companies of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. moved back to the rear, concentrating at a point about 2,000 yards N.-E. of QUEANT.

### **Second Canadian Division Attack.**

On the Second Cdn. Division Front, there were no indications up to Zero Hour that the enemy resistance would not be considerable. During the morning and afternoon of October 8th, a large number of Troops had been seen entering CAMBRAI. Reports from the XVII Corps on the right stated that stubborn resistance had been encountered in their attack on the NIERGNIES-AWOIGNT RIDGE. It appeared probable that the enemy would strongly resist any efforts to cross the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and a counter-attack from ESWARS and CUVILLERS might be expected. Every precaution was taken against these eventualities. A strong Machine Gun protection of the left was arranged, the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade being attached to the 6th C.I.B. for this purpose. The 7th C.I.B. of the Third Cdn. Division was also brought up in readiness to support the Second Cdn. Division in case of need. During the night October 8th/9th 1,000 Gas Drums were projected into the BANTIGNY Valley and this effectually prevented any concentration of Troops in that area.

At 1:30 A.M. October 9th the attack was launched. The 5th C.I.B. attacked with the 26th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 25th C.I.Bn. on the left. The 22nd C.I.Bn. followed in the rear of the 26th and formed a defensive flank facing CAMBRAI. The Bridges at PONT d' AIRE were rushed. The Bridge over the Western Spill-way had been destroyed but our Troops managed to scramble across and save the remaining Bridges from destruction. At 3:35 A.M. the 5th C.I.B. was well established on the Eastern Bank of the CANAL and at 8:00 A.M. held positions on the high ground E. and N.-E. of CAMBRAI and E. of ESCAUDOEUVRES.

At 10:00 A.M. this Brigade advanced in a N. Easterly direction towards NAVES. At this time, the Southern Boundary of the Second Cdn. Division was changed to the CAMBRAI-NAVES Road. The 5th C.I.B. was held up in front of NAVES and S.-E. of THUN-ST. MARTIN. There was a Gap on the left of their Line between their left flank and the right flank of the 6th C.I.B. This Gap was filled by Guns of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.

### **Action of Nos. 1 and 3 Companies, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.**

Nos. 1 and 3 Companies, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. were attached to the 5th C.I.B. for the Operation of October 9th. These Guns were allotted the following special Tasks :-

"L" Battery (No. 3 Company) was to operate at Zero Hour with the 26th C.I.Bn. on the right. When this Battalion had made good its Objectives, "L" Battery was to take up positions N.-E. of CAMBRAI to protect the right flank of the Battalion and to cover the Eastern exits of CAMBRAI. On the 4th C.I.B. passing through, "L" Battery would advance in support of the 20th C.I.Bn. and assist the Battalion in protecting the left flank of the 4th C.I.B.

"B" Battery (No. 1 Company) was to operate in conjunction with the 25th C.I.Bn. on the left of the 5th C.I.B. Front. When this Battalion reached its Objective, "B" Battery was to take up two 4-man Gun positions E. of ESCAUDOEUVRES, 4 Guns N. of the CAMBRAI-DENAIN Railway to fire N. to N.-E., and 4 Guns S. of the Railway firing N.-E., E. and S.

"D" Battery (No. 1 Company) from its present position E. of TILLOY, was to protect the right flank of the 22nd C.I.Bn. by Harassing Fire during the night October 8th/9th, and by taking advantage of all targets of opportunity during the advance.



No. 3 Company was to cooperate also with the 4th C.I.B. which was to advance through the 5th C.I.B. and to attack S. Eastward to connect up with the THIRD ARMY on the right. This Second Phase was not carried out owing to the rapidity of the advance of the Troops on the right.

The Guns of "A", "C" and "D" Batteries remained in the positions occupied by them on October 6th and described above. (X)

The 2 Mobile Batteries ("B" and "L") with Guns and Equipment on Pack Animals, followed the 25th C.I.Bn. closely until the low ground near the CANAL was reached. Here, they remained until the 25th C.I.Bn. was firmly established on its Objectives. The Batteries then moved forward.

"B" Battery (Lieut. CREIGHTON) took up positions on the high ground in the vicinity of the HALT on the Railway E. of ESCAUDOEUVRES.

"L" Battery was established on the Spur running N.-E. from CAMBRAI STATION, to protect the Southern flank of the 5th C.I.B. This Battery engaged numerous targets and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. "L" Battery also supported by Direct Overhead Fire the attack of an Infantry Company on the FACTORY 2,500 yards S.-E. of ESCAUDOEUVRES. At 12:30 P.M., "L" Battery was withdrawn from the 5th C.I.B. as No. 3 Company at this time came under Orders of the 4th C.I.B.

During the afternoon "A" and "B" Batteries pushed on and occupied positions on the high ground 1,500 yards S.-W. of NAVES, just N. of the NAVES ROAD and on the high ground S.-W. of ST. HUBERT. At 4:00 P.M. the Guns of No. 1 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., and the Guns of BRUTINEL'S Brigade supported the 5th C.I.B. in their attack on the Line of Rifle Pits in front of NAVES. The enemy Wire was too strong here and the Infantry were held up. The 4th C.I.B. received Orders to attack from this Line on the morning of October 10th.

#### **6th C.I.B. Attack.**

The 6th C.I.B. launched their attack at 1:30 A.M. October 9th. The enemy was completely surprised and was caught in the midst of a withdrawal across the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. Resistance was slight, RAMILLIES was captured at 2:25 A.M. Patrols were in BLECOURT, BANTIGNY and CUVILLERS by 6:00 A.M. and at 11:15 A.M. ESWARS was clear of the enemy. The right flank was pushed out and touch was gained with the 5th C.I.B. The Eleventh Division (British) on the left had encountered strong resistance from ABANCOURT and the vicinity of BANTIGNY. This for a time, threatened to expose the left flank of the 6th C.I.B. The resistance was overcome however, and the Eleventh Division (British) advanced rapidly. The 29th C.I.Bn. on the 6th C.I.B. left was squeezed out and came into Support. At 6:00 P.M. a firm Line was established.

The general situation at night, October 9th/10th was that the attack was held up E. of a Line CARNIERES-CAGNONCLES-NAVES and S. of THUN-ST. MARTIN. On the right the 5th C.I.B. held the Line in front of NAVES with the 26th C.I.Bn. and the 25th C.I.Bn. The 6th C.I.B. was astride the CANAL, its right flank, the 27th C.I.Bn. resting on the CAMBRAI-IWUY ROAD, 1,000 yards in rear of the 5th C.I.B. The Gap thus formed was covered by the Batteries of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. From here the Line continued in a North-westerly direction to ESWARS, the left of the Line being held by the 31st C.I.Bn. The Eleventh Division (British) continued the Line N. to PAILLENCOURT (inclusive). Patrols of the 6th C.I.B. were in THUN-LEVEQUE.



**Machine Guns Cooperating With 6th C.I.B.**

No. 2 Company (Major Mc CORKELL), Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., (32 Guns) together with 40 Guns of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade supported the attack made by the 6th C.I.B. No Rolling Barrage was arranged. The Artillery was firing a series of "*Crashes*" into localities where an organized resistance was expected and the Machine Guns were to engage selected targets with Harassing Fire.

"E" Battery, No. 2 Company was detailed to advance with the 6th C.I.B., in close support of the 27th C.I.Bn. Its Guns were placed on the Spur formed by the high ground between CUVILLERS and RAMILLIES. The closest liaison was established between Machine Gun Companies and Infantry Brigades.

The 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade Guns carried out vigorous Harassing Fire during the night October 8th/9th on BANTIGNY Village and CUVILLERS firing from positions 1,000 yards N. of SANCOURT. At 1:30 A.M., "D" Battery, 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade took up positions 1,000 yards S.-E. of SANCOURT and opened Fire on BANTIGNY until 6:00 A.M. At 8:30 A.M., "A" and "C" Batteries of this Brigade moved to positions on the N.-W. outskirts of ABANCOURT, protecting the left flank of the 6th C.I.B. At 9:30 A.M., "D" Battery moved again to positions 1,000 yards S. of CUVILLERS, protecting the right flank of the 6th C.I.C.

At 10:00 A.M. October 9th, Orders were received to relieve the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade. At 12:30 P.M., No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. was carrying out this relief. The rapid retirement of the enemy obviated the necessity for the completion of the relief and the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade was ordered to withdraw.

**No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., Joins 4th C.I.B.**

As already stated the 4th C.I.B. was originally intended to follow the 5th and 6th C.I.B.s across the CANAL and, attacking S.-E. to join up with the THIRD ARMY on the right. The rapid advance of the latter however rendered this Operation unnecessary. Consequently the 4th C.I.B. moved forward to the area MORENCHIES-RAMILLIES and took up positions E. of the CANAL. This Brigade had not rested during the night October 8th/9th and was now ordered to take all the rest possible prior to launching an attack on the morning of October 10th.

No. 3 Company (Major Mc CAMUS), M.C.), Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. was withdrawn to the 4th C.I.B. area in readiness to go forward in support to this Brigade on the morning of October 10th.

"L" Battery, during the night October 9th/10th was protecting the left flank of the 4th C.I.B. and was heavily Shelled. The Order to withdraw was given after 18 casualties had been suffered and 3 Machine Guns put out of action. Pte. A. TOROUX made several trips carrying wounded comrades to the rear. ESCAUDOEUVRES was reeking with Gas and many houses were burning. Despite this, he made one last trip back through the Village to find a Man who was reported mortally wounded. He found him in a locality which was being bombarded with Gas Shells. Working without his Gas Mask, he improvised a Tourniquet, bound the wounded Man's leg thus saving his life. He then carried him to the rear and collapsed from exhaustion and the effect of Gas.



**Operations, October 10th and 11th, 1918.****Plan of Attack for October 10th.**

Orders were issued for the Canadian Corps to attack at 6:00 A.M. October 10th. On the right, the Twenty-fourth Division (British) was attacking at 5:30 A.M. The Second Cdn. Division held the whole of the Canadian Corps Front. The 4th C.I.B. was to attack on the right and the 6th C.I.B. on the left. The right flank of the 4th C.I.B. rested on the CAMBRAI-SAULZOIR ROAD, inclusive, and the left flank of the 6th C.I.B. was on the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. The First Objective was the Village of NAVES and the SPUR 1,000 yards E. of it, the junction of the RIVER ERCLIN and the GRAND RIOT and thence the RIVER ERCLIN to its junction with the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. The Second Objective was the Ridge 1,1/2 miles N.-E. of the RIVER ERCLIN (i.e., the IWUY SPUR) and the Village of IWUY, inclusive.

BRUTINEL'S Brigade was to cooperate with the Second Division, pushing along the main road towards SAULZOIR and N. of IWUY, if practicable. Prior to Zero the 31st C.I.Bn. entered the Village of THUN-LEVEQUE. This Battalion quickly cleared the enemy from this Village and established Posts along the Western Bank of the CANAL. The following Table shows the Battle Order of attacking Battalions on October 10th :-

**Canadian Corps Order of Battle; October 10th.**

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Second Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Front.	Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.
4th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Right	No. 3 Company
19th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"J" Battery
18th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"M" Battery
20th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right Support	"K" Battery
21st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve Left	"L" Battery
6th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Left.	No. 2 Company
28th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"F" Battery
29th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	
31st C.I.Bn. (X)	Brigade Support	
27th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	
5th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Reserve	No. 1 Company

(X) Engaged in Minor Operation Prior to Zero.

**Action of No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., October 10th (with 4th C.I.B.)**

The attack was launched at 6:00 A.M. with the 19th C.I.Bn. on the right, attacking in a Northeasterly direction towards NAVES and supported by Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage. Very little resistance was met until reaching old Trenches 1,000 yards S.-E. of THUN-ST. MARTIN, where heavy Machine Gun Fire made further advance impossible until the Brigade on the left was able to push forward. The 18th C.I.Bn. was held up by this Fire and could not cross the River. Orders were sent to the 19th C.I.Bn. which pushed forward and crossed the River on the extreme right and gained the Road running W. from the BEETROOT FACTORY, just E. of the River. Here again very severe Machine Gun Fire was encountered from strong enemy positions E. of IWUY.

The 20th C.I.Bn. in support on the right, closely followed the 19th C.I.Bn. and when the latter had secured the Objective, via the high ground 1,500 yards S.-E. of IWUY, the 20th C.I.Bn. established itself in strong positions along the Road 500 yards E. of the RIVER ERCLIN.

On the left, the 18th C.I.Bn. improved its positions and established itself along the W. Bank of the RIVER immediately S. of IWUY with its left flank on the CAMBRAI-IWUY ROAD. The 21st C.I.Bn. in Reserve took up positions behind the 18th C.I.Bn. along the CAMBRAI-IWUY ROAD from 1,000 to 1,500 yards N.-W. of NAVES. The 4th C.I.B. advanced during the day a distance of 5,000 yards.



No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. cooperated with the 4th C.I.B. During the early Stages of the advance, the right of the 4th C.I.B. was covered by "K" Battery, which filled in the Gap existing between this Brigade and the Twenty-fourth Division (British) on its right. "M" Battery moved to the Railway S. and S.-W. of IWUY, from where it could enfilade the EROLIN RIVER. "J" Battery in support of the 19th C.I.Bn. occupied the high ground N.-W. of NAVES between the NAVES-IWUY and the NAVES-SAULZOIR ROADS. "M" Battery was also able to cover the Dump S.-W. of IWUY at which place the enemy was resisting strongly and was inflicting many casualties on the 6th C.I.B. Captain NORRIS, O.C. "M" Battery opened up with 4 of his Guns on this point and the situation was cleared.

At 1:30 P.M., "J" and "M" Batteries supported the Battalions attacking E. from the ERCLIN RIVER. This attack was held up, the enemy's positions being exceedingly strong and the ground favouring the Defence. The 21st C.I.Bn. had pushed through on the left to a point half-way between IWUY and RIEUX. The 18th C.I.Bn. came up and, passing on the right of the 21st C.I.Bn. went forward to attack the IWUY SPUR.

"L" Battery supported this advance. The Guns of "K" Battery and one Battery of BRUITEL'S Brigade which had taken up a position on the SAULZOIR ROAD E. of RIEUX, also fired in support of this attack. No appreciable advance was made before nightfall, owing chiefly to lack of Artillery Support.

#### **Action of No. 2 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. (with 6th C.I.B.)**

Prior to Zero the 31st C.I.Bn. drove the enemy out of THUN-LEVEQUE, captured the Town, and established their Line along the CANAL de l' ESCAUT. The 28th and 29th C.I.Bns. were to attack right and left respectively. Their jumping-off point was the Line reached by the 27th C.I.Bn. E. of the CANAL on the evening of October 9th. The distance to be covered by these Battalions made their arrival at the Assembly Area late. On account of this the 27th C.I.Bn. moved off at Zero Hour keeping touch with the 4th C.I.B. on the right, until overtaking the other 2 Battalions which passed through. THUN-ST. MARTIN was captured by the 29th C.I.Bn. but the whole Line was held up about 10:30 A.M. 1,000 yards W. of the RIVER ERCLIN by Machine Gun Fire from enemy Dumps on the W. Bank of the River and in IWUY. On word being received that the 4th C.I.B. had crossed the River the 28th C.I.Bn. was sent forward to attack N.-W. along the Bank of the River. If this attack proved successful the 29th C.I.Bn. and the other 2 Companies of the 28th C.I.Bn. were to cross the River and take IWUY, supported on the left flank by the 31st C.I.Bn. Owing to the strength of the enemy's resistance, however, this attack did not progress and at nightfall the attacking Battalions were very little E. of the ERCLIN RIVER.

No. 2 Company (Major Mc CORKELL), Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. assisted the 6th C.I.B. in their attack. "F" Battery left its positions just S.-E. of SANCOURT and proceeded to RAMILLIES, crossing the CANAL de l' ESCAUT at 7:00 A.M. Touch was established here with the Infantry Battalions in a Sunken Road 1,500 yards E. of the CANAL at RAMILLIES. At 3:30 P.M. No. 1 Section of "F" Battery supported a flank attack on IWUY from a point 2,000 yards S.-E. of that Town. No. 2 Section of this Battery, at the same, supported a frontal attack on THUN-ST. MARTIN. The enemy was holding IWUY in strength and it was decided to await Artillery Support before renewing the attack. At this time Lieut. PRICE was wounded and Lieut. URQUHART assumed command of "F" Battery. The Infantry was held up by German Machine Gun Fire just S. of THUN-ST. MARTIN and our Machine Guns engaged these Nests. The enemy retired in the direction of IWUY. Although it was impracticable at this time to continue the attack on IWUY, the enemy's position there was precarious and it was obvious that he would have to retire or surrender. Our Line at nightfall October 10th, was at a point not more than 1,500 yards S.-E. of IWUY and from that point almost encircled the Village, the left flank resting on the CANAL de l' ESCAUT 1,500 yards N.-W. of IWUY.



**Plan of Attack for October 11th.**

During the fighting of October 10th, the Eleventh Division (British) on the left had made good the ground from PAILLENCOURT to ESTRUN and the whole area between the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and the CANAL de la SENSEE was free of the enemy. This rendered the left flank of the Second Cdn. Division secure and Troops were able to advance along the Western bank of the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and enfilade the enemy's defences S.-W. of IWUY. On the right the twenty-fourth Division (British) had taken the Village of RIEUX, but had not been able to advance very far beyond it. Orders were issued for the advance on the Second Cdn. Division Front to be resumed at 9:00 A.M. October 11th.

The 4th C.I.B. on the right was to advance on AVESNES-le-SEC (inclusive) and LIEU-ST. AMAND (exclusive) and then continue toward NOYELLES and make good the Crossing over the RIVER SELLE in the vicinity. The 6th C.I.B. on the left was to attack IWUY and then advance on HORDAIN and LIEU-ST. AMAND both inclusive. The 5th C.I.B. remained in Support. The Forty-ninth Division (British) on the right of the 4th C.I.B. was to establish a Bridgehead over the RIVER SELLE. The Eleventh Division (British) on the left of the 6th C.I.B. was to advance N.-W. and clear up the ground between the IWUY-DENAIN Railway and the CANAL de l' ESCAUT as far as BASSEVILLE. BRUTINEL'S Brigade was to cooperate. During the night October 10th/11th, the Fifty-ninth Division (British) relieved a portion of the 4th C.I.B. and was in position to attack at 9:00 A.M. October 11th.

The Order of Battle for October 11th is shown on the following Table :-

**Canadian Corps Order of Battle; October 11th.**

<b>Infantry Unit.</b>	<b>Disposition.</b>	<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>
Second Cdn. Division.	Canadian Corps Front	Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.
4th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Right	No. 3 Company
21st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	"L" Battery
20th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	"K" Battery
18th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Support	"M" Battery
19th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve	
6th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Left	No. 2 Company
28th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Right	
29th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Left	
27th C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve Right	
31st C.I.Bn.	Brigade Reserve Left	
5th C.I.B.	Second Cdn. Division Reserve	No. 1 Company



**Action of No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. (with 4th C.I.B. October 11th.)**

The attack started at 9:00 A.M. Almost immediately, the enemy Barrage came down across the whole Front, being particularly severe in the vicinity of THUN-ST. MARTIN. The enemy's Machine Gun Fire was also intense. This lasted for less than half an hour when his Fire slackened and he was reported to be in retirement E. From IWUY. At 11 A.M. the enemy counter-attacked in strength with Infantry supported by 7 Tanks against the 4th C.I.B. and the Forty-ninth Division (British). The latter Division was driven back almost to their Jumping-off positions and the Front of the 4th C.I.B. was pushed back slightly. The 4th C.I.B. threw out a defensive flank and assisted the Forty-ninth Division to reorganize their attack.

*"Thanks to the good work done by a Battery of the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., which engaged the enemy's Tanks with 3 Guns, and the accompanying Infantry with 4 Guns, at a range of rather less than 600 yards, the surviving Tanks finally retired to the N.-W. of the Ridge behind which they took up a defensive position and allowed their Infantry to reform." (X)*

Artillery was then brought up and the situation on the right flank was re-established. At 8:00 P.M. the 4th C.I.B. in spite of heavy casualties, had made good the top of the IWUY SPUR and were in touch on their right with the Forty-ninth Division (British). During the night October 11th /12th, the 4th C.I.B. was relieved by Brigades of the Fifty-first (Highland) Division and moved into Billets in ESCAUDOEURES.

(X) Second Cdn. Division Narrative of Operations, March 13th to November 11th, 1918.

No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. supported the attack of the 4th C.I.B. Owing to the strength of the enemy's position in IWUY, the right of the 4th C.I.B. advanced faster than the left. "L" Battery in support of the 21st C.I.Bn. on the right, took up positions on the CAMBRAI-DENAIN Railway, 200 yards S. of IWUY Station, and from this commanding position endeavored to silence the enemy's Machine Gun Fire. Many casualties were suffered here. The O.C. "L" Battery, Capt. FROST was wounded in the head by a Machine Gun Bullet. Lieut. GARNEAU assumed command of the Battery.

On the left, "K" Battery in support of the 20th C.I.Bn. obtained Direct Fire on enemy Machine Gun Nests and silenced them. Direct targets were also obtained around the Dump N.-E. of IWUY Station.

As the Infantry advanced up the IWUY SPUR, the enemy's resistance increased and, shortly after the Crest was passed, a counter attack supported by 7 Tanks developed as already described. Lieut. GARNEAU, in command of "L" Battery had 7 Guns left, one having been knocked out. He halted these Guns in a Turnip Field and went forward to reconnoitre. He found that one Tank, supported by about 700 Infantry, was advancing in his direction. Mounting his Guns in the lowest possible position he brought the Fire of the 4 right Guns to bear on the Tank while his 3 Guns on the left were directed on the Infantry accompanying the Tank, to the left of it. This arrangement brought Cross-Fire to bear of the approaching enemy Formation at a range of about 500 yards. The enemy's Infantry quickly broke and fled. The Tank fired a few Shells and a few bursts from its Machine Guns and then turned and followed its own Infantry to cover. During this Action, the Battery lost 2 Men killed. The casualties inflicted on the enemy numbered about 40. Our Infantry, meanwhile, formed up behind "L" Battery which took up defensive positions.

Shortly after noon, the Village of IWUY was finally cleared of the enemy and occupied by the 6th C.I.B. The Line of the 4th C.I.B. ran from here in a South-Easterly direction along Sunken Roads near the top of the SPUR. The Forty-ninth Division (British) were somewhat in rear on the right. The Gap was held by "K" Battery until 2:30 P.M. when the Forty-ninth Division drew up level.

At 3:30 P.M. another attack was made and, although suffering many casualties the 4th C.I.B. made good the Crest of this SPUR. This concluded the Operations for the night. The final positions held by the Batteries were :-

- "L" Battery, on the right, close to the Crest of the Hill, 2,000 yards S.-E. of IWUY.
- "K" Battery, 1,000 yards to the left of "L" Battery and just S. of IWUY Station.
- "M" Battery, 4 Guns close to "K" Battery and 4 Guns 1,000 yards S.-W. of these.
- "J" Battery, in Reserve, 1,500 yards N.-E. on NAVES.

No. 3 Company was relieved during the night October 11th/12th by the Fifty-first Battalion M.G.C. On relief, the Company withdrew to ESCAUDOEUVRES.



**Attack of the 6th C.I.B. October 11th.**

The 6th C.I.B. attacked at 9:00 A.M. October 11th. The General Plan was that the 28th C.I.Bn. on the right was to attack IWUY while the 29th C.I.Bn., holding the Line to the CANAL on the left, made a demonstration to distract the enemy. When the 28th C.I.Bn. was firmly established in IWUY, the 29th C.I.Bn. was to advance to the RIVER ERCLIN, mopping up the area and then coming into Brigade Reserve. Meanwhile the 27th and 31st C.I.Bns. were to follow up the 28th C.I.Bn. closely and then attack through this Battalion, the 27th C.I.Bn., advancing on the right to capture LIEU-ST. AMAND and the 31st on the left to take HORDAIN.

The 28th C.I.Bn. advanced and, by 11:00 A.M. had captured IWUY. The enemy put down a heavy Barrage as soon as the attack commenced and this caused the 27th and 31st C.I.Bns. some casualties in their Assembly Areas, just S.-W. of THUN-ST. MARTIN. These 2 Battalions could not move forward to their Jumping-off Line for the Second Stage of the attack as the 4th C.I.B. had been held back by the counter-attack already described. At 3:20 P.M. these Battalions were disposed in the Railway Cutting N.-E. of IWUY and on the N.-E. outskirts of the Village. Subsequently, as the 4th C.I.B. advanced, the 27th and 31st C.I.Bns. pushed forward their Line. At dusk, the Line ran about 1,000 yards beyond IWUY on the N. and then turned S. where the 27th C.I.Bn was in touch with the 4th C.I.B. Meanwhile the 29th C.I.Bn. pushed forward and established their Line on the E. Bank of the RIVER ERCLIN.

The 6th C.I.B. was relieved during the night October 11th/12th by the 154th Brigade of the Fifty-first (Highland) Division. Relief being complete at 4:00 A.M. October 12th. On relief the 6th C.I.B. moved into Divisional Reserve in the ESWARA area.

The attack of the 6th C.I.B. was supported by No. 2 Company (Major Mc CORKELL), Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. Headquarters of this Company was moved during the early morning, October 11th, to CROIX ST. HUBERT, 500 yards S. of THUN-ST. MARTIN. The 6th C.I.B. was on the left of the Second Cdn. Division Front, and its advance was slow. The Batteries supported the attack on IWUY.

During the night October 11th/12th, No. 2 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. was relieved by Guns of the Fifty-first Battalion, M.G.C. On relief, the Company withdrew to RAMILLIES.



**Line Redistributed; Situation Night October 11th/12th.**

The relief of the 6th and 4th C.I.B.s by the Fifty-first (Highland) Division took place along the whole Second Cdn. Division Front. The actual Line handed over only extended as far W. as the IWUY-DENAIN Railway. The Second Cdn. Division was ordered to attack on the Front from this Railway W. to the CANAL de l' ESCAUT on October 12th in conjunction with the Fifty-first Division. It was arranged that the British troops should relieve the whole Front as detailed above and that the 5th C.I.B. from Reserve should attack through the Fifty-first Division on their Front, between the IWUY-DENAIN Railway and the CANAL de l' ESCAUT at 12:00 noon October 12th. The 5th C.I.B. marched up to their Assembly positions during the night October 11th/12th and the attack was launched as arranged.

When Nos. 2 and 3 Companies, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. were relieved No. 1 Company was already in Billets in MORENCHIES. During the morning of October 12th, this Company moved forward in readiness to support the attack of the 5th C.I.B. The Acting O.C., Capt. STONEHEWER, established his Headquarters in the Chateau N.-W. of THUN-ST. MARTIN.



**First Battalion, C.M.G.C., October 3rd to 12th, 1918.****October 3rd to 7th.**

The First Cdn. Division was relieved by the Eleventh Division (British) at 11:45 P.M. October 2nd/3rd. On relief the 1st C.I.B. withdrew to the HENDECOURT-CAGNICOURT Area, the 2nd C.I.B. to the BUISSY-BARALLE Area and the 3rd C.I.B. to MARQUION.

No. 3 Company (Major GRANTHAM, M.C.) First Battalion, C.M.G.C., withdrew their Mobile Batteries at 11:00 P.M. October 2nd and proceeded to the area between BUISSY and CAGNICOURT.

No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM, M.C.) withdrew the 3 Mobile Batteries at 8:00 A.M. October 3rd and proceeded to the Bivouacking Area in the vicinity of CAGNICOURT.

No. 1 Company (Major E. R. MORRIS) was relieved by the Fourteenth Battalion, M.G.C. at 7:30 P.M. October 3rd, and on relief proceeded to CAGNICOURT, where the Company arrived at 4:00 A.M. October 4th.

"B", "H" and "K" Batteries, in Divisional Reserve withdrew at 7:30 P.M., on relief by Guns of the Fourteenth Battalion, M.G.C. On relief, these Batteries rejoined their respective Companies in the neighborhood of CAGNICOURT.

On October 3rd, Orders were received that the First Cdn. Division was to relieve the Fourth Division (British) in the Line from PALLUEL to BIACHE-ST.-VAASTE, i.e. on a Frontage of about 14,000 yards between the CANAL du NORD and the RIVER SCARPE. The Front was separated from the enemy by the flooded Valley of the TRINQUIS and SENSEE RIVERS. For this reason, it was thought that this relief would give the Division a Period of Rest.

On October the 6th the 2nd C.I.B. moved to the right of the Line on the SENSEE Front, relieving the 11th Brigade (British). The same day, the 3rd C.I.B. took over the left of the Line from the 12th Brigade (British). The 1st C.I.B. remained in Divisional Reserve in the HENDECOURT-CAGNICOURT Area. The command of the new Divisional Front passed from the G.O.C., Fourth Division (British) to the G.O.C., 1st Cdn. Division on October 7th at 10:00 A.M., the 1st Cdn. Division coming under the Tactical Control of the XXII Corps. During the afternoon the 1st C.I.B. moved into the VIS-en-ARTOIS Area.

During these days, Companies of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C., (Lieut.-Col. WATSON, D.S.O.) remained in Billeting Areas, refitting and cleaning up. On being warned of the coming Infantry Relief, the new Area was reconnoitred and Bivouacking Areas arranged in the vicinity of CHERISY and VIS-en-ARTOIS. No. 2 Company moved to Bivouacking Area in MONCHY during the afternoon of October 6th. At the same time, No. 3 Company moved to the Area between CHERISY and VIS-en-ARTOIS. No. 1 Company left CAGNICOURT at 2:00 P.M. October 7th and reached their Bivouacking Area on the Eastern outskirts of CHERISY at 7:00 P.M.

At 7:30 P.M. October 7th, No. 2 Company relieved "C" and "D" Companies of the Fourth Battalion, M.G.C. in the Line E. of ETAING. At 11:30 P.M. night October 7th/8th, No. 3 Company relieved "A" and "B" Companies of the Fourth Battalion, M.G.C., in the Left Front Line. No. 1 Company was placed in Divisional Reserve. At 8:30 A.M. October 8th, Battalion Headquarters was established at LES FOSSES FARM on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI ROAD S.-W. of MONCHY.

**Operations, October 8th.**

The First Cdn. Division carried out a "Chinese" Attack under Instructions from the XXII Corps at 5:30 A.M. October 8th. This consisted of a Rolling Barrage commencing in front of our Outpost Line and moving forward to the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. Under this Barrage, the 13th C.I.Bn. pushed forward with the objective of enlarging a Bridgehead handed over to us N.-W. of ETAING. This was accomplished. A complete enemy Outpost consisting of 1 Officer and 23 Other ranks was captured and our Outposts were established in favourable positions.

In connection with this "*Chinese*" Attack, No. 2 Company (Major DENHOLM, D.C.M.) First Battalion, C.M.G.C. fired 32,000 Rounds on enemy positions on the N. Bank of the River. There was no retaliation to



this Barrage. On completion of their Barrage Tasks the Batteries were disposed behind the 2nd C.I.B. from right to left as follows :-

“G” Battery, defending the area from ECOURT-ST. QUENTIN to 200 yards S.-E. of LECLUSE.  
 “E” Battery, defending the area behind LECLUSE and including BOIS de RECCOURT.  
 “F” Battery, defending the area behind ETAING to ETERPIGNY.  
 “H” Battery, in rear of “F” Battery, covering DURY.  
 No. 2 Company’s H.Q. was at LECLUSE.

The Batteries of No. 3 Company fired 27,000 Rounds on their allotted Barrage Line between the hours of 5:30 A.M. and 6:30 A.M. October 8th. The enemy retaliation was slight. At the completion of the Barrage Tasks the Batteries were disposed as follows :-

“K” Battery, about 1,000 yards E. of BOIRY-notre-DAME.  
 “L” and “M” Batteries, W. of JIGSAW WOOD.  
 “J” Battery, in rear at Eastern outskirts of BOIS du VERT.  
 No. 3 Company’s H.Q. was 1,000 yards S.-E. of MONCHY.

### **Infantry Action, October 9th to 12th.**

The situation was normal during the day October 9th. A Barrage was put down at daylight, to feel out the strength of the enemy and to observe movement. Enemy retaliation to this Barrage was slight. Early in the morning of October 10th, the 3rd C.I.B. pushed out Patrols with the object of discovering the enemy’s Dispositions and, if possible, entering the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE and gaining touch with the 23rd Brigade (British) at VITRY. The 13th C.I.Bn. succeeded in penetrating the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE and SAILLY was taken. The 15th C.I.Bn. in endeavouring to effect a crossing on the Tow Path at BIACRE-ST. VASST, encountered heavy Machine Gun Fire and withdrew. In retiring to our Line, one Party of the 13th C.I.Bn. was cut off and overrun by the enemy, 2 Officers and about 50 O.R.s being taken prisoners.

At daybreak on October 11th, the Eight Division (British ) on our left, started an attack with the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE as their Objective. At 9:00 A.M. word was passed to all Units in the First Cdn. Division that the enemy was in full Retreat. The Brigades were ordered to push forward across the SENSEE and TRINQUIS RIVERS, drive in the enemy Rearguard and capture the high ground S. of the SCARPE.

The 2nd C.I.B. immediately sent the 7th C.I.Bn. forward. This Battalion made a bold attempt to cross the River on the LECLUSE-TORTEQUENNE ROAD but was met with heavy Machine Gun Fire. After 15 minutes Bombardment by our Artillery, under cover of which a Foot-bridge was thrown across the River, our Troops again pushed forward and the whole of the 7th C.I.Bn. was across the River and in touch with the 3rd C.I.B. on the left.

The 3rd C.I.B. advanced on the left of the 2nd C.I.B. with the 16th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 15th C.I.Bn. on the left.

From the time that the Brigades got in touch on the N. Bank of the River, the advance was steady. Slight resistance was encountered, this being from isolated Machine Gun Posts. By dusk, the First Cdn. Division was established on a Line, HAMEL-ESTREES-NOYELLE, all inclusive . thence to the SCARPE, about 1,000 yards W. of BREBIERES.

At 5:00 P.M. October 11th, the XXII Corps Frontage passed to the Canadian Corps and the First Cdn. Division once again came under Orders of the G.O.C., Canadian Corps. During the night October 11th/12th, the situation was quiet on the Corps Front. The 2nd and 3rd C.I.B.s were ordered to be in readiness to continue Operations in the morning of October 12th with the Objective of gaining Bridgeheads over the SENSEE CANAL.



**Action of First Battalion, C.M.G.C., October 9th to 12th.**

Units of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C. had conformed to and assisted Infantry movements during this period. On October 9th, the situation was normal. Nos. 2 and 3 Companies, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. remained in their positions. No. 1 Company came into Divisional Reserve and remained in their Bivouacking Area E. of CHERISY.

During October 10th, "E" and "F" Batteries of No. 2 Company, located Night-firing positions and positions for 2 Sniping Guns. 2 of the Night-firing Guns were located at the Cemetery E. of ETAING and 2 more, about 500 yards E. of the first 2. These positions were complete at 7:00 P.M. and 27,500 Rounds S.A.A. were fired between 8:30 P.M. and 3:30 A.M. night October 10th/11th, on enemy Tracks, Cross-roads and Exits from TORTEQUENNE.

No. 3 Company remained in their positions during the day, October 10th.

At 8:00 P.M. October 11th, No. 1 Company in Divisional Reserve, moved to RE COURT, arriving there at 1:45 A.M. October 12th.

In connection with the advance of the Infantry on October 11th, No. 2 Company supported the 2nd C.I.B. "E" Battery moved forward with the 7th C.I.Bn., one Section covering the advance with Direct Fire. When MONT BEDU was captured "E" Battery took up positions in front of TORTEQUENNE and MONT BEDU. At 6:40 P.M. this Battery was in touch with the 7th C.I.Bn. in LECLUSE and all the Guns were moving forward. At 10:15 P.M., "E" Battery was disposed for defence in depth in positions in front of TORTEQUENNE.

"F" Battery with the 5th C.I.Bn. moved off at 10:00 P.M. October 11th, passing through ETERPIGNY, REMY and LONG LANE, to the Bridge E. of VALLEY WOOD. At 1:00 A.M. October 12th a halt was made about 500 yards W. of LECLUSE, where the Battery remained for the night.

"G" Battery assembled in the BOIS de RE COURT, with Orders to keep in touch with the 8th C.I.Bn.

"H" Battery, in Brigade Reserve was ordered to "Stand To". These 2 Batteries remained in their positions throughout the day.

On receiving word that the enemy was withdrawing, No. 3 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. was ordered to be in readiness to cross the River in support of the 3rd C.I.B. attack.

"J" and "L" Batteries concentrated with Transport at a location half-way between BOIRY and ETAING. "J" Battery moved forward at 10:00 P.M. to the Pontoon Bridge at SAILLY. At 11:45 P.M. a halt was called at the Crossroads N. of SAILLY where the Limbers were unloaded and the stores man-handled up to positions about 1,000 yards W. of NOYELLE where the Battery arrived at 1:45 A.M. October 12th.

"K", "L" and "M" Batteries concentrated at their respective Battery Headquarters, ready to move forward at dawn October 12th.

No. 1 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. remained at RE COURT, preparing to go into the Line to relieve No. 3 Company on the relief of the 3rd C.I.B. which would probably take place during the night October 12th /13th.



**Casualties, Machine Gun Battalions, Battle of CAMBRAI.**

The following Table shows Casualties suffered by the 4 Battalions of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps during the BATTLE of CAMBRAI, August 26th to October 11th inclusive.

<b>Unit</b>	<b>Killed Officers - O.R.</b>		<b>Wounded Officers - O.R.</b>		<b>Missing Officers - O.R.</b>		<b>Total Officers - O.R.</b>	
First Bn. C.M.G.C.	5	59	22	449	1	5	28	513 = 541
Second Bn. C.M.G.C.	3	58	12	389		12	15	459 = 474
Third Bn. C.M.G.C.	2	98	8	234		5	10	357 = 367
Fourth Bn. C.M.G.C.	5	52	17	351			22	403 = 425
<b>TOTAL</b>	15	267	59	1443	1	22	75	1732 = 1807

The following Table shows Casualties to Canadian Machine Gun Battalions during various Periods of the

**BATTLE of CAMBRAI.**

<b>Date (inclusive 1918)</b>		<b>Killed Off. - O.R.</b>		<b>Wounded Off.- O.R.</b>		<b>Missing Off. - O.R.</b>		<b>Total for Period. Off.- O.R.</b>		<b>Total For Battle. Off.- O.R.</b>	
First	Aug. 26th to 31st.	1	9	2	67			3	76		
Battalion	Sept. 1st to 30th.	2	17	16	250			18	267		
C.M.G.C.	Oct. 1st to 11th.	2	33	4	132	1	5	7	170	28	513
Second	Aug. 26th to 31st.	3	24	8	163		12	11	199		
Battalion	Sept. 1st to 30th.		11	2	104			2	115		
C.M.G.C.	Oct. 1st to 11th.		23	2	122			2	145	15	459
Third	Aug. 26th to 31st.		22	2	59		3	2	84		
Battalion	Sept. 1st to 26th.		48		20				68		
C.M.G.C	Sept. 27th to Oct. 2nd.	2	28	6	175		2	8	205	10	357
Fourth	Aug. 26th to 31st.										
Battalion	Sept. 1st to 30th.	5	48	17	319			22	367		
C.M.G.C.	Oct. 1st to 11th.		4		32				36	22	403
<b>TOTAL</b>		15	267	59	1443		22			75	1732



### **Reinforcements.**

During the BATTLE of CAMBRAI, August 26th to October 12th, Machine Gun Reinforcements were supplied to Active Units from an Advanced Reinforcement Depot. This Depot was established at AGNEZ-les-DUISANS for the early Phases, and later moved forward, with Canadian Corps Headquarters, to the QUEANT Area. As our Line advanced the Lorries of the C.M.M.G.M.T. Company were employed to convoy Reinforcements forward to Units.

In order to avoid unnecessary delays, the Advanced C.M.G.C.R.D. during this period was administered directly by the G.O.C., C.M.G.C, and not, as in the AMIENS Operations, through the O.C., Advanced C.C.R.C. An Administrative and Training Staff with Equipment was provided for the Advanced Machine Gun Depot from the C.M.G.C.R.D. at AUBIN-ST.-VAAST. Estimated Casualty Wires, as formerly, were sent by Units in the Field direct to the G.O.C.C.M.G.C., who issued Orders direct to the Advanced Reinforcement. A copy of these dispatch Wires was forwarded to the O.C.C.M.G.C.R.D., who at once sent forward Replacements to the Advanced Depot.



**DOUAI TO MONS.****October 12th to November 11th, 1918.****General Situation October 12th to 16th.****Introductory.**

Operations of the Canadian Corps during the Period were divided into 3 stages, viz., (1) the Advance from the CANAL de la SENSEE to VALENCIENNES-CONDE, October 12th to 29th (2) the Operations leading up to and including the capture of VALENCIENNES, October 29th to November 2nd (3) the Advance from VALENCIENNES to MONS, November 3rd to 11th.

The Battle Order of Canadian Corps through successive Periods from October 12th to November 11th is shown as follows:-

	LEFT		RIGHT
<b>OCT. 12th</b>	1st Cdn. Div. 56th Div. (British)	11th Div. (British)	2nd Cdn. Div.
<b>12th / 13th</b>	1st Cdn. Div.	56th Div. (British) 10th C.I.B. (4th Cdn.)	2nd Cdn. Div.
<b>14th / 15th</b>	1st Cdn. Div.	4th Cdn. Div.	2nd Cdn. Div.
<b>19th P.M.</b>	1st Cdn. Div.		4th Cdn. Div.
<b>22nd A.M.</b>	3rd Cdn. Div.		4th Cdn. Div.
<b>Nov. 7th to 11th</b>	3rd Cdn. Div.		2nd Cdn. Div.

On October 12th, the Corps was holding the front from the IWUY-DENAIN Railway at a point just E. of IWUY, W. and N.-W. along the CANAL de la SENSEE, to the RIVER SCARPE. 2 Canadian Divisions and 2 British Divisions were in the line: The Second Canadian Division on the Corps Right held the short Frontage between the IWUY- DENAIN Railway and the CANAL de l'ESCAULT; the Eleventh Division (British) continued the line from ESTRUN to FRESSIES; the Fifty-sixth Division (British) carried the Line on from FRESSIES to PALLUEL, and the First Canadian Division, on the Corps Left, held the Frontage from PALLUEL to the Left Corps Boundary, 2 miles S.-W. of DOUAI. The XXII Corps was on the Right of the Canadian Corps, and the VIII Corps on the Left.

During the last few days of the CAMBRAI Battle, our Line on this Section of the Front had been almost stationary, but it became increasingly apparent that the enemy was preparing to carry out a withdrawal on a large scale. Prisoners reported the evacuation of civilians and the removal or destruction of all Stores; also that Roads and Railways had been prepared for demolition. These statements were confirmed by our Observers who reported numerous explosions and Fires behind the enemy lines.

Constant touch was maintained with the enemy to the N. Side of the CANAL de la SENSEE, and every sign of his impending withdrawal noted. Between October 12th and 16th the Divisions in the Line were rearranged, and, on October 17th when our advance commenced, the Canadian Corps Front was held by the Second Cdn. Division on the Right, the Fourth Cdn. Division in the Centre and the First Cdn. Division on the Left.



**Advance Begun Oct.17th.**

On October 17th the enemy attitude was unusually quiet; on the Front of the First Cdn. Division no reply was made to our daily Artillery Test Barrage. Patrols sent out on this Front succeeded in crossing the CANAL in several places, meeting with slight opposition. Attempts of the Second and Fourth Divisions to effect a crossing were met with considerable hostile Machine Gun Fire, but, by the evening of October 17th, all three Divisions had made good the N. Bank of the SENSEE CANAL. The enemy retired rapidly on the left on this day, and by nightfall the Fourth and First Divisions had penetrated an average depth of 3 ½ miles into the German Lines.

The Advance continued with varying speed on the following days. On October 19th, the Second Canadian Division squeezed out at NEUVILLE-sur-l'ESCAULT by the Fifty-first Division (British) on the Right and the Fourth Cdn. Division on the Left. On the morning of October 22nd, when the Canadian Corps had reached the General Line of the VALENCIENNES-ST. AMAND Road, the Third Cdn. Division passed through the First Cdn. Division. On the following day the Fourth and Third Divisions reached the line of the CANAL de l'ESCAULT from TRITH-ST.LEGER to its junction with the CANAL du JARD and the CONDE-MONS CANAL S. of CONDE.

The Canadian Corps Right or Southern Boundary during this Advance was the IWUY-DENAIN Railway from IWUY to NEUVILLE-sur-l'ESCAULT and the CANAL de l'ESCAULT from this point to TRITH ST.LEGER. The Corps Left or Northern Boundary was roughly a line drawn through CORBEHEM-S.E. outskirts of DOUAI-MARCHIENNES (incl.) – along the SCARPE RIVER to ST.AMAND (excl.) – ODOMEZ (excl.) the CANAL du JARD S. of CONDE (excl.)

**Capture of VALENCIENNES, November 1st to 2nd.**

At the Line of the CANAL de l'ESCAULT W. of VALENCIENNES, a pause of over a week occurred, during which time our own Rear Lines of Communication were improved and the Flanking Corps established themselves in Line with the Canadian Corps. Preparations were also undertaken for the Crossing of the Canal, the capture of VALENCIENNES and the continuation of our Advance. On November 1st, the enemy Positions S. of VALENCIENNES were taken by the Fourth Canadian Division, and early the following morning the entire City was in our hands.

**November 3rd to 11th.**

From this time until the signing of the Armistice, our Advance was rapid and continuous. The Southern Corps Boundary was a Line running E. from the Railway S. of MARLY to a point 1,000 yards. E. of ESTREUX; thence N.-E. to ST. SYMPHORIEN (incl.). The Northern Corps Boundary followed the CONDE-MONS CANAL to a point 4 miles W. of MONS where it turned N.-E. to GHLIN and on to MAISIERES.

The Fourth Cdn. Division carried our Line forward on the Right crossing the Belgian Border on November 6th. On the night of November 6th/7th, the Second Cdn. Division relieved the Fourth Cdn. Division. The Third Division made its way forward across the difficult flooded area on the Corps Left, E. of the CANAL de l'ESCAULT and S. of the CONDE-MONS CANAL: its right crossed into BELGIUM on November 6th, in touch with the Fourth Cdn. Division.

The Second and Third Divisions moved rapidly Eastwards, through the thickly-populated mining district W. of MONS reaching the outskirts of the city itself on November 10th. At 11.00 A.M. November 11th, when Hostilities ceased, the Canadian Corps was established on a line 4 to 5 miles E. of MONS.



### **Machine Gun Operations.**

During the entire Period from October 12th to November 11th, our operations consisted for the most part of desultory Fighting with enemy Rear Guards. The only Operation of any magnitude was the Attack on MONT HOUY and VALENCIENNES on November 1st. Machine Guns moved forward with Infantry Units, giving Covering Fire where required and engaging enemy Machine Gun Nests and other Targets of Opportunity. A considerable amount of Harassing Fire was done at night on enemy Communications, particularly during the time our Line was stationary W. of VALENCIENNES, our Machine Guns fired an effective Enfilade Barrage from the W. Bank of the CANAL de l'ESCAULT. At the end of each day's Advance, Machine Guns were placed in Forward Defensive Positions, and on the morning of November 11th, the Guns of the Second and Third Battalions, C.M.G.C., were placed for Defense in Depth of our line E. of MONS.



**DOUAI TO MONS.****FIRST STAGE.****CANAL DE LA SENSEE TO VALENCIENNES.****Second Battalion, C.M.G.C.; October 12th to 19th (-Nov. 6th), 1918.****Infantry Operations October 12th to 13th.**

On the night October 11th/12th, the Fifty-first Division (British) relieved the Second Cdn. Division E. and N.-E. of IWUY. The Machine Gun Relief was reported complete at 3.15 A.M., the Infantry Relief, at 4.20 A.M. At 12.00 Noon October 12th, the 5th C.I.B. attacked through the 154th Brigade, Fifty-first Division, between the IWUY-DENAIN Railway and the CANAL de l'ESCAULT, the Fifty-first Division attacking on the Right. An Advance of 2,000 yards. was made with slight Opposition, the Village of HORDAIN was captured and our Line established N. of the Village between the Railway and the Canal. This was the extent of the Second Cdn. Division Frontage on October 12th. During the night October 12th/13th the Second Division extended its front across the CANAL de l'ESCAULT, relieving the Eleventh Division (British) between ESTRUN and FRESSIES (exclusive) along the S. Bank of the CANAL de la SENSEE. ESTRUN is situated at the junction of these two Waterways. The 5th C.I.B. was now on the Right, the 4th C.I.B. in the Centre and the 6th C.I.B. on the Left, in touch with the Fifty-sixth Division (British).

**Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., Oct. 12th to 13th.**

The Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., on completion of Relief by the Fifty-first Battalion, M.G.C. night October 11th/12th was disposed as follows in the vicinity of CAMBRAI on October 12th. Advanced Battalion H.Q. was at ESCADOEUVRES, Rear H.Q. at MORENCHINES, No. 1 Company was in Billets at MORENCHIES, No. 2 Company, at RAMILLIES, No. 3 Company at ESCADOEUVRES. At 12.00 Noon, No.1 Company (Major BASEVI) attacked with the 5th C.I.B., "D" Battery advancing on the Right with the 24th C.I.Bn., "C" Battery on the Left with the 22nd C.I.Bn. "B" Battery was in Brigade Support, "A" Battery was in Brigade Reserve. After the Attack, positions were occupied for Defense of the new Frontage; "D" Battery Guns were placed between the IWUY- DENAIN Railway and HORDAIN, "C" Battery, on the Left between the Village and the CANAL de l'ESCAULT, "B" Battery E. of the CANAL, opposite ESTRUN, "A" Battery in the CHATEAU N. of IWUY in Reserve.

The Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., relieved the Eleventh Battalion, M.G.C., on October 13th, No. 3 Company (Major McCAMUS, M.C.) supporting the 4th C.I.B., in the Centre Divisional Sector, completed relief of Eleventh Battalion Guns at 6:15 P.M. No.2 Company, (Major McCORKELL) placed Guns in Position in Support of the 6th C.I.B. on the Divisional Left. Battalion Rear H.Q. moved to SANCOURT.

Dispositions night 13th/14th were as follows:-

No.1 Company -	In Positions occupied on October 12th. H.Q., THUN-ST. MARTIN.
No.3 Company -	H.Q., CUVILLERS. "K" Battery, 4 Guns, between THUN-ST. MARTIN and PAILLENCOURT, near top of spur. 4 Guns, Reserve at CUVILLIERS. "J" Battery, in Positions S.-W. of PAILLENCOURT. "L" and "M" Batteries, Brigade Reserve at CUVILLIERS.
No.2 Company -	H.Q. at SANCOURT. "E" Battery, 1200 yards, N.-W. of BANTGNY "F" Battery, N.-W. outskirts of ABANCOURT "H" Battery, along the AUBENCHEUL-au-BAC-CAMBRAI Road, E. of EPINOY. "G" Battery, SANCOURT, in Brigade Reserve.



**Operations And M.G. Dispositions Oct. 14th To 17th.**

The 4th C.I.B. relieved the 5th C.I.B. on October 14th, extending its Right across the ESCAUT CANAL to the Railway. Machine Gun Reliefs conformed. "L" and "M" Batteries, No.3 Company, relieved "C" and "D" Batteries, No.1 Company: 4 Guns of "J" Battery relieved the 4 Guns of "K" Battery at the THUN-ST. MARTIN-PAILLEN COURT SPUR. "K" Battery was then placed in 4th C.I.B. Reserve at CUVILLIERS. "A" and "B" Batteries were withdrawn and the whole of No.1 Company passed into Divisional Reserve on completion of Relief at 8:10 P.M. Guns of No.2 Company were rearranged on October 14th with a view to strengthening the 6th C.I.B. Machine Gun Defenses. 2 Guns "E" Battery replaced the 4 "J" Battery Guns which had taken over "K" Battery Positions. 4 Guns "G" Battery from Brigade Reserve, and 2 Guns "F" Battery were placed in Positions 1,000 to 1,500 yards S.-E. of HEM-LENGLET.

On October 15th, No.1 Company moved to billets in MARQUION with the 5th C.I.B.; Battalion Advanced H.Q. moved to SANCOURT. Machine Gun Dispositions remained unchanged throughout the 16th and 17th. These 2 days were marked by considerable enemy Shelling. On the 16th, there was heavy Gas Shelling along the Divisional Front; Battalion H.Q. at SANCOURT was shelled from 6:00 to 6:30 P.M. On the 17th, Bridgeheads were established by the 4th C.I.B., S. of WASNES-au-BAC, and by the 6th C.I.B. at HEM-LENGLET, and it was learned that the Germans were withdrawing.

**The Advance Oct. 18th.to 19th.**

The 19th C.I.Bn. (4th C.I.B.) and the 29th C.I.Bn. (6th C.I.B.) crossed the CANAL de la SENSEE on the morning of October 18th and, moving forward in touch with the Fourth Cdn. Division on the Left, established the Line WAVRECHAIN-sous-FAUX-MARQUETTE by the evening. "H" Battery, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., supported the 29th C.I.Bn., crossing the CANAL S. of WASNES-au-BAC in the early afternoon. Positions were occupied for the night on the Ridge N. of WASNES-au-BAC. The remaining Guns of No.2 Company remained in Positions already occupied as follows:-

"E" Battery	(2 Guns, S.W. of PAILLEN COURT. (6 Guns, 1,500 yds. N.-E. of BANTIGNY
"G" Battery	(4 Guns, 1,500 yds. S.-E. of HEM-LENGLET (4 Guns, SANCOURT, in 6th C.I.B. Reserve.
"F" Battery	(2 Guns, 1,000 yds. S.-E. of HEM-LENGLET (6 Guns, on N.-W. outskirts of ABANCOURT

No. 2 Company H.Q. moved to HEM-LENGLET.

Batteries of No.3 Company remained in Positions as follows:-

"M" and "L" Batteries, on the Right and Left of HORDAIN, respectively.  
 "J" Battery, 4 Guns on THUN-LEVESQUE-PAILLEN COURT SPUR.  
 4 Guns, S.-W. of PAILLEN COURT.  
 "K" Battery, CUVILLIERS, in 4th C.I.B. Reserve.

On October 19th the Second Canadian Division advanced with the 4th and 6th C.I.B.s on either side of the CANAL de l'ESCAULT, through BOUCHAIN, BASSEVILLE and BOUCHENEUIL as far as NEUVILLE-sur-l'ESCAUT. At this point, the Advance of the Fifty-first Division (British) on the Right and the Fourth Cdn. Division on the Left converged, and the Second Cdn. Division was withdrawn to Canadian Corps Reserve.

No.3 Company supported the 4th C.I.B. through BOUCHAIN to NEUVILLE-sur-l'ESCAUT. "G" Battery, No.2 Company, joined "H" Battery N. of the SENSEE CANAL: "E" and "F" Batteries were moved up close to the S. Bank of the CANAL. The Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., passed into Corps Reserve with the Second Cdn. Division in the evening and remained out of the Line until November 6th.



**Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., Corps Reserve, Oct. 20th to Nov. 6th.**

The Battalion now came under the direct orders of Lieut.-Col. WEIR, M.C., and assembled on October 20th, Battalion H.Q., with Nos. 1 and 3 Companies, at WASNES-au-BAC, No.2 Company at MARQUETTE. The 21st was spent in re-equipping, cleaning Guns and Equipment and clearing debris from Billets. The C.M.G.C. Concert Party and Band joined the Battalion at this time and gave a number of concerts and entertainment's during the following days. On October 22nd, the Battalion marched to Billets in EMERCHICOURT, where it was visited on the 23rd by Brig.-Gen. BRUTINEL, G.O.C. Canadian M.G. Corps. On Oct 25th H.R.H. The Prince of Wales inspected the Battalion, and expressed his pleasure at the smart appearance of all Ranks. From October 25th to November 3rd, the Battalion remained in this Area, Battalion H.Q., with Nos. 1 and 3 Companies, at EMARCHICOURT, No.2 Company at AZINCOURT FARM, 2,500 yds. N.-E. of EMERCHICOURT. On November 4th, the Personnel moved by Lorry to LA SENTINELLE 3,000 yds. W. of VALENCIENNES. Battalion H.Q. went on the same day to ST. SAULVE, E. of VALENCIENNES on the MONS Road. The whole Battalion moved up to ST. SAULVE on November 5th and 6th, in readiness to take over the Line from the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.\

**Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., Oct. 12th to 29th.****Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., In Reserve.**

The Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., was still in Rest at ANZIN-ST.AUBIN, on October 12th, with the Fourth Cdn. Division, in Corps Reserve. The time here was spent in Training, Route Marching, Sports and Entertainment's. The C.M.G.C. Concert Party visited ANZIN on October 12th. On the following day, Lieut.-Col. SCOTT issued Orders for a move toward the Line and for the Relief of the Fifty-sixth Battalion, M.G.C., by Nos. 1 and 2 Companies. Companies were detailed to Brigades for the move, and at Noon No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON) marched off to ARRAS, a mile to the S.-E., where the Personnel embussed with the 10th C.I.B. for MARQUION, 15 miles E. on the CAMBRAI Road. On arrival here, the Company marched to Billets in SAUCHY-LESTREE and SAUCHY-CAUCHY, No.2 Company (a/OC., Capt. HALL, M.C.) detailed to the 11th C.I.B., proceeded to MARQUION by Train on the 14th, and were billeted in ECOURT-ST.QUENTIN. No.3 Company (Capt. LOGAN) moved to SAUCHY-LESTREE, and Battalion H.Q., to VILLIERS-lez-CAGNICOURT on the 16th.

**Line Taken Over, and Advance Begun.**

The Fourth Cdn. Division relieved the Fifty-sixth Division (British) night October 14th/15th and 15th/16th, taking over that portion of the Line between the Second and First Cdn. Divisions, along the S. Bank of the SENSEE CANAL between FRESSIES (inclusive) and PALLUEL. Machine Gun Reliefs took place 24 hours after Infantry Reliefs. No.1 Company, supporting the 10th C.I.B. in the Divisional Right Sector, relieved Guns of the Fifty-sixth Battalion, M.G.C., between FRESSIES and ABB. du VERGER FARM, S. of AUBENCHEUL-au-BAC, night October 15th/16th. No. 2 Company, in Support of the 11th C.I.B., took over Positions in the Left Sector night 16th/17th. No.3 Company, with the 12th C.I.B. remained in Divisional Reserve.

The Advance of the Fourth Cdn. Division began on October 17th. The 10th and 11th C.I.B.s crossed the SENSEE CANAL in the evening. The 10th C.I.B. took AUBIGNY-au-BAC, and established a line to the E. and N. of the Village. The 11th C.I.B. in touch with the Fourth Cdn. Division on its Left, captured BUGNICOURT and during the night, advanced the Line E. of VILLERS-au-TERTE.

Orders for the Advance of Machine Guns were issued by Lieut.-Col. SCOTT, instructing Companies in the Line to detail 2 Batteries, each, to go forward with the Infantry, the remaining 2 Batteries of each Company to be held in Reserve under the O.C., Company. No. 3 Company, in Divisional Reserve, was prepared to move at 1 hours notice. Under this arrangement "A" and "C" Batteries, No.1 Company ' and "E" and "F" Batteries, No. 2 Company, went forward in close Support of the leading Infantry Battalions of their respective Brigades. No.3 Company moved to SAUCHY-CAUCHY.



**Advance, October 18th to 19th.**

On October 18th, the Fourth Division, advancing between the Second and Third Divisions, reached the Line MARQUETTE-EMERCHICOURT.

"A", "C", "E" and "F" Batteries were with the forward Infantry Battalions, "B", "D", "G" and "H" Batteries were ordered to join No.3 Company which crossed the CANAL in the afternoon, and bivouacked for the night in a field, 1,500 yds. N. of AUBIGNY-au-BAC, to the Right of the AUBIGNY-au-BAC-BUGNICOURT Road. Fourth Machine Gun Battalion H.Q. moved to ECOURT-ST. QUENTIN.

The following day, October 19th, the 10th and 11th C.I.B.s advanced their Line to DENAIN-BELLEVUE, both inclusive. Our troops were greeted with enthusiasm and affection by the French civilians in the captured Towns and Villages. In the late afternoon the Second Cdn. Division was withdrawn and the Fourth Cdn. Division gained touch with the Fifty-first Division (British) S. of the CANAL de l'ESCAUT.

Machine Gun arrangements were altered on October 19th. Lt.-Col. SCOTT detailed Companies to Brigades, No1. Company to the 10th C.I.B., No2. Company to the 11th C.I.B., No3. Company to the 12th C.I.B., to operate in accordance with orders from their respective Infantry Brigades. "A" and "C" Batteries continued to operate with the 44th and 47th C.I.Bns. respectively. "E" and "F" Batteries with the 54th and 102nd Bns. "B", "D", "G" and "H" Batteries returned to their respective Companies. Inter-Battery Reliefs were carried out and the Advance proceeded, to conform with Infantry Inter-Battalion Reliefs. No.3 Company advanced to MONCHECOURT with the 12th C.I.B.

2 Batteries of the C.M.M.G. Bde. and 2 Armoured Cars were attached to the Fourth Cdn. Division on October 19th and were placed for disposal under Lieut.-Col. SCOTT who divided them equally between attacking Brigades, 1 Battery and 1 Armoured Car being attached to each Brigade. (X)

**Events Oct. 20th to 22nd.**

The advances made by the Fourth Cdn. Division on October 20th (Line WAVRECHAIN-HAVELUY) and 21st (Line, TRITH-ST. LEGER- LA SENTINELLE - PETITE FORET - AUBRY), brought our Front on the Canadian Corps Right, to the W. Bank of the CANAL de l'ESCAUT opposite VALENCIENNES. ANZIN and BEUVRAGES were taken on October 22nd and the Fourth Division was established on a Line which remained stationary until the German Defenses E. of the CANAL were captured on November 1st. The 12th C.I.B. relieved the 10th C.I.B. night October 22nd/23rd.

On Oct 20th, "B" and "D" Batteries, No.1 Company, relieved "A" and "C" with the leading Infantry. No.2 Company with Forward Guns were advanced to HAVELUY. No.3 Company marched to Billets in ABSCON. Battalion H.Q. moved with Fourth Cdn. Division H.Q. to ABERCHICOURT. In the evening of October 21st, "B" and "D" Batteries, No.1 Company, were placed along the high ground overlooking the CANAL, between ROUVIGNIES and LA SENTINELLE. Company H.Q. was established at WAVRECHAIN, No.2 Company forward Guns were in the vicinity of AUBRY, No.3 Company H.Q. remained at ABSCON. In view of the impending relief of No.1 Company, Batteries joined the respective Infantry Battalions with which they normally co-operative, as follows:-

"J" Battery,	78th C.I.Bn.	ESCAUDAIN.
"K" Battery,	38th C.I.Bn.	ROEULX.
"L" Battery,	72nd C.I.Bn.	ABSCON.
"M" Battery,	85th C.I.Bn.	MASTAING.

After dusk on October 22nd, Batteries of No.3 Company, supporting the 12th C.I.B., moved up with Infantry Battalion and relieved the corresponding Batteries of No.1 Company which went into Divisional Reserve with the 10th C.I.B.



**Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., Dispositions October 22nd to 23rd.**

On completion of this Relief, the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., was disposed as follows:-

<b>M.G. Battalion</b>	<b>Infantry</b>	<b>Location.</b>	<b>Task.</b>	<b>Unit.</b>	<b>Affiliation.</b>
Bn. Advanced H.Q.		ESCAUDAIN			
Bn. Rear H.Q.		AUBERCHICOURT			
No. 3 Company	12th C.I.B.	H.Q. WAVRECHAIN			Defense of R.
Divl. Sector.					
"M" Battery	85th C.I.Bn.	Guns in houses and open Emplacements			R. Front Line
"J" Battery	78th C.I.Bn.	along High ground W. of CANAL			L. Front Line
"K" Battery	38th C.I.Bn.	Guns dismounted at ROUVIGNIES			R. Support.
"L" Battery	72nd C.I.Bn.	Guns dismounted near WAVRECHAIN			L. Support.
No. 2 Company	11th C.I.B.	H.Q. AUBRY			Defense of L. Divl. Sector.
"F" Battery)	75th and Vicinity of BEUVRAGES.				R. Front Line
"H" Battery)	87th C.I.Bns.	Vicinity of RAISMES			L. Front Line
"E" Battery)	54th and with Company H.Q. at Bde. Reserve				
"G" Battery)	102nd C.I.Bns.	AUBRY			
No. 1 Company	10th C.I.B.	H.Q. DENAIN			Div. Reserve
"A" Battery	44th C.I.Bn.	LOURCHES			
"B" Battery	46th C.I.Bn.	DENAIN			
"C" Battery	47th C.I.Bn.	ESCAUDAIN			
"D" Battery	50th C.I.Bn.	DENAIN			

These Dispositions remain generally unchanged until October 30th.

Batteries of No.3 Company relieved one another in accordance with Inter-Battalion Infantry Reliefs. Harassing fire was carrying out nightly. Some Sniping was done by Forward Guns. On October 24th "K" Battery Guns mounted in houses in TRITH-ST LEGER, fired from 4:00 to 7:00 A.M., on the ground between MAING and FAMARS, in support of an Attack by the Fifty-first Division (British), 50,000 Rounds were expended. Preparation were made to support Brigade Operations of the 38th, 85th and 78th C.I.Bns. on October 24th and again on the 25th, but, owing to enemy vigilance, the Operations were finally cancelled on each occasion.



**First Battalion, C.M.G.C., Oct. 12th to 21st (-Nov.11th, 1918.****Situation and M.G. Dispositions; Oct.12th.**

The First Cdn. Division, on October 12th, had reach the Line of the SENSEE CANAL from PALLUEL and the CANAL du NORD junction, to the RIVER SCARPE at CORBEHEM, 2 Miles S.-W. of DOUAI. The 2nd C.I.B were on the Right, in touch with the Fifty-sixth Division (British) the 3rd C.I.B. were on the Left. The VIII Corps held the Line N. of the SCARPE. In accordance with Canadian Corps Policy, daily Artillery Barrages were fired to test the enemy strength and discover his attitude and Dispositions, and attempts were made to establish Bridgeheads over the SENSEE CANAL.

First Battalion, C.M.G.C. was disposed on this date as follows:-

<b>M.G. Battalion</b>	<b>Infantry</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Task.</b>	<b>Unit.</b>	<b>Affiliation.</b>
Battalion H.Q.		Les FOSSES FARM, on ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road S.-W. of MONCHY le PREUX.			
No.2 Company	2nd C.I.B.	H.Q. LECLUSE	Divl.		Right Sector.
"G" Battery	8th C.I.B.	4 Guns, in Front of ARLEUX,	4 Guns, ESTREES.		Bde. Right
"E" Battery		Vicinity of ESTREES.			Bde. Centre
"F" Battery		4 Guns between ESTREES and GOUY, 4 Guns E. of GOUY.			Bde. Left
"H" Battery		BOIS de RECOURT 1,000 yds. N. of RECOURT			Bde. Reserve
No. 3 Company	3rd C.I.B.	Company H.Q. Vicinity of NOYELLES			Divl. Left Sector.
"J" Battery	16th C.I.Bn.	Immediately W. of GOUY			Bde. Right
"L" Battery	15th C.I.Bn.	S.-E. of BREBIERES			Bde. Left
"K" Battery		Line, NOYELLE-BREBIERES			Bde. Support
"M" Battery		Mont-Notre-Dame 1,500 yds. W. of NOYELLE			Bde. Reserve
No. 1 Company	1st C.I.B.	RECOURT			Divl. Reserve

Machine Gun Batteries were in Defensive Positions. Night Firing was carried on, harassing the enemy approaches to and exits from CANTIN, GOEULZIN and FERIN E. of the SENSEE CANAL. At 6:00 A.M. October 12th. "F" Battery fired in Support of a Minor Operation carried out by the 3rd C.I.B.

**Oct. 12th to 15th.**

During the night October 12th/13th the 1st C.I.B. relieved the 3rd C.I.B in the Line. In the evening of the 13th, No.1 Company (Major DENHOLM, D.C.M.), First Battalion, C.M.G.C., relieved No.3 Company (Major GRANTHAM, M.C.) in the Divisional Left Section, establishing Company H.Q. in the vicinity of NOYELLE. "B", "D" and "C" Batteries took over the Line from Right to Left, between GOUY and BREBIERES: "A" Battery relieved "M" Battery in Brigade Reserve on the W. Slope of MONT NOTRE DAME. On completion of Relief at 7:30 P.M. No. 3 Company proceeded to Billets at TORTEQUENNE, passing into Divisional Reserve with the 3rd C.I.B. The O.C., "J" Battery and 4 Other Ranks remained in the Line with No.1 Company to assist in firing a Barrage which has already been arranged for the following morning. During the night October 12th/13th, No. 2 Company expended 29,000 Round of S.A.A. in Harassing Fire.

Battalion H.Q. moved on the 13th to RECOURT, where they were established at 11.45 A.M. During the night 13th/14th No.2 Company expended 22,000 Rounds in Harassing Fire. 1st C.I.B. Patrols succeeded in crossing the CANAL by Cork Bridges, in the early morning of the 14th, and entered FERIN. The crossing was supported by an Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage, our Artillery firing from 5:00 to 6:30 A.M. A Battery of No.1 Company (Major DENHOLM, D.C.M.) expended 14,000 Rounds S.A.A. at this time. Our Infantry Patrols later returned with 4 Prisoners and 2 Machine Guns. No.2 Company had 3 Other Ranks wounded on the 14th. No.3 Company remained at TORTEQUENNE.

There were no Infantry Actions on the 15th and 16th. Enemy Artillery was active on the CANAL du NORD LINE, W. of ARLEUX, on ESTREES, GOUY and NOYELLE: considerable Yellow Cross Gas Shelling



was directed against NOYELLES and its vicinity on the 15th. Machine Gun Dispositions remained virtually unchanged. "H" Battery in 2nd C.I.B. Reserve, moved up to quarters E. of TORTEQUENNE on the 15th and, on the following day relieved "F" Battery on the Brigade left front. "F" Battery then replaced "H" Battery in Brigade Reserve, E. of TORTEQUENNE.

#### **Advance, October 17th to 18th.**

The advance of the First Canadian Division from the SENSEE CANAL began on October 17th. The 2nd and 1st C.I.B.s crossed the CANAL and, advancing on the left of the Fourth Canadian Division, had established the Line ERCHIN-LEWARDE-GUESNAIN-SIN-le-NOBLE by evening.

"G" and "H" Batteries moved forward with the 8th and 10th C.I.Bns., 2nd C.I.B., crossing the CANAL in the vicinity of le MOULINET and took up defensive positions between ERCHIN and LEWARDE. These positions were occupied by 9:00 P.M. "E" Battery Guns with the 7th C.I.Bn. were disposed for defence on the right flank, E. of CANTIN. "F" Battery in Brigade Reserve advanced with the 5th C.I.Bn. at 8:00 P.M. and reached Billets in GOEULZIN at 1:30 A.M. October 18th.

"B", "C" and "D" Batteries, No. 1 Company accompanied the 2nd, 3rd and 4th C.I.Bns., 1st C.I.B. respectively.

"B" and "C" Batteries occupied forward defensive positions for the night : "D" Battery, in Brigade support, parked Limbers with Guns in the vicinity of le RAQUET, 2,000 yards S. of DOUAI. "A" Battery in Brigade Reserve crossed the CANAL at 1:45 A.M. and assembled with the 1st C.I.Bn. in the Eastern outskirts of FERIN. No. 3 Company remained at TORTEQUENNE on the 17th.

The advance on the 18th brought the First Division to a Line extending from the Western edge of AUBERCHICOURT, on the right E. of ECAILLON and PECQUENCOURT to the Left Corps Boundary.

Machine Gun Batteries conformed to the movements of the Infantry Battalions which they were co-operating.

Forward Batteries of No.2 Company, in Divisional Right Sector had their Guns in defensive positions for the night 18th/19th between AUBERCHICOURT and ECAILLON. Company H.Q. was established at ROUCOURT at 1:30 P.M.

"A" and "D" Batteries advanced with the leading Battalions of the 1st C.I.B. and took up positions between the DOUAI-VALENCIENNES Railway and the left Corps Boundary in the vicinity of PECQUENCOURT. "B" Battery in Brigade Support, reached MONTIGNY, 4 miles E. of DOUAI at 6:15 P.M. "C" Battery in Brigade Reserve spent the night 18th/19th in the vicinity of LOFFRE where No. 1 Company H.Q. was established.

No. 3 Company marched to Billets in GOEULZIN arriving at 11:00 P.M.

First Battalion C.M.G.C. Headquarters moved at 11:30 A.M. to TORTEQUENNE and on to GOEULZIN at 7:30 P.M.

"D" Battery on the 1st C.I.B. left fired 8,000 rounds in harassing fire on the exits from MARCHIENNES from 11:00 P.M. October 18th to 6:00 A.M. October 19th.



**October 19th.**

On October 19th the First Canadian Division, with the Fourth Canadian Division on its right advanced an average depth of 6 miles to a Line E. of HELESMES-les-SARTS-WANDIGNIES-HAMAGE-WARLING. The 3rd C.I.B. passed through the 2nd C.I.B. in the morning.

No. 2 Company moved forward with the 3rd C.I.B., "C" and "H" Batteries cooperating with the 14th and 16th C.I.Bns. on the Brigade right and left respectively. "G" Battery occupied positions for the night 19th/20th with 4 Guns E. of HELESMES-les-SARTS. 4 Guns were kept in Limbers at HELESMES. "H" Battery, for the protection of the 16th C.I.Bn. left flank, placed all Guns along the HELESMES-HASNON Road just N. of the DOUAI-VALENCIENNES Railway. "E" Battery had 4 Guns in positions S. of HORNAING-HELESMES on the Brigade right flank and 4 Guns in Limbers at HORNAING. Orders were issued for the Relief of No. 2 Company by No. 3 Company on the morning of the 20th, and "F" Battery in Brigade Reserve was ordered to proceed to FENAIN to secure Billets for the Company at 7:00 P.M.

"B" and "C" Batteries, No. 1 Company advanced with the leading Infantry Battalions of the 1st C.I.B. on the Brigade right and left respectively, and took up defensive positions for the night 19th/20th on a Line BOIS ST.-AMAND-WARLING, 1,500 yards E. of WANDIGNIES-HAMAGE. "A" Battery in Brigade Support parked for the night along the MARCHIENNES-VILLE-SOMAIN Road; "D" Battery in Brigade Reserve was Billeted in RIEULAY. No. 1 Company H.Q. moved to WANDIGNIES-HAMAGE.

No. 3 Company marched to GUESNAIN arriving at 11:00 A.M. and moved up in the evening ready to pass through No. 2 Company next day. Battalion H.Q. moved forward by Lorries to LEWARDE at 11:00 A.M.

H.R.H. the PRINCE OF WALES, accompanied by Brig.-Gen. BRUTINEL lunched at Battalion H.Q. The advance on the 19th was made with great difficulty as all Transport was delayed by numerous Mine Craters on the Roads.

**October 20th.**

As on the Fourth Divisional Frontage, considerable enemy resistance was encountered on the 20th and the difficulties were increased by rain and fog. The Infantry made less progress than on the preceding days. Enemy Artillery, Machine Gun and Rifle Fire was severe, and the advance was not pressed. The First Division Line was established in the evening E. of the WALLERS-HASNON Road.

No. 3 Company, with "J" and "K" Batteries in front, on the 3rd C.I.B. right and left respectively, passed through No. 1 Company at 9:00 A.M., "J" Battery Guns were sited in pairs E. and N. of WALLERS. "K" Battery Guns were mounted along the HELESMES-HASNON Road between the Railway and BOIS des ECLUSETTES. "L" and "M" Batteries were kept in Brigade Reserve at HELESMES-les-SARTS. No. 3 Company H.Q. was established at HELESMES in the morning.

"A" and "D" Batteries (right and left), No. 1 Company, took the lead on the 20th. "A" Battery was sited in positions in the N. of BOIS des ECLUSETTES, and during the night 20th/21st expended 10,000 Rounds Harassing Fire on the Railway E. of the WOOD. "D" Battery Guns were mounted in the vicinity of the MOULIN a VENT, E. of CATAINE and engaged Opportunity Targets on the W. edge of the BOIS de VICOIGNE. 3,000 Rounds were fired also during the night. "C" Battery parked for the night at CATAINE. "B" Battery in rear, at WANDIGNIES-HAMAGE, No. 1 Company H.Q. was at FORESTERS HOUSE on the N.-W. edge of BOIS des ECLUSETTES. When No. 3 Company had passed through on the morning of the 20th, No. 2 Company assembled in Billets at FENAIN. Battalion H.Q. opened at SOMAIN at 11:00 A.M.



**October 21st to 22nd, First Canadian Division Relived.**

The First Canadian Division, advancing rapidly on October 21st through the FORET de VICOIGNE, reached the ST. AMAND-VALECIENNES Road where the Third Canadian Division passed through on the 22nd. The First Division then went into Corps Reserve.

No. 3 Company advanced on the Divisional Right with "J" and "K" Batteries in front. 4 Guns of "J" Battery on the right were mounted in the BOIS LECAT, the remaining 4 being kept in Reserve at AREMBERG. "K" Battery had 4 Guns sited in the vicinity of GRAND ROND, BOIS de VICOIGNE; the other 4 Guns were in Reserve at MAISON FRE, du BASSY. "L" and "M" Batteries in Brigade Reserve moved forward with Company H.Q. to AREMBERG arriving at 12:00 Noon.

No. 1 Company advanced on the Divisional Left, with "B" and "C" Batteries in front. 6 "B" Battery Guns were pushed forward into the FORET de VICOIGNE in the vicinity of le CHAMP du CARME; the remaining 2 Guns were mounted S. of GRAND BRAY. 2 of the Guns in the WOOD expended 3,000 Rounds in Harassing Fire between 6:00 P.M. October 21st and 3:00 A.M., 22nd. "C" Battery Guns were placed in positions on the 1st C.I.B. left flank along the S. Bank of the SCARPE where it bends N. towards ST. AMAND at the N.-W. edge of the FORET de VICOIGNE. "D" Battery in Brigade Support parked for the night at LA CROIX, W. of HASNON. "A" Battery spent the day in Reserve in the Southern outskirts of HASNON. Company H.Q. moved to CATAINE at 10:00 A.M. October 21st. No. 2 Company remained at FENAIN throughout the day of the 21st in Divisional Reserve.

**First Battalion, C.M.G.C., October 22nd to November 11th.**

Companies of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., passed through the First Battalion Companies in the morning of October 22nd, and the First Battalion, C.M.G.C. was placed in Corps Reserve. When the Line had been handed over, No. 1 Company assembled in HASNON, No. 3 Company in AREMBERG. On October 23rd, No. 1 Company marched to Billets in ERRE, No. 3 Company to SOMAIN; NO.2 Company remained in FENAIN and Battalion H.Q. in SOMAIN. The Battalion retained these Dispositions until November 11th.

Daily Syllabus of Training was carried out during this period, and a program of Sports arranged. On November 2nd the G.O.C. First Canadian Division inspected the Battalion. The Canadian M.G. Corps Band and Concert Party visited the Battalion and gave a series of concerts and entertainment's. The period of rest was much appreciated by all Ranks of the Battalion who had been continuously in the Line since their Relief of the Fourth Battalion, M.G.C., night October 7th/8th.



**Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., October 12th to November 2nd, 1918.****Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., October 12th to 21st.**

On October 12th the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. was in Corps Reserve with the Third Canadian Division in the QUEANT area, where it had been since its withdrawal from the Line on October 10th. Battalion H.Q. was located 1 mile N.-E. of QUEANT. Here the Battalion remained until October 20th, carrying on Training and Recreation. The Canadian Machine Gun Corps Band and Concert Party visited the Battalion and gave several entertainments during this rest period.

Lieut.-Col. MOORHOUSE handed over command of the Unit to Lieut.-Col. BALFOUR, D.S.O., on October 13th and proceeded on the following day to England to assume command of the Canadian Machine Gun Depot at SEAFORD.

The move towards the Line began on October 20th. On this date No. 1 Company (Major WHITAKER) with the 8th C.I.B. embussed at QUEANT for LEWARDE and marched from there to Billets in MASNY; No. 2 Company (Major BURNHAM) embussing with the 7th C.I.B. at QUEANT proceeded to Billets in AUBERCHICOURT. On the following day, October 21st, Battalion H.Q. moved to SOMAIN, No. 1 Company to BRUILLE, and No. 2 Company to CATAIN. No. 3 Company (a/o.C. Capt. GARRISON) with the 9th C.I.B., embussed at QUEANT, debussing at HORNAING and marching to Billets in ERRE.

**Third Canadian Division Operations, October 22nd to November 2nd.**

The Third Canadian Division, with the 9th C.I.B. on the right, the 7th C.I.B. on the left and the 8th C.I.B. in Reserve, passed through the First Canadian Division on the Line of the ST.-AMAND-VALENCIENNES Road in the morning of October 22nd, and continued the Advance in touch with the Fourth Canadian Division on the right and the 8th Division, VIII Corps on the left. By the evening our Troops had pressed on to the Railway which skirts the Southern edge of FORET de RAISMES. Our Line followed this Railway from N. of BEUVRAGES in a N.-E. direction to FOSSE LAGRANGE where it turned almost due N. passing through the FORET de RAISMES, 1,000 yards from its Eastern edge to the Left Corps Boundary at a point 500 yards S. of ODOMEZ. From here the Line bent back to the W. along the Northern Corps Boundary to MONT des ERUYERES and the RIVER SCARPE. It was necessary to hold this flank as the VIII Corps had been unable to get forward in touch with the Third Division Left. The Line was pushed forward on October 23rd to the CANAL de l' ESCAUT at BRUAY, on the right; thence along the CANAL to FRESNES, inclusive, where it bore to the N. and followed the ESCAUT RIVER to the Northern Corps Boundary S. of ODOMEZ.

Along this Line the Third Division Frontage remained stationary until November 3rd, when the German Defences E. of the CANAL had been captured by the Fourth Canadian Division. On October 27th the 8th C.I.B. relieved the 7th C.I.B. and on October 30th took over the entire Divisional Frontage.

**Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., October 22nd to 23rd.**

The Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. supported the Infantry Advance on October 22nd and 23rd with No. 3 Company on the right, No. 2 Company on the left and No. 1 Company in Divisional Reserve.

No. 3 Company operating with the 9th C.I.B. passed through No. 3 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. on the morning of the 22nd. "J" and "K" Batteries were in front, with the 52nd and 43rd C.I.Bns. respectively. "L" and "M" Batteries were held in Brigade Reserve. No. 2 Company moved forward through No. 1 Company, First Battalion, C.M.G.C. "E" Battery operated with the R.C.R. "F" Battery with the 42nd C.I.Bn. "G" and "H" Batteries were in Brigade Reserve. Forward Batteries of both Companies occupied defensive positions for the night 22nd/23rd.

No. 1 Company billeted at ERRE during the 22nd, and marched to WALLERS on the 23rd. Battalion H.Q. moved from SOMAIN to WALLERS on the same day.



On the same evening of October 23rd, the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. was disposed as follows :-

Machine Gun	Infantry	Location.	Task.	Battalion Unit.	Affiliation.
Battalion H.Q.		WALLERS			
No. 3 Company.	9th C.I.B.	H.Q. ARENBERG.			
"J" Battery.	52nd C.I.Bn.	Along the CANAL de l'ESCAUT between BRUAY and TEIERS.			Defence of Brigade right.
"K" Battery.	43rd C.I.Bn.	Near S.-E. edge of FORET de RAISMES at FOSSE LAGRANGE.			Defence of Brigade left.
"L" Battery.) "M" Battery.)		Brigade Reserve.			
No. 2 Company.	7th C.I.B	H.Q. , N.-W. corner of FORET de RAISMES near ST. AMAND-VALENCIENNES Road.			
"E" Battery.	R.C.R.	St. AMAND-VALENCIENNES Road E. of le CHAMP du CARME.			
"F" Battery.	42nd C.I.Bn.	4 Guns MONT des BRUYERES, 4 Guns near N.-E. edge of FORET de RAISMES along the Railway running through the N. Portion of the Wood.			Defence of Brigade and Divisional left.
"G" Battery.) "H" Battery.)					Brigade Reserve.
No. 1 Company.	8th C.I.B				Division Reserve.

### **Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. Operations October 23rd to November 2nd.**

During the following days, when our left flank had been secured by the VIII Corps, "E" and "F" Batteries were moved forward to positions E. of FORET de RAISMES, commanding the Front from FRESNES to the Divisional Left Boundary S. of ODOMEZ.

No. 1 Company with "L" Battery, No. 3 Company, took over the Machine Gun Defences of the entire Third Divisional Front on October 28th. "L" Battery was in positions on the right in the vicinity of BEUVRAGES; "A", "B", "C" and "D" Batteries from right to left, occupied forward positions from BEUVRAGES to the Divisional Left Boundary. No. 3 Company, less "L" Battery, on Relief by No.1 Company went into Brigade Reserve in RAISMES. No. 2 Company, on Relief, marched to WALLERS, where it remained in Divisional Reserve.

These Dispositions remained unchanged until the Advance of the Third Division began on November 3rd. Forward Batteries established Observation Posts and fired by day on Targets of Opportunity. Harassing Fire was carried out each night on suitable targets on the enemy Line. Captain GERMAN assumed command of No. 3 Company on November 2nd.



## **DOUAI TO MONS.**

### **SECOND STAGE.**

#### **CAPTURE OF MONT HOUY AND VALENCIENNES.**

**Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., October 30th to November 2nd, 1918.**

##### **General Situation.**

The ground opposite the Corps Front E. of the CANAL de l'ESCAUT was naturally divided into 2 Sectors. VALENCIENNES and the ground to the N. of the City is low and subject to inundation from the CANAL. The Germans had taken advantage of this and had flooded all the country between VALENCIENNES and the Northern Corps Boundary at CONDE. These floods also extended Eastward, so that large tracts of ground between the VALENCIENNES-MONS Railway and the CONDE-MONS CANAL were under water.

S. of VALENCIENNES the ground rises steadily between the ESCAUT CANAL and the RHONELLE RIVER, reaching its highest point at MONT HOUY, 1,500 yards N. of FAMARS Village. E. of VALENCIENNES and the RHONELLE RIVER, the ground is undulating and well drained by numerous Rivers.

The area N. of VALENCIENNES was, for the most part impassable owing to Floods, and could be easily by isolated Machine Gun Posts. S. and E. of the City the Germans possessed a strong natural Line of Defence, and it was clear, from their determined stand against the attack of the Fifty-first Division (British), and from the statement of prisoners, that they had resolved to fight this Line stubbornly. Owing to the presents of civilians in VALENCIENNES, the City could not be bombarded by our Artillery : for this reason, the enemy were able to reinforce their Line, debouching from VALENCIENNES, without suffering casualties from our Artillery Fire.

##### **Plan of Attack.**

Careful preparations were made for the capture of MONT HOUY and VALENCIENNES in a set-piece attack. Attempts to cross the CANAL from the West had made it clear that the City could be taken only from the direction of MONT HOUY. So long as the Germans were strongly entrenched here, they could easily defeat our Bridgehead Operations. Once our Troops were S. of VALENCIENNES and the enemy attention diverted to this flank, a frontal crossing of the CANAL might be forced from the W.

Owing to the necessity for close liaison between the Troops operating on both sides of the CANAL it was decided that the Fourth Canadian Division should take over the line E. of the CANAL, and carry out the attack on MONT HOUY, in conjunction with their own Troops attempting to cross the CANAL from the W. In accordance with these plans, the 10th C.I.B. relieved the 154th Brigade, Fifty-first Division (British) night October 29th/30th, S. and E. of the CANAL, from FAMARS VILLAGE to POIRIER FARM, opposite TRITH-ST. LEGER. The 12th C.I.B. was holding the Left Front of the Fourth Division, W. of the CANAL. The 11th C.I.B. which had been on the extreme left of the Fourth Division was relieved by the 9th C.I.B., night October 28th/29th, and on October 31st moved to the THIAIT-PROUVY-ROUVIGNIES Area in Divisional Reserve.

Plans for the Operation were completed on October 30th following upon a conference convened by the G.O.C., Fourth Canadian Division and attended by the Brigadiers, the C.R.A., the C.R.E., the D.M.G.C., the Brigade Majors and Divisional Staff. The 10th C.I.B. was to carry out the main attack from the S. on November 1st. As this attack developed, the 12th C.I.B. was to force its way across the CANAL from the W. into VALENCIENNES. The 11th C.I.B. was held ready to exploit the success of the 10th C.I.B.



### 3 Objectives were fixed for the Main Attack, viz. ,

- (1) The RED LINE, about 2,000 yards from the Jumping-off Line. It was the intention that Units should leapfrog one another on this Line.
- (2) The BLUE LINE, along the Southern outskirts of VALENCIENNES and MARLY. This was to be the Final Objective for November 1st.
- (3) The GREEN LINE, 2,000 to 3,000 yards beyond the BLUE LINE. The Area between the BLUE and GREEN LINES included MARLY VILLAGE but excluded VALENCIENNES.

The City itself was not taken by assault, but would be cut off when the GREEN LINE was reached. If enemy resistance proved slight in the advance to the BLUE LINE, it was intended to exploit to the GREEN LINE on the first day. Otherwise, its capture would be undertaken by the 11th C.I.B. on November 2nd.

The attack was to be carried out under an Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage, and synchronized with an attack of the Forty-ninth Division, XXII Corps, on our right.

The 10th C.I.B. assembled for the attack as follows :- The 44th C.I.Bn. on the right, the 47th C.I.Bn. on the left, the 46th C.I.Bn. in rear of the 44th C.I.Bn., and the 50th C.I.Bn., less 1 Company in Brigade Reserve. The 46th C.I.Bn. was ready to go through the 44th, on the RED LINE, to the Final Objective. The 4th C.I.Bn. was to attack right on to the BLUE LINE, assisted by 1 Company of the 50th C.I.Bn., detailed for mopping-up duties.

### Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. Preparations.

Machine Gun Preparations were hurried forward on October 30th and 31st. Batteries on No. 1 Company (Major BRITTON), Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. took up positions in the Line on the night 29th/30th with the Infantry Battalions which they normally cooperated with as follows :-

Unit.	Infantry Affiliation.	Location.	Task.
"A" Battery.	44th C.I.Bn.	Between FAMARS and la FONTENELLE.	Brigade Right.
"C" Battery.	47th C.I.Bn.	Between la FONTENELLE and POIRIER FARM.	Brigade Left.
"B" Battery.	46th C.I.Bn.	In Rear of "A" Battery.	Brigade Support.
"D" Battery.	50th C.I.Bn.	In Rear of "C" Battery.	Brigade Reserve.

Details of the Action of Batteries was arranged direct between Officers Commanding Infantry Battalions and Battery Commanders. Major BRITTON established his Headquarters at THAINT on October 30th.

An Enfilade Machine Gun Barrage coordinated with the Artillery Barrage was provided. All arrangements for this Barrage were made by Lieut.-Col. SCOTT, D.S.O., commanding the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. 9 Batteries of 8 Guns each were detailed for this purpose as follows :-

"A", "B", "C", "D" and "E" Batteries, 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.  
 "F" and "H" Batteries, No. 2 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.  
 "J" and "M" Batteries, No. 3 Company, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C.

Barrage positions were reconnoitred W. of the CANAL de l'ESCAUT, and Batteries so placed as to be able to observe their Fire Effect, should conditions of visibility permit. S.A.A. Dumps were established convenient to the Barrage positions under arrangements made by the O.C., Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. Final Machine Gun preparations were made on October 31st. Batteries of No. 1 Company assembled with the Infantry.

"F" Battery, No. 2 Company (a/O.C., Capt. HALL, M.C.) had been relieved in positions in front of BEUVRAGES by Guns of the Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. night 29th/30th. "H" Battery Guns were withdrawn on October 31st and moved with "F" Battery to Barrage positions under Capt. JOHNSON, E. of LA SENTINELLE. "E" and "G" Batteries moved with No. 2 Company H.Q. to THAINT.

"J" and "M" Batteries, No. 3 Company (Capt. LOGAN) took up their Barrage positions under Capt. HENDERSON, on October 31st N. of LA SENTINELLE.



“K” Battery under Lieut. GUDGEON and “L” Battery commanded by Capt. W.G. WILLIAMS, M.C. made preparations to support the 38th and 72nd C.I.Bns. respectively in crossing the CANAL de l’ESCAUT. 1st C.M.M.G. Batteries occupied Barrage positions in the vicinity of TRITH-ST. LEGER, “A”, “B” and “D” Batteries under Lieut. H. SMITH, M.C., M.M., “E” and “C” Batteries under Capt. F.F. WORTHINGTON, M.C., M.M.

### **Operation November 1st.**

Our Barrage opened at 5:15 A.M. November 1st and the attack proceeded according to plan. All Objectives of the 10th C.I.B. were gained on time. The German retaliation to our Barrage was prompt and severe, but slackened considerably shortly after Zero. Enemy Machine Gunners offered a resistance but their Infantry gave up in large numbers. Considerable heavy fighting took place, especially among the houses along the FAMARS-VALENCIENNES Road and in AULNOY.

During the advance of the 10th C.I.B., Patrols of the 38th C.I.Bn. crossed the CANAL and moved N. with them. The 72nd C.I.Bn. also affected a crossing immediately N. of the VALENCIENNES Railway Station, and by noon the greater part of both Battalions were established on the E. Bank of the CANAL.

Batteries of No.1 Company kept up with the Infantry Advance. “A” Battery under Capt. WEAVER occupied positions for the defence of the 10th C.I.B. with 6 Guns on the high ground N. of AULNOY, between the AULNOY-VALENCIENNES Road and the RHONELLE RIVER. These Guns accompanied the right forward Company of the 44th C.I.Bn., Capt. WEAVER placed the remaining 2 Guns of his Battery in front of the left Company, 400 yards W. of la BRIQUETTE CHURCH.

Lieut. YOUNG, commanding “B” Battery moved his Guns forward with the 46th C.I.Bn., through the 44th C.I.Bn. to positions for the defence of the right flank near the Final Objective. These Guns were in position at 10:40 A.M.

“C” Battery under Lieut. WOODWARD, advanced with the 47th C.I.Bn. to the Final Objective to positions near the Railway S. of VALENCIENNES defending the Brigade left.

“D” Battery commanded by Capt. WARD, M.C., occupied positions for defence in depth of the Left Brigade Area.

No. 1 Company H.Q. moved to CHATEAU des PRES, N. of MAING in the evening.

The Forty-ninth Division (British), attacking on the right had been unable to reach the BLUE LINE, and in order to increase the Machine Gun Defences of the 10th C.I.B. Area, “E” and “G” Batteries, No. 2 Company, were placed in positions in front of MONT HOUY along the AULNOY-POIRIER STATION Road in the course of the morning.

“K” Battery, No. 3 Company, meantime fired 25,000 Rounds in support of the 38th C.I.Bn. crossing on the 12th C.I.B. right. Capt. WILLIAMS detailed 3 “L” Battery Guns to cross the CANAL with the 72nd C.I.Bn. on the Brigade left; with the remaining 5 Guns, he fired a most effective 20 minute Barrage to cover the 72nd C.I.Bn. CANAL crossing, expending 15,000 Rounds. The 3 forward Guns were mounted E. of the CANAL near the VALENCIENNES Railway Station. No. 3 Company H.Q. moved to LA SENTINELLE at 8:00 P.M.

The Barrage Guns of No. 2 Company rejoined the 11th C.I.B. on completion of the Barrage. “J” and “M” Batteries, No. 3 Company remained in positions during the day for defence against possible enemy counter-attacks. These Batteries rejoined the 78th and 85th C.I.Bns. respectively during the night November 1st/2nd.

During the firing of the Barrage, the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade Batteries suffered 1 Officer and 45 Other Ranks casualties by Gas, due largely to cordite fumed from the Guns which were situated in buildings. This necessitated the reorganization of this Brigade into 4 Batteries instead of 5. On completion of this Barrage, 2 Batteries and 1 Armoured Car were ordered to report to the G.O.C., 10th C.I.B. for exploitation purposes. (X) The remaining 2 Batteries were placed in Divisional Reserve at MAING. In the evening these Batteries relieved “E” and “G” Batteries, Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. in positions in front of MONT HOUY.



**November 2nd.**

The 11th C.I.B. relieved the 10th C.I.B. on the right portion of their Front in the evening of November 1st, and by 10:00 P.M. their Patrols were through the Village of MARLY. The advance was continued at 5:30 A.M. November 2nd in an Easterly direction, and a Line was reached by the evening 1,500 yards E. of VALENCIENNES. 12th C.I.B. Patrols pushed into VALENCIENNES during the night November 1st/2nd, and at 9:50 A.M. November 2nd, the 38th and 72nd C.I.Bns. joined hands on the Eastern outskirts of the City. The Germans were driven out of ST. SAULVE in the afternoon by the 72nd C.I.Bn. and the 12th C.I.B. Line was linked up with the 11th C.I.B. on the right and the 8th C.I.B., Third Canadian Division on the left. The 10th C.I.B. was pinched out by the advance of the 11th and 12th C.I.Bs. and placed in Divisional Reserve.

2 Batteries of No.2 Company advanced with the 54th and 102nd C.I.Bns. on November 2nd; 2 Batteries were kept in Brigade Reserve. "J", "K" and "L" Batteries, No. 3 Company moved forward across the CANAL, through VALENCIENNES and took up defensive positions in the evening in the Eastern outskirts of the City. "M" Battery was held in Brigade Reserve at ST. WAAST-la HAUT. No. 3 Company H.Q. moved to ANZIN. No. 1 Company was ordered into Divisional Reserve with the 10th C.I.B. in the vicinity of THIANT.

**Complete Success of Attack.**

The completeness and thoroughness with which this Operation was carried out is witnessed by the large number of killed and captured Germans, which exceeded 2,100. This total is greater than the number of our own Assaulting Troops. There was abundant evidence of the effectiveness of our Machine Gun Barrage.

Our own Machine Gun casualties were small. No.1 Company had 2 Officers and 21 Other Ranks wounded. No. 3 Company suffered no casualties during the attack. Casualties of the 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade as already stated were 1 Officer and 45 Other Ranks wounded. 2 Guns of No. 1 Company were put out of action.

Infantry Battalion Commanders commented quite generally on the hearty and quick cooperation of our Machine Guns in this Operation. On November 2nd, Lieut.-Col. M.A. SCOTT, D.S.O., received the following letter of appreciation from Brig.-Gen. J.M. ROSS, D.S.O., commanding the 10th C.I.B. :-

*"Just a line to express the appreciation of the 10th Brigade for the magnificent work done by your people who were working with us in yesterdays Operation. All my Battalions have expressed their satisfaction, and I wish you would let those under your command, who were acting with us yesterday, know how we felt about it."*

Lieut.-Col. SCOTT replied to this letter as follows :-

*"Many thanks for your letter of appreciation of the work done by the Machine Gun Batteries and Armoured Car attached to your Brigade during the recent operations. It is a great satisfaction to me to know that the Battalions who achieved the success feel as they do with regard to the Machine Gun cooperation. I have communicated to the Units concerned your letter of appreciation, and I trust that in all future operations the same success will be attained."*



**DOUAI TO MONS.**

**THIRD STAGE.**

**VALENCIENNES TO MONS.**

**Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. : November 3rd to 6th (-11th), 1918.**

**The Advance, November 3rd to 4th.**

The Fourth Canadian Division Line was pushed forward on November 3rd on the right to a Line 1,000 yards E. of ESTREUX, which was captured by the 75th C.I.Bn. The 12th C.I.B. advanced the right of their Frontage in touch with the 11th C.I.B. On November 4th the Division reached the Line, ROMBIES (exclusive) – RUISSEAU RIVER W. of QUAROUBLE, capturing the Village of ONNAING. The Third Canadian Division relieved the Fourth Canadian Division on that part of their Front N. of the VALECIENNES-MONS Road night November 4th/5th.

“F” Battery, No. 2 Company took the lead on November 3rd and was replaced by “G” Battery on November 4th. The remaining Batteries of No. 2 Company went forward in Brigade Support and Reserve.

“K” and “L” Batteries advanced with the 38th and 72nd C.I.Bns. respectively during November 3rd and 4th. On the night November 4th/5th they were placed in defensive positions E. of ONNAING, on either side of the VALENCIENNES-MONS Road. Here they were relieved by “M” and “J” Batteries with the 85th and 78th C.I.Bns. respectively. 4 Guns of “L” Battery remained in the Line until the early morning of November 5th to support the 5th C.M.R., being withdrawn on completion of their task.

Capt. W.G. WILLIAMS, M.C., accompanied by the Intelligence Officer of the 72nd C.I.Bn. carried out a valuable reconnaissance on November 3rd thereby establishing touch with the 8th C.I.B. on the Fourth Division Left.

No. 3 Company H.Q. moved to VALENCIENNES on November 3rd. Battalion H.Q. opened in VALENCIENNES with Divisional H.Q. on November 4th.

**November 5th.**

Progress on November 5th was slow. At night our Line had reached the AUNELLE River on the right including the Village of ROMBIES. Thence it ran E. to a point on the VALECIENNES-MONS Road mid-way between QUAROUBLE and QUIEVRECHAIN. “G” Battery attacked at dawn with the 75th and 87th C.I.Bns. under an Artillery Barrage. “M” and “J” Batteries cooperated with the 85th and 87th C.I.Bns. Heavy Machine Gun Fire was encountered and the attack was not pressed. All forward Batteries occupied defensive positions night 5th/6th, 4 Guns “J” Battery were held in Brigade Reserve. No. 1 Company in Divisional Reserve at THIAIT were Relieved on November 5th by the Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., and moved to Billets in VALENCIENNES.

**Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., Relieved Night November 6th/7th.**

The Fourth Canadian Division crossed into Belgium on November 6th along the entire Divisional Front, reaching the Line of the GRANDE HONELLE River and capturing the Villages of MARCHIPONT, BAISIEUX and part of QUIEVRAIN. Along this Line the Division was relieved night November 6th/7th by the Second Canadian Division and passed into Corps Reserve.

Machine Guns advancing under the leading Infantry Battalions were disposed in defensive positions. “G” Battery was on the right with the 87th C.I.Bn., “M” and “J” Batteries on the left with their respective Infantry Battalions in positions S. and E. of QUIEVRECHAIN. The remaining Batteries of Nos. 2 and 3 Companies were in Brigade Reserve. The Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., took over the Line November 6th/7th; Fourth Battalion Guns were withdrawn and the entire Battalion assembled on November 7th in Billets in ST. WAAST-la HAUT where it remained until November 11th.



**Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., November 7th to 11th, 1918.****The Advance, November 7th to 8th.**

The Advance of the Second Canadian Division into Belgium was rapid and continuous. The 5th C.I.B. taking the lead on November 7th pushed the Line forward E. of ELOUGES. On the 8th DOUR was captured and the Line advanced to the Western edge of BOIS de LEVEQUE thence due N. to the inter-Divisional Boundary.

The Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., were assembled at ST. SAULVE on November 6th. (X) Nos. 1 and 2 Companies took over the Machine Gun Defence of the Line from the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C. night November 6th/7th and advanced with the 5th C.I.B. on the 7th and 8th. One Battery from each Company moved with the leading Infantry on either flank of the Brigade and occupied forward defensive positions each night. "E" Battery was on the right, "A" Battery on the left. The other Batteries of each Company were held in Brigade Reserve in the vicinity of their respective Company H.Q. No. 1 Company H.Q. moved forward to QUIEVRAIN, No. 2 Company H.Q. to MARCHIPONT on November 7th. In the evening of November 7th "E" and "A" Batteries, right and left, were in position on a Line 500 yards W. of the ELOUGES-THULIN Road.

During the night November 7th/8th No. 3 Company H.Q. with "J" and "K" Batteries moved to ELOUGES. "M" Battery to BAISIEUX, "L" Battery to QUIEVRAIN. On November 8th "E" and "A" Batteries were replaced in the lead by "F" and "B" Batteries respectively. No. 1 Company H.Q. with "A", "C" and "D" Batteries proceeded to ELOUGES. No. 2 Company H.Q. with "G" and "H" Batteries moved forward to HOUILLERE FERRAND, 1,000 yards S.-W. of ELOUGES. No. 3 Company remained at ELOUGES prepared to advance with the 4th C.I.B. on the following day. Battalion H.Q. was established at QUIEVRECHAIN.

**November 9th to 10th.**

The 4th C.I.B. passed through the 5th C.I.B. in the early morning of November 9th and carried the Line forward to a maximum depth of 6 miles through the densely populated Mining Area of MONS. WARQUIGNIES, WASMES, PATURAGES and FRAMIRIES were freed in the course of the day. By the evening the Second Canadian Division Right rested just N. of GENLY : from here the Line bore to the N.-E. to NOIRCHAIN and CIPLY, whence it bent to the N.-E. along the Railway, linking up with the Third Canadian Division Right. Progress on November 10th brought the 4th C.I.B. to MESVIN, HYON and the Southern outskirts of MONS.

No. 3 Company, Second Battalion, C.M.G.C. passed through Nos. 1 and 2 Companies in close support of the 4th C.I.B. on the morning of November 9th. No. 1 Company H.Q. was established in FRAMERIES. When No. 3 Company had gone forward, No. 1 Company moved to PATURAGES where it remained under Orders of the 4th C.I.B. in case of need. No. 2 Company remained in ELOUGES.

No. 3 Company continued the Advance with the 4th C.I.B. on November 10th. Considerable Machine Gun Fire came from NOUVELLES on our immediate right flank. "J" Battery kept the vicinity under Fire while the 18th C.I.Bn. worked round the position. Here the Battery lost Lieut. M.A. SCOTT who was killed by a Shell while directing the Fire of his Guns. Lieut. SCOTT was the last Officer casualty in the Battalion.

No. 1 Company remained at PATURAGES during November 10th. No. 2 Company moved forward from ELOUGES, under Orders of the 6th C.I.B. Battalion H.Q. and moved to FRAMERIES.



**November 11th.**

The 6th C.I.B. passed through the 4th C.I.B. at 8:00 A.M. November 11th at 11:00 A.M. when Hostilities ceased. The Brigade stood fast on the Line then reached E. of BOIS du RAPOIS.

Batteries of No. 2 Company advanced with the 6th C.I.B., 2 Batteries in front, 2 Batteries in Brigade Reserve. Some Machine Gun Fire was encountered during the Advance on November 11th, coming from BOIS d'HAVRE, BOIS du RAPOIS and from VILLERS-ST. GRISLAIN on the right. Lieut. LAYTON with 4 "F" Battery Guns covering the right flank of the 31st C.I.Bn. assisted in effectually neutralizing this Fire, keeping his Guns up with the Right Forward Infantry Company and giving invaluable covering fire when occasion offered.

When the Armistice came into force at 11:00 A.M., the Right Forward Battery with the 31st C.I.Bn. had reached PETIT HAVRE, E. of BOIS du RAPOIS, 9,000 yards E. on MONS; the Left Forward Battery with the 28th C.I.Bn. was in the N.-E. outskirts of HAVRE, S. of the CANAL du CENTRE; 2 Batteries in Reserve were located in CHEMICAL WORKS on the S. edge of BOIS d'HAVRE.

**Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., November 3rd to 11th, 1918.****Infantry Advance, November 3rd to 5th.**

The Third Canadian Division carried forward our Line on the Canadian Corps Left from November 3rd to 11th. The 8th C.I.B. was in the Front Line until night November 7th/8th, when it was relieved by the 7th C.I.B. which carried forward our Advance until the Armistice put an end to Hostilities. On November 1st a crossing of the CANAL de l'ESCAUT was secured N. of VALENCIENNES and a Post of the 8th C.I.B. pushed forward on November to BAS MARAIS HALTE, N. of ST. SAULVE where touch was established with the Fourth Canadian Division. On November 3rd the THIERS-VICQ Railway Bridge over the CANAL at THIERS was secured and a Line of Infantry Posts established from this point through CHATEAU de ROUCOURT to the Fourth Division Left. The Line was advanced on November 4th to the THIERS-VICQ Railway. The Railway Bridge over the CANAL at ESCAUPONT was captured the same day, and on November 5th the Third Canadian Division advanced to the Line of the ESCAUPONT-QUIEVRECHAIN Railway. During the night November 4th/5th the Division extended its Front to the right taking over from the Fourth Division the ground between the VALENCIENNES-MONS Railway and the Main Road.

**Third Battalion, C.M.G.C., November 3rd to 5th.**

The whole of No. 1 Company, and "L" Battery, No. 3 Company, Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. were in the Line in support of the 8th C.I.B. on November 2nd. (X)

On November 3rd, "D" Battery and 4 Guns of "C" Battery were withdrawn to Billets in RAISMES : "J" and "M" Batteries, No. 3 Company reported to the 5th C.M.R. Bn. at BRUAY to support the advance of this Battalion.

On November 4th, 4 "M" Battery Guns proceeded to ST. SAULVE and advanced with the 5th C.M.R. Bn. to positions E. of ONNAING. "L" Battery fired 9,000 Rounds on observed targets at 10:45 A.M. Battalion H.Q. moved on this day to RAISMES.

On November 5th, "L" Battery with the 2nd C.M.R. Bn. on the Brigade right, "M" Battery with the 5th C.M.R. in the centre, and "B" Battery with the 1st C.M.R. on the left, supported the Infantry Advance. "A", "D" and 4 Guns of "C" Battery, No. 1 Company were in Billets in RAISMES, in Brigade Reserve. The remaining 4 Guns of "C" Battery were still kept in positions W. of the CANAL de l'ESCAUT. "J" and "K" Batteries, No. 3 Company were held in Brigade Reserve. No. 2 Company in Divisional Reserve marched from WALLERS to RAISMES.



**November 6th to 8th.**

The Third Division advanced its Right across the Belgium Border on November 6th, and by the evening of the 7th had reached a Line extending from the VALENCIENNES-MONS Road S. of THULIN, thence to la CROIX-MONTROEUL sur HAINE : here the Line bent back due W., N. of HENSIES S. of THIVENCELLE, thence to the CANAL at CONDE.

Up to this time the VIII Corps on our left had been unable to pass the CANAL du JARD. The Third Canadian Division was therefore ordered to bring forward its left flank, clear the ground S. of the CONDE-MONS CANAL and secure the CANAL Crossing. The 7th C.I.B. relieved the 8th C.I.B. night November 7th/8th, and when the Advance was continued on the 8th, our Troops were pushed to the N., and by noon had secured the Villages of THIVENCELLE and ST. AYBERT. Later in the day, a Foot-bridge was constructed across the CANAL, and a Bridgehead established under cover of darkness. On the Division right the Line was advanced E. of BOUSSU from the inter-Divisional Boundary to HANIN, thence it ran W. along the HANIN River to the CANAL E. of ST. AYBERT.

On November 6th, "B" Battery which had operated with the 8th C.I.B. since the Advance recommenced, was definitely attached to No. 3 Company, and remained so attached until November 11th. "E" Battery was, during the same time attached to No. 1 Company in Divisional Reserve. No. 3 Company advanced with the 8th C.I.B. on November 6th and 7th. "J" Battery, with the 4th C.M.R., "L" Battery with the 2nd C.M.R., "M" Battery, with the 5th C.M.R., and "B" Battery with the 1st C.M.R. The 1st C.M.R. was relieved on the 7th and "B" Battery remained in support of the 6th Battalion Highland Light Infantry.

No. 2 Company marched to Billets in ONNAING on November 6th and on the following day, "G" and "H" Batteries joined the 49th C.I.Bn. and the P.P.C.L.I., respectively, in QUIVRAIN ready to take the lead with the 7th C.I.B. on November 8th. Company H.Q. with "E" and "F" Batteries moved to QUIEVRECHAIN.

The 4 Guns of "C" Battery, still in the Line, were withdrawn on November 6th, and No. 1 Company (less "B" Battery), with "K" Battery marched from RAISMES to Billets in VALENCIENNES. The Third Battalion H.Q. was established at VALENCIENNES on the same day.

No. 2 Company advanced with the 7th C.I.B. on November 8th. "G" and "H" Batteries were disposed for the night on positions between BOUSSU and HENSIES for the protection of the extended left flank : "H" Battery expended 5,500 Rounds Direct Fire. Company H.Q. and "F" Battery moved to THULIN. "E" Battery remained at QUIEVRECHAIN.

No. 3 Company with the 8th C.I.B. was in support to the 7th C.I.B.  
No. 1 Company and Battalion H.Q. remained in VALENCIENNES.

**November 9th.**

A deep Advance was made on November 9th bringing forward the Third Division Front E. of JEMAPPES, to within 1 ½ miles of MONS. N. of the CONDE-MONS CANAL the 49th C.I.Bn. cleared the area on a Front of 4,000 yards bringing the Line forward to the outskirts of GHLIN.

"H" Battery supporting the P.P.C.L.I. on the 7th C.I.B. right, left BOUSSU at 6:30 A.M. 4 Guns were pushed well forward, 2 Guns on each side of JEMAPPES. An enemy Machine Gun Nest was silenced by these Guns and 2 prisoners taken. "E" Battery operating with the R.C.R. mounted 2 Guns at night to defend the Bridgehead over the CANAL, N. of JEMAPPES. "F" Battery advanced with the 42nd C.I.Bn. "G" Battery moved forward N. of the CANAL with the 49th C.I.Bn. No. 2 Company H.Q. was established in JEMAPPES.

Batteries of No. 3 Company (less "K" Battery) moved up in support with the 8th C.I.B.

No. 1 Company (less "B" Battery) and "K" Battery, in Divisional Reserve with the 9th C.I.B., marched from VALENCIENNES to BOUSSU. "B" Battery Guns were withdrawn to VALENCIENNES on the 9th and rejoined No. 3 Company at HORNU on the following day.



**November 10th.**

Our Advance on the 10th carried the Third Division Right to the western edge of MONS, and the City was half encircled. N. of MONS the Line paused on the GHLIN-MONS Railway.

"E" Battery, with the R.C.R. placed 4 Guns S. of the CANAL, 1,000 yards W. of MONS to cover the R.C.R. right flank. Sniping was done by 2 Guns on targets in MONS from 5:30 to 10:30 A.M. with good effect. The other 4 Guns of "E" Battery were sited 1,000 yards N. of the CANAL. "G" Battery occupied positions N. GHLIN between the Village and the JURBISE-MONS Railway. 5,000 Rounds were expended on opportunity targets in BOIS de GHLIN. The Battery was withdrawn to JEMAPPES in the evening. "F" and "H" Batteries operated with the Infantry Battalions with which they were affiliated.

No. 3 Company (less "K" Battery) and "B" Battery assembled during the day in HORNU.

No. 1 Company (less "B" Battery) and "K" Battery marched to Billets in QUAREGNON, Battalion H.Q. moved to JEMAPPES.

**November 11th.**

During the night November 10th/11th the Division resumed the Advance. The Villages of NIMY and PETIT NIMY were captured with little opposition and the 7th C.I.B. effected an entry into MONS by way of the Railway Station before midnight. Stubborn Machine Gun Resistance of the German Rearguard was broken down by 6:00 A.M. November 11th, the City was entirely in our hands.

At 11:00 A.M. the Third Canadian Division had reached a Line running from the inter-Divisional Boundary N. of the CANAL du CENTRE, S.-E. and E. of ST. DENIS, thence N.-W. to the NIMY-CASTEAU Road, thence S.-W. back along this Road through MAISIRES to its junction with the NIMY-JURBISE Road. The Division was in touch with the Second Canadian Division on the right, and the Fifty-second Division (British) on the left. At 8:45 P.M. the 9th C.I.B. relieved the 7th C.I.B. and the Cavalry Outpost Line held by the Squadron of 5th Lancers, attached to the Third Canadian Division.

Batteries of No. 2 Company cooperated with the 7th C.I.B. in the capture of MONS. "E" Battery with the R.C.R., "F" Battery with the 42nd C.I.Bn. The Guns were sited on the Main Line of Resistance E. of MONS between FAUBOURG ST. LAZARE and the CANAL du CENTRE, W. of NIMY. "G" and "H" Batteries were in Reserve and moved into MONS with Company H.Q.

At 6:00 A.M. word was received by No. 1 Company at QUAREGNON that the 9th C.I.B. would relieve the 7th C.I.B. E. of MONS. "C" Battery was detailed to support the 58th C.I.Bn. on the right, "D" Battery, the 116th C.I.Bn. on the left. These Batteries moved off at 8:30 A.M. and were eventually placed for defence of the Third Divisional front. No. 1 Company H.Q. with "A" and "K" Batteries proceeded to Billets in MONS and were among the first Troops to enter the City after the leading Battalions had passed through.

On November 12th Battalion H.Q. and No. 3 Company moved to MONS.



**Casualties and Communications.****Casualties.**

Casualties to the 4 Battalions of the Canadian Machine Gun Corps during the Advance from the CANAL de la SENSEE to MONS are shown in the following Table :-

	Officers		Other Ranks		Total	
	Killed	Wounded	Killed	Wounded	Officers	Other Ranks
<b>Machine Gun Unit.</b>						
First Bn. C.M.G.C. Oct.12th to 22nd				3		3
Second Bn. C.M.G.C. Oct.12th to 19th			3	12		15
Nov.7th to 11th	1		1	5	1	6
Third Bn. C.M.G.C. Oct.23rd to Nov.11th		1	1	23	1	24
Fourth Bn. C.M.G.C. October	1	1	14	151	2	165
November		2	1	56	2	57
Total	2	4	20	250	6	270

**Communications.**

Communications presented a great difficulty during the period of our rapid Advance in October and November. While the Line was stationary, from October 12th to 17th, and again from October 23rd to November 1st, Telephone Communications were established from Battalion H.Q. to Companies and in many cases down to Batteries. But it was found impracticable to maintain Wire Communications when Headquarters were moving from day to day. Divisional and Brigade Wires were used under these circumstances. In the Fourth Battalion, C.M.G.C., Signallers were attached to Infantry Brigade Signalling Staffs to assist in relaying messages.

To supplement this service, 4 Motor-cycle Dispatch Riders were attached from the Motor Machine Gun Brigades to each Machine Gun Battalion. In spite of the destruction of roads so systematically carried out by the Germans, and despite the bad weather conditions during the last 5 days of Operations, these Dispatch Riders did yeomen service in keeping up Communications between Machine Gun Battalion Headquarters and their respective Companies.

**Reinforcements.**

Early in the final period of Operations, the Advanced Machine Gun Reinforcements Depot was disbanded. The breakdown of enemy Operation and the consequent diminution of casualties made it unnecessary to maintain a Reinforcement Depot in proximity to the Battle Area. Machine Gun Reinforcements maintained at QUEANT during the later Phases of the CAMBRAI Battle, were returned to the C.M.G.C.R.D. at AUBIN-ST. VAAST, whence, until November 11th Reinforcement Personnel was sent direct to Units in the Field.



## PART III



**CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE.**

**JULY 30th to NOVEMBER 11th, 1918.**

**I  
AMIENS**

**Introductory.**

**Object of Operation.**

Towards the end of July, 1918 the Fourth Army, under the command of SIR HENERY RAWLINSON, holding the northernmost portion of the British Line, began to make preparations, in conjunction with the First French Army, for a surprise attack at an early date on the German Forces E. of AMIENS. The object of the Operation was to reduce the Salient created by the successful German Offensive of March 21st, 1918, and also to facilitate the Operations of the French on the MONT DIDIER – NOYON Front. The Canadian Corps, then with the First Army, was detailed to participate in the attack, in cooperation with the Australian Corps on its left and the French on the right.

The initial attack of the Canadian Corps was carried out by the Third Canadian Division on the right, the First Canadian Division in the centre, the Second Canadian Division on the left in touch with the Australian Corps, and the Fourth Canadian Division in Reserve.

The following Troops were placed under the Tactical Control of the Canadian Corps for this Operation :-

5th Squadron R.A.F.  
4th Tank Brigade.  
3rd Cavalry Division.

A Mobile Force, called the Canadian Independent Force, was also organized to cooperate with the Cavalry in the neighbourhood of the AMIENS-ROYE Road, to cover the right flank of the Third Canadian Division and to maintain liaison with the French.

**Tasks of Canadian Divisions.**

The Task in brief, of the First, Second and Third Canadian Divisions on the first day was to capture the RED LINE. The Second Canadian Division was also responsible for the capture of part of the BLUE LINE. The Third Cavalry Division with Whippet Tanks was to pass through the Infantry at the RED LINE and proceed to capture and hold the BLUE DOTTED LINE, northward from the ROYE Road, at the same time exploiting their success E. of the BLUE DOTTED LINE. The Fourth Canadian Division was to pass through the First and Third Divisions in the RED LINE, and relieve the Cavalry in, or assist them in capturing the BLUE DOTTED LINE. The French on the right were to bombard MOREUIL WOOD for 45 minutes, beginning at Zero Hour, before their Troops moved to the assault.

**The Attack.**

The attack was a success. The enemy was taken by surprise and his forward defences were rapidly overrun by our Troops. By the afternoon of August 8th, 1918 the first day of the Battle, the Canadian Corps had gained its Objectives for the day, with the exception of a small bit of ground adjoining the AMIENS-ROYE Road, near LE QUESNEL, where unexpected Reserves were encountered. On the second day the advance was resumed and very satisfactory progress was made. Our Line was further pushed forward on the third day. At this point the old Trench Systems of the 1916 SOMME Battle was reached. The obstacle to our advance provided by these defences considerably helped the enemy to reorganize his defeated Divisions and to stiffen them with fresh Reserves. But by this time the Canadian Corps had penetrated the enemy's territory to a depth of about 11 or 12 miles. Many prisoners and numerous guns of all calibres had been captured.



### **Canadian Corps Moves South.**

On July 29th, 1918, the XVII Corps received Orders to relieve the Canadian Corps in the Line; and the following Units began to move from the ARRAS Sector to a Concentration Area west of AMIEN.

### **Move of Canadian Mobile Units.**

At this time the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade was in G.H.Q. Reserve at TILLOY-les-HERMAVILLE. The 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade had 3 Batteries at HERMAVILLE in Corps Reserve and 2 Batteries in the Line between WILLERVAL and BAILLEUL, N. of ARRAS. On the night of the 30th/31st July, 1918 the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades moved respectively, to the Villages of COURCELLES and PRISCAMPS, in the Fourth Army Area, about 13 miles S.-W. of AMIENS. The following night, the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion moved to the same Area and were allotted Billets in the Village of THILLOY-l' ABBAYE.



## FORMATION AND ORGANIZATION OF CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE.

### Formation.

Owing to the extensive Operations which were being undertaken by the French further S., it was thought quite probable that in the event of initial success the Battle would develop into one of considerable magnitude. To follow up success, if the Germans were taken by surprise and allowed our Infantry to rapidly overrun their forward defences, it would be necessary to have a Mobile Force to pursue the enemy, to watch our flanks and to maintain liaison with our dismounted Troops. Further the French Attack was timed to take place 45 minutes after the British, a fact which rendered our right flank more vulnerable. It was therefore decided to form for this Operation, in addition to the Cavalry, a Mobile Force, composed of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades, the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion, and one Section of 6-inch Newton Mortars, to operate on the main AMIENS-ROYE Road, the right boundary of the Canadian Corps. This Force was named the *Canadian Independent Force* and was commanded by the G.O.C. Canadian Machine Gun Corps, Brigadier-General R. BRUTINEL, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. (X)

(X) Cdn. Corps, G. 94/26-a dated Aug. 2nd, 1918.  
And Cdn. Corps, G. 135/2523-4 dated Aug. 3rd, 1918.

### Training.

From August 2nd, when the Canadian Independent Force came into being, until August 8th, the Units were busy training, allocating duties, overhauling Equipment and Transport, fitting 2 Machine Gun Mountings on every Fighting Lorry, and generally preparing to go into Action. Parts of 3 or 4 days were spent in combined Tactical Exercises in which all Units of the Force participated.

### Tactical Exercises.

The purpose of these Exercises was to practice and promote useful and successful cooperation with the Motor Brigades in the exploitation of success, in forming defensive flanks, in the use of the Armoured Cars as a Mobile Reserve or as an Advanced Guard on the Roads while the Batteries were taking up positions, in outflanking and overcoming Strong Points, and in holding and consolidating ground won. The necessity of close cooperation with the Cavalry and Artillery and maintaining good liaison with the Infantry was emphasized. These Exercises also served to illustrate the importance of the proper employment of the Cyclists as Scouts, Patrols, Escorts to Machine Guns, Snipers, etc. The tactical handling of the Lewis Guns, the value of Smoke as a screen to the advancing of Batteries, how to take advantage of Cover, and many other points were brought out and discussed.

### Task.

The Task of the Canadian Independent Force was to pass through the Third Canadian Division and make good the Line of the ROYE Road between the RED LINE and the BLUE DOTTED LINE forming a flank to the Third Cavalry Division towards the S. and cover the right flank of the Third Division. As the Fight made progress, the Independent Force was to continue exploitation of success down the ROYE Road, acting at the same time as a link between the most advanced Cavalry and leading Infantry. Close liaison with the Third Cavalry Division and the French was to be maintained.



### **Composition and Organization.**

The initial Organization of the Canadian Independent Force was as follows :-

Composition :-

- Headquarters C.M.G.C.
- 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade. (40 Vickers Machine Guns)
- 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade. (40 Vickers Machine Guns)
- Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion. (9 Lewis Guns)
- 1 Trench Mortar Section, 5th C.D.A. (2 – 6 inch Newton Mortars)
- 1 Continuous Wave Wireless Detachment.
- Canadian Motor Machine Gun, Mechanical Transport Company.

The Force was organized as follows :-

Commander - Brigadier-General R. BRUTINEL, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Headquarters - Major W.B. FORSTER, M.C., Brigade-Major.

Lieut. P.M. HUMME, Reconnaissance Officer.

Armoured Car Detachment - O.C., Captain R.C. CLARK, 1st C.M.M.G.B.

- 4 Armoured Cars. (2 from each Motor Brigade)
- 1 Platoon Cyclists.
- 10 Motor Cyclists. (Scouts and Liaison)

Trench Mortar Section - O.C., Captain J.N. Mc EACHERN, 5th Cdn. Div. Artillery.

- 2-6 inch Newton Mortars mounted on 2 Lorries, each of which carried 60 Rounds of T. M. Ammunition.

No. 1 Group – 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

- O.C., Lt.-Col. W.K. WALKER, D.S.O., M.C.
- 5 Motor Machine Gun Batteries. (40 Guns)
- 2 Platoon Cyclists.
- 20 Motor Cyclists.

No. 2 Group – 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

- O.C., Major H.F.V. MEURLING, M.C.
- 5 Motor Machine Gun Batteries. (40 Guns)
- 2 Platoon Cyclists.
- 20 Motor Cyclists.

No. 3 Group – Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion.

- O.C., Major R. HUMPHREY, D.S.O.
- 2 Armoured Cars. (1 from each Motor Brigade)
- 4 Platoon Cyclists.
- 10 Motor Cyclists.

Supply Section. – O.C. Lieut. G.H. MAY, C.M.M.G., M.T. Company.

- 1 Ration Lorry 1 Water Lorry
- 1 Ammunition Lorry 1 Fuel and Oil Lorry
- 2 First Aid Lorries 5 Motor Cyclists

C.L.H. Hotchkiss Guns. – The Hotchkiss Detachment, Canadian Light Horse, was placed on August 9th, at the disposal of the G.O.C., Cdn. Independent Force. The 12 Hotchkiss Guns were ordered to join No. 3 Group, which was then placed under command of Lieut.-Col. LEONARD, O.C., C.L.H.



### **Plans of Engagement.**

Arrangements for 2 possible eventualities were made :-

1 – In the event of the Cavalry getting through and the Road being clear up to LE QUESNEL – The Armoured Car Detachment to move rapidly to positions of observation E. of LE QUESNEL followed by 1st and 2nd Groups. The 1st Group to get into position and consolidate while the 2nd Group remained in observation ready to move forward through the first group on receipt of Orders.

2 – In the event of the Cavalry being delayed and resistance expected from LE QUESNEL – BRAUCOURT - FRESNOY – Groups to move into positions, with the M.G. Batteries leapfrogging under the protection of the Armoured Cars. If required broad use was to be made of medium and long range Overhead Machine Gun Fire. If strong resistance were encountered in LE QUESNEL and the Woods to the S., the 1st Group was to support the attack of the Cavalry and Tanks by Direct or Indirect Fire.

### **Trench Mortars.**

If the Armoured Car Detachment were unable to reduce by its own Fire isolated Machine Gun Nests or other local Points of Resistance it would call, by signal or message, for Newton Mortars, which were to move with the leading Machine Gun Battery.

### **Smoke.**

Smoke Grenades were to be used to neutralize enemy observation while the Trench Mortars and Machine Gun Batteries were getting into action.

### **3rd Group.**

The 3rd Group, was to be held in Reserve and used only if the situation demanded and on direct Orders from the G.O.C., Canadian Independent Force.

### **Exploitation of Success.**

Groups were warned that should the initial Assault prove successful, after the capture of the BLUE DOTTED LINE, the Independent Force, in liaison with the Cavalry on the left and the French on the right, would probably operate in the triangle HANGEST-en- SANTERRE – ROYE – VRELY.

### **Other Arrangements.**

Detailed arrangements were made for liaison with the Cavalry, the French, the Third, and Fourth Canadian Divisions, for co-operation with the R.A.F. and Artillery, for proper and continuous supply of Ammunition, Rations and Water, and for the establishment of First Aid Posts and evacuation of the wounded.



## **THE BATTLE.**

### **Concentration of Independent Force.**

At Zero Hour, 4:20 A.M., August 8th-1918, Headquarters Independent Force opened along the ROYE Road in the BOIS de GENTELLES about 400 yards S.- E. of the western edge of the Wood. By 5:00 A.M. all the Groups, in the order enumerated above, had concentrated on the ROYE Road with the head of the Column in rear of Headquarters.

### **Force Moves Forward, August 8th.**

After the Road to DOMART was reported clear the Column commenced to move forward at 7:33 A.M., passing through DOMART at 9:10 A.M. Headquarters C.I.F. was established at the intersection of the AMIENS-ROYE and DEMUIN-MOREUIL Roads. From that point the Armoured Car Detachment, which had been reinforced by 2 Armoured Cars from No. 3 Group, went forward to get in touch with the enemy.

### **Situation.**

MAISON BLANCHE, and the BRICKFIELD near it, had been captured by the Infantry, BEAUCOURT appeared empty, but MEZIERES was still in the hands of the enemy offering strong resistance to the French. At 11:00 A.M., 4 Platoon Cyclists were placed in Artillery Formation on the S. side of the main Road and about 1,000 yards in front of Headquarters. This was a precaution against a counter-attack by the Germans from the direction of MEZIERES. "C" and "E" Batteries of No. 1 Group which had followed the Armoured Cars, took up positions along the southern edge of VALLEY WOOD to cover the right flank of the Canadian Corps.

### **Capture of Mezières.**

When the Armoured Car Detachment reached the MAISON BLANCHE Crossroads, Capt. CLARK ordered 2 of his Cars and 1 Section of Cyclists S. towards MEZIERES. The enemy was encountered on the northern outskirts of the Village. The Guns of the Cars opened Fire on groups of the enemy and on the Crew of a German 5.9 inch Gun in action near the Cemetery. The Gun and about 30 prisoners were captured and a number of casualties were inflicted. At the same time Lieut. WORTHINGTON, M.M., in charge of "E" Battery, 1st C.M.M.G.Bde. in close cooperation with the French, moved his Guns forward into positions from which he kept MEZIERES under Fire until the French Infantry began to dribble into the Village. The work of this Battery and the Armoured Cars greatly facilitated the task of securing a footing in the houses and streets of the Village. As the French Troops were unable to debouch from MEZIERES, owing to the resistance offered by a cluster of German Machine Guns E. of the Village, Major MEURLING (O.C., No. 2 Group) arranged with the O.C., 94th French Infantry Regiment, a combined minor operation to take place at 2:00 P.M. to overcome the enemy at this point.

This arrangement proved unnecessary. Captain W.T. TRENCH, in command of "C" Battery, No. 1 Group, noticing the situation at MEZIERES, independently manoeuvred his Battery, outflanked the enemy positions round the Village and forced the German Machine Gunners and Infantry to surrender to the French. A Section of the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion covered the approach of this Battery in a very skillful manner and by Rifle Fire inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.

### **Action of Armoured Cars Between Beaucourt and Le Quesnel.**

While 2 of the Armoured Cars and 2 of the Machine Gun Batteries were co-operating with the French near MEZIERES, the remainder of Captain CLARK's Detachment was operating along the AMIENS-ROYE Road in conjunction with the Cavalry and Whippets in CLAUDE WOOD, 1,500 yards to the left of the Road. The Cars advanced with little opposition as far as the CHALK PIT S. of BEAUCOURT, where touch was obtained with our Cavalry on the left. The progress of the Cars was for a short time held up at this point by enemy Machine Gunners and Hand Grenades. This opposition was soon overcome by our Machine Guns, and the Cars then proceeded towards LE QUESNEL encountering heavy Machine Gun Fire as they reached the high point on the Road beyond the CHALK PIT. The Detachment, however, went ahead engaging at short range groups of enemy Infantry and Machine Guns on both sides of the Road,



inflicting many casualties. They continued to operate between the CHALK PIT and the Road from LE QUESNEL to FRESNOY-en-CHAUSSEE until the Machine Gun Batteries had come forward and taken up positions in the vicinity of the CHALK PIT. After successfully screening the move of the Batteries the Armoured Cars were withdrawn behind the Batteries in the afternoon as the advance of our Infantry on the left and that of the French on the right had been temporarily held up.

#### **Headquarters Force.**

Early in the afternoon, Headquarters of the Canadian Independent Force was established in a Dugout S. of the Main Road, about 600 yards E. of MAISON BLANCHE.

#### **Action of 1st Group South of Beaucourt.**

As soon as the French entered MEZIERES, Lieut.-Col. WALKER, commanding No.1 Group took his other 3 Batteries, "A", "B" and "D" forward along the ROYE Road, each Battery in turn leapfrogging the Batteries in front of it. Covered by the Armoured Cars in front, they advanced as far as the CHALK PIT, S. of BEAUCOURT, but were unable to advance beyond this point owing to heavy Artillery and Machine Gun Fire. Our Infantry had not been able to make much progress beyond BEAUCOURT (X) and the French Line, in the early part of the afternoon, still ran along the eastern outskirts of MEZIERES. The Batteries, therefore, took up positions S. and N. of the Road, acting as connecting links between the Canadian Corps and the French. On completion of their work with the French, "C" and "E" Batteries also took up positions S. of BEAUCOURT. Throughout the afternoon the Guns Fired on many enemy Parties which were seen round LE QUESNEL and FRESNOY. Late in the afternoon "C" and "E" Batteries assisted with their Fire, the French in their attack on FRESNOY. The Village was held in strength by the enemy and the French failed to capture it.

#### **Disposition of 1st Motor Brigade, Night August 8th/9th.**

In the evening, the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade Batteries took up the following defensive positions for the night on the right of the Canadian Corps :-

"C" and "E" Batteries – On the right of the AMIENS-ROYE Road, S. of BEAUCOURT covering FRESNOY, which was strongly held by the enemy. "C" Battery was in touch with the 11th C.I.B., N. of the Road and "E" Battery with the French.

"D" Battery – On the left of the Road covering LE QUESNEL.

"B" Battery – In support S.-W. of BEAUCOURT.

"A" Battery – In reserve close to the Independent Force H.Q., MAISON BLANCHE.

No.2 Group, the Armoured Car Detachment and the Trench Mortar Section were withdrawn for the night to VALLEY WOOD.

#### **Attack on LE Quesnel and Fresnoy, August 9th.**

Very early on August 9th-1918 "A" and "B" Batteries, No.1 Group, took up positions astride the AMIENS-ROYE Road to assist the 11th C.I.B. in the attack on FRESNEL. The French attacked FRESNEL at the same time. The 2 Batteries leapfrogging forward to the western edge of LE QUESNEL making good the ground on the right flank as they proceeded, and cooperated successfully with both attacks. They succeeded in inflicting many casualties on the enemy and "B" Battery (Lieut. H. SMITH, M.M.) was partly responsible for the capture by the French of a large number of prisoners. Both LE QUESNEL and FRESNOY were captured.



### **Action of Armoured Cars South and East of LE Quesnel.**

The Armoured Cars also cooperated in this attack. They met with a stiff resistance from the Woods S. of LE QUESNEL and LE PT. HANGEST. These localities contained enemy Machine Guns, which greatly hindered the work of "B" Battery and the French on the right of the Road. After a personal reconnaissance by Captain CLARK, the Armoured Cars again went forward and cleared the enemy out of the WOODS. During this action, the Gunners on the Cars obtained excellent targets, killing and wounding many Germans and capturing a few prisoners. The Cars then proceeded along the Road in the direction of BOUCHOIR. They encountered intense Artillery Fire as they approached the Railway Crossing E. of LE QUESNEL. After making 3 attempts to advance, they were forced back, but not before 1 of the Cars received a "*direct hit*" and all the other Car Crews had sustained several casualties. The Armoured Car Detachment was relieved before Noon by the 2nd Group, which leapfrogged the 1st Group.

### **No.1 Group Withdrawn.**

The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade, which, since the morning of August 8th, had suffered 32 casualties, and the Armoured Cars were withdrawn to the CHALK PIT, S. of BEAUCOURT, as soon as No.2 Group had completed the taking over of all the ground which had been won by the Armoured Cars. In the afternoon, enemy Artillery concentrated on this point causing a few casualties and wounding Captain CLARK, O.C. Armoured Car Detachment. To avoid this Shelling the 1st Brigade and the Cars were moved further back to MAISON BLANCHE.

### **Trench Mortars Silence Enemy Field Battery.**

The Trench Mortar Section, which was now operating with the 2nd. Group, was brought into action against an enemy "*Whizz-Bang*" Battery behind the Railway Embankment and against Machine Guns located in the Wood just E. of the Railway Crossing. The Mortars fired 25 Rounds obtaining very good hits and silencing the enemy. The advance which had been temporarily checked, was then resumed by the 5th C.M.R., N. of the Road and the 55th Regiment of French Infantry on the S. assisted by Tanks.

### **No. 2 Group in Action.**

"A" Battery, 2nd C.M.M.G.Bde., cooperating with the Cavalry pushed on through FOLIES and took up positions E. of the Village from where it inflicted heavy casualties on the retiring enemy. "B" and "C" Batteries of this Group, which were operating S. of the Main Road, entered ARVILLERS ahead of the French and captured a large number of prisoners. Pte. H. McCORKELL, 2nd C.M.M.G.Bde. displayed great courage by pushing into the Village and capturing 15 Germans single handed. "D" and "E" Batteries, supported by a Platoon of Cyclists, worked their way S.-E. of FOLIES and in cooperation with the Infantry, entered BOUCHOIR in the evening.

### **Dispositions of No. 2 Group, Night, August 9th/10th.**

The Dispositions of No. 2 Group for the night were as follows :-

"A" and "B" Batteries – N.-E. of BOUCHOIR.

"C" Battery – Eastern Edge of ARVILLERS.

"D" Battery – In BEETROOT FACTORY, N. of ARVILLERS, protecting the flank of the 5th C.M.R. and acting as a connecting link between the Canadian Corps and the French.

"E" Battery – 800 yards E. of BOUCHOIR.



### **Motor Machine Gun Transport Moves Infantry.**

During the night the Transport of the 2nd C.M.M.G. Bge. moved the 2nd C.M.R. from LE QUESNEL to BOUCHOIR in preparation for an attack on le QUESNOY at dawn the following morning.

### **Attack on LE QUESNOY, August 10th.**

Early on the morning of August 10th "A" and "B" Batteries of No. 2 Group supported the advance of the 2nd C.M.R. on LE QUESNOY. These Batteries had gone along the ROYE Road as far as la CAMBUSE, S.-W. of DAMERY, when the Canadian Independent Force was ordered to withdraw to rest and reorganize.

### **Canadian Independent Force Withdrawn.**

No. 1 and No. 3 Groups concentrated in VALLEY WOOD, No. 2 Group was withdrawn to HAMON WOOD, and the Supply Section was in LE QUESNEL.

### **No. 1 Group Moves Forward, August 16th.**

On August 16th, it was reported that the enemy Resistance was weakening in front of the French. Expecting our Allies to advance, No. 1 Group together with the Armoured Cars and the Trench Mortars moved to BOIS-en-Z and the Hotchkiss Detachment to the Woods W. of la CAMBUSE, ready to take advantage of any opening to exploit success. Motor Cyclists and Armoured Cars reconnoitred all the Roads leading E. from ANDECHY and DAMERY. The French, however, were held up in front of GOYENCOURT and were unable to pierce the enemy Line, which had been established in the old Trench System in that area. In the evening of August 17th, No. 1 Group and the Hotchkiss Detachment were withdrawn to LE QUESNEL WOOD and CAIX, respectively. The following day Lieut.-Col. WALKER moved his Command back to VALLEY WOOD.

### **Independent Force Disbanded.**

The Cavalry Machine Gun Detachment and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion ceased to form part of the Canadian Independent Force on August 19th. The former rejoined its Regiment and the latter was placed under Orders of the D.A. and Q.M.G., Canadian Corps. The 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades were held in Corps Reserve in their Bivouacs in VALLEY and HAMON WOODS under General BRUTINEL.



### **Acts of Bravery.**

The following are a few brief accounts of splendid work and acts of bravery performed by some of the Officer, N.C.O.s and Men of the Canadian Independent Force:-

On the morning of August 9th, Lieut. F. WAGHORN, D.C.M., M.M., was in charge of "B" Battery, 1st C.M.M.G. Bge., filling a gap between the French and the Canadian Corps, S. of LE QUESNEL. A German Strong Point opposite this Half-Battery was holding up the advance of the French, 2 Tanks and a WHIPPET were put out of action while attempting to overcome this point. Lieut. WAGHORN with great coolness and disregard for his own safety, skillfully handling his Machine Guns and the Detachment of Cyclists attached to him, captured and held the Strong Point. This action considerably helped the French in their advance.

No. 45578, Corporal G.C. KIRKHAM, in charge of an Armoured Car, showed conspicuous skill in handling his Car on August 8th and in the morning of August 9th. He repeatedly penetrated the enemy's Lines on the AMIENS-ROYE Road, near BEAUFORT, LE QUESNEL, and ARVILLERS, bringing back valuable information as to the enemy's Dispositions. After the driver had been badly wounded on August 9th, Corporal KIRKHAM drove the Car himself for 4 hours under heavy Fire, between LE QUESNEL and the Railway Crossing. By skillfully manoeuvring his Car his 2 Gun Crews were able to Fire effectively on many Groups of German Infantry and Machine Guns.

As a Motor-Cyclist Scout, No. 16399, Pte. A.L. BEBEAU, M.M., showed conspicuous bravery on August 8th and 9th. He rode through the enemy's Lines no less than 10 times with the object of drawing the enemy's Fire. He would then give the location of the German Machine Guns to the Gun Crews of the Armoured Cars. On the morning of August 9th, Pte. BEBEAU particularly distinguished himself by riding right through the enemy's positions S. of LE QUESNEL and bringing back information about the location of Machine Gun Nests. His report was of great value to the French and to the Motor Batteries operating S. of the Road.

In the Operations in the vicinity of LE QUESNEL WOOD, No. 45628, Pte. R.W. CRUSE, the driver of one of the 2nd. C.M.M.G. Bge. Armoured Cars displayed great gallantry and devotion to duty. His Car was hit on the side by an Anti-Tank Shell. Two of the Crew were killed and the others wounded. Driver CRUSE, although suffering from a very severe wound which almost severed his arm from his body, drove the Car back with one hand, thus saving the lives of his wounded comrades. Unfortunately this gallant soldier, who had been in France since 1915, died from his wounds after driving the Car back into safety.

### **2nd Motor Machine Gun Brigade Lorry.**

After midnight, August 9th/10th, a No. 2 Group Ration Lorry, by mistake, passed through our Outposts into No Man's Land. A strong enemy Patrol attacked it with Bombs, wounding the driver and assistant driver, who managed to walk back to our Lines. Sgt. MORRISON of the 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigade Train was sent forward on a Motor Cycle to investigate. With great courage he crept up to the Lorry, examined it, effected some small repairs and brought it back under Shell and Machine Gun Fire. The 3 or 4 men who were in the Lorry at the time it was assaulted, managed to escape, but the German Patrol took all the Rations with them.



## **GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.**

### **Task Fulfilled.**

The Canadian Independent Force fulfilled its primary Task, which was to form a flank for the Cavalry and to act as a connecting line between the advanced Cavalry and the Infantry. The scope of the Operations of the Cavalry was, however, very restricted by circumstances, and the ground they had overridden before noon, August 8th, was soon occupied by our Infantry. The Independent Force then covered the flank of the 4th Canadian Division and later the 3rd Canadian Division, and also tried to make headway.

### **Cooperation with the French.**

The C.I.F. had occasion to be of considerable assistance to the French 42nd and 126th Divisions by outflanking some Strong Points, which were giving trouble. The tendency of the French was to swerve to the right and our Troops swerved to the left, so that probably a Gap would have been left between the 2 Armies.

### **Armoured Cars.**

The Armoured Cars, though of an obsolete type, proved very valuable and the results would have been more pronounced had they tried, to a larger measure to cover and facilitate the progress of the Batteries and Lorries instead of working individually.

### **Trench Mortars.**

The 6 inch Newton Mortars were of great value. When employed their action was decisive. Throughout the whole Operation they acted as an Independent Unit, being attached to Groups as required by the Tactical Situation.

### **Hotchkiss Detachment.**

The Hotchkiss Cavalry Detachment arrive too late to be needed, and undoubtedly would have been of great value in the action against MEZIERES.

### **2 Motor Brigades and Cyclist Battalion.**

The work of the 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades and the Cyclist Battalion was carried out in a highly creditable manner. Their cooperation with Troops of the other Branches of the Service and the French produced excellent results. Owing to their hasty organization and the little opportunity they had for combined training, perhaps the Units did not make full use of the power of manoeuvre, which the addition of Cyclists and Trench Mortars gave them.

The following extracts from letters received by Brigadier-General R. BRUTINEL, distinctly show the appreciation of the work done by the Canadian Independent Force in protecting the flank of the Canadian Corps and in their cooperation with the French Forces.



### Letter from Canadian Corps Commander.

General Sir ARTHUR W. CURRIE, the Canadian Corps Commander wrote on August 15th:

*"I have just finished reading with most intense interest your report on Operations conducted by the Independent Force, from the 8th August to the 10th inclusive. In addition to the Special Order which I am publishing, I consider that special praise is due to the Officers and Men of your Command. "I congratulate you most heartily on the success achieved."*

### Letter from 42nd French Division.

On August 11th, General DEVILLE, Commanding the 42nd French Infantry Division, quick to recognize the valuable assistance given him, sent to General BRUTINEL, 10 Croix de Guerre, accompanied by the following letter:-

42 'D.I.  
ETAT-MAJOR

P.C., 11 Aout.1918.

*Mon cher General,*

*Je savais, a n'en pas douter, depuis votre visite au P.C. Jeanne d'Arc que la 42' D.I. pourrait, en toutes circonstances, compter sur l'appui des "Forces Canadiennes Independantes".*

*L'evenement a encore depasse mes previsions et, au lendemain de in glorieuse journee ou lorsque votre Detachement a prete a ma Division un concours si genereux et si efficace, je tiens a vous adresser mes plus sinceres felicitations pour la magnifique conduite de vos Unites et l'expression de mes remerciements pour qu'alles vous ont donnee votre aide.*

*De tous cotes dans les rapports qui me parviennent de mes chefs de Corps, et des chefs de Btn., sont mises au en relief votre intervention ai intelligemment efficace et l'ardeur de vos troupes a souder leur action a la notre.*

*Aussi, en souvenir de ces combats si glorieusement arrives en commun, je vous cite a la 'Ordre de la 42' D.I., pour le motif suivant:- "Officier General de hauts valeur, commandant une Unite d'elite qui a fait preuve au coure de la bataille du 8 aout, 1918 de la plus hautes qualites militaires – et a constamment prete a la 42'D.I. un appui aussi genereux qu'efficace."*

*Je mets de plus a votre disposition dix Croix de Guerre, avrc citation a l'ordre de la 42' D.I., en vous priant de les repartir, dans votre Detachement, a ceux que vous jugerez les plus dignes de cette distinction.*

J. DEVILLE.

### Translation.

42nd Infantry Division Headquarters.

Battle Post, 11th August 1918.

*My Dear General:-*

*From the moment of your visit to the Joan of Arc Battle Post, I knew, without any possible doubt, that the 42nd Infantry Division could at all times rely upon the support of the Canadian Independent Force.*

*The event more than justified our expectations and, on the morrow of that glorious day when your body of troops lent to my Division such generous and efficient co-operation, I hasten to send you my very sincere congratulations and thanks for the splendid behaviour of your Units and the assistance they gave us.*

*In every direction there come from my Officers of Corps and Battalions reports that give prominence to your efficient and skillful intervention and to the furore of your Men welding their Operations to ours. In remembrance, therefore, of those battles gloriously fought in common, I cite you in the Order of the 42nd Infantry Division for the following reasons :-*



*“General Officer of great valor, commanding a choice Unit, who has shown during the Battle of the 8th August 1918 the highest Military qualities, and who gave to the 42nd Infantry Division with unshaken determination a most “generous and efficient support”.*

*I also put at your disposal ten Croix de Guerre, with citations in the Order of the 42nd Infantry Division, and beg that you will award them to those in your Detachment whom you consider to be most worthy of the distinction.*

*J. DEVILLE*

**Letter from 126th French Division.**

*The general officer commanding the 126th French Infantry Division, General MATHIEU, awarded the Croix de Guerre to 6 Officers and Other Ranks of the Canadian Independent Force, and addressed the following letter to General BRUTINEL :-*

*126 Division d’Infanterie  
S.P.  
General MATHIEU.*

*16 Aout, 1918.*

*Mon General,*

*Comme je vous l’ai dit hier de vive voix, je suis tres heureux que le quiproquo auquel vous faites allusion, aifacilite l’avance de nos troupes dans les lignes boches.*

*Je serais tres content si en appreciant cette petite recompense, ils se rendaient compte que nous voulons toujours marcher avec vous la main dans la main, pour le succes final de notre juste cause, d’autant plus que nousavens pu juger de visu de la haute valeur de vos troupeset des heureux resultats de leur efficace co-operation.*

*Avec l’expression de mes meilleurs compliments et, salutations.*

*T. MATHIEU.*

**Translation.**

*126th Infantry Division  
P.S.  
General MATHIEU ,*

*16th August 1918*

*Dear General :-*

*As I said during our conversation of yesterday, I rejoice at the opportunity which offers, thanks to the “quid pro quo” to which you refer, of giving pleasure to some of your gallant Men whose invaluable support to my Troops facilitated our advance into the Bosche Lines.*

*I would be very happy if, in accepting this little reward, they would realize our earnest desire to go hand in hand with you to the final success of your just cause, the more so now that we have the occasion to appreciate “de vien” the great valor of your soldiers and the good results of their effectual cooperation.*

*With my very best regards and both hands in yours.*

*T. MATHIEU.*



**Extract from 11th C.I.B. Report.**

The following are extracts from the 11th C.I.B. Narrative of Operations on August 8th and August 9th (G. 413, dated August 29th, 1918) :-

*“The Motor Machine Guns (No. 1 Group) were held up in D. 28. b. (S. of Beaucourt) but they formed a protective flank for the Brigade right rear and connected it with the French who were still fighting in the vicinity of MEZIERES. The Motor Machine Guns did valuable protective work, but at no stage were they able to get far enough forward to help the Brigade in its advance. “*

*“ The Motor Machine Guns, too, gave great assistance and relieved me of anxiety concerning my right rear.”*

**Presentation of French Decorations.**

On August 20th, 1918, General CURRIE presented the CROIX de GUERRE to the Officers, N.C.O.s and Men of the Canadian Independent Force, who had been awarded the decorations by the General Officers Commanding the 42nd and 126th French Infantry Divisions. The Corps Commander then inspected the 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion, who were assembled in a field N.-E. of VALLEY WOOD.



### **Canadian Corps Returns to the First Army.**

#### **Units Move North.**

After August 19th the Canadian Units began to move N., back to the ARRAS Sector, in the First Army Area. The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade and the Canadian Motor Machine Gun, Mechanical Transport Company, moved on August 24th to TILLOY-les-HERMAVILLE and HABARCQ, respectively.

#### **2nd C.M.M.G.B. with Fourth Canadian Division.**

The 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade remained on the AMIENS Front and went into Divisional Reserve under Orders of the Fourth Canadian Division on August 21st. The following day the Brigade went into the Line, in support to the Fourth Division, with "A", "B" and "C" Batteries, under Captain O'REILLY, M.C., occupying positions N.-W. of WARVILLERS, and "D" and "E" Batteries under Captain LEARY, M.C., in front of ROSIERES. (X) These Batteries were relieved 2 days later by Machine Gunners belonging to the XXXVI French Corps. The 2nd Motor Brigade then moved N. and reached its old Billets in HERMAVILLE on the morning of August 26th.



**THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S (COMPOSITE) BRIGADE.**

**II  
CAMBRAI, PHASE I : AUGUST 26th to 30th, 1918.**

**Introductory.**

**Operations August 26th, 1918; General.**

As already stated, the Canadian Corps had begun to move back to the First Army Area on August 19th, 1918. By August 24th the Second Canadian Division was in the Line in the NEUVILLE VITASSE-TELEGRAPH HILL Sector, ARRAS Front : and the Third Canadian Division held the Line from the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road to the SCARPE RIVER.

The First and Fourth Canadian Divisions joined the Canadian Corps on August 25th and 28th respectively.

The Operations which the Canadian Corps was detailed to carry out on this Front in successive rapid stages beginning on August 26th were part of the Allied General Offensive which eventually forced the Germans to ask for the Armistice signed on November 11th, 1918. The Tasks assigned to the Canadian Corps in these Operations may be roughly outlined as follows :-

- 1 – To capture the very well organized defences W. and E. of MONCHY-le-PREUX, and to seize the FRESNES-ROUVROY LINE.
- 2 – To break and push through the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE, which formed part of the famous HINDENBURG System of Defences.
- 3 – To overcome enemy resistance in the CANAL du NORD LINE.
- 4 – To continue with the Offensive Operations until the Germans were forced to acknowledge defeat.

**Plan of 1st Operation.**

A Canadian Corps Operation Order issued on August 23rd, 1918, stated that the First of these Operations was to be carried out in conjunction with the VI Corps on the right. With the Fifty-first Division (British) which had been placed under the Tactical Control, of the Canadian Corps with 3 Divisions in the Line was to maintain touch with the advancing Troops of VI Corps and gain ground wherever possible. The 1st C.M.M.G.B., the First Life Guards M.G. Battalion, the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion, and the XVIII Corps Cyclist Battalion were to be in Corps Reserve, under the G.O.C., in readiness to move at 4 hours notice. (X)

The initial assault took place on August 26th, 1918 at 3:00 A.M. (Y)

The attack was carried out, under cover of an Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage, by the Second Canadian Division on the right, the Third Canadian Division in the centre, and the Fifty-first Division (British) holding the Line N. of the SCARPE RIVER, on the left.



### **Machine Gun Barrage.**

The Machine Gun Barrage applied on the Front of the 2 Canadian Divisions was prepared by General BRUTINEL, and carried out under the control of Divisional Machine Gun Commanders. To obtain a Barrage density of 1 Machine Gun for every 35 yards of Front, the Machine Gun Resources of the Divisions were supplemented by Guns from the 1st C.M.M.G.B. and the 1st Life Guards M.G. Battalion. 4 Batteries of the Motor Brigade and 2 Batteries (16 Guns) of the Life Guard Battalion were placed under the Orders of the O.C., Second Battalion, C.M.G.C., and 2 more Batteries of the Life Guards Battalion, under the O.C., Third Battalion, C.M.G.C. In addition to these Batteries 32 Guns of the Life Guards were placed under the Fifty-first Division to co-operate with the Third Canadian Division by Direct Flanking Fire on the Northern Slopes of ORANGE HILL, and by Neutralizing Fire on MOUNT PLEASANT.

(X) Cdn. Corps O.449, dated August 23rd, 1918. (Y)

### **Machine Gun Batteries take up Barrage Positions.**

On August 25th, "A", "B" "C" and "D" Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. moved to their Barrage positions with 2 Batteries on the N. and 2 Batteries on the S. Slope of TELEGRAPH HILL. The First Life Guards M.G. Battalion had 2 Batteries in position just S. of TILLOY-lez-MAFFLAINES. These 6 Batteries formed the C.M.M.G. Group of the Second Division Barrage Guns. Major R.D. HARKNESS, M.C., 1st C.M.G.B. was in command of the Group, with Headquarters in RONVILLE.



## **THE BATTLE.**

### **Barrage Fire.**

At Zero Hour, 3:00 A.M., August 26th, all the Guns opened Fire and the Barrage Scheme was carried out successfully. Immediately after the capture of the First Objective the 4 Life Guard Batteries and "C" and "D" Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. were withdrawn to Corps Reserve. "A" and "B" Batteries remained in position to support the attack of the 6th C.I.B. by Direct Fire on the ground E. of NEUVILLE VITASSE. These 2 Batteries rejoined their Unit in the afternoon. The Guns attached to the Fifty-first Division were withdrawn after the capture of the Second Objective. The First Life Guards M.G. Battalion was then transferred from the Canadian Corps to the "*Composite Force*" commanded by Col. LINDSAY, D.S.O., First Army M.G. Officer.

### **Attack Makes Good Progress.**

Early reports indicated that the attack was progressing favourably. Both Canadian Divisions had captured their Objectives by 11:00 A.M. and MONCHY-le-PREUX and GUEMAPPE were in our hands.

### **Canadian Independent Force Reformed.**

The Canadian Independent Force was then reformed, under Brigadier-General R. BRUTINEL, with the 2 Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades, the Canadian Corps Cyclists and XVIII Corps Cyclist Battalions, which were assembled on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road. The Task of the Force was to exploit success down the CAMBRAI Road as soon as an opportunity occurred.

### **Patrols Sent Out.**

Officer and Motor Cyclist Patrols were immediately sent forward to get in touch with the advancing Infantry and to reconnoitre all the roads leading Eastward. The enemy resistance had stiffened E. of MONCHY and GUEMAPPE and the roads were found to be in poor condition.

### **Machine Gun Batteries Fill In Gap.**

In the evening 2 Batteries of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B., accompanied by 2 Platoons of Canadian Corps Cyclists took up positions astride the Main Road to fill a Gap that existed between the Second and Third Canadian Divisions. After the Infantry had established a Line for the night and the flanks of the 2 Divisions were in touch with one another the Units of the Canadian Independent Force were withdrawn at midnight to the CITADEL, ARRAS. The XVIII Corps Cyclists Battalion was withdrawn from the Independent Force and placed in Army Reserve.

### **Infantry Resumes Attack.**

The Second and Third Canadian Divisions resumed the attack on August 27th and captured BOIS du SART, VIS-en-ARTOIS and CHERISY. The Infantry were held up at this Line by the enemy holding the Trenches in front of the 2 Villages. (X)



### **2nd Motor Brigade and Cyclists Concentrate.**

During the afternoon, the 2nd C.M.M.G.B., 6 Armoured Cars, and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion were concentrated on the NEUVILLE VITASSE-WANCOURT Road in readiness to exploit success beyond VIS-en-ARTOIS, should the enemy resistance weaken in the evening or early the following morning. Patrols which had been in close touch with the forward Troops throughout the day reported that the enemy had launched an unsuccessful counter-attack S.-E. of VIS-en-ARTOIS. A very large Mine Crater on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road, W. of the Village, and numerous Shell-holes on all the other Roads leading to it blocked all M.T. Traffic in that direction. The 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and the Cyclist Battalion remained concentrated in WANCOURT until the following day.

### **The Line, Night August 27th/28th.**

That night the Canadian Corps Front ran approximately, E. of the SENSEE RIVER to VIS-en-ARTOIS (inclusive), then the Line bent North-Westward and continued along the Eastern edge of BOIS du VERT and the BOIS du SART to the SCARPE RIVER, W. of PHLEVES. (Y) N. of the River both ROEUX and GAVRELLE were in our hands : but GREENLAND HILL was still held by the enemy.



**BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE (COMPOSITE BRIGADE).****Composite Brigade.**

An Operation Order issued by the Canadian Corps on August 27th, (X) stated that, on the night of August 28th/29th, the First Canadian Division was to relieve the Second Canadian Division and that the Fourth Division (British) would relieve the Third Canadian Division which was holding the Sector immediately S. of the SCARPE RIVER. It also Ordered a "*Composite Brigade*" commanded by General BRUTINEL, and consisting of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B., the 101st M.G. Battalion (less 1 Company), the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion, to be at the disposal of the Fourth Division (British). The Task of the Composite Brigade was to form a flank S. of the SCARPE. The Fourth Division (British) now formed part of the Canadian Corps. (X) Canadian Corps G. 642.

**1st Motor Brigade in Corps Reserve.**

The 1st C.M.M.G.B. (Lt.-Col. WALKER) was held in Corps Reserve in ARRAS ready to operate down the CAMBRAI Road if an opportunity occurred.

**Concentration of Composite Brigade.**

Early in the afternoon of August 28th, the Units of the Composite Brigade were concentrated in the Area between FRUCHY and the ARASS-CAMBRAI Road.

**Brigade's Task.**

The Composite brigade was allotted by the Fourth Division (British) the Tasks of relieving the 7th C.I.B. in the Line, forming a defensive flank along the RIVER SCARPE, and at the same time conforming with the movements of the other Troops of the Division.

**Organization.**

For this purpose the Brigade was organized into 3 Groups :-

No. 1 Group – 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

O.C., Lieut.-Col. W.J.A. LALOR, M.C.

5 Motor Machine Gun Batteries (40 Guns).

2 Platoons Cyclists.

3 Trench Mortars.

No. 2 Group – 101st Machine Gun Battalion.

O.C., Lieut.-Col. F.H. CHIPPS, D.S.O.

101st M.G. Battalion, 2, 1/2 Companies (40 Guns).

3 Trench Mortars.

No. 3 Group – Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion.

O.C., Major HUMPHREY, D.S.O.

5 Platoons Cyclists.

Detachment from 101st M.G. Battalion (8 Guns).

Detachment from Armoured Cars (12 Guns).



**Boundaries.**

The SCARPE RIVER formed the Northern Boundary of the Brigade, and the Southern Boundary was determined by a Line running due E. through a point 500 yards N. of MONCHY-le-PREUX and a point 250 yards N. of BOIRY-notre-DAME. General BRUTINEL divided his Brigade Area into 2 Sectors by a Line running along the Northern edge of JIGSAW WOOD in a North-Easterly direction to the cross-road S. of HAMBLAIN-les-PRES.

**Line Taken Over By Brigade.**

The Line taken over from the 7th C.I.B. ran approximately from ARTILLERY HILL, N. of BOIRY, along the Eastern and Northern edges of JIGSAW WOOD to the SAND PIT on the BOIRY-PELVES Road and thence N. to the River E. of PELVES. The Relief which was completed at 6:00 A.M., August 29th proved very exhausting and difficult. This was due to the darkness of the night, the uncertainty of the whereabouts of the Line, the long distance all Machine Gun Equipment had to be carried, and to continuous never ending Shelling of ARTILLERY HILL, JIGSAW WOOD and the River Valley.

**Tasks of Groups.**

No. 1 Group relieved the 42nd C.I.Bn., the P.P.C.L.I. and other elements of the Third Canadian Division which were in the Brigade Right Sector. Touch was at once obtained with the left Battalion of the 11th Brigade (British), on the right. No. 2 Group relieved the 49th C.I.Bn. and other elements of the 7th C.I.B. which were in the Brigade Left Sector. This Group extended its left to the SCARPE RIVER and kept the River Valley and the Southern Slopes of GREENLAND HILL under Observation. The 3rd Group was held in FACTION TRENCH, 1,500 yards behind the Front Line, in Support to the other 2 Groups.

**Communications and Medical Arrangements.**

All Groups were connected by Telephone with one another and with Brigade Headquarters, which had been established in a Dugout on ORANGE HILL. First Aid Posts were also established by the Medical Officer of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B.

**Brigade's Name Changed.**

A Canadian Corps Order issued on the evening of August 28th, stated that the Composite Brigade was to be known as BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE. The reason for the change in nomenclature was, perhaps, to avoid confusion with the Composite Force commanded by Col. LINDSAY, D.S.O., First Army Machine Gun Officer.

**Policy of Divisions in the Line.**

The policy of the Divisions in the Line was to secure a Jumping-off Position for the capture of the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE. With this object in view Local Operations were undertaken every day to force the enemy back until we had reached a satisfactory position from which to launch the next attack. As soon as the Line was advanced at any point by a Unit, the flanking Troops immediately took steps to conform to this movement.



### **Brutinel's Brigade Attack.**

An early morning reconnaissance on August 29th made it apparent to the G.O.C., Brigade that the enemy was not holding in strength his positions opposite the Brigade Frontage but was keeping this part of the Front under heavy Shell Fire. The Line taken over by the Brigade was irregular and therefore unnecessarily long and very hard to hold. Both No. 1 and No. 2 Groups were therefore ordered to push forward with a view of straightening the Line and thus conforming with the positions held by the Fourth Division (British) Troops on the right.

The right Sector Group immediately sent small Patrols forward. The Guns of the 2nd Motor Machine Gun Brigade Batteries under Major MEURLING followed them moving by bounds, from Shell-hole to Shell-hole. Owing to the necessity of concealing this movement from the high ground N. of the River, which still in German hands, the Machine Gunners had to advance by rushing forward 1 Gun Crew at a time. The heavy Machine Gun Equipment made this task very difficult and tiresome. No organized resistance was met with and by 11:00 A.M. August 29th, No. 1 Group had occupied a new Line running from the N.-E. corner of BOIRY, E. of BENCH FARM and VICTORIA COPSE, and then back to JIGSAW WOOD, where No. 2 Group was preparing to advance.

Early in the afternoon No. 2 Group attacked the enemy positions in front of the left Sector with the object of capturing the Trench System N. of QUARRY WOOD and establishing Posts in BONS and DUKE Trenches. The attack was carried out successfully by 4 Platoon Cyclists (Major HUMPHRY), supported by the Machine Guns of the 101st Machine Gun Battalion. "E" Battery of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. on the left of No. 1 Group conformed with this movement and obtaining good targets on the enemy retiring from the Front attacked by the Northern Group.

The Brigade Line was straightened. In the evening it ran from the Brigade Right Boundary to the E. of BENCH FARM, thence in a North-Westerly direction to the E. of VICTORIA COPES and on to a point on the SCARPE RIVER immediately S. of the Western edge of BIACHES.

The Fifty-first Division captured GREENLAND HILL during the day; but the British Front E. of the SCARPE was still 2,000 yards W. of the Line held by BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE. To secure the left flank 4 Platoons Cyclists and 20 Machine Guns were placed forward along the River Valley facing E. and Posts were established E. of PICADDILLY and DUKE Trenches, which formed the Northern half of the Brigade Front Line.

### **Tasks Carried Out Successfully.**

Great credit is due the Commanding Officers for the arrangements and plans of the Operations, and to the Machine Gun Batteries and Cyclists for carrying out the attack, without Artillery support and in broad daylight, over ground that was being Shelled by the enemy. Our Troops suffered very few casualties and captured about 20 prisoners.

### **Relief of Brutinel's Brigade by 11th Division Troops.**

The 11th Division (British) was transferred, on August 29th, from the 1 British Corps to the Canadian Corps and during the night August 29th/30th the 32nd Brigade (British) took over BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Front. The 101st Machine Gun Battalion remained in action under Orders of the Eleventh Division. On completion of Relief at 7:30 A.M. August 30th the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. moved to the CITADEL, ARRAS. The Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion and the Trench Mortar and the Armoured Car Detachments concentrated temporarily W. of ORANGE HILL and along the FEUCHY-FEUCHY CHAPEL Road. In the afternoon, they to proceeded to the CITADEL, ARRAS.



**New Task of Brutinel's Brigade.**

BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE, when relieved, remained with the Fourth Division (British) and was ordered to take over the Front of the 11th Brigade (British) and fill any Gaps between the Fourth and Eleventh Divisions. For this purpose the 39th Army Machine Gun Battalion had been placed, on August 29th, under the control of General BRUTINEL.

During the night 29th/30th August, 3 eight Gun Batteries of the 39th Machine Gun Battalion were in positions between BOIRY and the COJEUL RIVER. The following day 1 Machine Gun Company (16 Guns) of this Battalion supported by 1 Company of the 1st Kings Own Regiment (12th Brigade, British), which had been placed at the disposal of General BRUTINEL, was ordered to push forward and make good a Line about 2,000 yards E. and N.-E. of BOIRY. From this Line the Machine Guns were to cover by Fire the North-Eastern Flank of the 11th Brigade (British), and the Crossings of the COJEUL RIVER to its point of junction with the SENSEE RIVER at ETAING and the Crossing of the TRINQUIS RIVER S. and W. of SAILLY-en-OSTHEVENT. At the same time, the 11th Division, on the left, was requested to conform with this movement.

**New Line Occupied and Brigade Relieved.**

The Operation was successfully carried out during the afternoon and evening and touch was obtained with the 11th Brigade on the right and with the 32nd Brigade on the left. The XXII Corps took over the Front between the SCARPE and COJEUL Rivers on the night August 30th/31st. The 32nd Brigade (British) extended to the right and relieved BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE holding approximately the following Line :-

From a point in GALLEY WOOD, 500 yards E. from its Western edge, N. to a point on the BOIRY-SAILLY-en-OSTREVENT Road, 950 yards E. of KASHMIR WOOD, along the Northern edges of UGANDA and TRIG COPSE, to a point on the HAMBLAIN-les-BOIRY Road, 800 yards N.-E. of BENCH FARM.

The 39th Machine Gun Battalion remained in the Line and was transferred to the XXII Corps.

**Brutinel's Brigade Disbanded.**

General BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE, consisting chiefly of Machine Gun Units, was disbanded on the completion of this Relief, after it had accomplished all its Tasks by successfully cooperating with the Infantry in establishing a Jumping-off Line for the next Operation.



**THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE.**

**III  
CAMBRAI, PHASE II : AUGUST 31st to SEPTEMBER 4th, 1918.**

**Introductory.**

**Canadian Independent Force Reformed.**

The Canadian Corps Operation Order (X), which detailed the taking over by the XXII British Corps of that portion of the Canadian Corps Front N. of the COJEUL RIVER, also contained instructions for the reorganization of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE on completion of Relief. The 2 Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion were to be withdrawn to Corps Reserve and regrouped into the Canadian Independent Force under Brigadier-General BRUTINEL for the forthcoming Operation. The following day, August 31st, 1918, the 10th Royal Hussars, the Canadian Light Horse (less 1,1/2 Squadrons), 6 Heavy Armoured Cars of the 17th Tank Battalion, the 30th Battery of Canadian Field Artillery, 2 Sections Medium Trench Mortars, 1 Wireless Detachment, and 1 Supply Column were added to General BRUTINEL's Command.

(X) G.765 Dated August 30th, 1918.

**Assaulting Divisions.**

The active preparations of the Canadian Corps at this time led to the capture of the famous DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE on September 2nd, 1918. The initial attack was carried out by the First Canadian Division on the right, the Fourth Canadian Division in the centre, and the Fourth Division (British) on the left. The First Division (British) and the Canadian Independent Force were held in Corps Reserve to exploit success.

**General Plan of Attack.**

The general idea of the Operation was to break through the DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE on a narrow front astride the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road, and swing onwards rolling up the flanks to the N. and S. This having been accomplished, the advance was to be resumed at Zero plus 3 hours, the high ground overlooking the CANAL du NORD seized, and, if possible the CANAL was to be crossed and our Line established on the high ground on the E. Bank. This last Task was allotted to the First Division (British). The Canadian Independent Force was to pass the first Objective with the Infantry at Zero plus 3 hours and advance to the CANAL along the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road.



### **Organization of Canadian Independent Force.**

Subject to alterations which the Tactical Situation might demand during the Battle, the initial Operations of the Canadian Independent Force for the attack was as follows :-

Commander – Brigadier-General R. BRUTINEL, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C., Cdn. M.G. Corps.

Headquarters – Captain M.R. LEVEY, M.M., Brigade Major.

Lieut. P.M. HUMME, Reconnaissance Officer.

1 Platoon Canadian Corps Cyclists.

10 Motor Cyclists.

1 Continuous Wave Wireless Detachment.

Leading Group – O.C., Lieut.-Col. F.H.D.C. WHITMORE, C.M.G., D.S.O., 10th Royal Hussars.

10th Royal Hussars.

Canadian Light Horse. (less 1,1/2 Squadrons)

1 Section, 30th Battery C.F.A.

6 Heavy Armoured Cars, 17th Tank Battalion.

2 Light Armoured Cars, 2nd C.M.M.G.B.

10 Motor Cyclists (for inter-communications), C.M.M.G. Bdes.

2nd Group – O.C., Lieut.-Col. W.K. WALKER, D.S.O., M.C., 1st C.M.M.G.B.

1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

4 Light Armoured Cars.

Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion. (less 1 Platoon)

1 Section, 30th Battery, C.F.A.

2 Sections, Medium Trench Mortars.

20 Motor Cyclists.

3rd Group – O.C., Lieut.-Col. F.F.V. MEURLING, M.C., 2nd C.M.M.G.B.

2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.

1 Section, 30th Battery, C.F.A.

20 Motor Cyclists.

Supply Column – O.C., Major G. ARNOLD, C.M.M.G., M.T. Company.

1 Water Lorry.

1 Fuel and Oil Lorry.

1 Ammunition Lorry.

Train of 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G.Bs.

1 Supply Lorry.

5 Motor Cyclists for Inter-liaisons.



### **Plans of Engagement.**

#### **First Objective.**

The RED LINE, which was the First Objective, was to have been reached by the Infantry 3 hours after Zero. It was expected that by that time the enemy would be considerably shaken and his resistance beyond the Line would therefore be desultory and weak.

#### **Tasks Assigned to Groups.**

The Leading Group was then to cross the RED LINE, move as rapidly as possible down the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road towards MARQUION, seize the Bridge by a quick and bold action, and hold the Bridgehead until the arrival of the 2nd Group. Any resistance by weak Garrisons was to be overcome with Machine Gun Fire and if necessary the Section of Field Artillery was to be brought into action. If determined resistance was encountered strong reconnoitering Patrols were to be sent along the Line of the CANAL du NORD, S. of MARQUION, with a view of turning the latter, and seize in the meantime portions of the GREEN LINE on both sides of the CAMBRAI Road, as a "*Ligne de repli*".

The Second Group was to move in support of the Leading Group. If the Bridgehead was captured by the Leading Group, it would enlarge and consolidate the gains already made. If necessary, it would engage with all the means at its disposal, Garrisons or other unorganized defences, and endeavour to force the crossing of the bridge in conjunction with the 1st Group. But if owing to determined resistance, the leading Group were unable to reach the neighbourhood of the CANAL, the 2nd Group would occupy the GREEN LINE astride the Main Road, extend its gains N. and S. and relieve the Leading Group.

The 3rd Group was to be in reserve and would support or pass through the other 2 Groups in accordance with the requirements of the situation.

The Supply Column was to assemble on the night previous to the attack in the CITADEL, ARRAS. Its movements were to be regulated according to circumstance. The Commanding Officer was to be personally at the Headquarters of the Force.

#### **Precautions Against Possible Enemy Action.**

At all Stages of the Operation all groups were to exercise a great vigilance on their flanks pushing Patrols N. and S. and were to be prepared to come into immediate action on either side of the CAMBRAI Road.

A certain amount of unorganized resistance was expected to be encountered beyond the RED LINE chiefly from the Artillery and Machine Gun elements known to be echeloned in depth along the Main Road. These obstacles were to be dealt with by determined and bold action and the utmost vigor. The Motor Machine Gun Brigades were to be prepared to come into action mounted or dismounted and, if necessary, advance by bounds combining Fire and Movement.

#### **Other Arrangements.**

Arrangements were made with the Artillery for amending their Fire Barrage Schemes to conform to the proposed movements of the Independent Force and to place special Concentrations in BARALLE WOOD and Village, and also on MARQUION.

A Contact Plan for the 5th Squadron, Royal Air Force, was to report from time to time the position of the Head of the Column. To facilitate the work of the Pilot and his Observer, all the Mechanical Transport Vehicles of the Force were marked with a White Hand 18 inches wide across the Bonnets.

2 Light Box Cars and 2 Motor Cyclist Orderlies were placed at the disposal of the Medical Officers of the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G.B.s who were to establish at a convenient point a Medical Aid Post to clear all Casualties of the Force.



## **THE BATTLE.**

### **Concentration and Forward Move of C.I.F.**

At 5:00 A.M. (Zero Hour) September 2nd, 1918, the Canadian Independent Force Headquarters opened on the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road near ST. ROHART FACTORY, W. of VIS-en-ARTOIS. The assembly of the 3 Groups, on the WANCOURT-GUEMAPPE Road, was completed at the same time, with the Head of the Column resting just S. of the CAMBRAI Road.

The Contact Patrol Plane dropped 4 messages between 5:30 and 8:25 A.M. keeping General BRUTINEL informed as to the position of our own and the enemy's Barrage, and giving the most advanced places where our Infantry had been seen. Unfortunately after dropping its last message, the Aeroplane was brought down by a hostile Fighting Scout.

Early reports indicated that the attack was progressing according to time and the enemy was surrendering without much resistance. At 8:45 A.M., however, the attack appeared to have been held up astride the CAMBRAI Road, approximately at the RED LINE.

### **The Force Moves Forward.**

The Leading Group, which had been considerably delayed by congested traffic in VIS-en-ARTOIS, commenced to move forward from its Concentration Point at 8:00 o'clock, followed, a few minutes later by the 2nd Group. Lieut.-Col. MEURLING's Group was ordered to remain on the WANCOURT-GUEMAPPE Road until the situation cleared. The 3 Sections of Artillery joined the Groups to which they were attached at about the same time, after they had completed the Task allotted to them in the Initial Artillery Barrage. Canadian Independent Force Headquarters moved forward with the first 2 Groups and opened on the CAMBRAI Road, 700 yards S.-E. of ST. SERVINS FARM.

### **Action of Leading Group.**

Lieut.-Col. WHITMORE's Group got in touch with the enemy at about 9:00 A.M. The leading Squadron of the 10th Royal Hussars supported by the Heavy Armoured Cars had reached the high ground E. of the DURY-HENDECOURT Road, but were held up there by heavy Artillery and Machine Gun fire coming from the direction of SAUDEMONT and VILLERS-lez-CAGNICOURT. Patrols were then sent N. toward DURY, which was still held by the enemy, and S.-W. towards VILLERS. No progress was made. The Leading Group reported at 9:30 that the Cavalry and Armoured Cars had returned after making unsuccessful attempts to reach the VILLERS-SAUDEMONT Road. The 10th Royal Hussars had suffered no casualties; the Heavy Armoured Car Detachment had 1 man wounded.

### **30th Battery Canadian Field Artillery.**

The artillery Sections were withdrawn from the Groups and came into action about 800 yards S. of the Force Headquarters. Throughout the day and night the 30th Battery fired effectively on enemy Artillery Batteries and small German Infantry Concentrations. It also answered numerous calls from No. 2 Group and from our Infantry to fire on enemy Machine Gun Nests and Trench Mortars which were greatly annoying our Troops.

### **Advance Held Up.**

The Situation at the Corps front was not very clear for a few hours after our Troops were due to advance from the RED LINE. The enemy was offering very strong resistance to the Fourth Canadian Division in the neighbourhood of DURY. The First Canadian Division was making very slow progress, particularly on its left flank. The repeated attempts of the Canadian Independent Force to push forward were being frustrated by flanking Artillery and Machine Gun Fire from both sides of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road. Almost all the Tanks which had gone forward had been put out of action.



### **Enemy Resistance.**

The enemy had a great number of Machine Guns advantageously placed. With these, he brought Direct Fire to bear on our advancing Troops. This made a Frontal Attack very difficult. Several Batteries of German Field Artillery and Trench Mortars were firing over open Sights from the high ground between SAUDEMONT and BUISSY. The Village of VILLERS-lez-CAGNICOURT had been fortified by the enemy by placing Machine Guns and "*Minewerfers*" in the houses. The Factory on the CAMBRAI Road, N. of the Village, and the Sunken VILLERS-SAUDEMONT Road were strongly held by the enemy and proved formidable obstacles. Even after their capture later in the day, the enemy Gunners still commanded all the approaches from the W. to all these positions.

### **2nd Group Takes the Lead.**

It was of the utmost importance to the Canadian Independent Force that the Cross-roads N. of VILLERS should be captured. To carry out their mission the Mobile Forces depended to a very large extent in the use of Roads. The Cavalry could not get into action until the determined enemy resistance in front of the RED LINE had been overcome. The O.C., 2nd Group was, therefore ordered to take the lead. The Heavy Armoured Cars were placed under his command. Officers Patrols were immediately sent out and these reported that the Infantry had been held up about 800 yards E. of l'ESPERANCE FARM by Machine Gun Fire coming from the direction of the buildings at the Cross-roads N. of VILLERS-lez-CAGNICOURT.

### **"E" and "D" Batteries, 1st C.M.M.G.B. in Action.**

Lieut.-Col. WALKER sent forward "E" Battery (Capt. WORTHINGTON, M.M.), 1st C.M.M.G.B., to take up positions in front of the Infantry. The Battery supported by 2 Platoons Cyclists passed through the 32nd C.I.Bn. and set up their Guns on both sides of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road, about 1,300 yards E. of the DURY-HENDECOURT Road. Here they met with considerable Artillery and Machine Gun Fire. The Gunners of this Battery and the Cyclists operating with them remained here throughout the day and engaged many good targets, with their Machine Guns and Rifles. By crawling and dragging their Guns with them, 2 Gun Crews managed to move further forward to a position from which they opened Fire on an enemy Field Battery in action S.-W. of SAUDEMONT. They also Fired very effectively on a number of German Gun-Limbers concealed behind trees S.-W. of SAUDEMONT causing casualties amongst the Drivers and stampeding the horses.

"D" Battery (Capt. BERRSFORD) with 2 Platoons Cyclists then went ahead and leapfrogged "E" Battery, aiming at the concentration of buildings on the CAMBRAI Road, N. of VILLERS. Machine Gun and Artillery Fire from the left flank held up the Gunners and Cyclists about 500 yards short of their Objectives. The Guns were set up on both sides of the Road while waiting for the situation to clear a little.

### **Trench Mortars in Action.**

A Section of Trench Mortars, in the charge of Lieut. P.B. STAIRS, was very skillfully maneuvered forward and brought into action within 3 or 400 yards of the enemy. By their accurate Fire, the Mortars dispersed small enemy concentrations killing and wounding many Germans. Targets engaged also included enemy Machine Gun Nests and Snipers, and the buildings at the Cross-roads, which were several times hit. The Guns of Lieut. STAIRS, being mounted, each on a Motor Lorry, were exposed clearly to enemy observation and formed an excellent target for German Field Guns, which engaged the Lorries at close range over open Sights. When the entire Crew of one of the Trench Mortars became casualties, Lieut. STAIRS kept their Gun firing until it was put out of action by an enemy Shell, which also wounded Lieut. STAIRS and set fire to the Lorry. A considerable amount of Trench Mortar Ammunition, on the Lorry itself and in the vicinity endangered the lives of the wounded members of the Gun Crew, and Lieut. STAIRS despite his own wounds, and at the imminent risk of his life, helped his Men to a place of safety, and endeavoured to extinguish the fire. During this time, he was again wounded but carried on until the Ammunition exploded, destroying the Lorry. Unfortunately this gallant Officer died from the effects of the wounds sustained during this action.



### Action of Armoured Cars.

When No. 2 Group took the lead in the morning Lieut.-Col. WALKER sent 2 Light Armoured Cars down the CAMBRAI Road with Orders to reach, if possible the Intersection of VILLERS-lez-CAGNICOURT – SAUDEMONT Road with the CAMBRAI Road. Fallen trees, however, blocked the Road. As soon as the Cars returned a Platoon of Cyclists went ahead and cleared the way. 2 Heavy Armoured Cars were then sent forward to get in touch with the enemy and bring back information as to his Strength and Disposition. “Direct Hits” destroyed both Cars while carrying out their Task.

### 2 Light Cars Sent Forward.

Early in the afternoon, “A” Battery (Capt. INCH) with 2 Platoons Cyclists reinforced “D” and “E” Batteries. At the same time 2 more Light Armoured Cars were sent down the CAMBRAI Road to try and push through to the SAUDEMONT-VILLERS Road. One of these Cars, under Corporal E.E. Mc GILL, engaged a Group of the enemy at close range with good effect. On its return journey this Car was hit by an enemy Shell and destroyed. All but 1 of its Crew were killed. At the same time, 2 Tanks moving N. of VILLERS were put out of action by enemy Shells.

### Situation, Afternoon, September 2nd.

The 2nd Group had now 3 Machine Gun Batteries and 6 Platoons Cyclists in positions on both sides of the Main Road, between DURY and VILLERS. Their repeated attempts to reach and go beyond the SAUDEMONT-VILLERS Road met with success. Their left flank was exposed and the ground over which they had to advance was under the direct observation of German Artillery and Machine Gun Batteries in SAUDEMONT and in commanding positions S. of the Village. As the afternoon wore away it became quite evident that an organized Infantry attack on both sides of the Area occupied by the Canadian Independent Force would be necessary to overcome the enemy resistance.

### Independent Force Withdrawn.

The Cavalry was withdrawn in the evening to Watering Points. No. 2 Group in co-operation with the 11th and 12th C.I.B.s took up defensive positions for the night. A message from Canadian Corps received at a later hour, ordered the withdrawal of the Canadian Independent Force from the Line. At midnight September 2nd/3rd, the disposition of Units was as follows :-

Headquarters Cdn. Ind. Force.	CITADEL, ARRAS.
10th Royal Hussars	WAILLY.
Canadian Light Horse	WANCOURT-GUEMAPPE Valley.
Heavy Armoured Cars	ST. SERVINS FARM.
1st C.M.M.G.B. )	
Trench Mortar Section )	WANCOURT-GUEMAPPE Road.
Cdn. Corps Cyclist Bn. )	
2nd C.M.M.G.B.	FEUCHY – FEUCHY-CHAPEL Road.
30th Battery, C.F.A.	In positions about 1,600 yards S. of ST. SERVINS FARM.
Supply Column	CITADEL, ARRAS.

### 2 Motor Brigades Held In Reserve.

The 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades had Orders that in case of enemy counter-attacks during the night they were to support the First Canadian Division and the Fourth Division (British), respectively.



**Casualties.**

On September 2nd, enemy Aircraft had been audacious. They repeatedly came over in large numbers dropping “EGG” Bombs and firing their Machine Guns into the positions occupied by the Motor Machine Gun Batteries and Cyclists. This and the intense German Artillery Shelling in the afternoon caused considerable casualties. The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade during the day had 5 Other Ranks killed, and 4 Officers and 30 Other Ranks wounded. It also had 20 of its Motor Vehicles either permanently or temporarily put out of action.

**September 3rd, 1918.**

During the night September 2nd/3rd, the enemy withdrew to the E. Bank of the CANAL du NORD, and destroyed all the Bridges. On the 3rd, Headquarters Cdn. Ind. Force, the 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigade and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion moved to points astride the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road, about 2,000 yards E. of VILLERS-lez-CAGNICOURT. The Heavy Armoured Cars patrolled the CANAL LINE.

**Enemy Holds East Bank Of Canal.**

An early morning reconnaissance on September 4th by General BRUTINEL and 2 Officers of his Staff found the enemy clear of the W. Bank of the CANAL and holding the E. side with strong Posts. The Germans were taking advantage of this water barrier to reorganize their Forces and Defences. No further attempts to advance could now be made without securing Crossings over the CANAL. Complete plans for a well-organized attack that would take our Troops over the marshy land and the high ground E. of the CANAL would have to be prepared.

**Canadian Independent Force Withdrawn and Disbanded.**

The Canadian Independent Force was withdrawn from the Line on the evening of September 4th and the Units were disposed of as follows :-

The 10th Royal Hussars rejoined the 6th Cavalry Brigade.  
 The Heavy Armoured Car Detachment returned to the 17th Tank Battalion.  
 The 2nd C.M.M.G.B. was withdrawn to the CITADEL, ARRAS.  
 The Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion went to Billets at WAGNONLIEU.  
 On September 6th the Canadian Light Horse moved to HABARCQ.  
 The 30th Battery, Cdn. Field Artillery returned to its Wagon Lines to await Orders from the G.O.C., R.A.  
 The 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades proceeded to their old Billets in TILLOY-lez-HERMAVILLE, and HERMAVILLE respectively. The 1st Motor Brigade moved to MAZIERES on September 8th but it returned to TILLOY on the 20th.

The Canadian Independent Force was disbanded : but the 2 Motor Brigades and Cyclist Battalion remained in Corps Reserve under the G.O.C., Cdn. M.G.C.



### **Observations.**

The following quotations and remarks are drawn from “*Notes on Recent Fighting*” written by General BRUTINEL, at the conclusion of the above Operation :-

### **Task and Battle Action.**

The Task given to the Canadian Independent Force on September 2nd, 1918 was consistent with the Strength and Composition of the Independent Force, and within its scope.

*“It consisted in the main, to advance, arrow-like to a depth of 6,000 to 7,000 yards in front of the Infantry Line, and at 8:00 A.M., in an endeavour to seize the Bridgeheads of MARQUION, or failing this, to capture and hold the GREEN LINE and harass the retreating enemy until the arrival of our Infantry following closely, in accordance with the Program of Attack.*

*“This Task was, broadly speaking, similar to the performance accomplished on August 8th, 1918, by the Canadian Independent Force, and the measure of success attained there justified the belief of the Operation contemplated.*

*“The Canadian Independent Force, however, failed to accomplish its mission.*

*“It advanced astride the CAMBRAI Road, fighting foot by foot, to a depth of about 1,800 yards in front of the Infantry as at 10:00 A.M., but this participation in the fight could not create the opportunity required to put the Force through.”*

The opportunity to debouch could perhaps have been forced between 8:00 A.M. and 9:30 A.M. when, although the advance of our Infantry had been checked, the enemy was seriously shaken and the situation was obscure to him. A few of his Field Batteries and a number of Machine Guns were in action, but most of the German Artillery was trying to withdraw towards RE COURT and EC COURT.

From the detail given above of the part played by the Leading Group during the battle, it can be deduced that the enemy resistance was not at that time properly tested. By 10:00 A.M. the opportunity had passed. German Infantry, Machine Gunners, and Artillery were dribbling forward. The rest of the morning and throughout the afternoon the enemy was most active with Machine Gun and Artillery in positions S. and S.-W. of SAUDEMONT, causing considerable casualties to No. 2 Group.

There was no occasion in the following 2 days to engage the Independent Force, which was withdrawn from the Line on the night September 4th/5th.



**Organization.**

*"The Independent Force was fairly well balanced, and except for its weakness in Infantry elements (too few Cyclists), was strong enough to overcome patchy resistance. Its Firepower was sufficient to enable it to hold captured ground until the arrival of the Infantry.*

*"It was not however properly welded, and its various elements were not endowed to an equal extent with the boldness and resolution which should characterize such a Force.*

*"This is not surprising in view of the fact that it was put hastily together 24 hours before zero day.*

*"These imperfections will always be present in Forces put together at the last minute, and the question arises as to whether Mobile Independent Forces should be spasmodic extemporizations, or should be given a degree of permanency.*

*"In view of the depth and elasticity of the German Defences, it is believed that the employment of Mobile Forces, approximating the composition of the Canadian Independent Force, will in the battles of the future bear better results than the early employment of large bodies of Cavalry, because more than the latter they can prolong and help forward action of the Infantry.*

*"The Composition of such Mobile Independent Force should be approximately as follows :-*

- 4 Squadrons of Cavalry.*
- 1200 Cyclists.*
- 2 Batteries Field Artillery.*
- 2 Sections Trench Mortars in Lorries.*
- 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades.*
- 8 Armoured Cars (belonging to the Brigades).*
- 1 Signal Section.*

*"The Squadrons of Cavalry and the Batteries of Field Artillery give to the Force the ability to manoeuvre, and would correct the road limits of the M.M.G. Brigades.*

*"The Cyclists dismounted would give the power to overcome by manoeuvre and assault, in conjunction with the Fire Power of the M.M.G. Brigades and Trench Mortars, serious local resistance.*

*"Such a Force, owing to its great Mobility and Fire Power, would be able to take advantage of opportunities to increase the depth of our penetration in the course of our attacks."*

**Time and Method of Engagement.**

*"Such an Independent Force should not be engaged too early and in any event not before the coordinated M.G. Defences of the enemy have been overrun; this implies a penetration of about 80,000 yards.*

*"In that respect the engagement of the Canadian Independent Force on the 8th of August was well timed. It was a little premature the 2nd of September on account of the check suffered by our Infantry astride the CAMBRAI Road.*

*"The engagement by scheduled time should not be attempted. It has the effect of paralyzing the initiative of the Leader, and to a large extent of making the engagement of the Force dependent on the success of operations in an area localized beforehand.*

*"The Mobile Force should be thrown in at the point where the penetration is the deepest, with due regard to road limitations of some of the elements. In a 'break-through' it should proceed and support the engagement of large bodies of Cavalry,*

*"The Point of concentration of a Mobile Force should be equidistant (in time) from all points of the Corps Front, and complete arrangements should be made to keep in constant touch with the situation.*



*“Standing Patrols of Cavalry and Motor Cyclists with each Infantry Brigade, specially detailed Contact Plans, etc., would probably answer the purpose.*

*“Special arrangements would also have to be made regarding the action of the Heavy Artillery.*

*“To illustrate what is meant, the following example is given :-*

*“AT 6:00 A.M., the 2nd September, the 1st Canadian Division was definitely in possession of the BUISSY SWITCH. It would have been possible at that time, and probably earlier, to throw, say 2 Squadrons of Cavalry to operate in the Northerly direction towards SAUDEMONT and 2 Squadrons to operate towards MARQUION. The engagements of the first 2 Squadrons would have enabled the Motor Machine Gun Brigade headed by Armoured Cars to debouch from the Cross-roads North of VILLERS, and probably reach MARQUION, or at worst the GREEN LINE, concurrently with the 2 Squadrons moving in that direction.*

*“In the present conditions it would have been impossible, to carry out such Action, because the elements of the Independent Force were foreign to one another.”*

### **Training and Morale.**

*“Combined Training, in which Units learn their possibilities and limitations, acquire mutual confidence and unity of purpose, is indispensable to a Force of opportunity.*

*“The chief elements which are essential to the morale of such a Force are confidence in the support that they will receive promptly, unselfishness and devotion to duty, based on a broad and comprehensive Esprit de Corps. This can only be obtained if the Troops of the Independent Force belong to the Corps under which they fight.”*



### **Organization of Brutinel's Brigade on a Semi-permanent Basis.**

#### **Organization.**

A Canadian Corps Letter issued on September 19th, 1918, with reference to the future "Employment of Corps Mobile Troops" contained the following :- (X)

*"The Canadian Light Horse, less 1,1/2 Squadrons, the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion, and the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades will be grouped into a Mobile Brigade under the G.O.C., C.M.G.C., and will be known as BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE.*

*"Whenever the situation permits, the G.O.C., R.A. will arrange for 1 Battery Cdn. Field Artillery and 1 or more Sections 6 inch Newton Mortars to be attached to the Brigade.*

*"The A.D. Signals will arrange to provide a Wireless Set for the purpose of communication between the Brigade and Corps Headquarters. " (X) Cdn. Corps G. 528/3-53 Dated August 19th, 1918.*

#### **General Tasks of Brigade.**

*"The Brigade will operate directly under the Order of Corps Headquarters who will allot tasks as required by the situation. "The following are some of the tasks which may be allotted :-*

*"At the commencement of offensive operations, the Brigade may be employed to thicken up the initial Machine Gun Barrage.*

*"When the fight commences to become fluid, the Brigade will be ordered to push through with a view to seize tactical features in advance of our Line and holding them until the arrival of the Infantry.*

*"When absolutely open warfare conditions are reached, the Brigade will be employed normally as Protective Mounted Troops, and may be required to act as a General Advanced Guard for the Corps.*

*"In defensive Operations necessitating a withdrawal over some distance the Brigade will be employed as part of the Rear Guard.*

*The Brigade was to be organized at once and Tactical Schemes carried out 'based on the different tasks which it may be called upon to undertake."*

The above Organization did not include all the Troops suggested by General BRUTINEL, but it gave the Brigade, what it so far lacked, a semi-permanent form. Instead of grouping and disbanding Units at the beginning and end of every Operation, they were, in the future, to be controlled by the same Commander when out of the Line as well as when in Action.



**THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE.**

**IV  
CAMBRAI, PHASE III : SEPTEMBER 5th to OCTOBER 1st, 1918.**

**Introductory.**

**Situation on September 5th, 1918.**

The progress of the Canadian Corps as indicated above, was temporarily arrested in front of the CANAL du NORD. The Germans had not only destroyed all the Bridges but they had also followed the marshes of the SENSEE RIVER and shore along the CANAL. Owing to the topographical features, the ground for a considerable distance W. of our Front was under the direct observation of the enemy Gunners. Our Field Artillery found it extremely hard to get suitable locations for their Guns, before an attack on our Front could be undertaken, it was thought advisable that the Corps should mark time in its present position while Operations are developed further South with a view to manoeuvring the enemy out of his positions behind the CANAL. (X) The German Line was a natural Defensive Position, strengthened by a good System of Defences, built by an enemy fighting desperately to stop our onslaught. To assault such a Line, it would be necessary to prepare a scheme on a large scale, which involve Troops other than the Canadian Corps. Further, the same obstacles that stopped our advance would be in the way of the Germans, were they to attempt an Offensive against us. Advantage was therefore taken of these facts to rest and refit all the Units.

(X) Cdn. Corps G. 79/2526-4, dated Sept. 5th, 1918.  
(XI)

**Training.**

**Overhauling of Equipment.**

The 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion spent the first 2 or 3 days after September 4th in resting the Men and overhauling their Equipment. The large number of vehicles damaged in the previous Action taxed the full energy of the Canadian Motor Machine Gun Mechanical Transport Company, and the 2 Brigade Trains to complete the necessary repairs before the next Operation.

**Tactical Exercises.**

The Motor Machine Gunners and the Cyclists trained every day for about 2 weeks in accordance with a Program of Training suggested by General BRUTINEL. All the N.C.O.s and Gunners went through a short course on the Vickers Gun, and were lectured by their Officers on the Duties of all Members of a Gun Crew, on Indirect Fire, Barrage Fire, the value of Cover, the necessity of close cooperation with the other Batteries and all Arms of the Service, and on other Allied Subjects. Batteries did individual Tactical Exercises as a preliminary to Exercises in cooperation with other Batteries. Exercises were carried out in which a number of Dismounted Batteries assisted with Direct and Indirect Fire a Mounted Battery whose advance had been held up : Batteries received Training in advancing in pairs and in mutual assistance against Defended Localities and Strong Points. Many Tactical Schemes were executed in which a group of Motor Batteries, a few Platoons of Cyclists, a Detachment of Armoured Cars, and a number of Motor Cyclists took part. All the Schemes and Exercises were followed by discussions and criticisms with a view to emphasizing special points and drawing lessons for the future. The G.O.C., Cdn. M.G. Corps, and the Officers of his Staff were occasionally present at the Field Exercises and at the discussions on the manner in which the Schemes had been carried out.



### **Sports.**

During this period of Training, Sports of all kinds were greatly encouraged. Indoor Baseball and Football were two favorite games. Inter-Battery Machine Gun Drill, Guard Mounting, Revolver Shooting, getting into Action wearing a Small Box Respirator, and other competitions were organized and keenly contested. All Ranks were in high spirits and quite ready to join in the next hunt of the Canadian Corps.

### **Preparations for the Attack.**

Active preparations for the Attack on the CANAL du NORD began to occupy the full time and thought of the Units about September 24th, 1918. The Canadian Corps had been ordered to take part in the general Advance so as to protect the left flank of the Third Army.

### **Bourlon Wood Operation.**

The Operation of the Corps was to be carried out in 2 Phases comprising (I) the capture of BOURLON WOOD and the high ground N. of it, and (II) the seizing of the Bridge over the CANAL de l' ESCAUT, N.-E. of CAMBRAI, establishing necessary Bridgeheads, and at the same time capturing the high ground overlooking the SENSEE VALLEY, between the CANAL de l' ESCAUT and the CANAL du NORD.

### **Assaulting Divisions.**

The First and Fourth Canadian Divisions were to carry out the attack of the 1st Phase, under cover of an Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage. The Third Canadian Division and the Eleventh Division (British) were to come into Line at the beginning of the 2nd Phase.

### **Brutinel's Brigade Task.**

The Task of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE was to cross the CANAL de l' ESCAUT in the vicinity of CAMBRAI and to exploit success along the CAMBRAI-IWUY- VALENCIENNES Road, special attention being paid to securing the Crossings over the CANAL de l' ESCAUT between CAMBRAI and the SENSEE.

The probabilities were that 2 opportunities for a "*break-through*" might occur :-

- (a) On Zero Day, if the Fourth Canadian Division were successful in gaining RAILLENCOURT and SAILLY thus breaking the MARCOING Trench System running between the 2 Villages, or
- (b) On the Second Day, if the Assault of the Third Canadian Division on the MARCOING LINE were successful.

### **Plan of Engagement of Brigade.**

The actual place and method of engagement and the composition of the Groups of the Brigade were not definitely laid down. Its Operation would depend largely on the initial success of our Infantry and on the nature of the Roads and the resistance encountered.

The 3 most favourable points, which were fully discussed by the G.O.C., Brigade and all the Unit Commanders to be (1) the Bridge of FAUBOURG de SELLES, (2) the PONT d' AIRE, and (3) the Bridge of ESWARS.

Liaison Patrols, each consisting of 1 N.C.O., 6 Mounted Men, and 2 Motor Cyclists were to be employed to establish communication between the Canadian Infantry in the Line and BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Headquarters.



### **Machine Gun Barrage.**

4 Batteries from each of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades took part in the initial Machine Gun Barrage, these Batteries, which had been placed under Orders of the 1st Canadian Division for the purposes of the Barrage, were organized into a Group Commanded by Major W.T. TRENCH, M.C., 2nd C.M.M.G.B. (X) This Group, known as the Right Sub-Groups of the First Battalion, C.M.G.C., Barrage Guns, was subdivided as follows :-

“B” Sub-Group “A”, “B”, “C”, and “E” Batteries, 1st C.M.M.G.B.

“C” Sub-Group “A”, “B”, “C”, and “D” Batteries, 2nd C.M.M.G.B.

### **Preparations of Barrage.**

Owing to the practical impossibility of making a daylight reconnaissance, due to exposure of the area a night reconnaissance was made by Major TRENCH and 1 Officer from each of the Motor Brigades. The Barrage positions selected were just W. of and between INCHY-en-ARTOIS and PAVILAND WOOD. To facilitate communication, the Batteries were located in pairs. Each pair was connected by telephone and buzzer to the Group Headquarters, which was established at the 1st C.I.B. Headquarters, 600 yards W. of INCHY. By arrangement with the 1st C.I.B., the group Commander was in communication with the First Canadian Division and the First Battalion, C.M.G.C. As a precaution, 2 Motor Cycle Dispatch Riders were held at Group Headquarters.

### **Barrage Batteries in Position.**

To reduce the congestion of traffic in the forward area, the Batteries limited their Transport to 3 Fighting Lorries, which were driven only as far as the Cross-roads between QUEANT and BUISSY. From this point only 1 Lorry per Battery, loaded with Belted S.A.A., was allowed to proceed to within 300 yards of the Battery positions. The Guns and Equipment were carried by the Gun Crews. With the exception of 6 casualties suffered by “B” Sub-Group, this move was carried out on the eve of the attack without incident. At 3:15 A.M. September 27th, the 8 Batteries were dug in the Barrage Positions, with the Guns laid and all the Ammunition unloaded from the Lorries and carried to the Guns.



## **THE BATTLE.**

### **Barrage Fired.**

At 5:29 A.M., Zero Hour, September 27th, 1918, all the Guns opened Fire and followed out the Firing Program as laid down in the Machine Gun Barrage Map prepared by the G.O.C., Cdn. M.G. Corps. Over 320,000 Rounds were fired by the 64 Guns of the Motor Brigades. As a result of hostile Artillery and Machine Gun Fire which became very noticeable an hour after Zero, the Right Sub-Groups had 6 Officers and 38 Other Ranks killed or wounded, 2 Guns completely destroyed and 5 other Guns put out of action.

At Zero plus 7 hours, all the Batteries rejoined their Units; all Guns were cleaned and Ammunition Belts refilled.

### **Concentration of Brutinel's Brigade.**

While the above Batteries were taking up their Barrage Positions, on the night September 26th/27th, 1918, the Units of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE concentrated as follows :-

Canadian Light Horse      CHERISY  
Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion   GUEMAPPE  
1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades   WANCOURT – GUEMAPPE

A few hours after our Infantry went "*over*" on the 27th, a reconnaissance of the Bridges over the CANAL du NORD was made. The whole of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE then moved to the area E. of SAINS-lez-MARQUION, "B" Battery, 251st Brigade, Royal Field Artillery, was placed under the Orders of General BRUTINEL, in the afternoon.

### **Situation Evening September 27th.**

Scouts which had been sent forward to get in touch with the situation on the whole Corps Front reported in the evening that our Line on the right flank was not very definite. RAILLENCOURT was still in enemy hands. On the left flank we had Posts in HAYNECOURT.

No surprise can be felt at the lack of an opportunity for a break-through on this day, if the magnitude of the Task allotted to the Infantry is properly appreciated. The CANAL du NORD presented a very strong and difficult obstacle, partially filled with water, which necessitated the launching of the attack on a Frontage of 2,600 yards. This Frontage increased as the attack developed to 10,000 yards. Besides crossing the CANAL, 3 definite Trench Systems had to be assaulted, the CANAL du NORD Line, the MARQUION Line, and the MARCOING Line.

### **September 28th.**

The following morning, the Third, Fourth and First Canadian Divisions resumed the attack. Liaison Patrols were sent to Headquarters 7th, 9th and 10th C.I.B.s with instructions to keep the G.O.C., BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE informed of any alterations in the situation that might be favourable to the employment of the Brigade.

At 9:00 A.M. all the Units moved to the vicinity of BOURLON Village and Brigade Headquarters opened near the Windmill on the SAINS-lez-MARQUION – BOURLON Road. From here, the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigades, the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion and the Field Artillery Battery were moved to Tactical Locations in the neighbourhood of la MAISON NEUVE, where they held themselves in readiness to go into immediate action with the Bridges at ESWARS, RAMILLIES and PONT d'AIRE as Objectives. Brigade Headquarters moved to a point about 250 yards S. of the FERME des LILAS.

No action developed. The Third Canadian Division was held up in a Line about 2,000 yards N. of FONTAINE-notre-DAME, and the Fourth Canadian Division behind SANCOURT in front of SAILLY. The First Canadian Division, on the left of the Fourth Division, held the Line along the DOUAI-CAMBRAI Road.



Throughout the afternoon and night the Brigade kept in touch with the situation on the whole Corps Front by means of Patrols. The 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade had its Patrols working on the Third Canadian Division Front, the Canadian Light Horse on the Fourth Division Front and the 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade on the First Division front. They sent reports quite frequently and, when necessary, some of them were repeated by wireless to Corps Headquarters.

### **September 29th.**

Early reports, on the morning of September 29th, indicated that on the left our Troops were advancing N. of SANCOURT and making for the Railway Line. In the centre the Railway had been reached, and on the right our forward move was continuing.

Steps were immediately taken by the G.O.C., BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE to have all his Units ready for action in the event of a "break-through" by the Infantry. The Canadian Light Horse moved to the area W. of SANCOURT and their Patrols kept in touch with the First and Fourth Canadian Divisional Fronts. The O.C., C.L.H. was instructed to take advantage of any opportunity of exploiting success to seize the Bridgehead at ESWARS.

Lieut. L.N. BLACK, M.C., 2nd C.M.M.G.B. in charge of 2 Armoured Cars, was sent along the Road through SAILLY and NEUVILLE ST. REMY with Orders to send out Motor Cyclist Patrols to keep in touch with the Infantry and, if conditions allowed, to push the Cars through and seize the SELLES and PONT ROUGE Bridgeheads.

Lieut. T.A. SMITH, 1st C.M.M.G.B. in charge of 2 Armoured Cars, was dispatched down the main CAMBRAI Road with Orders to follow the Infantry and if possible to take the Bridgehead W. of the Town.

"B" Battery, 251st Royal Field Artillery moved into positions E. of the RAILLENCOURT - FONTAINE-notre-DAME Road.

The Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion took up positions N. of SAILLY, ready to support the Cavalry in any action that might develop.

From the reports received from the Armoured Cars and the Patrols of the 2 Motor Brigades and the C.L.H. the situation in the afternoon appeared to be quite obscure. Our Infantry were held up for a while in ST. OLLE by Machine Gun Fire. The 2 Armoured Car Detachments cooperated with the 1st Canadian Mounted Rifles in dealing with the enemy in this neighbourhood. In the centre our Line ran a short distance W. of the Railway Line. SANCOURT was in our hands and from the Eastern outskirts of this Village the Line was taken up by the First Division and ran about 300 yards N. along the CAMBRAI-DOUAI Road.

In the evening, the Canadian Light Horse was withdrawn to the SAINS-lez-MARQUION Area. Brigade Headquarters, the Armoured Cars, the Cyclist Battalion and the Field Battery went into Bivouacs for the night near the 2 Motor Brigades between BOURLON Village and the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road.

### **September 30th.**

The attack was resumed by the Infantry on the morning of September 30th. BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Units once more moved forward to tactical positions behind the assaulting Divisions, ready to push forward at a moment's notice. Their Patrols did splendid work all day keeping in close touch with the situation on the whole Front. The progress of our Infantry was very slow. The enemy, who had thrown into the battle opposite the Canadian Corps 3 or 4 fresh Divisions, offered a very determined resistance. The fighting became "sticky". No favourable opportunity for employment of Mobile Forces occurred. The Cavalry, Motor Brigades and Cyclists were therefore ordered back to the same positions they had occupied on the previous night.



**October 1st.**

On October 1st, another effort was made by the Third Canadian Division on the right to advance our Line. The attempt proved quite successful at first, but strong enemy counter-attacks forced our Troops back. The enemy fought desperately and appeared to be preparing for further counter-attacks. BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE which had been in readiness during the morning to follow up the Infantry with the object of seizing the Crossings over the CANAL le l' ESCAUT, prepared defensive plans to support the Divisions in the Line in case of enemy action against them in the afternoon or during the night. 4 Batteries of the 2nd C.M.M.G. Brigade took up defensive positions N.-E., E. and S.-E. of HAYNECOURT. The 1st C.M.M.G. Brigade reconnoitred their positions and were ready to go to the assistance of any part of the Canadian Front that might be threatened.



**THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE.**

**V**

**CAMBRAI, PHASE IV : OCTOBER 2nd to 12th, 1918.**

**October 2nd.**

No new development took place during the night October 1st/2nd. Early in the afternoon of October 2nd, all Guns of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. were placed under Orders of the Second Canadian Division which had relieved the Fourth Canadian Division and portions of the First and Third Canadian Divisions. The Guns of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. were placed under Orders of the Eleventh Division (British), which relieved the First Canadian Division. (X)

At the same time BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Headquarters moved to Advanced Corps Headquarters, N. of BOIS du CAROSSE on the QUEANT-BUISSY Road.

The Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion moved to Billets in SUN QUARRY, about 1,000 yards S.-E. of CHERISY.

The period between October 3rd and October 8th passed without any material changes on the Corps Front.

**1st Motor Brigade in Defensive Positions.**

On October 2nd, "A", "B" and "C" Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B., under the Second Canadian Division, took up positions immediately S. of SAN COURT and between the CAMBRAI-DOUAI Road and the Railway. The Gun Positions were dug in well and carefully camouflaged. All the Guns were laid on an S.O.S. Line along the North-Eastern outskirts of BLE COURT. The Batteries were in communication with the 6th C.I.B. Headquarters by telephone to an advanced Report Centre near the Crossroads S. of SAN COURT and from there by Dispatch Riders. "E" Battery occupied defensive positions behind the main DOUAI Road and N. of the above mentioned Cross-roads. "D" Battery remained in Mobile Reserve with the Unit Headquarters near la MAISON NEUVE. On October 4th, the first 3 Batteries moved to the Sunken Road which runs in a North-Westerly direction out of SAN COURT and laid their Guns on the same S.O.S. Line. While in these positions they were considerably Shelled with High Explosives and Gas Shells. "D" Battery relieved "A" Battery on the night of October 5th/6th and 2 nights later "B" Battery, having been relieved by "A" Battery, went into Mobile Reserve. The 1st C.M.M.G.B. Headquarters moved to SAILLY on October 7th.

**2nd Motor Brigade in Defensive Positions.**

The 4 Batteries of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. remained in their defensive positions under the Eleventh Division (British), in front of HAYNE COURT until the morning of October 9th, when the whole Unit moved to the area just E. of TILLOY. Here they remained in Reserve till the following morning.

**Cambrai Operation.**

On October 7th, preparations were in full swing for an Operation aiming at the capture of Bridgeheads over the CANAL de l' ESCAUT, and subsequently the capture of the Town of CAMBRAI by an enveloping movement.

This Operation was to be carried out in 2 Phases by the Third Canadian Division on the right and the Second Canadian Division on the left.

BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE was allotted the Task of taking advantage of any opening during the 2nd Phase to exploit success.



**Dispositions of Brutinel's Brigade.**

The Dispositions of the Brigade on October 8th were as follows :-

Headquarters.	With Advanced Corps H.Q., near BOIS du CAROSSE.
Canadian Light Horse.	N. of SAINS-lez-MARQUION.
1st C.M.M.G.B.	Under Second Cdn. Division, 4 Batteries in the Line and 1 in Reserve at SAILLY.
2nd C.M.M.G.B.	Under Eleventh Division (British), 4 Batteries in the Line and 1 in Reserve near la MAISON NEUVE.
Cdn. Corps Cyclist Battalion.	S.-E. of CHERISY.
Trench Mortar Section and 2 Motor Bde. Transport. )	CITADEL, ARRAS.
C.M.M.G., M.T. Company.	HARBARCQ.

**1st Motor Brigade Help in Initial Attack.**

During the night October 8th/9th, "A" and "C" Batteries, 1st C.M.M.G.B. moved their Guns in front of the Sunken Road they had been occupying, and "D" Battery took up new positions immediately S.-E. of SANCOURT. At 1:30 A.M. Zero Hour, October 9th, the first 2 Batteries Fired on their S.O.S. Line and continued to do so for 2 hours. "D" Battery Guns opened up at the same time on BANTIGNY and maintained their Fire until 6:00 A.M. At 8:30 A.M., "A" and "C" Batteries moved to the N. edge of ABANCOURT to protect the left flank of the 6th C.I.B. and "D" Battery covered the right flank by moving forward into positions between CUVILLERS and RAMILLIES.

**Canal de l' Escaut Crossed.**

The Infantry Attack was launched successfully and rapid progress was made. In a short time, RAMILLIES and the Crossing at PONT d' AIRE were captured and a firm footing had been established on the E. side of the CANAL.

**Brutinel's Brigade Concentrated.**

During the morning the Batteries of the Motor Brigade attached to the Divisions in the Line were withdrawn and the whole of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE concentrated behind the Second Canadian Division Front.

Early in the morning, Motor Cyclist Scouts were sent forward to reconnoitre Crossings over the CANAL suitable for Motor Transport. General BRUTINEL was in touch with the Second Division Headquarters and the C.L.H. were in close liaison with the 5th and 6th C.I.B. Headquarters. The Cavalry Regiment (Lt.-Col. LEONARD) was concentrated S.-E. of MORENCHIES, near the 5th C.I.B. Headquarters with instructions to seize, as soon as the opportunity arose, the high ground between VAVES and THUN ST. MARTIN as a first bound, and the high ground E. of IWUY-RIEUX Road, as a second bound.

The Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion (Major HUMPHREY) moved to the same area as the Canadian Light Horse. BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Headquarters was established in the same neighbourhood. The 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades concentrated later W. and S.-W. of TILLOY along the CAMBRAI-DOUAI Road.



**Line Morning October 9th.**

At 10:00 A.M., October 9th the 25th C.I.Bn. was in ESCAUDOEUVRES with Patrols in front, the 6th C.I.B. in ESWARS and the Eleventh Division (British) in THUN LEVEQUE.

**“B” Squadron, Canadian Light Horse in Action.**

“B” Squadron (Major C.F. Mc EWEN), C.L.H., then moved forward along the CAMBRAI-IWUY Road, got into touch with the Infantry Patrols and pushed through them with great determination. The 2nd Troop of this Squadron, under Lieut. STIRRETT, went ahead, covered by 2 Patrols operating between the CAMBRAI-IWUY Road and the Railway. On reaching the Railway, the right Patrol was fired at by enemy Machine Guns and Men and horses were seen to fall. The left Patrol went over the crest of the Ridge, but was heavily fired on by Machine Guns behind Wire, in the Sunken Road leading E. from CROIX ST. HUBERT. The main body of the Troop, although under heavy Machine Gun Fire from both sides, dashed forward and took up positions on the high ground between the Railway and the Road E. of le MARIS. Hotchkiss Guns were dug-in on the flanks of the Troop, and greatly helped to neutralize enemy Fire throughout the day.

The Railroad on the right of this position consisted of a very high Embankment leading into a Cutting to the N. The Embankment commanded all the approaches to the position held by the 2nd Troop. To overcome the enemy in this point, the 4th Troop of “B” Squadron was sent forward to try and outflank the German positions. The Troop crossed the Railway E. of ESCAUDOEUVRES, divided itself into Parties and galloped Northwards as far as the Railway running to NAVES where they were held up by Wire and Machine Guns. The Cavalry then dismounted and dug themselves in.

At the same time Major Mc EWEN detailed his 1st Troop to work round the left flank of the 2nd Troop to deal with the enemy Machine Guns between THUN ST. MARTIN and IWUY. If the manoeuvres were successful, the Troop was to move Southward along the high ground. Covered by an advanced Patrol the 1st Troop made a determined attempt to push forward, but it was held up by well organized Machine Gun Nests and well-directed Rifle Fire. It was forced to dismount and take up positions on the left of the 2nd Troop.

**Enemy Resistance.**

The enemy Line in front of “B” Squadron was well-organized and strongly protected by a band of Wire and numerous Machine Gun Posts. It became quite apparent during the day that a dismounted Force of considerable strength would be required to overcome the enemy resistance. It was, therefore, decided not to throw any more Men into the fight, but to consolidate and improve the ground already captured.

**Aeroplanes Good Work.**

During the day, 2 of our Scout Aeroplanes were of great assistance to the Cavalry. They dived down and, flying very low, the Pilot indicated to our Men the location of the enemy and fired with their Machine Guns into the German positions. One of these Planes repeatedly came over and caused many casualties amongst the German Machine Gunners. Unfortunately, this Plane was finally hit by Machine Gun Fire and was seen to land behind our Line.

**Enemy Active.**

In the afternoon the enemy became more aggressive and his Artillery Fire increased considerably. He attempted to dislodge the 2nd Troop from its positions and was greatly annoying the 4th Troop with Machine Gun Fire. Part of the 3rd Troop, “B” Squadron, was sent to reinforce Lieut. STIRRETT and 1 Troop of “C” Squadron was dispatched to support the 4th Troop.



### **Cavalry Patrol Clears Situation.**

At about 3:30 P.M. the 25th C.I.Bn. reported a Gap in the Line between the CAMBRAI-IWUY Road and the CANAL. Lieut. FYFE, C.L.H., was dispatched in charge of a Patrol to get in touch with the enemy in that vicinity. The Patrol which throughout acted with great dash and bravery, located enemy Posts and Machine Gun Nests on the outskirts of TUN ST. MARTIN and got in touch with the O.C., "B" Squadron and the Infantry on the right and left. The information brought back by Lieut. FYFE regarding the disposition of the enemy and our own Troops was most valuable and cleared up the situation on the left flank. In the meantime the Bridge at POINT d' AIRE was ready for traffic and the 1st C.M.M.G.B. and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion were sent across the CANAL to relieve the C.L.H. in the Line as soon as the situation permitted.

### **"B" Squadron Relieved.**

In the evening the 1st and 2nd Troops of "B" Squadron were relieved by the 1st Motor Brigade and the Cyclists, and the 4th Troop of "B" Squadron were relieved by the Infantry. "B" Battery, 1st C.M.M.G.B., took up positions between ESCAUDOEUVRES and NAVES. "A" and "D" Batteries dug their Guns in on both sides of the CAMBRAI-IWUY Road in support to the Cyclists, who had relieved the 1st and 2nd Troops. The Cavalry brought out with them their wounded, who had not been evacuated during the day on account of the exposure of the ground.

### **Observations.**

"B" Squadron advanced, during this Operation, to an average depth of 2,000 yards on a Frontage of about 2,000 yards. It secured a footing on the high ground between THUN ST. MARTIN and NAVES thus depriving the enemy of a valuable tactical point and obtaining for our Troops a good jumping-off Line for the resumption of the attack. The position was held in spite of strong enemy action and was turned over to the Infantry intact. 2 German Machine Guns were captured and many casualties inflicted on the enemy. The Cavalry casualties were 1 N.C.O. killed, 11 Other Ranks wounded, 12 horses killed and 25 wounded. The lightness of these casualties is accounted by the excellent way in which the Officers concerned handled their Commands and the brave and cool manner in which the Troopers rode straight and hard at their Objectives. Close liaison with the G.O.C., 5th C.I.B. and his Battalion Commanders enabled full co-operation between the Infantry and Cavalry to be affected.

### **Infantry Attempt to Advance.**

At 5:00 P.M. the Infantry attacked again with the object of seizing all the ground between NAVES and YHUN ST. MARTIN. Lieut. T.A. SMITH, 1st C.M.M.G.B. in charge of 4 Armoured Cars and 4 Platoons Cyclists co-operated with the assaulting Troops along the CAMBRAI-NAVES Road. If possible he was to cross the ERCLIN River and seize the high ground E. of the IWUY-RIEUX Road. The attack however did not make good progress. The 25th and 26th C.I.Bns. were held up between NAVES and ESCAUDOEUVRES. The British on the right reached CAGNONCLES but were driven back and took up positions a few hundred yards W. of the Village. The Armoured Cars were then withdrawn for the night.

### **Motor Transport Suffers from Shell Fire.**

The Vehicles of the 1st Motor Brigade had been well concealed from the enemy, but a stray Shell during the night hit a "D" Battery Fighting Lorry and set it on fire. This drew a concentration of Shell Fire with the result that 2 Lorries were completely destroyed and 2 other Lorries and 1 Ford Car were damaged. The last mentioned 3 Vehicles were repaired by the C.M.M.G., Mechanical Transport Company.



### **Trench Mortars in Action.**

A Patrol of Motor Machine Gunners located a Nest of 10 German Machine Guns about 1,000 yards W. of NAVES along the Railway running to the Village. These Guns offered a strong resistance to our Infantry on the evening of October 9th and continued to annoy out Troops throughout the night. Very early on the morning of the 10th, one of the Trench Mortar Sections attached to the 1st C.M.M.G.B. was dispatched forward with instructions to deal with this nest. The Mortars fired about 25 Rounds obtaining numerous hits and silencing the enemy Machine Guns. It was later reported that when the Infantry advanced at 6:00 A.M. October 10th, no resistance was encountered in this locality.

### **October 10th.**

Immediately after Zero Hour (6:00 A.M.) October 10th the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. concentrated N. of ESCAUDEUVRES and the 1st C.M.M.G.B. and the Cyclist Battalion assembled S.-E. of the same Village. BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Headquarters was established in the Eastern edge of the Wood in which the CHATEAU d' ESWARS is situated.

The Armoured Car Detachment (Lieut. T.A. SMITH) with 1 Platoon Cyclists was given Instructions to work up the CAMBRAI-SAULZOIR Road and to accomplish its Mission of the day before, should an opportunity occur.

### **River Reconnaissance.**

Patrols of the C.L.H., the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and Cyclist Bn. were in touch with the Infantry. A reconnaissance by these Patrols a short time after the advance occurred showed that all Bridges across the ERCLIN had been destroyed, but that a small stretch of the River, where it bends S.-W. just N. of the NAVES-VILLERS-en-CAUCHIES Road, was dry.

### **Armoured Car Detachment Seizes Bridgehead.**

Naves was captured by the Infantry. The Armoured Cars went through them, seized the Bridgehead and got into touch with the XVII Corps in RIEUX. Lieut. SMITH then dismounted his Crews, dashed forward with his Guns and Cyclists and took up positions astride the NAVES-SAULZOIR Road about 1200 yards E. of the River. The Detachment received a great deal of attention from the enemy Machine Guns situated on the high ground N. of the Main Road and from a Party of Germans holding the Sunken Road just in front of our Machine Gunners and Cyclists. The Sunken Road was soon cleared of the enemy by a Party of Cyclists and Lieut. SMITH occupied it with 4 Guns and 28 Men of the Cyclists.

### **Cavalry in Action.**

The O.C., C.L.H. who had kept close touch with the Infantry all morning decided to send part of his Regiment over the dried portion of the River ERCLIN. In the afternoon, when the Infantry attacked again and their advance seemed to be going well, "A" Squadron and 2 Troops of "C" Squadron crossed the River and moved forward in a Northerly direction. As they advanced, enemy Rifle and Machine Gun Fire caused them considerable casualties, "A" Squadron losing practically all their horses. But they pushed on with great determination until they reached a cut bank close to the buildings on the right of the RIEUX-IWUY Road, where they were held up by terrific Machine Gun Fire. Many of the Horses of "C" Squadron were killed, the Men reaching the cut bank on foot. The Machine Gun Fire being very severe and the Cavalry forming too good a target, it was thought that no useful purpose would be accomplished by throwing more Men into the attack. By holding the positions they had reached, the 2 Squadrons helped considerably the advance of the Infantry and later, with their Rifle and Machine Gun Fire, neutralized enemy Machine Gun Nests when the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and the Cyclists advanced on the right. The Cavalry were withdrawn in the evening after handing their positions over to the Infantry.



## **2nd Motor Brigade E. of Naves.**

The 2nd C.M.M.G.B., which had assembled N. of ESCAUDOEUVRES moved forward to just W. of NAVES in the morning of October 10th. Scouts were immediately sent to reconnoitre the Crossings of the River ERCLIN, and "A" Battery with 1 Platoon Cyclists was sent to the Bridgehead on the Main Road to strengthen and support the Armoured Car Detachment. Lieut.-Col. MEURLING, O.C., 2nd Motor Brigade established his Headquarters in NAVES. On finding that all the Bridges over the River had been destroyed, he sent back a Party of his Men with a number of Lorries to an Engineer Dump to get bridging material to rebuild the Bridge on the CAMBRAI-SAULZOIR Road. At the same time, telephone poles, cable wire and other Engineer Stores that could be found in NAVES were being collected to use as temporary bridging material. Captain MAY, the Officer in charge of the 2nd Motor Brigade Train, with 6 Sappers borrowed from the 4th C.I.B. and a Party of Men from "C" Battery commenced to build the Bridge. Unfortunately the enemy, who had the advantage of superior observation, began to Shell the Party shortly after the work had been started. Captain MAY and a number of Men were wounded and the work had to be suspended until dark.

## **Motor Batteries Move Forward.**

The high ground E. of the IWUY-RIEUX Road was defended by the enemy with strong Machine Gun Posts, which frustrated the attempts of the Canadian Light Horse to gain possession of this commanding position. The 2nd C.M.M.G.B. then took steps to carry out a minor Operation during the afternoon with the object of overcoming the enemy resistance in this locality. "B" Battery and half of "D" Battery, and 2 Platoons Cyclists were sent forward as far as the Bridgehead to cooperate with "A" Battery in an endeavour to advance the Line. The Guns of "A" Battery and the 4 Guns of "D" Battery were deployed on the W. side of the Bridgehead. Covered by the Neutralizing Fire of these Guns, "B" Battery and the 2 Platoon Cyclists rushed forward as far as the Sunken Road about 1400 yards E. of the River. The Armoured Car Detachment with a number of Cyclists, operating under direct Orders of the G.O.C., BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE, had already occupied this position.

## **Cyclists Capture Ground.**

"B" Battery Guns were immediately set up and assisted by the Guns of the Armoured Cars, opened an intense Fire on the German Machine Gun Posts and Sniper Nests on the Eastern and South-Eastern outskirts of IWUY. At the same time, Hotchkiss Guns of the Canadian Light Horse between IWUY and RIEUX concentrated their Fire on enemy positions on the high ground in front. Under the cover of this Fire the 2 Platoons of Cyclists, which had assembled in the Sunken Road, went forward divided into 2 Parties. The right Party operating parallel to the NAVES-SAULZOIR Road succeeded in dislodging the enemy Machine Gunners and Infantry from the high ground immediately N. of the Road and about 1,000 yards E. of the Sunken Road. A number of Machine Guns were captured and many casualties were inflicted amongst the German Crews. The Cyclists established a strong Post at this point. The left Party of the Cyclists was not as fortunate in their attack. Heavy enemy Machine Gun Fire coming from all directions caused many casualties and prevented them from making any headway.

## **Positions Occupied Night October 10th/11th.**

In the evening, 1 Company of the 19th C.I.Bn. and 1 Company of the 20th C.I.Bn. concentrated in the Sunken Road, but no further attack developed. All the Machine Guns of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE E. of the ERCLIN River, together with 4 Guns of "D" Battery, 2nd C.M.M.G.B., which had been sent forward, were placed in positions in and on all sides of the Sunken Road to cover all approaches of it.



**Bridge Over Erclin River Constructed.**

At 11:00 P.M. October 10th, when Shelling had to a certain extent died down, a Party of the 4th Bn., Canadian Engineers came up with bridging material and commenced to build the Bridge. A Battery of Machine Guns from the 2nd Motor Brigade covered the Sappers and every assistance was given them in accomplishing their Task. The Bridge was completed by 2:00 A.M. October 11th.

**Letter from Canadian Engineers.**

The following is an extract from a letter sent to the Second Canadian Division Headquarters and written Major G. Mc CALLUM, M.C., 4th Battalion, Canadian Engineers, who Commanded the Company that built the Bridge E. of NAVES :-

*“In connection with the construction of the Bridge on the NAVES – VILLERS-en-CAUCHIES Road across the ERCLIN River, on the night of October 10th/11th, 1918, valuable information and assistance was given us by Lieut.-Col. MEURLING of the 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade.”*

*“Besides information on the tactical situation and the state and size of the Gap to be Bridged, he gave us a Battery of Machine Guns to cover our Party while the bridge was being constructed, greatly increasing the confidence of the Sappers and speeding up the work.”*

**October 11th, 1918.**

Early in the morning of October 11th, the Forty-ninth Division (British), on the right of the Canadian Corps, resumed the advance. The Guns of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. covering the Bridge and those in positions in and near the Sunken Road supported the attack with Indirect, Flanking and Enfilade Fire. The Infantry seemed to make good progress at first, but the Germans counter-attacked with Tanks and drove our Line back over the high ground. A Field Battery of Artillery in action between NAVES and RIEUX, and the Guns of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. already in the Line together with another Motor Battery that was rushed forward, considerably helped the Forty-ninth Division to repel the counter-attack and recapture the high ground which had been lost on both sides of the Main Road.

**Brutinel's Brigade Withdrawn.**

The 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and the Cyclists were withdrawn from the Line on the afternoon of October 11th. The 2nd Motor Brigade spent the night October 11th/12th in the Sugar Refinery, N.-W. of CAUROIR, moving back to BUISSY the following day. The casualties of this Unit for the period October 9th to October 12th, were 1 Officer and 1 Other Rank killed, and 6 Officers and 23 Other Ranks wounded.

The 1st C.M.M.G.B. and the Canadian Corps Cyclists Battalion went into Billets at BARALLE on October 12th. The Canadian Light Horse moved from Bivouacs W. of CAMBRAI to MARQUION on October 13th.



**Observations.**

Between October 8th and 11th the Operations of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE were of great assistance to our Infantry by seizing Tactical Points and holding them against strong enemy resistance. The Cavalry, Cyclists and Motor Machine Gunners often acted as a screen to the next move of the Infantry. The enemy was kept under close observation by continuously disputing with him the possession of the high ground both W. and E. of the River ERCLIN.

The repeated attempts of the Canadian Light Horse to push forward against heavy enemy Fire, and their determination to hold the ground they had captured, especially S.-E. of THUN ST. MARTIN, where both flanks were exposed, is a noteworthy performance. The Work of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and the Cyclists in the Operations E. of NAVES was most noticeable, not only in the way in which the Units were handled and all Ranks tried to fulfill their various duties, but in their fine spirit of comradeship and co-operation.



**THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE.**

**VI  
SENSEE CANAL TO VALENCIENNES : OCTOBER 12th to 28th, 1918.**

**Introductory.**

All the Units of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE spent the period from October 12 to 18th in reorganizing and refitting, overhauling equipment, general Training and Sports. On October 18th HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS the PRINCE OF WALES visited the 1st and 2nd Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigades.

On October 17th, 1918 the First and Fourth Canadian Divisions, which had been transferred to the Sector between DOUAY and the SENSEE River, were Ordered to continue the advance and keep in close contact with the enemy. Weak enemy detachments were to be brushed aside and not allowed to delay the advance. (X)

To assist in these Operations 1 Squadron, Canadian Light Horse, 1 Company, Canadian Cyclist Battalion were placed at the disposal of each of the Divisions. On October 18th the 1st and 2nd C.M.M.G.Bs. detailed Motor Cyclist Patrols to keep in touch with the situation on the Corps Front, special attention being paid to reconnaissance of Bridges. The following day 2 Motor Machine Gun Batteries and 2 Armoured Cars were also placed at the disposal of each of the 2 Divisions to assist in breaking down the enemy's resistance. On the same day 1 Company Cyclist Battalion was placed at the disposal of the Second Canadian Division. Previously 1 Troop, C.L.H. had been attached to each Division for Dispatch Rider Duties.

The elements of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE attached to Divisions may be tabulated as follows:-

First Cdn. Division – (1) "B" Squadron, C.L.H.

(2) "A" Company, Cyclist Bn.

(3) "C" Battery, 1st C.M.M.G.Bde.

"E" Battery, 1st C.M.M.G.Bde.

2 Armoured Cars, 1st C.M.M.G.Bde.

Fourth Cdn. Division – (1) "C" Squadron, C.L.H.

(2) "C" Company, Cyclist Bn.

(3) "C" Battery, 2nd C.M.M.G.Bde.

"E" Battery, 2nd C.M.M.G.Bde.

2 Armoured Cars, 2nd C.M.M.G.Bde.

Second Cdn. Division – (1) "B" Company, Cyclist Bn.



### **Action of Units with the Fourth Canadian Division.**

#### **Cavalry, October 18th.**

Early in the morning of October 18th, "C" Squadron, C.L.H. reported to the Fourth Canadian Division and its Troops were disposed as follows :-

1st and 2nd Troops	Fourth Canadian Division Headquarters.
3rd Troop	11th C.I.B.
4th Troop	10th C.I.B.

The 1st and 2nd Troops remained in ECOURT ST. QUENTIN all day.

The 4th Troop reported to the 10th C.I.B. in CEMETERY WOOD, N. of SAUCHY l' ESTREE. Patrols consisting of 1 N.C.O. and 7 Other Ranks were detailed to report to each of the 46th and 50th C.I.Bns. The remainder of the Troops were kept at Brigade H.Q. as Dispatch Riders.

No. 1 Patrol, after reporting to the 46th C.I.Bn. at FRESSIES, pushed ahead through MARCQ and the high ground N.-E. of it, where it gained contact with the enemy. The other Patrol reported to the 50th C.I.Bn. in FRESSAIN and then proceeded to MONCHECOURT. It encountered heavy Machine Gun Fire E. of the Village and remained in touch with the enemy until the Infantry came up.

Lieut. TEASDALE, in charge of the 3rd Troop, went to the 11th C.I.B. where a Platoon of Cyclists also was placed in his command. He received instructions to report to the H.Q. of the 102nd C.I.Bn. in QUENESSON FARM N.-E. of BUGNICOURT. Lieut. TEASDALE was directed by the Officer Commanding the Battalion to employ his Cavalry and Cyclists to gain contact with the enemy and to keep the Battalion constantly informed of the situation. 2 Cavalry and 2 Cyclist Patrols, consisting of 1 N.C.O. and 5 Men each, were organized. These Patrols gained contact with the enemy N. of MONCHECOURT and along the main MONCHECOURT-ECAILLON Road.

#### **Cyclists, October 18th.**

"C" Company Cyclist Bn. reported to the Fourth Cdn. Division and its Platoons were ordered as follows :-

No. 7 Platoon	to the 10 C.I.B.
No. 8 Platoon	to the 11th C.I.B.
No. 9 Platoon	to Divisional Headquarters.

No. 7 Platoon was divided into 2 Patrols, one reporting to each of the 46th and 50th C.I.Bns. The Patrol with the 46th C.I.Bn. went forward to reconnoitre the roads through MARCQ. The other Patrol was sent forward ahead of the 50th C.I.Bn. in the direction of EMERCHICOURT and located enemy Guns along the AUBERCHICOURT-MONCHICOURT Road.

No. 8 Platoon operated in conjunction with the 3rd Troop "C" Squadron, C.L.H.

No. 9 Platoon remained in Reserve at ECOURT ST. QUENTIN.



**Cavalry, October 19th.**

The 1st and 2nd Troops, "C" Squadron, C.L.H., remained in ECOURT ST. QUENTIN all day and reported in the evening to the 11th C.I.B.

The Patrols of the 4th Troop operating with the 50th and 46th C.I.Bns. reconnoitered MASTAING, ABSCON, FOSSE de ROEULX and went as far as DENAIN without meeting opposition. During the day, the 47th C.I.B. relieved the 50th C.I.Bn.

The 3rd Troop and No. 8 Platoon, Cyclists were again divided into 4 Patrols. Nos. 1 and 2 being Cavalry Patrols and Nos. 3 and 4 Cyclist Patrols. At noon October 19th, Patrols went forward through ABSCON and remained in observation E. of the Village until the Infantry came up. Then under the direct Orders of the G.O.C., 11th C.I.B. the 2 Cavalry Patrols advanced over the open ground and the 2 Cyclist Patrols along the Roads. In the evening Nos. 1 and 2 Patrols reached BELLEVUE, No. 3 Patrol FOSSE LAMBRECHT and No. 4 Patrol le CHAUFFOUR. The 2 Cavalry Patrols then pushed on to HAVELUY and reported the Village clear of the enemy.

**Cyclists, October 19th.**

The Patrol of No. 7 Platoon, Cyclist, with the 46th C.I.Bn. advanced in the morning of October 19th, through MASTAING and ROEULX into DENAIN. The Cyclists captured 1 prisoner in ROEULX and encountered in DENAIN 9 Germans who retired hastily as soon as they saw our Men. The Patrol then pushed through to the Eastern outskirts of the Town where enemy Machine Gun Fire held them up. Touch with the enemy at this point was maintained until the Advanced Guard of the 44th C.I.Bn., which had passed through the 46th C.I.Bn., took over the Line. The remainder of No. 7 Platoon advanced ahead of the 47th C.I.Bn. No. 9 Platoon moved from ECOURT ST. QUENTIN and reported in the evening to the 10th C.I.B. H.Q. at MASTAING.

**Motor Batteries, October 19th.**

In the evening of October 19th, "C" and "E" Batteries and 2 Armoured Cars of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. were placed under the Orders of the Fourth Canadian Division, They were ordered to report themselves as follows :-

"C" Battery and 1 Armoured Car to the 10th C.I.B.

"E" Battery and 1 Armoured Car to the 11th C.I.B.

Both of these groups were placed in Reserve by the Formations to which they were attached. "E" Battery spent the night in AUBERCHICOURT and "C" Battery in MASTAING.

**Cavalry, October 20th.**

On October 20th, "C" Squadron Headquarters was established in FOSSE ABSCON. During the day the Troops of this Squadron accompanied the Infantry Battalions in their advance and carried messages for them.

**Cyclists, October 20th.**

A Patrol of No. 7 Platoon, Cyclists crossed the CANAL de l' ESCAUT S. of DENAIN in a small rowing boat and made a reconnaissance of BOUCHY, which was found to be clear of the enemy. No. 9 Platoon, which had been held in reserve at 10 C.I.B. Headquarters went forward to join No. 7 Platoon. 4 strong Patrols were organized and sent forward to gain contact with the enemy E. of DENAIN. They located many enemy Machine Guns in action and Sniper Nests N. and N.-E. of the Town.

No. 8 Platoon, under Orders from the 54th C.I.Bn. pushed through HAVELUY and located enemy Machine Guns in the FOSSE E. of the Village.



**Motor Batteries, October 20th.**

“C” Battery (Capt. Mc ISAAC) with 1 Armoured Car, 2nd C.M.M.G.B. moved on October 20th, with the 10th C.I.B. to DENAIN and were held there in Reserve.

“E” Battery (Capt. LEARY) and the other Armoured Car left AUBERCHICOURT early in the morning and proceeded to BELLEVUE where touch was gained with the 54th C.I.Bn. The Armoured Car went forward to HAVELUY to make a reconnaissance. It returned with the information that the Infantry had been held up on the Railway E. of the Village by Fire from Machine Guns located between WALLERS and OISY. It also reported that the enemy Machine Gun Defence appeared to be well organized and that the WALLERS Road was being swept by Shell and Machine Gun Fire. This information was immediately transmitted to the infantry Commander. The Armoured Car was again sent forward to HAVELUY and from there to WALLERS with instructions to get along the BELLAING Road to outflank the enemy Machine Gun Nests. This however proved impossible as the Car could not proceed beyond WALLERS owing to the Road junctions being blown-up. The Car then got in touch with the Troops on the left of the 11th C.I.B. and brought back their Dispositions. Capt. LEARY's Detachment was withdrawn to AUBERCHICOURT for the night.

**Cavalry, October 21st.**

On the right flank of the Fourth Canadian Division a Patrol from the 4th Troop, “C” Squadron, C.L.H. advanced on October 21st to ROUVIGNIES with the 44th C.I.Bn. The remainder of this Troop was kept busy all day maintaining liaison between the 10th and 11th C.I.B.s and the 44th and 47th C.I.Bns.

The 1st and 2nd Troops operating with the 87th C.I.Bn. sent out 3 Patrols on the morning of October 21st. The 1st Patrol proceeded to the CHATEAU de MALPLAQUET, where it located a number of German Marksmen. This was reported to the Infantry. The Patrol continued to advance in a Northerly direction until it was held up by Machine Gun Fire from GROSSE FOSSE, E. of AUBRY. Part of the Patrol remained in touch with the enemy and the remainder reported back to the 87th C.I.Bn.

A number of the enemy were encountered by the 2nd Patrol on the Eastern outskirts of AUBRY. The enemy retired before any Action could be taken.

The 3rd Patrol carried out a reconnaissance N. of AUBRY meeting with no opposition until it reached the South-Western edge of MARAICAUX, where it came under heavy flanking Machine Gun Fire. It was found that the MARAICAUX-ANZIN Road was strongly held by the enemy and this was reported to the Infantry.

“C” Squadron Headquarters moved to FOSSE LAMBRECHT, N. of BELLEUVE, and the 3rd Troop was held in Reserve.

**Cyclists, October 21st.**

Nos. 7 and 9 Platoons, Cyclists Patrolled the 44th and 47th C.I.Bns. Fronts. A small Party of Cyclists working along the Southern flank of the 10 C.I.B. went through ROUVIGNIES to PROUVY and then joined a larger Scouting Detachment of Cyclists, operating along the Main Road to VALENCIENNES. N. of the FERME URTEBISE a small group of enemy Cavalry was seen hastily retiring. As the Cyclist Scouts proceeded Northward they began to receive attention from a number of Machine Guns and a Field Gun located S.-W. of VALENCIENNES. On receipt of this information the 44th C.I.Bn. deployed for action. Other Cyclist Patrols kept the 47th C.I.Bn. constantly informed as to the situation on its front.

The 8th Platoon, working with the 11th C.I.B. moved to HAVELUY with Brigade Headquarters and was employed during the day as Dispatch Carriers.



**Motor Batteries, October 21st.**

The 10th C.I.B. ordered the Detachment of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. attached to it to proceed through ROUVIGNIES to PROUVY. This last Village was occupied and Captain Mc ISAAC placed the 8 Guns of "C" Battery and the 2 from the Armoured Car in defensive positions along the CANAL Bank from PROUVY to TRITH-ST. LEGER to protect the exposed flank of the Fourth Canadian Division. These positions were held for 36 hours without Infantry support. During the night the Guns were subjected to heavy Shell and Machine Gun Fire.

At 8:00 A.M. October 21st, Capt. LEARY in charge of "E" Battery and an Armoured Car reported to the G.O.C., 11th C.I.B. at the 102nd C.I.Bn. Headquarters on the ANICHE-ABSCON Road, S. of FOSSE FENELON. He was instructed to proceed forward with half of his Battery (4 Guns and Lorries) and the Armoured Car, and 20 Engineers to render every possible assistance to the Infantry, who had been held up by hostile Machine Gun Fire in FOSSE OUTEMPLE, S.-E. of AUBRY. Motor Cyclist Scouts were sent forward to reconnoitre the Roads in the forward Area. The enemy had been systematically blowing up most of the Crossroads and Road junctions, thus delaying the pursuit. To get forward, the Mechanical Transport had either to wait until the Roads were repaired or else move by a circuitous route over Third Class Roads, which were very often impassable.

The reports received from the Motor Cyclist Scouts compelled Capt. LEARY's Detachment to take a very indirect Road to reach OISY. They proceeded first to HAVELUY and then left the Village in a South-Easterly direction via a Secondary Road running S. of the FOSSE d' HAVELUY. This Road was followed as far as the first Fork-roads, where the Detachment turned S. along the Road running to DENAIN, and continued as far as the DENAIN-OISY Road. At this point the head of the Column turned N.-E. and proceeded to the first Crossroads, which had been blown up by a Mine. The Engineers bridged the Craters and the Motor Machine Gunners went on through OISY to the North-Eastern outskirts of HERIN, where another large Mine Crater at a Street Crossing proved a serious obstacle. The Armoured Car was skillfully driven around the back of a corner building and went on ahead to reconnoitre the enemy positions.

Working along the Road between PETITE FORET and ST. WAAST-la-HAUT, the Armoured Car effectively engaged the enemy Machine Gunners in FOSSE OUTEMPLE and forced them to evacuate the place. After Firing on other enemy groups, the Car returned with very valuable information. It located an enemy Field Artillery Battery in front of ST. WAAST-la-HAUT Church and a number of Machine Gun Nests E. of ANZIN which were later dealt with by our own Artillery. In the meantime the 4 Guns of "E" Battery had been pushed forward as far as PETITE FORET. But the Lorries could not be driven any farther owing to numerous large Shell-holes and Mine Craters on the Roads. The Guns were dismounted and placed in positions on the Eastern outskirts of the Village from which they supported by Fire the action of the Armoured Car. The Guns remained in their positions until the Infantry came up and established a Line for the night.

**Cavalry, October 22nd.**

Headquarters "C" Squadron, C.L.H. moved during the day, October 22nd to le MOULIN, N. of HERIN, and the 1st and 2nd Troops were held there in Reserve.

Patrols of the 3rd Troop were sent out most of the day reconnoitering Roads and obtaining contact with the enemy. One Patrol arrived at the first crossroads E. of BONNE ESPERANCE and N. of ANZIN, just in time to prevent its destruction by the enemy. A reconnaissance of the 11th C.I.B. Front between ANZIN and MARAICAUX was carried out. Heavy Rifle and Machine Gun Fire coming from ANZIN and la CHAP were reported and Mines were seen to explode in ANZIN and BEUVRAGES. The latter Village was entered by the Cavalry Patrols without opposition. The 4th Troop was held in Reserve at ROUVIGNIES.



### **Cyclists, October 22nd.**

The 12th C.I.B. took over the Line from the 10th C.I.B. on October 22nd. The 85th C.I.Bn. relieved the 44th C.I.Bn. and the 78th C.I.Bn. passed through the 47th C.I.Bn. 2 Patrols from Nos. 7 and 9 Platoons, Cyclists operated in front of these 2 Battalions. One of the Patrols reached ST. WASST-la-HAUT and the other was held up by Machine Gun Fire and Snipers while advancing towards LA SENTINELLE.

### **Motor Batteries, October 22nd.**

"C" Battery, 2nd C.M.M.G.B. continued to protect the right flank of the Fourth Canadian Division. On several occasions during the day, it Fired on enemy groups and at night carried out a little Harassing Fire.

Early in the morning of October 22nd the Engineers attached to "E" Battery repaired the Roads N. of PETITE FORET. The Motor Machine Gun Battery then moved forward as far as the Crossroads E. of BONNE ESPERANCE, where it came under intense Machine Gun Fire from ANZIN. The Armoured Car turned to the right towards ANZIN to deal with the enemy there, but it could not go very far owing to a large Crater in the Road. Captain LEARY then organized an Infantry Patrol and fought his way through the Western outskirts of ANZIN as far as the Main ST. AMAND Road. The Armoured Car operating on this Road from le PAVE Southwards covered the advance of the Patrol with the Fire of its 2 Guns. After the enemy had been ejected from this area, the Detachment went to BEUVRAGES. From here the Armoured Car was ordered forward to clear the enemy out of the main Road between ANZIN and BRUAY. While carrying out this Task, the Gunners engaged the enemy Machine Guns and inflicted many casualties on the Crews. The Road was successfully cleared and the Infantry were then able before dusk to establish a Line on the whole 11th C.I.B. Front without further opposition. The Guns of "E" Battery were placed in defensive positions for the night, N.-E. of la CHAP.

During the above action Corporal ANTHONY, 2nd C.M.M.G.B. greatly distinguished himself when the steering rod of his Armoured Car had been broken, he walked along in front of the Car, under heavy Machine Gun Fire and steered it by hand into a place of safety.

### **Cavalry, October 23rd.**

On October 23rd the Canadian Light Horse moved to HASNON and on the same day "C" Squadron was withdrawn from the Fourth Canadian Division and returned to its Regiment.

### **Cyclists, October 23rd.**

The Cyclists attached to the Fourth Canadian Division Brigades were used as Runners during the day.



**Motor Batteries, October 23rd.**

“C” Battery, on the right flank of the Fourth Canadian Division was relieved during the night October 23rd/24th by “D” Battery, 2nd C.M.M.G.B.

In the evening of October 23rd, the Armoured Car attached to the 11th C.I.B. was sent forward to patrol the Main Road from BRUAY Southwards and report on the Bridges and Crossings over the CANAL and the disposition of our Infantry. The Car brought back the required information and reported that some of our Infantry had been held up in ANZIN at the junction of the BRUAY road with one of the Streets leading to the CANAL. This point is about 800 yards N.-E. from the junction of the ANZIN-BRUAY and ANZIN-ST. AMAND Roads. The Germans had placed Machine Guns in the houses near the CANAL and with their Fire were preventing our Men from approaching the CANAL Bank. The Armoured Car was sent back to clear the enemy from the neighbourhood of the Street-crossing and 2 Guns from “E” Battery under Lieut. BUCK were ordered to push through to the CANAL with the object of outflanking the German Machine Gunners. Capt. LEARY with 2 Guns followed the Armoured Car and took up positions in the Mine Crater at the Street-crossing. These 2 Guns immediately opened Fire on a German Machine Gun at a range of 500 yards from the top window of a house near the Canal. At the same time Capt. LEARY with 2 Infantrymen boldly rushed down the Street firing at the Germans with their Revolvers and Rifles. One of the 2 German Gunners was killed and the other taken prisoner. The enemy Machine Gun was captured and turned on the Germans who were then hastily retiring from that area. Our Infantry then established a Line along the CANAL and the Motor Machine Gun Detachment was withdrawn to AUBRY.



### **Action of Units with the First Canadian Division.**

#### **Cavalry, October 18th.**

Before dawn on October 18th, "B" Squadron, C.L.H. under Major Mc EWEN, left its Billets in MARQUION and reported to the First Canadian Division as follows :-

1st and 2nd Troops	to the 1st C.I.B.
3rd Troop (less Hotchkiss Gun Section)	to the 1st Canadian Division Signals as
Dispatch	Carriers.
4th Troop and Hotchkiss Gun Section of 3rd Troop	to 2nd C.I.B.

At 8:00 A.M., the 1st and 2nd Troops moved forward to DECHY with the G.O.C., 1st C.I.B. where the nature of the work required of them was explained. A Patrol of 7 Men commanded by a Sergeant was selected from each Troop and sent forward to get in touch with the enemy. The remainder of the Troops – 10 Men with Hotchkiss Guns – were detailed to remain at brigade Headquarters as special Orderlies to the G.O.C.

The left Patrol advancing in front of the 4th C.I.Bn. was to advance as far as the BOIS de MONTICHY and gain contact with the enemy. Heavy Machine Gun Fire at close range was encountered N.-W. of MONTIGNY. Two Men of the Patrol were wounded and their horses killed. The Patrol withdrew a short distance and then proceeded to approach the WOOD from a Northerly direction thus outflanking the enemy on the high ground and causing him to retire. The WOOD was found to be clear of the enemy. Sgt. LAWSON, who was in charge of this Patrol, then conducted the Infantry by a safe route to a position where they could attack MONTIGNY from the N.

The right Patrol was to encircle MONTIGNY from the S. as far as the Railway, advancing in front of the 1st C.I.Bn. They found the 3rd C.I.B. already in MASNY, but no enemy were encountered E. of MONTIGNY. Sgt. LUCAS, in charge of the Patrol, then tried to return through the Village from the E. He was driven back by the Fire of 2 Machine Guns located in the houses. The location of the enemy was immediately given to the nearest Infantry Commander who was able to attack the Village from the E. and S.

At 9:30 A.M., Lieut. COCKSHUTT, 1st C.I.B. Headquarters, with 2 C.L.H. Orderlies galloped into MONTIGNY ahead of the Infantry Scouts. In the centre of the Village, they encountered about 30 Germans and located a number of Machine Gun Posts. One of these Guns opened Fire on them at close range wounding Pte. THOMPSON, one of the Orderlies and killing his horse. Pte. THOMPSON reported back to Brigade Headquarters at once and gave them the first hand information they had received to the effect that the Village was held by the enemy.

Undoubtedly the work of the Cavalry Patrols proved of assistance to the Infantry in discovering the flanks of the enemy's positions.

The 4th Troop, with part of the 3rd Troop, consisting of 1 Officer, 27 Other Ranks and 31 horses, reported to the 2nd C.I.B. Headquarters at LECLUSE where they were instructed to report to the 8th C.I.Bn. in the Line at CANTIN. The Cavalry reported to the 8th C.I.Bn. after the latter had reached ROUCOURT. The reason for the delay was the breaking down of the Bridge across the CANAL de la SENSEE, S. of GOEULIZN, which necessitated a crossing being effected E. of ARLEUX.

Three Patrols were sent forward, one got in touch with the foremost elements of the 8th C.I.Bn. The other 2 redirected the progress of the Infantry as the Line of Advance had been altered from due E. between ROCOURT and ERCHIN to a North-Easterly direction N. of AUBERCHICOURT. One of these Patrols got in touch with the Fourth Canadian Division on the right.

The Headquarters of the 102nd C.I.Bn. was located in VILLERS au TERTRE and its left Platoon was found 1,000 yards N. of FOSSE ST. ROCHE. In the afternoon, another Patrol came into contact with the enemy between ECAILLON and AUBERCHICOURT, drawing Fire from FOSSE ST. MARIE and le PAVE. This information was forwarded to the Artillery, who engaged the targets and forced the enemy to evacuate their positions. In addition to the above Tasks, Troopers were used to carry dispatches to the 102nd C.I.Bn. and the Artillery.



### **Cyclists, October 18th.**

“A” Company, Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion was distributed as follows on reaching LECLUSE early in the morning of October 18th :-

No. 1 Platoon to the 10th C.I.Bn. (2nd C.I.B.) at ROUCOURT.

No. 3 Platoon to the 8th C.I.Bn. (2nd C.I.B.) at ROUCOURT.

No. 2 Platoon to the 1st C.I.B. at SAILLY-en-OSTREVENT.

No. 1 Platoon supplied Runners to keep Bn. Headquarters in touch with the Companies in the Line and the Units on the Flanks.

A Patrol from No. 3 Platoon went forward, via LEWARDE, to obtain contact with the enemy. It located hostile Machine Guns in the Southern edge of AUBERCHICOURT and FOSSE ST. MARIE.

No. 2 Platoon was not employed during the day and moved to MONTIGNY for the night.

During the night of October 18th/19th, the 3rd C.I.B. relieved the 2nd C.I.B. All the elements of the C.L.H. and Cyclists with the latter Brigade were transferred to the former.

### **Cavalry, October 19th.**

The 4th Troop, “B” Squadron, C.L.H. operated with the 3rd C.I.B. whose Headquarters was in LEWARDE. A Patrol of 1 N.C.O. and 6 Men was sent forward to each of the 14th and 16th C.I.Bns. and were used as Dispatch Riders. The remainder of the Troop moved with Brigade H.Q. through SOMAIN to ERRE where the night was spent.

At 9:00 A.M. on October 19th, 2 Patrols of the 1st and 2nd Troops moved forward to try and locate the enemy. One Patrol advanced on the right in front of the 2nd C.I.Bn. A few of the enemy who were concealed in RIEULAY were captured with little resistance and taken back to Brigade H.Q. The enemy was again encountered in la RENTIS, S. of RIEULAY. The Patrol remained here until the Infantry came up and dealt with the situation. The left Patrol advanced ahead of the 3rd C.I.Bn. and entered VRED, where it learnt from the East Lancashire Bn. that their Men had gone, earlier in the morning, as far as MARCHIENNES without opposition. This information was transmitted to a Company of the 3rd C.I.Bn., who were able to route-march to WANDIGNIES-HAMAGES, screened by the Cavalry Patrol. While patrolling the Front, the Cavalry discovered a Gap about 1 mile wide between the 1st and 3rd C.I.B.s. The 2 Flank Battalions of these Brigades were immediately notified and while the Infantry extended their flanks the Cavalry Patrol covered the Gap.

Major Mc EWEN, C.L.H., with the Infantry Bn. Commanders coordinated the Line to be held during the night. This Line ran about 1/4 mile W. of BOIS des ECLUSETTES and E. of BOIS ST. AMAND and HELESMES.

### **Cyclists, October 19th.**

On October 19th the Cyclists were used at the 1st and 3rd C.I.B. Headquarters and with the 10th and 16th C.I.Bns. as Runners and small advanced Patrols.



**Motor Batteries, October 19th.**

At 6:00 A.M. October 19th, 2 Armoured Cars and "C" and "E" Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. reported to the 1st Canadian Division at FERIN. They were instructed to report to the 1st C.I.B. The G.O.C., 1st C.I.B. divided the Detachment into 2 Groups :-

- (A) – 1 Armoured Car and "C" Battery commanded by Lieut. MONTGOMERY, to work under the 3rd C.I.Bn.
- (B) – 1 Armoured Car and "E" Battery commanded by Capt. WORTHINGTON, were attached to the 2nd C.I.Bn.

The last Group followed the 2nd C.I.Bn. from BOIS de MONTIGNY to GROHAIN FARM, N. of BOIS St. AMAND. The Roads were in very bad condition and many of the Railway Bridges had been blown down thus rendering the Roads impassable. "E" Battery had to make many wide detours to get forward. The Group with the 3rd C.I.Bn. advanced with the Infantry keeping in close touch with Battalion H.Q. In the evening, all of Lieut. MONTGOMERY's Guns were set up along the Western edge of the BOIS des ECLUSETTES and in the Southern outskirts of WARLAING. These positions were held throughout the night while the Infantry were behind resting. The Crews of "C" Battery and the Armoured Car had to fill in or bridge 8 Mine Craters before the Lorries could be taken forward.

**Cavalry, October 20th.**

On the 3rd C.I.B. Front the 15th and 13th C.I.Bns. passed through the 16th and 14th C.I.Bns. on October 20th to resume the advance. The 4th Troop, "B" Squadron, C.L.H. had many Patrols out during the day locating the enemy and carrying messages between the various Units of the Brigade. One Patrol started from ERRE and went to the Northern edge of BOIS ST. AMAND, where it gained touch with the 1st C.I.B. Troops. The Patrol then returned through the WOOD and proceeded to WALLERS. They were Fired on by Machine Guns from a house about 400 yards N. of WALLERS Station. The Infantry were at once warned of the presents of these Guns and their location was sent to our Artillery who opened Fire on the house and forced the enemy to withdraw. Our Infantry later advanced across the open ground in this area without opposition. In the afternoon, another Patrol worked Southward and got in touch with the 54th C.I.Bn. of the Fourth Canadian Division holding the Railway E. and N.-E. of HAVELUY. In the evening, the same Patrol made a reconnaissance in front of WALLERS. It found the 13th C.I.Bn. holding a Post on the Eastern outskirts of WALLERS and another S. of the Railway, 800 yards E. of the Station. This last Post was drawing considerable ire from the WOODS, N. of the Railway. A report of this reconnaissance was forwarded to 3rd C.I.B. Headquarters who took steps to deal with the situation.

The 1st and 2nd Troops sent 2 Patrols forward in the morning to maintain contact with the enemy. The right Patrol working ahead of the 1st C.I.Bn. encountered the enemy in la CHOQUE and in the WOOD to the S. of it. The left Patrol operating in front of the 4th C.I.Bn. met Germans in the Village of HASNON. Both Patrols remained in contact with the enemy until the Infantry came up.

Major Mc EWEN was again detailed to coordinate with Battalion Commanders the Line to be held for the night. On his way to visit an Outpost in the Eastern outskirts of BOIS des ECLUSETTES, Major Mc EWEN rescued 3 French Soldiers, who had been captured by the Germans in 1916, and had been hiding in the WOOD for the past 8 days.

**Cyclists, October 20th.**

No. 2 Platoon, Cyclists, moved with the 1st C.I.B. Headquarters to the FERME HIVERCHICES, 1 mile E. of WARDGNIES. The other 2 Platoons working with the 3rd C.I.B. moved in front of the 15th and 13th C.I.Bns. acting as Patrols. They cleared an enemy Machine Gun Post out of WALLERS Station and located another S. of the FORET de VICOIGNE, which had been holding up the advance of part of the 15th C.I.Bn.



**Motor Batteries, October 20th.**

1 Armoured Car and "E" Battery, 1st C.M.M.G.B. followed the 1st C.I.Bn., and at dusk the Guns were placed in defensive positions on the Eastern and Northern edges of BOIS des ECLUSETTES. The other Armoured Car and "C" Battery advanced with the 4th C.I.Bn.

**Cavalry, October 21st.**

On October 21st, as on the previous day, the Men of the 4th Troop, "B" Squadron, C.L.H. were kept busy patrolling the Front of the 3rd C.I.B. and carrying Dispatches over heavy ground in the FORET de VICOIGNE. A Patrol proceeded with the 14th C.I.Bn. to AREMBERG. 4 Troopers of this Patrol were sent forward in a North-Easterly direction to get in touch with the enemy. Whilst crossing the BOIS LECAT, they were Fired on by Machine Guns from the Railway Embankment just W. of RAISMES. Another Patrol pushed Northwards across the WALLERS-RAISMES Railway to the Eastern outskirts of the Forest opposite VICOIGNE. They were Fired on by Machine Guns located in the houses on the ST. AMAND-ANZIN Road. A third small Patrol, later in the day, got in touch with the Fourth Canadian Division Troops at AUBRY, where our Infantry was encountering stiff resistance.

On the left Brigade Front of the First Canadian Division the ground was almost impassable for Mounted patrols. The 1st and 2nd Troops were employed throughout the day in carrying messages between the 1st C.I.B. Headquarters and the Battalions in the Line.

A very regrettable loss was sustained by "B" Squadron on this day. While mounting his horse in HASNON Major Mc EWEN, who had been attached to the 1st C.I.B. Headquarters and had been doing excellent work in organizing the Cavalry Patrols, was killed by a large Calibre Shell, which exploded within 40 feet of him.

**Cyclists, October 21st.**

The 1st and 3rd Platoons Cyclists operated on October 21st with the Battalions of the 3rd C.I.B. as Runners and Scouting Parties. No. 2 Platoon was attached to the 7th C.I.B. which had relieved the 1st C.I.B. during the night.

**Motor Batteries, October 21st.**

Early in the morning of October 21st the 2 Armoured Cars and 2 Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B., operating with the 1st C.I.B. were attached to the 3rd C.I.B. Working as a single Group under Capt. WORTHINGTON, the Detachment followed the advance of the 15 and 14th C.I.Bns. In the afternoon the right of the 14th C.I.Bn. was out of touch with the left of the 87th C.I.Bn. (Fourth Cdn. Division). Capt. WORTHINGTON got in touch with both Battalions and closed in the Gap by placing "E" Battery between BOIS LECAT and AUBRY. During the night, "C" Battery relieved "E" Battery in the same positions. Close communication was maintained with 3rd C.I.B. Headquarters and the Infantry Battalions on both flanks.

**Infantry Relief.**

On the night October 21st/22nd, the Third Canadian Division took the Line over from the First Canadian Division. The 7th and 9th C.I.B.s relieved the 1st and 3rd C.I.B.s respectively.



**Cavalry, October 22nd.**

The Patrols of the 4th Troop, "B" Squadron, C.L.H. maintained contact with the enemy in the morning while the 9th C.I.B. was passing through the 3rd C.I.B.

The 7th C.I.B. resumed the advance on October 22nd on the left of the Canadian Corps with the Royal Canadian Regiment on the right and the 42nd C.I.Bn. on the left. The 1st and 2nd Troops of "B" Squadron were ordered to precede the Battalion Scouts in the advance through the FORET de RAISMES. 2 Patrols were sent out, 1 in front of each Battalion. The right Patrol forced the enemy to retire out of the positions he was holding about 500 yards N. of the junction of the ANZIN-ST. AMAND Road and Railway. The left Patrol encountered the enemy in MONT des BRUYERES and his location was reported to the leading Officer of the 42nd C.I.Bn. who dealt with the situation. The Patrols advanced through the Forest without further opposition and reached ESCAUTPONT in the afternoon.

**Cyclists, October 22nd.**

Nos. 1 and 3 Platoons, Cyclists, operating with the 9th C.I.B. had Patrols out all day. A Patrol of No. 3 Platoon in front of the 52nd C.I.Bn. encountered 2 enemy Cavalry Patrols E. and S.-E. of the ETOILE de CERNAY. Later it obtained touch with the Fourth Canadian Division Troops on the right. Patrolling in front of the 43rd C.I.Bn., a Patrol of No. 1 Platoon gained contact with the enemy at ETOILE de CERNAY in the RAISMES Forest.

The 42nd C.I.Bn. sent 2 Patrols from No. 2 Platoon through the FORET de VICOIGNE and the Western portion of the FORET de RAISMES to reconnoitre the Roads.

**Motor Batteries, October 22nd.**

The Group from the 1st C.M.M.G.B. consisting of 2 Armoured Cars and 2 Batteries, operating with the 3rd C.I.B. were attached on the morning of October 22nd, to the 9th C.I.B. At 8:00 A.M., Capt. WORTHINGTON received instructions to move forward and get in touch with the enemy. The Detachment advanced beyond the Infantry and proceeded into RAISMES as far as the sharp bend in the ST. AMAND-ANZIN Road. The intention was to exploit CHEMIN notre DAME. But as this Road was reported by a Motor Cyclist Patrol to be in bad condition, attention was directed to the RUE de MARAIS. The Civilians in this neighbourhood stated that a Party of Germans was occupying a Chateau just N. of WARAICAUX. The Armoured Cars were at once placed in positions commanding all the exits from it, but on a search being made no enemy was found. The Group then continued up the RUE de MARAIS as far as the Railway Crossing. Infantry screens came up to this point and established a Line of Outposts.

After a reconnaissance by Motor Cyclists the Detachment resumed its forward move with the Bridge over the CANAL, E. of DENAIN-ANZIN as the objective. The Armoured Cars led the way, followed closely by "E" Battery with "C" Battery a little distance behind in support. A glance at the Map will show DENAIN-ANZIN to be a Mining and Industrial Suburb of VALENCIENNES containing many Metal Factories and Coal Mines with their accompanying mass of closely built workman's houses. Slag Heaps are in abundance and the Village is traversed many times by Main Railway Lines, Sidings and Spurs leading to all the Mines, Factories and Workshops. The stretch of country E. of the Bridge and N.-W. of it across the ANZIN-CONDE Road is almost flat. W. of DENAIN-ANZIN the ground rises a little.

The Armoured Cars and the Batteries proceeded to the end of the RUE de MARAIS and then turned S. along the Road running S. and S. of the MARAIS de BEUVRAGES as far as the "Y" Roads S. of the MARAIS d' ARNONVILLE. From this point one Road led Eastwards and the other through la CHAP to VALENCIENNES. "E" Battery and the Cars were now about 2,700 yards in front of our Infantry and about 1,200 yards from the CANAL Bridge. They were being Fired at from the right flank, and one Party of Germans was seen working on top of the Bridge and another underneath it, apparently laying a Mine. One Armoured Car was sent to the right to locate and silence the enemy on that flank, and the other moved towards the Bridge but was unable to go very far owing to engine trouble.

On observing our Men, the enemy increased the volume of his Fire with 2 Machine Guns firing from the Bridge and the other from the Railway Embankment on the right. The Armoured Cars immediately retaliated with their 4 Guns and also fired on Groups of the enemy along the CANAL Bank. The German



Guns were temporarily silenced, a few casualties were inflicted on their Crews and 1 Man was seen to fall from the Bridge into the CANAL. During this Machine Gun Duel, Lieut. T.A. SMITH, who had in previous Actions done very excellent work, was killed and 1 of our Gunners was wounded.

In the meantime, the 2 Guns from the foremost "E" Battery Lorry were quickly dismounted and set up near the "Y" Roads. As soon as they opened Fire, hostile Machine Guns sited in the bushes of the MARAIS d' ARNONVILLE and in the edges of la CHASSE FOURA, began to Fire on our Men. 2 more "E" Battery Guns were brought into action about 300 yards N.-W. of the other 2, and with their Fire covered all the Roads in front of la CHASSE FOURA, neutralizing the enemy in that area. A third pair of Guns were taken to the top floor of the first building on the right of the Road running S. of la CHAP. They were set up near the windows and effectively engaged the enemy on the CANAL Bank and the Railway Embankments.

One Gun was placed near the BEUVRAGES Railway HALTE to cover the right flank and to Fire on the Slag Heap and high ground to the S., where an active German Machine Gun had been annoying our Gunners. About 30 minutes after the Action had commenced, a number of Germans, crawling along a hedge, tried to push out from the Railway Crossing in front of the "Y" Roads. One of the Armoured Cars engaged and drove them back. The enemy was considerably harassed by our Gunners, who took immediate advantage of every live target within range. The demoralizing effect of our intense and effective Machine Gun Fire may be judged from the fact that the Motor Detachment was able to operate successfully although it was surrounded by the enemy on almost all sides. At about this time, Detachments of Men were seen moving about 1,000 yards behind the positions of our Guns from N. to S. Owing to the rainy weather it was impossible to ascertain at that distance their identity, but they were thought to be some of our own Infantry. Information received from the French Civilians later on clearly indicated that they were Germans, who, although fairly strong in numbers, preferred to rejoin their retiring comrades rather than face our Guns.

The Germans made 3 attempts to crawl out to the centre of the Bridge, but each time the 2 Guns of "E" Battery, which had been placed in the upper windows of the buildings above mentioned, drove them back by accurate bursts of Fire. These same Guns were later on given another excellent target. An enemy Detachment was seen mounting a Machine Gun on the flat roof of one of the larger buildings in DENAIN-ANZIN. Fire was withheld until the Germans had set up their Gun and were ready to get into action. Our Gunners then Concentrated their Fire on the enemy Crew and either killed or wounded the man behind the German Gun.

Realizing that the element of time was of the greatest importance to the preparation of his Defensive Plans, the enemy now brought into action many more Machine Guns to strengthen his Rear Guard and to delay the energetic pursuit of our Troops. Captain WORTHINGTON had his Guns advantageously located and with their Fire he was able to frustrate all the efforts of the enemy to drive him out of his positions. Early in the afternoon, the Motor Machine Gunners replied very effectively to the German Gunners and continued to fire with all their Guns for 30 or 40 minutes until they had obtained superiority of Fire over the enemy.

Throughout this action, Captain WORTHINGTON kept in touch with the Infantry. At 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the 52nd C.I.Bn. and an hour later, the 75th C.I.Bn. came up as far as the positions held by our Machine Gunners and established Posts in that neighbourhood. In the evening, "A" and "B" Batteries, 1st C.M.M.G.B. relieved "C" and "E" Batteries of the same Unit. Captain WORTHINGTON withdrew his Detachment to ARENBERG for the night.

### **October 23rd.**

The Third Canadian Division established the Line of the CANAL de l' ESCAUT on October 23rd. No further progress was made owing to the exposure of the left flank of the Canadian Corps, the proximity of the CANAL and the stiffening resistance of the enemy. The Cavalry and Cyclists were used during the day to carry Dispatches between the Infantry Units and to reconnoitre Roads. The Motor Machine Gunners were held in reserve in their positions in DENAIN-ANZIN.



## Second Canadian Division.

“B” Company, Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion, reported on October 19th, to the Second Canadian Division at SAILLY, N.-W. of CAMBRAI. The Cyclists were placed under Orders of the 4th C.I.B. and were mainly used as Runners and Dispatch Carriers. On October 22nd, the Company rejoined its Unit at DECHY, S.-E. of DOUAI.

## Withdrawal of Units From the Line.

While the Cavalry Squadrons, Cyclist Companies and Motor Machine Gun Batteries were operating with the Canadian Divisions in the Line, the remainder of BRUTINEL’S BRIGADE also moved ahead in touch with the forward Troops. Brigade Headquarters moved to LEWARDE on October 21st, with Cdn. Corps H.Q. The Canadian Light Horse took up Billets in RIEULAY and the 2 Motor Machine Gun Brigades, the C.M.M.G., M.T. Coy., and the Cdn. Corps Cyclist Battalion established themselves in DECHY. On October 23rd the C.L.H. went to HASNON to keep in close touch with its forward Squadrons. The following day, all elements of BRUTINEL’S BRIGADE were withdrawn from the Line and the Dispositions of the Brigade were as follows :-

Canadian Light Horse	)
Canadian Corps Cyclist Bn.	) SOMAIN
1st C.M.M.G.B	)
2nd C.M.M.G.B.	) DECHY
C.M.M.G., M.T. Coy.	)

From October 24th to October 28th, the Units of BRUTINEL’S BRIGADE took advantage of a comparatively quite interval to rest and refit and also to overhaul their Transport and Equipment. A little General Training was done every day; and sports and concerts helped to fill in the days Programs.

## Observations.

The above brief and sketchy account of the forward movement of the Canadian Corps between October 12th and October 28th indicated that the enemy, suffering from the successive blows dealt him by the British Armies during the previous 3 months, was trying to extricate himself from a threatening situation and then retire behind a shorter and less vulnerable Line, where he could reorganize his Forces and possibly re-start real Trench Warfare. To accomplish this manoeuvre, time was required, and time could only be secured by delaying our advance. The Germans, therefore, destroyed the Railways, blew up the Bridges and Road junctions, laid Mines at frequent intervals in the Main Roads, flooded the CANALS, and fought skillful Rearguard action with specially well-trained Machine Gun Detachments. As his Main Force retired, the German Engineers carried out a well planned system of demolition, screened by their Rearguard.

To prevent the enemy from carrying out his intention at leisure, it was necessary to maintain constant contact with him, and to hasten his retirement by pursuing him closely and annoying him as much as possible. In view of the flat ground over which the advance was made and the wholesale destruction of Roads and Railways with the resultant increased difficulties of bringing up supplies, no tactical advantage could have been gained by forcing the enemy to give Battle. The Canadian Divisions, which had been in action continuously since the beginning of August, followed very closely and kept in touch with all his movements through the Mobile Troops of BRUTINEL’S BRIGADE attached to them.

The Squadrons of the C.L.H., the Companies of the Canadian Cyclist Battalion and the Batteries and Armoured Cars of the Motor Machine Gun Brigades were of great assistance to our Infantry in patrolling the Front and keeping them well informed as to the enemy’s movements and dispositions. Through them all the Infantry Battalions and Brigades kept in close communication with one another throughout the advance. In penetrating the enemy’s territory to a great depth, the reports from these Mounted Patrols and advanced Reconnaissance Parties proved of the greatest value to our Dismounted Troops. In spite of the bad state of the Roads and the adverse weather conditions, the groups of Cavalry, Cyclists and Motor Machine Gunners carried out the duties assigned to them skillfully and boldly. They annoyed the enemy considerably,



hastened his retreat on parts of the Canadian Corps Front and very effectively protected the flanks of the Infantry Divisions and Brigades, which are often exposed in a similar advance.

The following extract from a letter written on October 24th, 1918, by Major-General Sir DAVID WATSON, commanding the Fourth Canadian Division, and addressed to the Canadian Corps, emphasized the value of the work accomplished by the Units of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE during the advance of the Canadian Corps from DOUAI through DENAIN and the FORET de RAISMES to the CANAL de l'ESCAUT :-

*"I would take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered us by the Units at our disposal by the Corps during these last few days' operations.*

*"I refer particularly to the work of the Squadrons of Cavalry, the Cyclists and the Armoured Cars and affiliated Guns in Lorries with Crews. From first to last, these Units have cooperated with our Infantry with the utmost gallantry and vigour. They have carried out the orders and work allotted to them with the greatest satisfaction. Time and again Armoured Cars have been sent around to help in outflanking Machine Gun positions. On certain occasions these Armoured Cars have been sent out with Parties of Engineers, dropping these at various points where Roads required mending, and then coming back for additional loads. The Cavalry, acting as Patrols, have kept us constantly in touch with the enemy carrying out this hazardous work with great skill and complete satisfaction; while the Cyclists have been most valuable in their excellent Patrol duties as well as carrying Dispatches and securing information regarding enemy movements and positions of our own Troops.*

*"From both Brigades in the Line, I have the same excellent reports of the work of these Units, and I am anxious that they should receive the full credit for the splendid results they have given me."*

The Canadian Light Horse received the following letter from the First Canadian Division :-

*"1st Canadian Division.  
November 3rd, 1918.  
G.3-101/3.*

*"O.C. Cdn. Light Horse.*

*"The following extracts have been received from reports by Infantry Brigadiers upon the advance recently carried out by the 1st Canadian Division.*

*"From G.O.C. 1st Cdn. Inf. Bde.*

*"I used one Troop of Cavalry for liaison on the flanks and for intercommunication, and one Troop for reconnaissance and they behaved remarkably well although they were not fresh when they came to me, having been recently engaged with another Division.*

*"From G.O.C. 3rd Cdn. Inf. Bde.*

*"One Troop C.L.H. was attached to the Brigade and used as follows :- A Section of 1 N.C.O. and 6 Men was attached to each of the forward Battalions, the remainder being kept under the orders of the G.O.C. the Brigade. The work of the Cavalry was good on the whole, especially on the last day when they pushed forward and sent in valuable reports."*

*I am directed by the Divisional Commander to send the above to you to ask you to accept his heartiest thanks for the splendid work carried out by these Troops which were attached to the Division."*

*(Sgd) A.R. PARSONS, Lieut.-Colonel, General Staff, 1st Canadian Division.*



**THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE.**

**VII  
CAPTURE OF MONT HOUY AND VALENCIENNES :  
OCTOBER 28th to NOVEMBER 2nd, 1918.**

On October 28th, a Detachment from the 1st C.M.M.G.B., 1 Squadron, C.L.H., and 1 Company, Cdn. Corps Cyclist Bn., reported to the Fourth Canadian Division, under whom they were placed for the VALENCIENNES Operation.

**Operation; General; November 1st.**

The main object of the Operation was the capture of the high ground S. and E. of VALENCIENNES. In conjunction with the XXII Corps on the right, the 10th C.I.B., Fourth Canadian Division attacked on a front of 2,500 yards at 5:15 A.M. November 1st with the object of capturing MONT HOUY, which dominated l' ESCAUT Valley and the Crossing of the RHONELLE River. The assault was made on a 2-Battalion Front, the 44th C.I.Bn. on the right and the 47th C.I.Bn. on the left. Well supported by an excellent Artillery and Machine Gun Barrage, the attack made good progress from the outset and continued according to time. Early in the morning, MONT HOUY was completely secured and AULNOY cleared of the enemy; at noon our Troops had reached their Objective and were pushing Patrols forward towards MARLY.

The 12th C.I.B. took advantage of the successful attack on their right and forced Crossing over the CANAL de l' ESCAUT E. of the FAUBOURG de PARIS and also at a point about 500 yards N. of the main AMAND-VALENCIENNES Road. The enemy offered considerable resistance on the outskirts of the Town and our Infantry were unable to push very far beyond the Line of the Railway E. of the CANAL. Our Line that night ran from the Steel Works S. of MARLY, through the Village of MARLY and along the Southern and Western edges of VALENCIENNES.

**1st C.M.M.G.B.**


The 1st C.M.M.G.B. Detachment, consisting of "B" and "D" Batteries and 1 Armoured Car, reported on October 28th to the Fourth Canadian Divisional Machine Gun Commander, at ESCAUDAIN. The contemplated Operation having been postponed, they were ordered into Billets in PROUVY, where they were held in Divisional Reserve. On October 30th, the remainder of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. was allotted to the Fourth Canadian Division. Accordingly, the following day, "A", "C" and "E" Batteries together with Unit Headquarters left DECHY and joined the other 2 Batteries at PROUVY.

**Machine Gun Barrage, November 1st.**

The 5 Motor Batteries, together with 4 Batteries of the 4th Bn., C.M.G.C., had been detailed to take part in a Creeping, Enfilade Machine Gun Barrage. (X) To support the attack of the 10th C.I.B. which was delivered in a Northerly direction from FAMARS towards VALENCIENNES, the Machine Gunners started their Barrage at the summit of MONT HOUY and ended at the Southern edge of VALENCIENNES. Battery Officers had already made a reconnaissance of the ground and on the night of October 31st/November 1st, the Motor Batteries took up the following Barrage Positions :-

"A", "B" and "C" Batteries – from the vicinity of the USIN METALLURGIQUE, N. of TRITH-ST. LEGER, to the intersection of the Railway with the TRITH-ST. LEGER—LA SENTINELLE Road.  
"D" and "E" Batteries – near le VIGNOBLE, S.-E. of LA SENTINELLE.





The ground in front of TRITH and part of the Village itself was flooded. Some of the Guns were therefore mounted in the upper rooms of houses, and as the enemy was on the other side of the stretch of Water, which was only a few hundred yards across, great precaution had to be taken to avoid showing lights when laying the Guns and in checking their elevation and direction. At Zero Hour on the morning of November 1st all the Guns Fired in the Machine Gun Barrage. Owing to the closed in space in which some of the Guns had been mounted, a large percentage of the Gunners became casualties from the Cordite fumes and a small amount of Poison Gas which was present but hard to detect. Many of these casualties, however rejoined the Unit several days later. After completion of the Barrage, the Transport came up as far as TRITH-ST. LEGER and the Motor Batteries returned to PROUVY, where the Guns were thoroughly cleaned and all Ammunition Belts refilled.



**1st C.M.M.G.B. Cooperation With 10th C.I.B., November 1st.**

At noon November 1st, the 1st C.M.M.G.B. moved to MAING. On arrival there "C" and "E" Batteries, under Captain WORTHINGTON, reported to the 10th C.I.B. and received instructions to go forward in support to the 44th C.I.Bn. After a consultation with the Battalion Commander, Capt. WORTHINGTON placed his Guns on the Eastern Slope of MONT HOUY, on both sides of the FAMARS-VALENCIENNES Road, S.-W. of AULNOY. These positions were occupied during the night and the following morning. At dawn November 2nd the 11th C.I.B. passed through the 10th C.I.B. and resumed the advance. "C" and "E" Batteries were then withdrawn from the 10th C.I.B. and returned to MAING.

**1st C.M.M.G.B. Cooperation With 11th C.I.B., November 2nd.**

At 4:00 A.M. November 2nd Capt. BERESFORD, in charge of "B" and "D" Batteries and 1 Armoured Car was ordered to report to the 11th C.I.B. This Armoured Car had been attached to the 10th C.I.B. and had operated on the previous day, along the FAMARS-MARLY Road keeping in touch with the attacking Infantry and taking forward fresh supplies for them. Being a little under strength, "B" and "D" Batteries were reinforced by the personnel of "A" Battery, which had been very much depleted in numbers through Gas poisoning. In accordance with 11th C.I.B. Instructions the 2 Motor Batteries and Armoured Car moved to FAMARS, where they waited for a favourable opportunity to pass through the Infantry. Motor Cyclist Scouts kept the Batteries in close touch with the situation in front.

The 12th C.I.B. succeeded in completely clearing the enemy out of VALENCIENNES, early in the morning of November 2nd and pushing through the Town joined hands with the 11th C.I.B. North of MARLY. The enemy was offering resistance from the high ground N.-E. of MARLY and from the CHATEAU a SOURIS FARM. Capt. BERESFORD sent his Armoured Car forward at 9:45 A.M. preceded by Motor Cyclist Scouts. Lieut. CRISP, in charge of the Car pushed through the advanced elements of the 54th C.I.Bn. who were then in the Northern outskirts of MARLY, and proceeded to the CHATEAU a SOURIS FARM to deal with the hostile Machine Guns there. As soon as the Guns on the Car opened Fire the enemy replied with a number of Machine Guns in rear of the Car and located in the Cemetery N.-E. of MARLY. Lieut. CRISP withdrew a little distance and engaged with his 2 Guns enemy Parties in the Cemetery. In the meantime "D" Battery, which had received a report on the situation from the Armoured Car and had moved up, came into action against the enemy in the Cemetery. A number of Germans were seen to fall and a few to retire; it was afterwards ascertained that considerable casualties had been inflicted by our Gunners. Owing to very strong resistance from the direction of the CHATEAU, it was impossible for the time being to make further progress. "D" Battery Guns took up positions in and around the Cemetery and held the ground until the 54th C.I.Bn. Patrols came up at noon and relieved them.

**Armoured Car in Action, November 2nd.**

After a reconnaissance by Motor Cyclists the Armoured Car advanced along the VALENCIENNES-MONS Road towards ST. SAULVE. It got into touch with the 102nd C.I.Bn. (11th C.I.B.) and also with the 72nd C.I.Bn. (12th C.I.B.) which had come through VALENCIENNES from the W. The Car then proceeded beyond ST. SAULVE and engaged large Groups of Germans in the houses and clumps of trees about half way to ONNAING, inflicting considerable losses on the enemy and causing him to retire hastily. The Car then withdrew and brought back very valuable information as to the enemy. This information was immediately transmitted to the 11th and 12th C.I.B.s.

In the afternoon the Armoured Car went down the ST. SAULVE-SEBOURG Road and encountered a considerable number of the enemy on and around the Slag Heap in front of the "Y" Roads immediately S.-E. of ST. SAULVE. The Armoured Car Guns opened Fire at once with noticeable effect and silenced the active hostile Machine Guns in that neighbourhood. As the Car proceeded down the Road, 40 or 50 Germans were seen running from the Slag Heap and the ANCIENNE FOSSE PETIT in a North-Easterly direction towards ONNAING. The Gunners on the Car took advantage of this excellent target and inflicted more casualties on the retiring enemy. After this action, 3 Machine Guns and 10 dead Germans were found near the Slag Heap. As our Infantry came up to it the Armoured Car withdrew and joined "D" Battery, which had moved to the building along the W. side of the Drill Grounds at VALENCIENNES.



**THE CANADIAN INDEPENDENT FORCE  
AND  
BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE.**

**VIII  
VALENCIENNES to MONS : NOVEMBER 3rd to 11th, 1918.**

**November 3rd.**

A Counter-attack by the enemy was expected during the night November 2nd/3rd and, as a precautionary measure the Guns of "D" Battery were placed in defensive positions E. of MARLY in support to the 54th and 102nd C.I.Bns. "B" Battery remained in support at FAMARS throughout the night. No enemy action developed during the night. The following morning, November 3rd, "D" Battery moved back to its location of the previous evening, near the Drill Grounds. At the same time, the Armoured Car started from MARLY, passed through the Infantry E. of the Village and proceeded down the Road with the objective of entering ESTREUX from the S.-W. As the Car approached the main Crossroads between MARLY and ESTREUX, about 20 Germans gave themselves up and were taken prisoners by the Patrols of the 54th C.I.Bn., who were following the Car. Owing to Mine Craters N. and E. of the Crossroads the Roads were impassable and prevented the Armoured Car from reaching its objective. In the afternoon of November 3rd, "B" Battery was ordered forward and proceeded on foot as far as the Northern edge of ESTREUX, where its Guns were placed in defensive positions for the night in support to the 75th C.I.Bn.

**1st C.M.M.G.B. Cooperating With 12th C.I.B., November 3rd.**

"C" and "E" Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. spent November 2nd and the first half of November 3rd at MAING. In the afternoon of the latter day, the 2 Batteries under Capt. WORTHINGTON were ordered to report to the 12th C.I.B. at VALENCIENNES. Here they received instructions to proceed forward as quickly as possible and get in touch with the O.C. 38th C.I.Bn. whose Headquarters were at ST. SAULVE. The 38th C.I.Bn. was preparing to continue the advance at 5:00 P.M., and Capt. WORTHINGTON was asked to follow the Infantry with his 2 Batteries in close support and assist in the consolidation of their gains. During the night the Guns of "C" Battery were placed astride the MONS-VALENCIENNES Road and about half-way between ST. SAULVE and ONNAING. The 38th and 72nd C.I.Bns. had Patrols in front of the position occupied by the Motor Machine Gunners. "C" Battery remained in its position all night but the enemy did not attempt to drive our Troops back. During the night Capt. WORTHINGTON attended a conference at the Headquarters of the 72nd C.I.Bn., where arrangements for Operations of the following day were made. The Motor Machine Gun Detachment was given the Task of pushing forward in the morning to keep in touch with the enemy and harass his retreat. A Platoon of Cyclists was attached to the Detachment and a sub-Section of Engineers to fill in Mine Craters and assist the Motor Vehicles to make headway on the Roads.

**Action of 1st C.M.M.G.B. Detachment, 12th C.I.B. Front : November 4th.**

At 5:15 A.M. November 4th, "E" Battery with the Cyclists passed through "C" Battery and proceeded forward to take ONNAING and establish a Line on the E. side of the Town. The Infantry, following up, were to clean up the houses and side streets. With the exception of a few enemy Patrols, which were seen and engaged, no resistance was encountered in the Town. A small Party of Germans was caught Mining the MONS Road through ONNAING near the Church, but it was immediately dispersed by the Fire of the 2 forward Guns of "E" Battery. Just previous to the Battery's arrival a Mine had been blown near the same spot, on the street leading E. to the THIERS Road. On reaching the Eastern exit of the Town strong resistance was met with, but the 8 Guns of the Battery were brought quickly into action forcing the enemy to abandon his positions. A number of Germans were killed and wounded, and 4 prisoners and 2 Machine Guns were captured. The Cyclists were at the same time seen advancing on the N. side of the Main Road. They captured a few prisoners and 2 Field Guns.

Hostile Machine Guns located in the Western houses on QUAROUBLE were very active against our Troops. The destruction of the Road between the 2 Towns made it impossible for the Battery Lorries to make further progress. Captain WORTHINGTON sent 2 of his Guns to the Cemetery, just E. of the CHATEAU, to engage with their Fire, 2 German Machine Guns, which were mounted on the lip of a Mine Crater on the Road beyond the Cemetery. A Lewis Gun which had been picked up by our Gunners was



taken around to the left flank of the Crater. The enemy Guns were put out of action, 2 Men of their Crews were killed and the remainder wounded. At about 7:00 A.M. Patrols of the 72nd C.I.Bn. came up but were unable to push beyond our Machine Gunners. They established a Line between the Cemetery and the Railway, connecting the positions held by "E" Battery and the Cyclists. In the meantime, 2 Guns of "E" Battery had established a Post at the Cross-roads S. of ONNAING and nearest to QUAROUBLE, and a little later 4 Guns were placed in the Sunken Road running E. to MARCHIPONT and about 1,000 yards directly S. of the ONNAING Cemetery.

At about 9:00 A.M. an Armoured Car from the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. reinforced Capt. WORTHINGTON's Detachment. As the Car was leaving the above mentioned Sunken Road, on its way to ST. ROCH and MARCHIPONT, it was "*knocked out*" by hostile Shell Fire, which completely destroyed the 2 Machine Guns on the Car and wounded 4 Gunners. The enemy now began to enfilade the Sunken Road with Machine Gun Fire, greatly annoying our own Gun Detachments. After advising the Infantry Commanders in the area, the 4 Guns moved to the Brickfield, just S. of the Sunken Road. From these new positions a good Field of Fire was secured and harassing Fire was carried out during the day. In the evening the Infantry decided to establish for the night a Line extending from a point about 600 yards S.-E. of the Brickfield through the Cemetery in front of ONNAING to the VALENCIENNES-MONS Railway. Guns of the Motor Machine Gun Group were placed in defensive positions in support to the 78th and 85th C.I.Bns., which had relieved the 72nd and 38th C.I.Bns. respectively.

#### **Motor Machine Gun Batteries With 11th C.I.B., November 4th.**

Captain BERESFORD's Group, attached to the 11th C.I.B. remained in support all day. His Armoured Car could not go far forward as the enemy had blown up practically every Cross-road. While passing through ST. SAULVE, on its return from an unsuccessful attempt to reach ROMBIES the Armoured Car was hit by an enemy Shell and was temporarily put out of action. "D" Battery drove on its Transport as far as ESTREUX, and just before dusk advanced on foot to the vicinity of le CAVIN BOISSARD and le GRAND VAL, W. of ROMBIES. The Guns were then placed in positions on both sides of the Road to support the 75th C.I.Bn. Considerable enemy Shelling was experienced during the night. On the morning of November 5th, "B" and "D" Batteries under Capt. BERESFORD, operated with the 11th C.I.B., moved back to the VALENCIENNES Drill Grounds where they remained in Brigade Reserve.

#### **Motor Machine Batteries With 12th C.I.B.**

At 5:00 A.M. November 5th the Infantry resumed the advance and made fairly good progress. QUAROUBLE fell into our hands early, but enemy resistance stiffened during the day. Our Infantry was held up in front of la MASON ROUGE and FOSSE NO. 2 between QUIEVRECHAIN and MARCHIPONT. With the Guns of "E" Battery Capt. WORTHINGTON assisted in the Covering Barrage and after QUAROUBLE had been captured he moved his Detachment forward to the Sunken Road, S.-E. of the QUAROUBLE Cemetery. From these positions our Gunners held FOSSE No. 2 under Fire for a long period to neutralize the intense Fire coming from German Machine Guns located in the vicinity of the FOSSE. The enemy Artillery Shelled the Battery positions during the day causing a few casualties amongst the Motor Machine Gun Group. In the evening the Infantry established a Line for the night S. of the MONS Road and about 2,000 yards W. of QUIEVRECHAIN. The Guns of "C" Battery were dug in E. of QUAROUBLE and laid on an S.O.S. Line intended to protect the 85th C.I.Bn. Front in case the enemy attempted a Counter-attack under cover of darkness.

During the night Capt. WORTHINGTON attended a conference at the Headquarters of the 85th C.I.Bn., where the details of the next day's Operation on the AUNELLE River were discussed. At 5:00 A.M. on November 6th, "C" Battery Guns fired in the Barrage covering the Infantry advance and "E" Battery went forward on foot with the Infantry. As soon as FOSSE No. 2 was reached, the Guns of "E" Battery were set up and opened Fire at a range of 1,600 yards on a small WOOD S.-E. of QUIEVRECHAIN. This Fire was kept up until noon, when the Detachment received Orders to withdraw from the Line and rejoin the 1st C.M.M.G.B. the Headquarters of which had moved to VALENCIENNES on November 3rd. Capt. BERESFORD's Group was also withdrawn from the 11th C.I.B., November 6th and returned to its Unit.



**1st C.M.M.G.B. Casualties, Oct. 28th to Nov. 6th.**

In the Operations from October 28th to November 6th the 1st C.M.M.G.B. suffered the following casualties in Personnel and transport :-

<b>Personnel.</b>	<b>Killed</b>	<b>Wounded</b>	<b>Total</b>
Officers	2	3	5
Other Ranks	1	77	78
Total	3	80	83

**Transport.**

2 Armoured Cars	damaged by Shell Fire.
6 Lorries	damaged by Shell and Machine Gun Fire.
3 Ford Cars	damaged by Shell Fire. (1 completely destroyed)
2 Motor Cycles	damaged by Shell and Machine Gun Fire.
13 Total	

**C.L.H. and C.C. Cyclist Bn., Oct. 28th to Nov.6th.**

In addition to the Motor Machine Gun Batteries, "A" and "C" Squadrons of the Canadian Light Horse and "B" Company of the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion reported on October 28th to the Fourth Canadian Division. The Troops of the 2 Squadrons and 3 Platoons of Cyclists were attached to the 10th, 11th and 12th C.I.Bs. for the VALENCIENNES Operation. They were employed as Dispatch Riders, Runners and Orderlies between Headquarters of Brigades and the advanced Battalion Headquarters and also for keeping up Communication between the Scouts, Patrols, Companies and Infantry Report Centres. Small Cavalry and Cyclist Parties were frequently used by the Infantry Battalions of the 11th and 12th C.I.Bs. to get in touch with their flank Companies and with the Units operating on either side of them. These duties were carried out, often under difficult conditions, to the satisfaction of the Infantry Commanders. Sometimes Patrol and Reconnaissance duties were assigned to them. They never failed to accomplish their mission and always sent back valuable reports on the Dispositions of our own Troops, the strength and location of the enemy, and the state of the Bridges and Roads. On a few occasions Cavalry and Cyclist Detachments were employed to Patrol temporary small Gaps that occurred between our advancing Battalions or Brigades.

The following extract from the 72nd C.I.Bn. Report on the VALENCIENNES Operation illustrates the appreciation by the Infantry of the work done by the Detachments of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE :-

*"The work of the Cyclists attached to this Battalion throughout the recent Operations cannot be too highly spoken of and their services in reconnoitering Cross-roads and Tactical Points was of immense value. The reports rendered to Battalion Headquarters during the operations were concise and accurate".*



### **Moves of Units of Brutinel's Brigade.**

The Units of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE, with the exception of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. and elements of the Cavalry and Cyclists attached to the Fourth Canadian Division, moved on November 4th to HAVELUY. The same day, BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE Headquarters moved from LEWARDE to DENAIN with Canadian Corps H.Q. The following day, November 5th, the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and the Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion went into Billets in VALENCIENNES. The C.L.H. remained in HAVELUY until November 9th, when they changed their location to MARLY.

### **Reliefs, Night November 6th/7th.**

On the night November 6th/7th, the 5th C.I.B. (Second Cdn. Division) relieved the 11th and 12th C.I.Bs. in the Line, and the Second Canadian Division assumed command of the Fourth Canadian Division Front. The Detachments of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE in the Line were, on the relief of the Infantry, transferred from the Fourth to the Second Canadian Division. The 2nd C.M.M.G.B. relieved the Batteries of the 1st C.M.M.G.B. which withdrew to VALENCIENNES.

### **Second Canadian Division Resumes Advance, Nov. 7th.**

In cooperation with the Third Canadian Division on its left and the Sixty-third Naval Division on its right, the Second Canadian Division resumed the Offensive Operations on the morning of November 7th. The object was to continue to press and harass the disorganized enemy, who were retreating behind a Rearguard consisting mainly of Machine Gun Detachments. The advance, which was to be carried out by strong Patrols of the 5th C.I.B., was supported by a concentration of Artillery and Machine Guns and a specially organized Unit called the Independent Force. As soon as the G.O.C., 5th C.I.B. considered that the enemy's Main Line of Resistance had been broken or that the enemy's Rearguard had been pierced, the Independent Force was to advance through the Infantry and work ahead of them.

### **Organization of Part of Brutinel's Brigade into an Independent Force.**

This Independent Force, which really was a detachment of BRUTINEL'S BRIGADE consisted of :-

- 4 Batteries, 2nd C.M.M.G.B.
- 2 Squadrons, Canadian Light Horse.
- 1 Company, Canadian Corps Cyclist Battalion.
- 2 Newton Trench Mortars, 5th C.D.A.
- 2 Sub-Sections of Engineers, 6th Battalion, C.E.

These Troops were placed under Major W.T. TRENCH, M.C., 2nd C.M.M.G.B. and were organized as follows :-

- (A) – Southern Detachment – O.C., Major SPENCER, C.L.H.  
 “A” and “C” Squadrons, C.L.H.  
 “B” and “C” Batteries, C.M.M.G.B., (Capt. Mc ISAACS)  
 1 Sub-Section, 6th Bn., C.E., (Lieut. CORLEY)
- (B) – Northern Detachment – O.C., Capt. SCROGGIE, Cyclist Bn.  
 “B” Company, Cdn. Corps Cyclist Bn.  
 “A” and “D” Batteries, 2nd C.M.M.G.B. (Lieut. MARSHALL)  
 1 Sub-Section, 6th Bn., C.E. (Lieut. YOUNGHAM)
- (C) – At Force Headquarters :-  
 2 Armoured Cars (Lieut. HOYLE, 2nd Motor Bde.)  
 2 Newton Trench Mortars (Lieut. Mc KENZIE)

Three 3-Ton Lorries were allotted to the Engineers and were loaded with approximately 7 Tons of timbering to be used in bridging Mine Craters on the Roads. Each Detachment had 1 of these Lorries and the third Lorry was held in reserve at Force Headquarters.



**Tasks and Assembly of Independent Force.**

The Task assigned to the Southern Detachment was to advance, as soon as an opportunity occurred, to the high ground W. of ELOUGES, and then push N. of the Village in a North-Easterly direction. The Northern Detachment was to move along the VALENCIENNES-MONS Road as far as the Village of BOUSSU. The 2 Detachments assembled at 7:00 A.M. on November 7th at ROMBIES and QUAROUBLE respectively. Independent Force Headquarters were established in ONNAING with the 5th C.I.B.

**Infantry Attack, November 7th.**

The Infantry commenced to advance at 8:00 A.M. November 7th, and made good progress. The general Line ELOUGES-JONCQUOI-HENSIES were reached without opposition, and during the morning the latter 2 places were entered and Patrols pushed into ST. AYBERT. In the afternoon ELOUGES was cleared of the enemy, but the Line remained substantially the same.



**Independent Force, November 7th.**

The Independent Force was unable to follow up the progress made by the Infantry. 4 large Mine Craters, approximately 40 feet in diameter and 12 feet in depth made the VALENCIENNES-MONS Road between QUAROUBLE and QUIEVRAIN completely impassable to all traffic. The Roads forward from ROMBIES towards ELOUGES were badly destroyed by enemy Mines, and the GRANDE HONNELLE River (35 feet wide) could only be crossed by means of rafts. "B" and "C" Batteries moved during the morning, via VALENCIENNES to QUIEVRECHAIN. After 6 hours hard and continuous work by the Personnel of the Independent Force, the Mine Craters in the MONS Road as far E. as QUIEVRAIN were filled or bridged. Shortly after midday when the work in the MONS Road was completed, the 2 Armoured Cars were ordered forward to cooperate with and assist "A" and "D" Batteries, which had been instructed to advance towards BOUSSU. In spite of what appeared to be a favourable opportunity for the employment of Mobile Forces, the advance of the Armoured Cars and Batteries was completely stopped by a huge Mine Crater at the GANT d' OR CABARET, at the Cross-roads about 1,000 yards E. of QUIEVRAIN. The attached Engineers estimated that the task of overcoming this obstacle would take at least 6 hours work, and the quantity of bridging material that would be required greatly exceed the available supply in the Lorries. The time being about 4:00 P.M. the Mobile Detachments withdrew for the night to Billets in QUIEVRAIN.

**Operations, Second Canadian Division Front, November 8th.**

Early in the Morning of November 8th, it was reported that the enemy had retired E. of ELOUGES. Our Infantry continued to advance meeting little opposition by noon, the general Line DOUR-HAININ had been reached. The 2 Cavalry Squadrons of the Independent Force were ordered in the morning to push forward. They were to endeavor to gain contact with the enemy and cooperate with our Infantry so as to avoid unnecessary deployment of Troops. The Cavalry Patrols succeeded in reaching the neighbourhood of FOSSE ST. ANTOISE No. 9, N. of DOUR, where they were held up by Machine Gun Fire. At dawn on November 8th, 3 Parties of Motor Cyclist Scouts were instructed to reconnoitre the Roads in the forward area and report which were suitable for Motor Transport traffic. The Main Roads had been systematically Mined and the 3rd Class Roads were in very bad condition largely owing to the wet weather. "B" and "C" Batteries moved along the only passable Road, via JONCQUOI, to THULIE. Mine Craters on all the Roads E. of the point held up the advance of the Motor Machine Gunners until the following morning. Major TRENCH moved his Headquarters also to JONCQUOI. The 2 Squadrons, C.L.H. were detached from the Independent Force and attached to the 5th and 4th C.I.Bs. They were employed from this date until November 11th as Contact Patrols and Dispatch Riders.



**November 9th and 10th.**

On November 9th, the general advance on the whole Corps Front was resumed. Progress continued throughout the day and night. FRAMERIES and JEMAPPES were entered and the Infantry Patrols during the night reached the Line NOIRCHIN-CIPLY-CUESMES after bridging many Mine Craters and overcoming other obstructions in the Roads, the Independent Force managed to get as far as FRAMERIES, where it got into touch with the 6th C.I.B. November 10th found our Infantry still moving forward. During the day MESVIN and HOYN, were taken and the enemy resistance on the Western outskirts of MONS were overcome. In the evening the Line ran approximately W. of ST. SYMPHORIEN through MONS and NIMY. The Independent Force tried in the morning to outflank the enemy in the high ground S.-E. of MONS. After an early reconnaissance of the Roads the whole Force, less Cavalry, moved as far as the intersection of the Railway with the MAUBEUGE-MONS Road, about 1,000 yards N. of CIPLY. From this point, one Detachment was to move in a Northerly direction and the other Eastwards to outflank the high ground from the S. Neither Detachment was able to make progress. The first one was held up by Artillery and Machine Gun Fire from BOIS la HAUT and the advance of the second Detachment was definitely arrested in FAVARIE (N. of CIPLY) at the River Bridge, which had been destroyed by the Germans. The Engineers and the Personnel of "C" Battery repaired the Bridge, but owing to the large quantity of material required for the work it was not finished until late in the afternoon. The Detachments were withdrawn to FRAMERIES, where Lieut. W.H. SMITH, in command of 2 Armoured Cars from the 1st C.M.M.G.B. reported for duty with the Independent Force.

**November 11th.**

In cooperation with the 6th C.I.B., the Independent Force on November 11th pushed forward with considerable difficulty to the Village of SPIENNES, S.-E. of MONS. Owing to the very bad state of the Roads, no touch was gained with the retreating enemy up to 11:00 A.M. with the exception of 1 Light Car which managed to reach the small Village of ST. ANTOINE, S. of OBOURG by 10:30 A.M. The few small Parties of the enemy encountered offered no resistance. In the afternoon of November 11th the Independent Force was established in the CHATEAU 800 yards W. of ST. ANTOINE. The whole of the 2nd C.M.M.G.B. (including Brigade H.Q.) concentrated in the immediate vicinity of the CHATEAU.



### Instructions for Errors and Omissions

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